Oral Argument Re-Listen: Abouammo v. United States | Trial on Home Turf Not Government's Pick

Opinion Summary: Wolford v. Lopez | Permission Slip Flopped

Wolford v. Lopez | Case No. 24-1046 | Docket Link: Here [https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-1046.html] | Argued: January 20, 2026 | Decided: June 25, 2026 Overview: After Bruen recognized the right to public carry, Hawaii required licensed gun carriers to obtain express permission before entering any private business open to the public — reversing the common-law presumption of open entry for anyone, including armed citizens. Question Presented: Whether Hawaii may prohibit licensed carry permit holders from entering private commercial property while armed without the property owner's express permission. Posture: District court enjoined the law; Ninth Circuit reversed; Supreme Court granted certiorari. Main Arguments: * Petitioner (Carry Permit Holders): * (1) Hawaii's law burdens the daily exercise of Second Amendment rights by effectively banning carry on ninety-six percent of publicly accessible land; * (2) No historical tradition justifies flipping the common-law default from implied permission to presumptive prohibition on property open to the public; * (3) Hawaii's anti-poaching analogues targeted agricultural land and distinct hunting harms — not concealed carry in commercial establishments. * Respondent (Hawaii): * (1) The Second Amendment never protected armed entry onto private property without consent — the form of that consent belongs to state property law; * (2) Colonial anti-poaching laws and Reconstruction-era statutes support a tradition of requiring affirmative consent for armed carry onto private property; * (3) Hawaii's law vindicates property owners' right to exclude by requiring armed visitors to seek express permission before entry. Holding: Hawaii's law prohibiting licensed concealed-carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without the property owner's express authorization violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined as to Part II–B only. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor. Reversed and remanded. Majority Reasoning: * (1) Hawaii's law falls within the Second Amendment's plain text — permit holders sought to "bear" "Arms" in public, making the law presumptively unconstitutional; * (2) Hawaii's colonial anti-poaching analogues targeted agricultural land and hunting-specific harms vastly different from restricting concealed carry in commercial establishments; * (3) Hawaii's 1865 Louisiana Black Code analogue — enacted to disarm newly freed Black Americans — carries no probative value under the Bruen framework. Separate Opinions: * Barrett (concurring; Thomas and Gorsuch join as to Part II–B only): Property-law framing doesn't immunize Hawaii's law from Second Amendment scrutiny. States may not use property rules to evade constitutional limits. Anti-poaching laws and Black Codes both fail Bruen's "why" inquiry. Thomas and Gorsuch joined only the Black Code portion. * Kagan (dissenting): Anti-poaching laws share sufficient "how" and "why" with Hawaii's rule — both required express consent for armed entry onto private property in response to harms posed by armed individuals on another's land. Kagan dissented solely on the historical analogue question. * Jackson (dissenting; Sotomayor joins): This case never implicated the Second Amendment — the dispute concerns only the form of consent required for armed entry onto private property, a question state property law controls. Hawaii's historical analogues satisfy Bruen. The majority invites unconstrained judicial discretion. Implications: * (1) Carry permit holders may now enter commercial property in Hawaii, California, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York absent an owner's posted prohibition; * (2) Business owners now bear the burden of posting signage to exclude armed visitors; * (3) Courts must apply a stricter historical analogue standard to Second Amendment challenges. The Fine Print: * Second Amendment, U.S. Const. Amdt. 2: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." * Haw. Rev. Stat. § 134-9.5(a) (2023): "A [licensed] person carrying a firearm [may not] intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly enter or remain on private property of another person while carrying a loaded or unloaded firearm, whether the firearm is operable or not, and whether the firearm is concealed or unconcealed, unless the person has been given express authorization to carry a firearm on the property by the owner, lessee, operator, or manager of the property." Primary Cases: * New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen (2022): Established the two-step framework for Second Amendment challenges — requiring States to justify gun regulations through history and tradition, rejecting interest-balancing tests. * District of Columbia v. Heller (2008): Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms, with self-defense as the core purpose; history governs the right's scope. Oral Advocates: * For Petitioner (Wolford): Alan A. Beck, San Diego, California. * For United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues. * For Respondent (Lopez): Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.

Opinion Summary: Blanche v. Lau | Seize Green Cards First and Prove Why Later

Blanche, Acting Attorney General v. Muk Choi Lau | Case No. 25-429 | Docket Link: Here [https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/25-429.html] | Argued: April 22, 2026 | Decided: June 23, 2026 Overview: The Court addressed whether border officers must possess clear and convincing evidence that a green card holder committed a crime before stripping that person of already-admitted status and treating the holder as an applicant for admission. Question Presented: Whether the INA requires border officers to possess clear and convincing evidence of a crime before treating a green card holder as seeking admission. Posture: Second Circuit vacated removal order; Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit split. Main Arguments: • Petitioner (Government): * (1) The INA imposes no evidentiary burden on border officers making on-the-spot classification decisions; * (2) the two-step framework requires crime commission at step one and conviction at step two, both satisfied here; * (3) the government met the clear-and-convincing standard at the removal hearing through Lau's guilty plea. • Respondent (Lau): * (1) The INA's "shall not" command required the government to determine whether an exception applied before treating a returning green card holder as seeking admission; * (2) the statute's present-perfect tense confirms border officers must make that determination at the moment of reentry, not later; * (3) a conviction entered after the parole decision cannot retroactively justify the border officer's classification call. Holding: The INA does not require a border officer to possess clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident committed a crime involving moral turpitude before treating the resident as an applicant for admission. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan. Second Circuit judgment vacated and remanded. Majority Reasoning: * (1) Section 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) requires only crime commission — not conviction — at step one to trigger "seeking admission" status; conviction or admission of guilt at step two establishes inadmissibility; * (2) the INA nowhere imposes a clear-and-convincing-evidence burden on border officers making on-the-spot classification calls; * (3) the BIA's clear-and-convincing standard applies at removal hearings — not at the border — and the government satisfied it through Lau's guilty plea. Separate Opinions: • Justice Jackson (dissenting, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan): The INA's "shall not" command required the government to determine whether an exception applied before reclassifying a returning green card holder as seeking admission. The majority permits post hoc justification, gutting the statutory protection Congress built for green card holders. Implications: * (1) Green card holders face possible parole at any border crossing if a pending criminal charge appears in federal databases — no evidentiary floor required at the moment of the call; * (2) courts must still resolve what standard — if any — governs border officers' parole decisions; * (3) the Second Circuit must decide on remand whether Lau's conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude. The Fine Print: * 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v): "An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for the purposes of the immigration laws unless the alien . . . has committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2) of this title" * 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I): "convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of . . . a crime involving moral turpitude" Primary Cases: * Barton v. Barr (2020): Established the two-step framework for removing returning lawful permanent residents — crime commission at step one triggers "seeking admission" status; conviction at step two establishes inadmissibility. * Matter of Valenzuela-Felix (BIA 2012): The Board of Immigration Appeals applied the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard to removal hearings only, not the border — the distinction the majority adopted and the Second Circuit ignored. Oral Advocates: * Petitioner (United States): Sopan Joshi of the Department of Justice * Respondent (Muk Choi Lau): Shay Dvoretzky of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP

Opinion Summary: Pung v. Isabella County | Small Debt, Tiny Check

Pung v. Isabella County | Case No. 25-95 | Docket Link: Here [https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/25-95.html] | Argued: 02/25/2026 | Decided: 06/23/2026 Overview: A Michigan family lost their $194,400 home at a tax auction for $76,008 over a disputed $2,241.93 debt. The Court decided whether just compensation under the Takings Clause demands fair market value or only the auction surplus. Question Presented: Whether the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause requires the government to pay fair market value — not just the auction surplus — after a tax foreclosure sale. Posture: District Court awarded surplus only; Sixth Circuit affirmed on circuit precedent; Supreme Court granted certiorari. Main Arguments: * Petitioner (Pung Family): * (1) Just compensation under the Fifth Amendment requires fair market value, not the artificially depressed auction sale price; * (2) No court in 250 years held surplus proceeds automatically satisfy just compensation for a home sold far below assessed value; * (3) The Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause bars the government from consuming the vast majority of a homeowner's equity over a small tax debt. * Respondent (Isabella County): * (1) Centuries of English and American law establish that surplus auction proceeds satisfy just compensation in tax foreclosure sales; * (2) Adopting fair market value as the constitutional baseline would render tax foreclosure sales financially infeasible for governments nationwide; * (3) The Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to fairly conducted tax sales with deep historical roots. Holding: The proper baseline for just compensation after a tax foreclosure sale is the auction price — the surplus above the tax debt — not the property's hypothetical fair market value, at least when the sale proceeds fairly in light of the nation's history of tax sales. The Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause does not require more than the surplus proceeds. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson; Justice Thomas joined except as to Part II-B. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Gorsuch and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Gorsuch except as to footnote 1. Vacated and remanded. Opinion: Here [https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-95_dc8e.pdf] Majority Reasoning: * (1) Centuries of English and American law — codified in founding-era statutes and confirmed in Court precedent — established surplus auction proceeds as the measure of just compensation in tax foreclosure sales; * (2) Owners can generally avoid tax foreclosure by refinancing or selling voluntarily, distinguishing tax sales from traditional eminent domain; * (3) A fair-market-value rule would render tax sales financially infeasible, forcing governments to pay delinquent taxpayers more than the auction ever generates. Separate Opinions: * Justice Sotomayor (concurring, joined by Gorsuch and Jackson): Agreed with the result but wrote separately to clarify that the majority's "fairly conducted" language does not define the constitutional floor for a valid tax auction — leaving that standard open for the lower courts on remand. * Justice Thomas (concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Gorsuch except footnote 1): Declined to join Part II-B; argued historical tax-sale tradition imposed strict limits the County violated — including exhausting personal property before seizing the home and selling only as much as necessary — and called the County's conduct likely unconstitutional. Implications: * (1) Homeowners facing tax foreclosure cannot demand fair market value as a constitutional right — only the auction surplus; * (2) Governments may conduct tax sales without paying more than the surplus, preserving the system nationwide as a viable debt-collection tool; * (3) Lower courts must now define what a "fairly conducted" auction requires, inviting future constitutional challenges on procedural grounds. The Fine Print: * Fifth Amendment, Takings Clause: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation" * Eighth Amendment, Excessive Fines Clause: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted" Primary Cases: * Tyler v. Hennepin County (2023): The government must return surplus proceeds from a tax foreclosure sale to the former owner; retaining the surplus violates the Takings Clause. * BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1994): A foreclosure sale price reflects the actual market for foreclosed property; the former owner does not recover fair market value through foreclosure. Oral Advocates: * For Petitioner (Pung): Philip L. Ellison of Outside Legal Counsel PLC. * United States as Amicus Curiae: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice. * For Respondent (Isabella County, Michigan): Matthew Nelson of Warner Norcross and Judd.

Opinion Summary: Exxon Mobil v. Cimex | SCOTUS Shatters Cuba's Legal Shield

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), et al. | Case No. 24-699 | Docket Link: Here [https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-699.html] | Argued: 02/23/2026 | Decided: 06/23/2026 Overview: Cuba's Communist government confiscated Exxon's oil refinery and service stations in 1960. Congress created a legal remedy in 1996 via the Helms-Burton Act. The Court decided whether that law itself strips Cuban government companies of their immunity shield. Question Presented: Whether the Helms-Burton Act abrogates the sovereign immunity of Cuban government agencies and instrumentalities, excusing plaintiffs from satisfying the FSIA's separate exceptions. Posture: District court and divided D.C. Circuit sided with Cuban defendants; Supreme Court granted cert. Main Arguments: Petitioner (Exxon Mobil): * (1) Helms-Burton's express cause of action against foreign instrumentalities abrogates sovereign immunity under Court precedent without a separate waiver provision; * (2) Applying the FSIA guts the cause of action because the simultaneous embargo bars the commercial nexus those exceptions require; * (3) The Act routes suits through §1331 — not §1330 — and grants the President exclusive gatekeeping power, confirming FSIA displacement. Respondents (CIMEX/CUPET): * (1) Helms-Burton's text never addresses sovereign immunity, failing the unmistakably-clear abrogation standard; * (2) Congress considered adding an express FSIA exception and deliberately dropped it after DOJ objected; * (3) The FSIA and Helms-Burton can coexist because some suits satisfy FSIA exceptions through lawful Cuba-U.S. commercial activity. Holding: The Helms-Burton Act abrogates the foreign sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities; plaintiffs who sue Cuban agencies or instrumentalities under the Act need not separately satisfy an FSIA exception. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson. Reversed and remanded. Opinion: Here [https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-699_f204.pdf] Majority Reasoning: * (1) The Act's cause of action expressly applies against foreign instrumentalities, which under Kirtz (2024) abrogates immunity without a separate waiver provision; * (2) Applying the FSIA guts the cause of action — the simultaneous Cuba embargo bars the commercial nexus the FSIA's exceptions require, creating an inescapable trap Congress never intended; * (3) The Act routes suits through §1331 not §1330, grants the President exclusive immunity-gatekeeping authority mirroring the pre-FSIA regime, and expressly contemplates judgments against Cuban entities — all confirming FSIA displacement. Separate Opinions: * Justice Kagan — Dissenting (joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson): Helms-Burton's text never addresses immunity; Congress dropped a draft FSIA amendment after DOJ objection; the cause of action retains meaningful work against private defendants without any abrogation. Implications: * (1) American claimants with Cuba-confiscated property can now sue Cuban government entities under Helms-Burton, bypassing FSIA exceptions entirely; * (2) Dozens of pending suits involving Cuban hotels, ports, and airports advance to the merits; * (3) The Court reserved whether the ruling extends to non-Cuban foreign instrumentalities, guaranteeing future litigation. The Fine Print: * 22 U.S.C. §6082(a)(1)(A) (Helms-Burton Act / Title III): "any person that...traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government...shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property" * 28 U.S.C. §1604 (FSIA): "a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter" Primary Cases: * Dep't of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz (2024): Congressional creation of a cause of action expressly applying against government agencies or instrumentalities abrogates sovereign immunity without a separate waiver provision. * Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Centro De Periodismo Investigativo (2023): Congress does not "authorize a suit against a sovereign with one hand, only to bar it with the other" — statutory schemes must afford meaningful remedies to identified defendants. Oral Advocates: * For Petitioner (Exxon Mobil): Morgan Ratner of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP argues for Petitioner Exxon Mobil. * United States as Amicus Curiae: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice. * For Respondents (Corporación Cimex): Jules Lobel, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

New Opinions: June 25th | Four Rulings, One Day: Guns, Borders, Refugees, and Roundup

Overview: * Four opinions released June 25th, 2026 — one day, across environmental tort preemption, immigration enforcement, executive authority over humanitarian protections, and Second Amendment rights. * Three of four decisions split 6–3: identical conservative majority, identical liberal dissent, three consecutive times. * The fourth — a Roundup cancer lawsuit and a $1 million-plus Missouri jury verdict — fractured the usual alliances, drawing Sotomayor and Kagan into a 7–2 conservative coalition while pushing Gorsuch into dissent alongside Jackson. * Justice Alito authored three majority opinions; Justice Kavanaugh authored one; Chief Justice Roberts joined all four without writing separately. * Justice Thomas wrote or joined a separate concurrence in all four cases — each one planting seeds for future constitutional challenges to the administrative state, executive immigration power, and federal equal protection doctrine. * Justice Jackson dissented in all four cases — twice as the author — making her the most prolific dissenter of the opinion day. * This episode breaks down all four decisions: authors, vote splits, key holdings, Thomas's concurrence roadmap, and real-world consequences. Monsanto Co. versus Durnell | No. 24–1068 * Federal preemption law (FIFRA) blocks state failure-to-warn tort claims requiring cancer warnings on Roundup's label beyond what the EPA approved. * 7–2. Justice Kavanaugh authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Barrett. * Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion flagging three structural concerns: FIFRA likely exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause authority; EPA's labeling power raises non-delegation problems; and agency regulations may lack Supremacy Clause status to preempt state law. * Justice Jackson dissented, joined by Gorsuch. * Missouri Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. Mullin, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al. versus Al Otro Lado et al. | No. 25–5 * An alien standing in Mexico does not "arrive in the United States" within the meaning of the INA; inspection and asylum obligations don't attach before physical border crossing. * 6–3. Justice Alito authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. * Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion arguing lower courts evaded §1252(f)(1)'s classwide injunction bar through declaratory-relief labeling, and that statutes compelling the President to admit aliens would infringe inherent executive exclusion authority. * Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Kagan and Jackson. * Justice Jackson filed a separate dissenting opinion. * Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al. versus Doe et al. | Nos. 25–1083 & 25–1084 * The TPS statute bars judicial review of termination decisions; the equal protection race claim challenging Haiti's TPS termination unlikely to succeed on the merits. * Justice Alito announced the judgment and delivered the Court's opinion, joined in full by Roberts, Thomas, and Kavanaugh, and except for Part III–A by Gorsuch and Barrett. * Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion arguing §1254a(b)(5)(A) bars even constitutional claims, that Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) deserves overruling, and that non-citizen immigrants hold no constitutional equal protection rights against federal immigration decisions. * Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson. * Second and D.C. Circuits reversed and remanded. Wolford et al. versus Lopez, Attorney General of Hawaii | No. 24–1046 * Hawaii's law prohibiting licensed carry-permit holders from carrying firearms on private property open to the public without the owner's express consent violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. * 6–3. Justice Alito authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. * Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion — joined by Thomas and Gorsuch as to Part II–B — rejecting Hawaii's property-law framing and disqualifying both the anti-poaching and Black Code historical analogues as invalid historical support under Bruen. * Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion. * Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Sotomayor. * Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.