Not by the Back Door
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By Dr. Daryoush Mohammad Poor | The Twin Wisdoms [https://twinwisdoms.org]
Podcast
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Pluralism, universalism, and the difference that both relativism and perennialism would erase
When I argued recently that pluralism is not relativism, a reader replied with a smile: “Unless you bring in universalism through the back door.” The objection is sharp, and it deserves a straight answer rather than a defensive one. If pluralism holds that some readings are better than others, that a claim can simply be wrong, that a line runs between truth and falsehood — then it must be appealing to a standard. And a standard that binds across traditions looks like nothing so much as a universal. So, the charge goes, the moment pluralism refuses relativism it smuggles back in the very universalism it claimed to have left at the door. The smile marks a trap: relativism on one side, universalism on the other, and no honest ground in between.
The grain of truth in this is real, and I shall not pretend otherwise. Pluralism is not value-neutral; it is a normative commitment, and it does invoke something that holds good across traditions. To that extent there is indeed a universal in play. But “universalism” names two quite different things, and the entire argument turns on holding them apart. There is a substantive universalism, which claims to possess the one truth that every tradition expresses in local dress — the perennialist conviction that beneath all the faiths lies a single transcendent unity, of which the visible religions are so many partial translations. And there is a formal universalism, which claims no such content: only that certain disciplines of inquiry — declaring one’s assumptions, stating what would refute them, granting the other the standing to answer back — bind everyone who would reason in good faith. The first is a thesis about reality. The second is a thesis about method. Pluralism needs the second and must refuse the first.
The refusal is not fastidiousness; it is self-defence. Substantive universalism is the true back door through which difference is eliminated — not by force, but by flattery. It assures the Muslim, the Buddhist, and the Christian that their disagreements are superficial, that each is, without quite realising it, saying the same thing as the others. This sounds generous. It is in fact a quiet imperialism, for it claims to understand traditions better than their own adherents do, and the “common essence” it uncovers turns out, with suspicious regularity, to be the essence most legible to whoever is doing the uncovering. Frithjof Schuon gave this its classic name, the transcendent unity of religions.[1] The more honest name for it is the dissolution of the religions into a unity supplied from outside them. When Aldous Huxley gathered the spiritual classics and wondered why they should not all agree, he secured his harmony precisely by passing over the differences the traditions themselves regard as load-bearing.[2] In such a scheme difference survives only as appearance. That is elimination by absorption.
Here the critic’s trap closes on itself. Mark Sedgwick, surveying these positions, notes that contemporary pluralism tends to drift towards what he calls naïve universalism — the comfortable sense that every tradition is beautiful and that, at bottom, they all say the same thing — and that this naïve universalism is, on any usable definition, indistinguishable from relativism.[3] The observation repays attention. Relativism erases difference by indifference: if every view is as good as every other, nothing is at stake between them, and difference goes idle. Substantive universalism erases difference by absorption: if every view is a veil over one reality, then difference is not finally real. Two opposite-looking errors arrive at the same address — the back door and the front of a single empty house. What was offered as the only alternative to relativism turns out to be relativism’s twin.
This is why the most demanding account of pluralism sets itself against both, insisting that difference is to be embraced rather than overcome. As the late Aga Khan put it in Ottawa:[4]
Connection does not necessarily mean agreement. … It does not mean that we want to eliminate our differences or erase our distinctions. … Pluralism does not mean the elimination of difference, but the embrace of difference.
— His Highness the Aga Khan, Ottawa, 16 May 2017
The formulation is exact. Pluralism is not the discovery that we already agree; it is the costly practice of engaging those with whom we do not. Diana Eck compresses the same thought into a sentence: pluralism is not mere tolerance, and not relativism, but the real encounter of commitments.[5] An encounter requires two parties who remain, after it, themselves.
So the critic is right that pluralism leans on a universal — and wrong about which one. The universal it admits is formal, procedural, and deliberately thin: not a truth that everyone secretly holds, but a discipline to which everyone must submit. In the earlier essay I put the test as plainly as I could — a defensible reading must declare its assumptions and say what would refute it.[6] That is Karl Popper’s standard, not Schuon’s.[7] It is universal in scope, since it binds every claimant alike, yet empty of content, since it dictates no conclusion, privileges no tradition, and leaves the substantive disagreements exactly where it found them, now conducted in the open. Isaiah Berlin, who spent a career arguing that genuine values can conflict beyond reconciliation and that this is emphatically not relativism, drew the line in the same place: to understand why another holds what we reject is not to agree with it, and that very capacity for understanding is what relativism, sealing each of us inside an incommensurable world, denies us.[8] This universal does not arrive by the back door. It comes by the front, openly declared, itself fallible and open to challenge — and its whole office is to keep the back door bolted, so that no tradition, mine least of all, can install its own content as the hidden essence of everyone else’s.
None of this is easy, and that is the part most worth saying without ornament. The two errors are seductive precisely because they are cheap. Relativism asks nothing of us: pronounce all views equal, and the labour of judgement is abolished. Naïve universalism asks almost as little: pronounce all views secretly one, and the labour of engagement is abolished. Each buys its peace by retiring from the work. Genuine pluralism cannot. It demands deep knowledge of one’s own tradition and real knowledge of others; the patience to hold a contradiction open without collapsing it; the nerve to judge while conceding that no single civilisation owns the measures of justice, knowledge, or beauty; and the humility to be argued out of one’s position and changed. It is an achievement, not a default — and, like any achievement, it has to be earned again each time it is claimed.
We happen to live in a moment that makes the discipline both harder and more necessary. The instruments we increasingly reason with are built to agree with us; they return our own assumptions in fluent prose and invite us to mistake the echo for insight. In such a climate it is easy to take the sound of one’s own voice for the universal, and the refusal to listen for respect for difference. Pluralism is the standing refusal of both. We can be pluralists without becoming relativists — but it is not handed to us. It is built, and rebuilt, by hand; and the back door stays bolted only for as long as someone is willing to keep watch.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aga Khan IV (Shāh Karīm al-Ḥusaynī). “Address at the Opening Ceremony of the New Headquarters of the Global Centre for Pluralism.” Ottawa, 16 May 2017.
Berlin, Isaiah. The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas. Edited by Henry Hardy. London: John Murray, 1990.
Eck, Diana L. A New Religious America: How a “Christian Country” Has Become the World’s Most Religiously Diverse Nation. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2001.
Huxley, Aldous. The Perennial Philosophy. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1945.
Mohammad Poor, Daryoush. “Pluralism Is Not Relativism.” The Twin Wisdoms, 2 June 2026. https://twinwisdoms.org/pluralism-is-not-relativism/.
Popper, Karl R. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963.
Popper, Karl R. The Open Society and Its Enemies. 2 vols. London: Routledge, 1945.
Schuon, Frithjof. The Transcendent Unity of Religions. Translated by Peter Townsend. London: Faber and Faber, 1953. First published as De l’unité transcendante des religions (Paris: Gallimard, 1948).
Sedgwick, Mark. Against the Modern World: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Sedgwick, Mark. “Pluralism and Perennialism.” Lecture, The Institute of Ismaili Studies, London, 15 June 2017.
[1]Frithjof Schuon, The Transcendent Unity of Religions, trans. Peter Townsend (London: Faber and Faber, 1953); first published as De l’unité transcendante des religions (Paris: Gallimard, 1948).
[2]Aldous Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1945). On Huxley’s universalist register and its passing-over of difference, see Mark Sedgwick, “Pluralism and Perennialism” (lecture, The Institute of Ismaili Studies, London, 15 June 2017).
[3]Sedgwick, “Pluralism and Perennialism”; for the broader typology of monism, universalism, and inclusivism drawn on here, see his Against the Modern World: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
[4]His Aga Khan IV, “Address at the Opening Ceremony of the New Headquarters of the Global Centre for Pluralism” (Ottawa, 16 May 2017).
[5]Diana L. Eck, A New Religious America: How a “Christian Country” Has Become the World’s Most Religiously Diverse Nation (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2001); the formulation cited is the defining statement of the Pluralism Project, Harvard University.
[6]Daryoush Mohammad Poor, “Pluralism Is Not Relativism,” The Twin Wisdoms, 2 June 2026, https://twinwisdoms.org/pluralism-is-not-relativism/.
[7]Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963); see also his The Open Society and Its Enemies, 2 vols. (London: Routledge, 1945).
[8]Isaiah Berlin, “The Pursuit of the Ideal,” in The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy (London: John Murray, 1990), 1–19; and “Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought,” in the same volume.
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