Financial Forensics: Autopsy Files

Mozambique Tuna Bonds 2016 : The Business Plan Said $200M Revenue. Debt Service Was $260M. The Bond Was Oversubscribed — EP64 T1

19 min · 23. maj 2026
episode Mozambique Tuna Bonds 2016 : The Business Plan Said $200M Revenue. Debt Service Was $260M. The Bond Was Oversubscribed — EP64 T1 cover

Beskrivelse

🔴 FFL Case Library is Live 80 forensic cases · 3 offline tools · zero cloudRun your deals against the pattern database before you sign.Launch price $79 → $99 after EP100 release.[⁠⁠https://sergiostieben.gumroad.com/l/wqyicc⁠⁠ [https://sergiostieben.gumroad.com/l/wqyicc]] In September 2013, Credit Suisse raised $500 million for a tuna fishing company in Mozambique called Ematum — incorporated weeks earlier, with no vessels, no catch history, and no operating revenue. The government guarantee was signed by Finance Minister Manuel Chang without parliamentary approval. The IMF did not know it existed. Fourteen donor countries funding a quarter of Mozambique's national budget did not know it existed. And the offering circular described $200 million in projected annual revenues against debt service requirements of $260 million. The bond was oversubscribed. By 2016, Mozambique had accumulated $2.2 billion in secret sovereign debt — equivalent to 12.5% of GDP — through three state-owned entities that had never been disclosed to parliament, the IMF, or any bilateral donor. The Kroll forensic audit found $500 million in loan proceeds that could not be accounted for. Kickbacks to Credit Suisse employees and Mozambican officials exceeded $200 million, embedded in the transaction fee structure from the first disbursement. This is the financial autopsy of the Mozambique Tuna Bonds — the hidden sovereign guarantee mechanism that converted a country's maritime security budget into a $2.2 billion concealed debt obligation, with Credit Suisse as active architect rather than passive intermediary. We dissect the full structure: the three state-owned entities (Ematum, Proindicus, MAM), the Privinvest contractor relationship, the Chang guarantee and its constitutional invalidity under Mozambican law, the kickback chain from Privinvest to Andrew Pearse to Surjan Singh, and the April 2016 disclosure that triggered simultaneous IMF program suspension, bilateral donor cutoff, sovereign downgrade, and metical collapse. We cover the criminal convictions of Pearse, Singh, and Subeva, the $475M Credit Suisse settlement, Finance Minister Chang's extradition and trial, and the accountability gap: the tuna fleet never generated meaningful revenue, the three companies remain largely inactive, and Mozambique — ranked 181st of 189 on the UN Human Development Index at the time — is still negotiating its debt restructuring. If you cover EM sovereign credit, allocate to sub-Saharan Africa, or conduct due diligence on sovereign-guaranteed instruments in frontier markets, this is the episode that establishes the hidden sovereign debt due diligence framework. Financial Forensics Labs — Every collapse has a pattern. We dissect it. Layer by layer. KEYWORDS Mozambique tuna bonds fraud, Ematum bond Credit Suisse, hidden sovereign debt Africa, Chang guarantee Mozambique, Credit Suisse Mozambique conviction, Andrew Pearse Credit Suisse kickback, Privinvest Mozambique fraud, sovereign guarantee fraud frontier markets, IMF program suspension Mozambique, $2.2 billion hidden debt Mozambique, Mozambique default 2017, tuna bonds Proindicus MAM, constitutional guarantee fraud Africa, sovereign debt concealment mechanism, EM sovereign credit fraud signal

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152 episoder

episode Greensill Capital 2021 : Insurance Dependency & Single Point of Failure │ GP/LP Analysis - 3 Red Flags│EP76 T2 cover

Greensill Capital 2021 : Insurance Dependency & Single Point of Failure │ GP/LP Analysis - 3 Red Flags│EP76 T2

🔴 FFL Case Library is Live 80 forensic cases · 3 offline tools · zero cloudRun your deals against the pattern database before you sign.Launch price $79 → $99 after release. All Info is in the Link [⁠https://sergiostieben.gumroad.com/l/wqyicc⁠ [https://sergiostieben.gumroad.com/l/wqyicc]] Trade finance fund credit risk and trade finance fund liquidity risk are not the same thing. Greensill proved it when one insurance underwriter’s decision froze $10 billion in investor capital. This GP/LP technical episode dissects how a supply chain finance platform became structurally dependent on a single insurance counterparty, turning performing assets into illiquid ones overnight when the policies were not renewed. We identify three critical red flags for any trade finance or supply chain finance fund: (1) high single-insurer concentration and renewal risk, (2) material future receivables proportion without transparent valuation methodology, and (3) extreme client concentration hidden behind insurance coverage. We deliver the active institutional framework to distinguish sound supply chain finance structures from those with a hidden single point of failure in their insurance architecture. Essential for private credit LPs, trade finance investors, alternative credit analysts, and anyone evaluating non-bank lending platforms. KEYWORDS Greensill GP LP analysis, trade finance insurance dependency, single point of failure risk, supply chain finance red flags, future receivables risk, Greensill Credit Suisse collapse, trade credit insurance due diligence

I går17 min
episode Greensill Capital 2021 : How $10 Billion in Trade Finance Funds Collapsed Over One Insurance Policy — EP76 T1 cover

Greensill Capital 2021 : How $10 Billion in Trade Finance Funds Collapsed Over One Insurance Policy — EP76 T1

🔴 FFL Case Library is Live 80 forensic cases · 3 offline tools · zero cloudRun your deals against the pattern database before you sign.Launch price $79 → $99 after EP100 release. All Info is in the Link [⁠https://sergiostieben.gumroad.com/l/wqyicc⁠ [https://sergiostieben.gumroad.com/l/wqyicc]] On March 1st, 2021, Credit Suisse froze four supply chain finance funds worth approximately $10 billion. The cause was not a market crash or mass defaults. It was a single Australian insurance company — Bond and Credit Company — deciding not to renew trade credit insurance policies covering $4.6 billion of the book. This is the financial autopsy of the Greensill Capital collapse — how a high-profile fintech, backed by SoftBank’s Vision Fund and advised by former UK Prime Minister David Cameron, built a $10 billion asset management operation whose entire commercial viability depended on the annual renewal of policies from one mid-sized insurer. When the insurer walked away, the structure had no alternative. The funds froze, Greensill filed for insolvency, and the cascade exposed massive concentration risk and future receivables financing that investors had not properly understood. We dissect the full sequence: the extension from confirmed invoices to future receivables, the extreme concentration in GFG Alliance, the invisible single point of failure in the insurance contract, and the political and regulatory fallout that followed. A landmark case of structural liquidity risk hidden inside a trade finance label. KEYWORDS Greensill Capital collapse, Greensill trade finance, Credit Suisse Greensill funds, trade credit insurance failure, supply chain finance risk, GFG Alliance, future receivables financing

I går17 min
episode Rusal 2018 : Beneficial Ownership Transmission & Commodity Supply Chain Risk │ GP/LP Analysis — 3 Red Flags │EP75 T2 cover

Rusal 2018 : Beneficial Ownership Transmission & Commodity Supply Chain Risk │ GP/LP Analysis — 3 Red Flags │EP75 T2

🔴 FFL Case Library is Live 80 forensic cases · 3 offline tools · zero cloudRun your deals against the pattern database before you sign.Launch price $79 → $99 after EP100 release. All Info is in the Link [⁠⁠https://sergiostieben.gumroad.com/l/wqyicc⁠⁠ [https://sergiostieben.gumroad.com/l/wqyicc]] Beneficial ownership is not only a compliance variable — it is a supply chain risk variable. The Rusal event proved it dramatically. When OFAC designated Oleg Deripaska in 2018, the automatic application of the 50% rule to EN+ and Rusal created immediate commercial paralysis across the global aluminum market, even though buyers had no direct relationship with Deripaska. This GP/LP technical episode dissects the beneficial ownership transmission mechanism in commodity supply chains and how a single individual designation can trigger systemic disruption. We identify three critical red flags for commodity and trade finance exposure: (1) beneficial owner political exposure combined with high supply concentration, (2) dollar payment dependency of the supplier, and (3) secondary sanctions exposure in the logistics and insurance layer. We deliver the active institutional framework for modeling beneficial ownership risk in supply chains — essential for any fund, trader, or portfolio company with material commodity or infrastructure exposure. Critical listening for commodity finance professionals, emerging markets LPs, trade credit analysts, and anyone managing sanctions risk in global supply chains. KEYWORDS Rusal GP LP analysis, beneficial ownership supply chain risk, OFAC 50% rule commodity, sanctions transmission mechanism, commodity supply chain due diligence, Rusal aluminum shock, sanctions risk modeling

I går16 min
episode Rusal & OFAC Sanctions 2018 : How One Man’s Designation Crashed the Global Aluminum Market — EP75 T1 cover

Rusal & OFAC Sanctions 2018 : How One Man’s Designation Crashed the Global Aluminum Market — EP75 T1

🔴 FFL Case Library is Live 80 forensic cases · 3 offline tools · zero cloudRun your deals against the pattern database before you sign.Launch price $79 → $99 after EP100 release. All Info is in the Link. [⁠⁠https://sergiostieben.gumroad.com/l/wqyicc⁠⁠ [https://sergiostieben.gumroad.com/l/wqyicc]] On April 6th, 2018, the US Treasury sanctioned one Russian oligarch — Oleg Deripaska. What fell next was not just his companies. The entire global aluminum market collapsed. The London Metal Exchange price surged more than 20% in days. Physical premiums exploded. Supply chains in automotive, aerospace, and packaging faced immediate disruption. This is the financial autopsy of the Rusal sanctions event — how the application of OFAC’s 50% rule to a company producing 7% of world primary aluminum (and 17% outside China) created the largest commodity market shock since the financial crisis. We dissect the full sequence: the visible ownership chain, the transmission mechanism through dollar payments, logistics and insurance, the market’s complete failure to model beneficial ownership as a supply chain risk, and the nine-month resolution process that became known as the “Deripaska Rule.” A landmark case showing how sanctions risk on a beneficial owner can transmit instantly through a global commodity supply chain. KEYWORDSRusal sanctions 2018, Oleg Deripaska OFAC, aluminum market crash 2018, OFAC 50% rule, commodity supply chain sanctions risk, Rusal supply shock, beneficial ownership transmission

I går16 min
episode Petrobras & Lava Jato 2018 : Political Appointment Capture & State-Owned Kickback Architecture │ GP/LP Analysis - 3 Red Flags│EP74 T2 cover

Petrobras & Lava Jato 2018 : Political Appointment Capture & State-Owned Kickback Architecture │ GP/LP Analysis - 3 Red Flags│EP74 T2

🔴 FFL Case Library is Live 80 forensic cases · 3 offline tools · zero cloudRun your deals against the pattern database before you sign.Launch price $79 → $99 after release. All Info is in the Link [⁠https://sergiostieben.gumroad.com/l/wqyicc⁠ [https://sergiostieben.gumroad.com/l/wqyicc]] State-owned enterprise due diligence is not the same as private company governance analysis. When directors are appointed by political parties as patronage assets, the kickback is not a failure of oversight — it is the operating model. This GP/LP technical episode dissects the political appointment capture mechanism that turned Petrobras into a systematic extraction vehicle for Brazil’s governing coalition. We identify three institutional-grade red flags visible before the scandal exploded: (1) directorate appointments correlating with political cycles rather than operational expertise, (2) statistical anomalies in contract award distribution and bidding patterns, and (3) correlation between contractor political donations and directorate appointment timelines. We deliver the active due diligence framework for any fund, lender, or capital provider with exposure to state-owned enterprises in jurisdictions where coalition politics intersects with strategic sectors — including how to distinguish aligned SOE governance from captured governance. Critical for infrastructure investors, emerging markets LPs, sovereign debt analysts, and anyone evaluating counterparty risk in politically exposed state-owned companies. KEYWORDSPetrobras GP LP analysis, political appointment capture, SOE governance risk, Lava Jato due diligence, state-owned enterprise red flags, infrastructure corruption risk, political patronage in SOEs, Petrobras contract cartel

28. maj 202616 min