Age of Conquest: A Kings and Generals Podcast

3.179 Fall and Rise of China: Lake Khasan Conflict II

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the battle of lake Khasan. On a frost-bitten dawn by the Chaun and Tumen, two empires, Soviet and Japanese, stared at Changkufeng, each certain the ridge would decide their fate. Diplomats urged restraint, but Tokyo's generals plotted a bold gamble: seize the hill with a surprise strike and bargain afterward. In the Japanese camp, a flurry of trains, orders, and plans moved in the night. Officers like Sato and Suetaka debated danger and responsibility, balancing "dokudan senko", independent action with disciplined restraint. As rain hammered the earth, they contemplated a night assault: cross the Tumen, occupy Hill 52, and strike Changkufeng with coordinated dawn and night attacks. Engineers, artillery, and infantry rehearsed their movements in near-poetic precision, while the 19th Engineers stitched crossings and bridges into a fragile path forward. Across the river, Soviet scouts and border guards held their nerve, counting enemy shadows and watching for a break in the line. The clash at Shachaofeng became a lightning rod: a small force crossed into Manchurian soil in the restless dark, provoking a broader crisis just as diplomacy teetered. #179 From Darkness to Crest: The Changkufeng Battle Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. As remarked in the 19th division's war journal "With sunset on the 30th, the numbers of enemy soldiers increased steadily. Many motor vehicles, and even tanks, appear to have moved up. The whole front has become tense. Hostile patrols came across the border frequently, even in front of Chiangchunfeng. Tank-supported infantry units were apparently performing offensive deployment on the high ground south of Shachaofeng." Situation maps from the evening indicated Soviet patrol activity approaching the staging area of Nakano's unit near the Tumen, moving toward Noguchi's company to the left of Chiangchunfeng, and advancing toward Matsunobe's unit southwest of Shachaofeng. Russian vessels were depicted ferrying across Khasan, directly behind Changkufeng, while tanks moved south from Shachaofeng along the western shores of the lake. The 19th division's war journal states "Then it was ascertained that these attack forces had gone into action. All of our own units quietly commenced counteraction from late that night, as scheduled, after having systematically completed preparations since nightfall." Meanwhile, to the north, the Hunchun garrison reinforced the border with a battalion and tightened security. All evidence supported the view that Suetaka "in concept" and Sato"(in tactics" played the main part in the night-attack planning and decisions. Sato was the only infantry regimental commander at the front on 30 July. One division staff officer went so far as to say that Suetaka alone exerted the major influence, that Sato merely worked out details, including the type of attack and the timing. Intertwined with the decision to attack Changkufeng was the choice of an infantry regiment. The 76th Regiment was responsible for the defense of the sector through its Border Garrison Unit; but the latter had no more than two companies to guard a 40-mile border extending almost to Hunchun, and Okido's regimental headquarters was 75 miles to the rear at Nanam. T. Sato's 73rd Regiment was also at Nanam, while Cho's 74th Regiment was stationed another 175 miles southwest at Hamhung. Thus, the regiment nearest to Changkufeng was K. Sato's 75th, 50 miles away at Hoeryong. Although Suetaka had had time to shuffle units if he desired, Sasai suggested that troop movements from Nanam could not be concealed; from Hoeryong they might be termed maneuvers. Suetaka undoubtedly had favorites in terms of units as well as chiefs. K. Sato had served longest as regimental commander, since October 1937; Okido's date of rank preceded K. Sato's, but Okido had not taken command until 1938. He and Cho were able enough, but they were unknown quantities; T. Sato and Cho were brand-new colonels. Thus, K. Sato was best known to Suetaka and was familiar with the terrain. While he did not regard his regiment as the equal of units in the Kwantung Army or in the homeland, K. Sato's training program was progressing well and his men were rugged natives of Nagano and Tochigi prefectures. From the combat soldier's standpoint, the Changkufeng Incident was waged between picked regulars on both sides. The matter of quantitative regimental strength could have played no part in Suetaka's choice. The 74th, 75th, and 76th regiments each possessed 1,500 men; the 73rd, 1,200. Even in ordinary times, every unit conducted night-attack training, attended by Suetaka, but there was nothing special in July, even after the general inspected the 75th Regiment on the 11th. It had been said that the most efficient battalions were selected for the action. Although, of course, Sato claimed that all of his battalions were good, from the outset he bore the 1st Battalion in mind for the night attack and had it reconnoiter the Changkufeng area. Some discerned no special reasons; it was probably a matter of numerical sequence, 1st-2nd-3rd Battalions. Others called the choice a happy coincidence because of the 1st Battalion's 'splendid unity' and the aggressive training conducted by Major Ichimoto, who had reluctantly departed recently for regimental headquarters. Coming from the 75th Regiment headquarters to take over the 1st Battalion was the 40-year-old aide Major Nakano. By all accounts, he was quiet, serious, and hard-working, a man of noble character, gentle and sincere. More the administrative than commander type, Nakano lacked experience in commanding battalions and never had sufficient time to get to know his new unit (or they, him) before the night assault. He could hardly be expected to have stressed anything particular in training. Since there was no battalion-level training, the most valid unit of comparison in the regiment was the company, the smallest infantry component trained and equipped to conduct combat missions independently. Sato valued combat experience among subordinates; Nakano's 1st Battalion was considered a veteran force by virtue of its old-timer company commanders. All but one had come up through the ranks; the exception, young Lieutenant Nakajima, the darling of Sato, was a military academy graduate. For assault actions synchronized with those of the 1st Battalion, Sato selected Ito, the one line captain commanding the 6th Company of the 2nd Battalion, and Takeshita, 10th Company commander, one of the two line captains of the 3rd Battalion. In short, Sato had designated five veteran captains and a promising lieutenant to conduct the night-attack operations of 30-31 July, the first Japanese experience of battle against the modern Red Army. During the last two weeks of July, numerous spurious farmers had gambled along the lower reaches of the Tumen, reconnoitered the terrain, and prepared for a crossing and assault. Scouts had operated on both the Manchurian and Korean sides of the river. Major Nakano had conducted frequent personal reconnaissance and had dispatched platoon and patrol leaders, all heavy-weapons observation teams, and even the battalion doctor to Sozan Hill, to Chiangchunfeng, and close to enemy positions. In Korean garb and often leading oxen, the scouts had threaded their way through the Changkufeng sector, sometimes holing up for the night to observe Soviet movements, soil and topography, and levels of illumination. From this data, Nakano had prepared reference materials necessary for an assault. Hirahara, then located at Kucheng BGU Headquarters, had established three observation posts on high ground to the rear. After Chiangchunfeng had been occupied, Hirahara had set up security positions and routes there. Regarding Changkufeng, he had sought to ensure that even the lowest private studied the layout. Formation commanders such as Takeshita had volunteered frequently. Sato had also utilized engineers. Since the order to leave his station on 17 July, Lieutenant Colonel Kobayashi had had his regiment engage in scouting routes, bridges, and potential fords. Sato's 1st Company commander had prepared a sketch during 3% hours of reconnaissance across from Hill 52 during the afternoon of 18 July. Captain Yamada's intelligence had contributed to the tactical decisions and to knowledge of Russian strength and preparations. The most important information had been his evaluation of attack approaches, suggesting an offensive from the western side, preferably against the right flank or frontally. This concept had been the one applied by the regiment in its night assault two weeks later; Yamada had died on the green slopes he had scanned. Cloudy Saturday, 30 July, had drawn to a close. The moment had been at hand for the 75th Regiment to storm the Russians atop Changkufeng. Setting out from Fangchuanting at 22:30, Nakano's battalion, about 350 strong, had assembled at a fork one kilometer southwest of Changkufeng. The roads had been knee-deep in mud due to intermittent rain and downpours on 29–30 July. Now the rain had subsided, but clouds had blotted out the sky after the waning moon had set at 22:30. Led by Sakata's 1st Platoon leader, the men had marched silently toward the southern foot of Changkufeng; the murk had deepened and the soldiers could see no more than ten meters ahead. It had taken Sakata's men less than an hour to push forward the last 1,000 meters to the jump-off point, where they had waited another two hours before X-hour arrived. Scouts had advanced toward the first row of wire, 200–300 meters away. Platoon Leader Amagasa had infiltrated the positions alone and had reconnoitered the southeastern side of the heights. Sakata had heard from the patrols about the entanglements and their distance and makeup. While awaiting paths to be cut by engineer teams, the infantry had moved up as far as possible, 150 meters from the enemy, by 23:30. Although records described Changkufeng as quite steep, it had not been hard to climb until the main Russian positions were reached, even though there were cliffs. But as the craggy peak had been neared, the enemy defenses, which had taken advantage of rocks and dips, could not have been rushed in a bound. It had been 500 meters to the crest from the gently sloping base. The incline near the top had been steep at about 40 degrees and studded with boulders. Farther down were more soil and gravel. Grass had carpeted the foot. Japanese Army radio communications had been in their infancy; wire as well as runners had served as the main means of linking regimental headquarters with the front-line infantry, crossing-point engineers, and supporting guns across the Tumen in Korea. From Chiangchunfeng to the 1st Battalion, lines had been installed from the morning of 29 July. Combat communications had been operated by the small regimental signal unit, 27 officers and men. In general, signal traffic had been smooth and reception was good. Engineer support had been rendered by one platoon, primarily to assist with wire-cutting operations. Nakano had ordered his 1st Company to complete clearing the wire by 02:00. At 23:30 the cutters had begun their work on the right with three teams under 1st Lieutenant Inagaki. Since the proposed breach had been far from the enemy positions and there were no outposts nearby, Inagaki had pressed the work of forced clearing. The first entanglements had been breached fairly quickly, then the second. At about midnight, a dim light had etched the darkness, signaling success. There had been two gaps on the right. On the left side, Sakata's company had hoped to pierce the barbed wire in secrecy rather than by forced clearing. Only one broad belt of entanglements, actually the first and third lines, had been reconnoitered along the south and southeastern slopes. Sakata had assigned one team of infantry, with a covering squad led by Master Sergeant Amagasa, to the engineer unit under 2nd Lieutenant Nagayama. Covert clearing of a pair of gaps had begun. The Russian stakes had been a meter apart and the teams cut at the center of each section, making breaches wide enough for a soldier to wriggle through. To the rear, the infantry had crouched expectantly, while from the direction of Khasan the rumble of Soviet armor could be heard. At 00:10, when the first line of wire had been penetrated and the cutters were moving forward, the silence had been broken by the furious barking of Russian sentry dogs, and pale blue flares had burst over the slopes. As recalled by an engineer "It had been as bright as day. If only fog would cover us or it would start to rain!" At the unanticipated second line, the advancing clearing elements had drawn gunfire and grenades. But the Russians had been taken by surprise, Sakata said, and their machine guns had been firing high. Two engineers had been wounded; the security patrol on the left flank may have drawn the fire. Sakata had crawled up to Lieutenant Nagayama's cutting teams. One party had been hiding behind a rock, with a man sticking out his hand, grasping for the stake and feeling for electrified wire. Another soldier lay nearby, ready to snip the wire. The enemy had seemed to have discerned the Japanese, for the lieutenant could hear low voices. Although the cutters had been told to continue clearing in secrecy, they had by now encountered a line of low barbed wire and the work had not progressed as expected. Forced clearing had begun, which meant that the men had to stand or kneel, ignoring hostile fire and devoting primary consideration to speed. The infantrymen, unable to delay, had crawled through the wire as soon as the cutters tore a gap. Ten meters behind the small breaches, as well as in front of the Soviet positions, the Japanese had been troubled by fine low strands. They had resembled piano-wire traps, a foot or so off the ground. The wires had been invisible in the grass at night. As one soldier recalled "You couldn't disengage easily. When you tried to get out, you'd be sniped at. The wires themselves could cut a bit, too." Sakata had kept up with the clearing teams and urged them on. On his own initiative, Amagasa had his men break the first and third lines of wire by 01:50. Meanwhile, at 01:20, Nakano had phoned Sato, reporting that his forces had broken through the lines with little resistance, and had recommended that the attack be launched earlier than 2:00. Perhaps the premature alerting of the Russians had entered into Nakano's considerations. Sato had explained matters carefully, that is, rejected the suggestion, saying Changkufeng must not be taken too early, lest the enemy at Shachaofeng be alerted. The entire battalion, redeployed, had been massed for the charge up the slope. In an interval of good visibility, the troops could see as far as 40 meters ahead. A little before 02:00, Nakano had sent runners to deliver the order to advance. When the final obstructions had been cut, Nagayama had flashed a light. Then a white flag had moved in the darkness and the infantry had moved forward. Sakata's company, heading directly for Changkufeng crest, had less ground to traverse than Yamada's, and the point through which they penetrated the wire had been at the fork, where there appeared to have been only two lines to cut. The soldiers had crawled on their knees and one hand and had taken cover as soon as they got through. It had been 02:15 when the battalion traversed the barbed wire and began the offensive. The Japanese Army manual had stated that unaimed fire was seldom effective at night and that it had been imperative to avoid confusion resulting from wild shooting. At Changkufeng, the use of firearms had been forbidden by regimental order. Until the troops had penetrated the wire, bayonets had not been fixed because of the danger to friendly forces. Once through the entanglements, the men had attached bayonets, but, although their rifles had been loaded, they still had not been allowed to fire. The men had been traveling light. Instead of the 65 pounds the individual rifleman might ordinarily carry, knapsack, weapons and ammunition, tools, supplies, and clothing, each helmeted soldier had only 60 cartridges, none on his back, a haversack containing two grenades, a canteen, and a gas mask. To prevent noise, the regulations had prescribed wrapping metal parts of bayonets, canteens, sabers, mess kits, shovels, picks, and hobnails with cloth or straw. The wooden and metal parts of the shovel had been separated, the canteen filled, ammunition pouches stuffed with paper, and the bayonet sheath wrapped with cloth. Instead of boots, the men had worn web-toed, rubbersoled ground socks to muffle sound. Although their footgear had been bound with straw ropes, the soldiers occasionally had slipped in the wet grass. Considerations of security had forbidden relief of tension by talking, coughing, or smoking. Company commanders and platoon leaders had carried small white flags for hand signaling. In Sakata's company, the platoons had been distinguished by white patches of cloth hung over the gas masks on the men's backs, triangular pieces for the 1st Platoon, square for the second. Squad leaders had worn white headbands under their helmets. The company commanders had strapped on a white cross-belt; the platoon leaders, a single band. Officer casualties had proven particularly severe because the identification belts had been too conspicuous; even when the officers had lay flat, Soviet illuminating shells had made their bodies visible. On the left, the 2nd Company, 70–80 strong, had moved up with platoons abreast and scouts ahead. About 10 meters had separated the individual platoons advancing in four files; in the center were Sakata and his command team. The same setup had been used for Yamada's company and his two infantry platoons on the right. To the center and rear of the lead companies were battalion headquarters, a platoon of Nakajima's 3rd Company, and the Kitahara Machine-Gun Company, 20 meters from Nakano. The machine-gun company had differed from the infantry companies in that it had three platoons of two squads each. The machine-gun platoons had gone through the center breach in the entanglements with the battalion commander. Thereafter, they had bunched up, shoulder to shoulder and with the machine guns close to each other. Kitahara had led, two platoons forward, one back. The night had been so dark that the individual soldiers had hardly been able to tell who had been leading and who had been on the flanks. The 2nd Company had consolidated after getting through the last entanglements and had walked straight for Changkufeng crest. From positions above the Japanese, Soviet machine guns covering the wire had blazed away at a range of 50 meters. Tracers had ripped the night, but the Russians' aim had seemed high. Soviet illuminating shells, by revealing the location of dead angles among the rocks, had facilitated the Japanese approach. Fifty meters past the barbed wire, Sakata had run into the second Soviet position. From behind a big rock, four or five soldiers had been throwing masher grenades. Sakata and his command team had dashed to the rear and cut down the Russians. The captain had sabered one soldier who had been about to throw a grenade. Then Master Sergeant Onuki and the others had rushed up and overran the Russian defenses. The Japanese had not yet fired or sustained casualties. There had been no machine guns in the first position Sakata had jumped into; the trenches had been two feet deep and masked by rocks. To the right, a tent could be seen. Blind enemy firing had reached a crescendo around 02:30. The Russians had resisted with rifles, light and heavy machine guns, hand grenades, rifle grenades, flares, rapid-fire guns, and a tank cannon. "The hill had shaken, but our assault unit had advanced, disregarding the heavy resistance and relying only on the bayonet." The battalion commander, Major Nakano, had been the first officer to be hit. Moving to the left of Sakata's right-hand platoon, he had rushed up, brandishing his sword, amid ear-splitting fire and day-like flashes. He had felled an enemy soldier and then another who had been about to get him from behind. But a grenade had exploded and he had dropped, with his right arm hanging grotesquely and many fragments embedded in his chest and left arm. After regaining consciousness, Nakano had yelled at soldiers rushing to help him: "You fools! Charge on! Never mind me." Staggering to his feet, he had leaned on his sword with his left hand and pushed up the slope after the assault waves, while "everybody had been dashing around like mad." Sakata had encountered progressive defenses and more severe fire. The main body of the company had lost contact with other elements after getting through the entanglements. Sakata had thought that he had already occupied an edge of Changkufeng, but about 30 meters ahead stood a sharp-faced boulder, two or three meters high, from which enormous numbers of grenades had been lobbed. The Japanese, still walking, had come across another Soviet position, manned by four or five grenadiers. Sword in hand, Sakata had led Sergeant Onuki and his command team in a rush : "The enemy was about to take off as we jumped them. One Russian jabbed the muzzle of his rifle into my stomach at the moment I had my sword raised overhead. He pulled the trigger but the rifle did not go off. I cut him down before he could get me. The others ran away, but behind them they left grenades with pins pulled. Many of my men fell here and I was hit in the thighs". Onuki had felled two or three Russians behind Sakata, then disposed of an enemy who had been aiming at Sakata from the side. It had been around 03:00. On the right, the 1st Company had made relatively faster progress along the western slopes after having breached two widely separated belts of barbed wire. Once through the second wire, the troops had found a third line, 150 meters behind, and enemy machine guns had opened fire. Thereupon, a left-platoon private first class had taken a "do or die" forced clearing team, rushed 15 meters ahead of the infantry, and tore a path for the unit. At 03:00, Yamada had taken his men in a dash far up the right foot of the hill, overran the unexpected position, and captured two rapid-fire guns. The company's casualties had been mounting. Yamada had been hit in the chest but had continued to cheer his troops on. At 03:30, he had led a rush against the main objective, tents up the hill, behind the antitank guns. Yamada had cut down several bewildered soldiers in the tents, but had been shot again in the chest, gasping "Tenno Heika Banzai!" "Long Live the Emperor!", and had fallen dead. His citation had noted that he had "disrupted the enemy's rear after capturing the forwardmost positions and thus furnished the key to the ultimate rout of the whole enemy line." Sergeant Shioda, though wounded badly, and several of the men had picked up their commander's body and moved over to join Lieutenant Inagaki. On the left, Kadowaki had charged into the tents with his platoon and had played his part in interfering with the Russian rear. After this rush, the unit had been pinned down by fire from machine-gun emplacements, and Kadowaki had been wounded seriously. His platoon had veered left while watching for an opportunity to charge. Eventual contact had been made with Sakata's company. The assault on the right flank had been failing. With the death of Yamada, command of the company had been assumed temporarily by Inagaki. He and his right-flank platoon had managed to smash their way through the entanglements; Inagaki had sought to rush forward, sword in hand. Furious firing by Soviet machine guns, coupled with hand grenades, had checked the charge. Losses had mounted. Still another effort had bogged down in the face of enemy reinforcements, supported not only by covered but by tank-mounted machine guns. Russian tanks and trucks had appeared to be operating behind Changkufeng. Sergeant Shioda had been trying to keep the attack moving. Again and again, he had pushed toward the Soviet position with five of his surviving men, to no avail. The left-flank platoon had sought to evade the fierce fire by taking advantage of rock cover and hurling grenades. Finally, a private first class had lobbed in a grenade, rushed the machine gun, and silenced the weapon. By now, precious time and lives had been lost. Either instinctively or by order, the 1st Company had been shifting to the left, away from the core of the enemy fire-net. Inagaki had decided to veer left in a wide arc to outflank Changkufeng from the same side where the 2nd Company and most of the battalion were at-tacking. There would be no further attempts to plunge between the lake and the heights or to head for the crest from the rear. Military maps had indicated tersely that remnants of the 1st Company had displaced to the 2nd Company area at 04:00, sometime after the last charge on the right by Yamada. On the left front, in the sector facing the main defenses on Changkufeng crest, Sakata had fallen after being hit by a grenade. A machine gunner had improvised a sling. "I had lost a lot of blood," Sakata had said, "and there were no medics. Onuki, my command team chief who had been acting platoon leader, had been killed around here. I had ordered Warrant Officer Kuriyama to take the company and push on until I could catch up." As Sakata lay on the ground, he had seen the battalion commander and the Nakajima company move past him in the darkness. Nakano had said not a word; Sakata had not known the major had been maimed. "I still hadn't felt intense pain," Sakata had recalled. "I had rested after the first bad feelings. In about 15 minutes I had felt well enough to move up the hill and resume command of my company." With both Nakano and Sakata wounded, individual officers or noncoms had kept the assault moving. The 1st Platoon leader, Kuriyama, had been securing the first position after overrunning it but had become worried about the main force. On his own initiative, he had brought his men up the hill to join the rest of the company, while the battalion aide, 2nd Lieutenant Nishimura, had made arrangements to deploy the heavy machine guns and reserve infantry in support. Before 4 A.M., these troops under Kitahara and Nakajima had caught up with the remnants of the 2nd Company, which had pressed beyond the third position to points near the Soviet Crestline. By the time Sakata had regained his feet and moved toward the peak, somewhere between 03:30 and 04:00, the Japanese had been pinned down. Most of the losses had been incurred at this point. "Iron fragments, rock, sand, blood, and flesh had been flying around," Akaishizawa had written. Grenades had caused the preponderance of wounds after the men had penetrated the barbed wire. Deaths had been inflicted mainly by the Soviet "hurricane" of small arms and machine-gun fire and by ricochets ripping from man to man. Six Russian heavy weapons had kept up a relentless fire from three emplacements, and milk-bottle-shaped grenades had continued to thud down on the Japanese. The grenades had hindered the advance greatly. Mainly at the crest, but at every firing position as well, the Russians had used rifle grenades, primarily to eliminate dead angles in front of positions. There had been low piano wire between firing points, and yellow explosive had been planted amidst rock outcroppings and in front of the emplacements. "The Russians had relied exclusively on fire power; there had been no instance of a brave enemy charge employing cold steel." Only 20 meters from the entrenchments atop Changkufeng, Kitahara had been striving to regain the initiative and to hearten the scattered, reeling troops. One Japanese Army motto had concerned the mental attitude of commanders: "When surprised by the enemy, pause for a smoke." Kitahara had stood behind a rock, without a helmet, puffing calmly on a cigarette—a sight which had cheered the men. Sakata could not forget the scene. "It really happened," he had said, respectfully. As soon as Sakata had reached the forward lines, he had joined Kitahara (the senior officer and de facto battalion commander till then) and three enlisted men. All had been pinned behind the large boulder, the only possible cover, which had jutted in front of the Soviet crestline positions. Fire and flame had drenched the slopes, grenades from the peak, machine guns from the flank. The eastern skies had been brightening and faces could be discerned. Troubled by the stalemate yet not feeling failure, Sakata had said nothing about his own wounds but had told Kitahara he would lead his 2nd Company in a last charge up the left side of Changkufeng if only the machine gun company could do something about the enemy fire, especially some Soviet tanks which had been shooting from the right. "The enemy must have learned by now," the regimental records had observed, "that our forces were scanty, for the Soviets exposed the upper portions of their bodies over the breastworks, sniped incessantly, and lobbed illuminating shells at us." Agreeing with Sakata that the "blind" Japanese would have to take some kind of countermeasure to allow his two available heavy machine guns to go into concerted action, Kitahara had ordered illuminating rounds fired by the grenade dischargers. He had clambered atop the boulder and squatted there amidst the furious crossfire to spot for his guns, still only 20 meters from the Russian lines. Perhaps it had been the golden spark of Kitahara's cigarette, perhaps it had been the luminescence of his cross-bands, but hardly a moment later, at 04:03 am, a sniper's bullet had caught the captain between the eyes and he had toppled to his death. Nakajima had wanted to support Sakata's stricken company as well. The lieutenant had seen the advantage of outflanking the emplacements from the far left of Changkufeng where the fire of two Soviet heavy machine guns had been particularly devastating. Nakajima had swung his reserve unit around the crest to the southwest side, pressed forward through deadly grenade attacks, and had managed to reach a point ten meters from the Russian positions. Perched on the cliff's edge, he had prepared to continue: "Nakajima, who had been calming his men and looking for a chance to advance, leaped up and shouted, "Right now! Charge!" Sword in hand, he led his forces to the front on the left and edged up against the crest emplacements. But the enemy did not recoil; grenades and machine gun fusillades burst from above on all sides. Men fell, one after another. [During this final phase, a platoon leader and most of the key noncoms were killed.] A runner standing near Nakajima was hit in the head by a grenade and collapsed. Nakajima picked up the soldier's rifle, took cover behind a boulder, and tried to draw a bead on a Russian sniper whom he could see dimly 20 meters away through the lifting mist. But a bullet hit him in the left temple and he pitched forward, weakly calling, "Long Live the Emperor!" A PFC held the lieutenant up and pleaded with him to hang on, but the company commander's breath grew fainter and his end was at hand. The time was 4:10 am". Nakajima's orderly said of the event "Lieutenant Nakajima charged against the highest key point on Changkufeng, leading the reserve unit, and ensured the seizure of the hill. The lieutenant was wearing the boots which I had always kept polished but which he had never worn till this day." Akaishizawa added that Nakajima had purified himself in the waters of the Tumen before entering combat, in traditional fashion. Lieutenant Yanagihara had penned a tribute to his young fellow officer, the resolute samurai "Lt. Nakajima must have been expecting a day like today. He was wearing brand-new white underclothes and had wrapped his body with white cloth and the thousand-stitch stomach band which his mother had made for him. .. . Was not the lieutenant's end the same as we find in an old tanka verse? "Should you ask what is the Yamato spirit, the soul of Japan: It is wild cherry blossoms glowing in the rising sun." On this main attack front, Soviet heavy machine guns and tanks had continued to deliver withering fire against the Japanese remnants, while Russian snipers and grenadiers had taken an increasing toll. Shortly after 04:00, enemy reinforcements had appeared at the northeast edge. Of the company commanders, only Sakata had still been alive; the other three officers had died between 03:30 and 04:30. A machine gunner who had been pinned down near the crest had commented: "It must have been worse than Hill 203" (of bloody Russo-Japanese War fame). Between a half and two-thirds of each company had been dead or wounded by then. Sakata had still been thinking of ways to rush the main positions. After Kitahara had been shot down, he had moved around to investigate. A colleague had added: "The agony of the captain's wounds had been increasing. He rested several times to appease the pain while watching intently for some chance to charge once more." Now, Sakata had been wounded again by grenade fragments tearing into the right side of his face. "It hadn't been serious," Sakata had insisted. As he had limped about, he could see his platoon leader, Kuriyama, sniping at a Russian grenadier. Much would depend on the effectiveness of supporting firepower. With the death of Kitahara, control of the machine-gun company had been assumed by Master Sergeant Harayama. There had been almost no time to coordinate matters before Kitahara had fallen, but Harayama as well as Sakata had known that the infantry could not break loose until the Soviet heavy weapons had been suppressed. Working with another sergeant, Harayama had ordered his gunners to displace forward and rush the positions 20 meters away. The one heavy machine gun set up for action had been the first to fire for the Japanese side at Changkufeng, after its crew had manhandled it the last few meters to the first Soviet trench below the crest. The trench had been empty. Thereupon, the gunner had opened up against tents which could be seen 20 meters to the rear. Other friendly machine guns had begun to chatter. Kuriyama had dashed up and secured the southeast edge of the heights. Enemy resistance had begun to slacken. What appeared to be two small Soviet tanks, actually a tank and a tractor had been laying down fire near the tents in an apparent effort to cover a pullback. The two vehicles had advanced toward the Japanese and sought to neutralize the heavy machine guns. A squad leader had engaged the tractor, set it afire, and shot down the crewmen when they had tried to flee. Next, the tank had been stopped. The Japanese lead gun had consumed all of its armor-piercing (AP) ammunition—three clips, or 90 rounds—in 10 or 15 seconds. No more AP ammunition had been available; one box had been with the last of the six squads struggling up the heights. "More AP!" had yelled the 1st Squad leader, signaling with his hand—which had at that moment been hit by a Russian slug. A tank machine-gun bullet had also torn through the thumb and into the shoulder of the squad's machine gunner, whereupon the 21-year-old loader had taken over the piece. Similar replacements had occurred under fire in all squads, sometimes more than once in the same unit. "It had been a fantastic scene," Sakata had commented. "Just like grasshoppers! But they had finally neutralized the heavy weapons." The knocked-out Russian vehicles had begun to blaze while the eastern skies had lightened. New enemy tanks (some said many, others merely three) had lumbered up the slopes, but the Japanese heavy machine guns had continued to fire on them, and the tanks had stopped. If the machine guns had gone into action minutes later, the Russian armor might have continued to the top, from which they could have ripped up the surviving Japanese infantrymen: "So we gunners fired and fired. I could see my tracers bouncing off the armor, for there was still no AP. We also shot at machine guns and infantry. Since we carried little ammo for the night attack, my gun ran out, but by then the enemy had been ousted. We had originally expected that we might have to fire in support of the infantry after they took the crest. We lost none of our own heavy machine guns that night, overran four Maxims and captured mountains of hand grenades. By dawn, however, our machine gun company had lost more than half of its personnel—about 40 men". The light-machine-gun squad leader had been wounded in the hand by a grenade near the site where Sakata had been hit. Nevertheless, the superior private had clambered up the slope with his men. After 04:00, when he and his squad had been pinned down with the infantry below the crest, he had heard Japanese heavy machine guns firing toward the foe on the right: "Our units were in confusion, bunched up under terrific fire in a small area. Getting orders was impossible, so I had my light machine gun open up in the same direction at which the heavies were firing. We could identify no targets but tried to neutralize the enemy located somewhere on the crest. Although Soviet flares were going off, we never could glimpse the enemy clearly. But we heard the Russians yelling "Hurrah!" That ought to have been the signal for a charge; here it meant a retreat". But, of the ten men in this Japanese machine-gun squad, only four had been in action when dawn had come. The turning point had arrived when the machine-guns belonging to Sakata, and the reserves of the late Nakajima, had torn into the Russian emplacements, tanks, and tents behind. Others had said the key had been the fire of grenade dischargers belonging to the same units. A high-angle weapon, the grenade discharger, had been light, effective, and ideal for getting at dead space. In terms of ammunition, it had been especially useful, for it could fire hand grenades available to the foot soldier. Undoubtedly, the combined action of the grenade dischargers and machine guns (heavy and light) had paved the way for a last charge by the infantry. The four light machine guns of the 2nd and 4th companies had played their part by pouring flank fire against the Russians, who had clung to the position although Kuriyama's platoon had made an initial penetration. At about 04:30, Japanese assault forces could be seen dimly, in the light of dawn, exchanging fire with the Russians only a few meters away on the southern edge of Changkufeng Hill. At the same time, on the northern slopes, enemy reinforcements numbering 50 men with trucks and tanks had been scaling the hill. Around 04:45, Japanese grenades began to burst over the heads of the last enemy atop Changkufeng; the Russians had wavered. After the heavy weapons had finally begun to soften up the Soviet positions, Sakata had judged that there were not many Russians left. He had jumped into the first trench, ahead of his only surviving platoon leader, Kuriyama, and several soldiers. Two or three Russians had been disposed of; the rest had fled. By then the 2nd Company had been chopped down to a platoon; about 40 men still lived. There had been no cheer of banzai, as journalists had written; it would have drawn fire to stand up and raise one's arms. But Sakata had remained proud of the assertion by Sato that, from Chiangchunfeng, he had observed the last rush and knew the "real story," that "Sakata was the first to charge the peak." The regimental eulogist had written that Sakata's earnestness "cut through iron, penetrated mountains, and conquered bodily pain." As for Inagaki, about 15 or 20 minutes after the badly wounded Sakata had managed to reach the point where Kitahara and Nakajima had been pinned down near the Crestline, the lieutenant had arrived with the remnants of Yamada's company, probably by 04:20. The records would have us believe that Sakata had been able to coordinate the next actions with Inagaki despite the storm of fire: "The acting battalion commander [Sakata] resumed the charge with a brand-new deployment—his 2nd Company on the right wing and the 1st Company on the left." Actually, all Sakata could think of had been to charge; it had been too confused a time to issue anything like normal orders as acting battalion commander: "About all I remember asking Inagaki was: "What are you doing over here? What happened to your company commander?" I think he told me that Yamada had been killed and resistance on the right flank had been severe. Undoubtedly, he acted on his own initiative in redeploying. Nor was there any particular liaison between my company and Inagaki's force." To the left of Sakata's survivors were the vestiges of Nakajima's platoon, and further to the left, the outflanking troops brought up by Inagaki. These forces gradually edged up to the rear of the foe, in almost mass formation, on the western slope just below the top. "The enemy soldiers who had been climbing up the northern incline suddenly began to retreat, and Inagaki led a charge, fighting dauntlessly hand-to-hand." As a result of the more or less concerted Japanese assaults, "the desperately resisting enemy was finally crushed and Changkufeng peak was retaken completely by 05:15," three hours after the night attackers had jumped off. Akaishizawa had said that the troops "pushed across the peak through a river of blood and a mountain of corpses. Who could withstand our demons?" Sato's regimental attack order had called for the firing of a green star shell to signal success. At 05:15, according to the records, "the signal flared high above Changkufeng, showering green light upon the hill; the deeply stirring Japanese national flag floated on the top." Sakata thought that this must have been 10 or 20 minutes after the hill was taken, but he remembered no flare. "After the last charge I had no time to watch the sky!" The flare had probably been fired from a grenade launcher by the battalion aide or a headquarters soldier. After the final close-quarter fighting, Sakata had pressed forward while the survivors came up. The captain had deployed his men against possible counterattack. Later he had heard that Soviet tanks had lumbered up to reinforce the peak or to counterattack but that, when they observed the Japanese in possession of the crest, they had turned back. Only after his men had secured the peak had Sakata talked to Inagaki about sharing defensive responsibility. The records described Sakata's deployments at 05:20, but there had been painfully few men to match the tidy after-action maps. Did Sakata and his men push across the peak? "Not downhill a bit," he had answered. "We advanced only to the highest spot, the second, or right-hand peak, where we could command a view of the hostile slope." He had merely reconnoitered to deploy his troops. The senior surviving Japanese officer atop Changkufeng heights had been Sakata. What had happened to Major Nakano, who had been wounded shortly after jump-off? Although his right arm had been shattered, he had dragged himself to his feet, once he had regained consciousness, and kept climbing to catch up. His men had pleaded with him to look after his terrible wounds, but he had insisted on advancing, leaning on his sword and relying on spiritual strength. "Left! Move left!" he had been heard to shout, for the faltering Japanese had apparently been of the opinion that they were at the enemy's rear. Instead, they had pressed against the Russians' western wing, directly in front of the enemy works, from which murderous fire had been directed, especially from machine-gun nests ripping at their flanks. With sword brandished in his uninjured hand, high above his head, Nakano had stood at the corner of the positions. The explosion of an enemy grenade had illuminated him "like the god of fire," and he had been seen to crumple. He had died a little before 0500, to the left of where young Nakajima had fallen at 0430. His citation had said: "The battalion commander captured Changkufeng, thanks to his proper combat guidance and deployments. He provided the incentive to victory in the Changkufeng Incident." A eulogist had called Nakano a "human-bullet demon-unit commander": "All who observed this scene were amazed, for it was beyond mortal strength. One could see how high blazed the flame of his faith in certain victory and what a powerful sense of responsibility he had as unit commander. Major Nakano was a model soldier." When Nakano had pitched forward, badly wounded PFC Imamura had tried to protect the commander's corpse. Imamura had killed a soldier who appeared from behind a boulder, had lunged at another two or three, but had toppled off the cliff. Two other Japanese privates—a battalion runner and PFC Iwata—had been lying nearby, hurt seriously; but when they saw Imamura fall to his death, leaving the major's body undefended, they had dragged themselves to the corpse, four meters from the foe. Iwata, crippled and mute, had hugged Nakano's corpse until other soldiers managed to retrieve it. While death had come to Nakano, Sakata had been fighting with no knowledge of what was going on to his left. Pinned behind a boulder, he had had no way of checking on the battalion commander. Only after Sakata had charged onto the crest and asked for the major had he been told by somebody that Nakano had been killed. He had not even been sure where the commander had fallen. Such had been the time of blood and fury when battalion chief, company commanders, and platoon leaders had fought and died like common soldiers, pressing on with saber or pistol or sniping rifle under relentless cross-fire. Pretty patterns of textbook control had meant nothing. Life—and victory—depended on training, initiative, raw courage, and the will to win. The result of this combination of wills could not be ascertained, on 31 July 1938, until dawn brightened the bleeding earth on Changkufeng Hill. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Tokyo gambled on a night strike to seize Changkufeng, while diplomacy urged restraint. Amid mud, smoke, and moonless skies, Nakano led the 1st Battalion, supported by Nakajima, Sakata, Yamada, and others. One by one, officers fell, wounds multiplying, but resolve held. By 05:15, shattered units regrouped atop the peak, the flag rising as dawn bled into a costly, hard-won victory.

3.178 Fall and Rise of China: Lake Hasan

Last time we spoke about the beginning of a conflict between the USSR and Japan. In the frost-hardened dawns by the Chaun and Tumen, two powers eye a ridge called Changkufeng, each seeing a prize and fearing a trap. On the Soviet side, weary front-line troops tighten their grip, while Moscow's diplomats coaxed restraint through Seoul and Harbin. As July unfolds, Tokyo's generals push a dangerous idea: seize the hill with a surprise strike, then bargain for peace. Seoul's 19th Division is readied in secret, trains loaded with men and horses, movement masked, prayers whispered to avoid widening the rift. Japanese scouts in white Hanbok disguise, peering at trenches, wire, and watchful Russians. Russian border guards appear as shadows, counters slipping into place, yet both sides hold their fire. On July 29, a skirmish erupts: a platoon crosses a shallow line, clashes flare, and bodies and banners ripple in the cold air. #178 Night Attacks and Diplomatic Strains: The Lake Khasan Conflict Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. A second troop train was scheduled to depart Agochi for Nanam on the night of 29 July, carrying back the initial elements of the 75th Infantry. At Haigan, regimental commander Sato was pulling on his boots at 16:00 when the division informed him that fighting had broken out near Shachaofeng since 15:00 and that the Russians were assembling forces in that area. Suetaka ordered Sato's 3rd Battalion, which had not been slated to leave until the following night, to proceed to Kucheng; the remainder of the regiment was to assemble at Agochi. After consulting with Division Staff Officer Saito at Agochi, Sato returned to Haigan with the conclusion that "overall developments did not warrant optimism, it was imperative to prepare to move the entire regiment to the battlefield." One of Sato's first actions was to telephone a recommendation to the division that he be allowed to occupy Hill 52, which commanded the approaches to Changkufeng from south of Khasan. Suetaka approved, and at 17:30, Yamada's company was ordered to proceed to Shikai along with Hirahara's battalion. Meanwhile, Suzuki's 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, which had been among the last units ordered to leave, had finished loading at Agochi by about 15:00. Sato recommended to Suetaka that a portion of Suzuki's regiment be attached to him; this was why Suetaka decided to transfer one of the two batteries to the 75th Infantry. The rest of the heavy artillery concentrated at Kyonghun. Suetaka's orders, issued at 18:20, called for Sato to have two of his battalions, the 1st and 3rd, cross the Tumen as soon as possible, with engineer support. Attached was Narukawa's heavy battery. Sato's mission was twofold: to assist Senda and to watch the enemy in the Changkufeng area. Sato arrived at 21:15 in Shikai. There, he assembled a number of his officers, including Yamada, and explained his plan: the 1st Company plus machine guns were to cross the Tumen from Sozan ahead of the other units, occupy Hill 52 with an element, and concentrate the main body at the foot of Fangchuanting to await Hirahara's battalion. A portion of the 19th Engineers would go to Sozan to assist the 1st Company with its river crossing. Amid heavy rain and darkness, the various units set out at 22:15. The platoon sent to Hill 52 arrived before dawn on the 30th, the rest of the forces somewhat later, though Sato had intended to move everybody across the river by the early hours. On the 29th the engineer regiment commander, Kobayashi, had also arrived at Shikai. He ordered Captain Tomura to handle the crossing in the vicinity of Sozan, as well as preparations for a future offensive with the main body. When Kobayashi reached Kucheng, he learned from Hirahara not only about the front-line situation but also about Sato's important plans: "The K. Sato force is going to cross the river tonight, 29–30 July. A night attack will be launched against Changkufeng on the night of 30–31 July." Kobayashi issued orders to his two commanders to assist the crossing by Nakano's infantry unit, 1st Battalion, 75th Regiment at Matsu'otsuho and Sozan, and, in addition, to cooperate with the position attack by Nakano and help in the assault at Hill 52. Most of these young officers, such as Seutaka dishing out orders were performing what the Japanese termed "dokudan senko" or "arbitrary or independent action". Japanese operational regulations actually contained a section dealing with dokudan senko, by which initiative, not imperiousness, was meant. Two elements were involved: control but encouragement of self-reliant thinking. This subject became important in training officers, all of whom, including such infantry experts as Suetaka, were well acquainted with the requirements. Combat missions were stipulated in operations orders, but, if these were not realistic, initiative was to come into play, though only when there was no time to contact superiors. By the same token, commanders had to be ready to assume full responsibility if matters turned out adversely. "We were disciples of the 'Moltke' system of AGS control, with dual authority vis-à-vis the local forces and the chief of staff." The Korea Army's version of events on 29 July, there was no mention of any report received from the division prior to 17:30. Details did not reach Seoul, in the form of printed divisional intelligence reports and operational orders, until 1 August. The late afternoon report from Kyonghun provided the Korea Army authorities with little solid information, but Seoul had to notify higher headquarters immediately. Kitano sent messages to Tokyo and Hsinking at 19:15. The command and Kwantung Army were told that, in addition to Senda's assault party, 40 Japanese soldiers were deployed west of Changkufeng and at Yangkuanping. The division's main forces had begun the rail pullback from the 28th, leaving behind only two infantry battalions and a mountain artillery battalion for the time being. At 21:20 on 29 July, Korea Army Headquarters received the text of Suetaka's full report, which concluded: "With a view toward a possible emergency, the division suspended movement back of the 75th Regiment and is making necessary arrangements to have them advance instead. The latest affair derives sheerly from the enemy's unlawful challenge. It is my firm belief that the nature of this incident differs completely from the one at Changkufeng and should be handled separately. At present, since communication with the forward lines is not good, Lieutenant Colonel Senda (who is at the front) has been entrusted with command, but I assume entire responsibility for the consequences." Instead of boarding their trains at Agochi, Sato's regiment and supporting engineers moved to the Manchurian side of the Tumen as soon as possible. Suetaka called Sato's 2nd Battalion to Kyonghun as divisional reserve. Subsequent dispatches claimed that: (1) Senda's unit, which had driven off intruders in the Shachaofeng area once, was engaged against new Soviet forces (sent at 18:20, 29th); (2) Senda's unit had expelled trespassers, and a combat situation had developed near Shachaofeng (22:00, 29th); (3) fighting was going on in the vicinity of Shachaofeng (06:40, 30th). Korea Army Headquarters, however, obtained no more important communication concerning the events of 29 July than a report, sent that evening by Suetaka, that revealed his concern about a possible Soviet attack in the Wuchiatzu sector near the neck of the long Changkufeng appendix. After the clash at Shachaofeng, a general officer, Morimoto, happened to be visiting Colonels Okido and Tanaka in Nanam. Both of them were said to be of the pronounced opinion that no troubles ought to be provoked with the USSR while the critical Hankow operation lay ahead; yet Suetaka apparently had some intention of striking at the Soviet intruders, using the 75th Regiment. They urged that this policy not be adopted and that Suetaka be approached directly; the channel through Y. Nakamura, the division chief of staff, was hopeless. Although in agreement, General Morimoto declined to approach Suetaka; since the latter seemed to have made up his mind, it would be inappropriate to "meddle" with his command. Suetaka was functioning as an operations chief at that time. Apart from the mobilization staff officer, who was not enthusiastic about aggressive action, the only other officer who may have affected the decisionmaking process was the Hunchun OSS chief, Maj. Tanaka Tetsujiro, a positive type who shared Suetaka's views and was probably with him on the 29th as well as 30th. Although developments at Suetaka's command post were known more as the result of silence than of elucidation, we possessed considerable information about thinking at the Korea Army level: "Suetaka contacted us only after his men had driven out the enemy near Shachaofeng. Till then, the front had been relatively quiet and we were of the opinion all or most of the deployed forces were on their way home. We at Seoul had no foreknowledge of or connection with the 29 July affair. Reports came in; we never sent specific orders. Triggered by the affray at Shachaofeng, the division attacked on its own initiative. It was our understanding that very small Japanese forces had been committed to evict a dozen enemy scouts and that, when a platoon of ours got atop the hill, they observed surprisingly huge hostile concentrations to the rear. This was probably why the platoon pulied back, although much has been made of the desire to obey the nonaggravation policy to the letter. We at Seoul felt that this was a troublesome matter—that our side had done something unnecessary. When the division finally made its report, the army had to reach some decision. There were two irreconcilable ways of looking at things. We might condemn what had been done, and the division ought to be ordered to pull out promptly, having arbitrarily and intolerably acted against the known facts that Imperial sanction for use of force had been withheld and Tokyo had directed evacuation of the moved-up units. The opposing, eventually predominant view was that the division commander's course of action ought to be approved. Perusal of small-scale maps of the locale indicated a clear violation of the frontier, something not proved in the case of Changkufeng. We shared the division commander's interpretation. His BGU had its mission, and he was acting with foresight to solve matters positively and on his own, since he was the man closest to the problem. General Nakamura felt that the latest development was inevitable; our units did not cross the Tumen until the Soviets attacked us in force. Therefore, the division's actions were approved and a report was rendered promptly to Tokyo. It could be said that our outlook served to "cover" the division commander, in a way. But if IGHQ had ordered us to desist, we would have". Nakamura added: "I was of the opinion the only solution was to drive the Soviet troops outside Manchukuoan territory; therefore, I approved the action by the division." Such sanction had been granted on the basis of information supplied to Seoul by Suetaka on the evening of 29 July, again post facto. At 01:20 on the 30th, Nakamura wired Suetaka a message characterized by gracious phrasing that suggested his grave concern: "One ought to be satisfied with expelling from Manchurian territory the enemy attacking our unit on the . . . heights southwest of Shachaofeng. It is necessary to keep watch on the enemy for the time being, after having pulled back to the heights mentioned above, but we desire that matters be handled carefully to avoid enlargement; in case the foe has already pulled back south of Shachaofeng . . . he need not be attacked." Nakamura also sent a wire to the AGS chief, the War Minister, and the Kwantung Army commander. After conveying the information received from Suetaka, Nakamura continued: "In spite of the fact that our troops have been patient and cautious . . . this latest incident [near Shachaofeng] started with Soviet forces' arrogant border trespassing and . . . unlawful challenge. Therefore, I am convinced that this affair must be dealt with separately from the incident at Changkufeng. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to handle matters so that the incident will not spread and shall make it my fundamental principle to be satisfied with evicting from Manchurian territory the hostile forces confronting us. The Korea Army chief of staff is being dispatched quickly to handle the incident". The Korea Army, "painfully slow to act," says a Kwantung Army major, was merely the intermediary link, the executor of Tokyo's desires. In the case of remote Shachaofeng, there was an inevitable gap between on-the-spot occurrences and AGS reactions. By then, Arisue, Kotani, and Arao, Inada's observers, had returned to Japan—an important fact, given the "Moltke" system of staff control. Nevertheless, their return must have exerted significant effects on central operational thinking. Kotani remembered that his AGS subsection had given him a welcome-home party on the night of 29 July when an emergency phone call was received from the duty officer. "It was about the clash at Shachaofeng. The festivities came to an abrupt end and I headed for the office. From then till the cease-fire on 11 August, I remained at the AGS night and day." Since the 19th Division had furnished higher headquarters with minimal information, Tokyo, like Seoul, had only a few ostensible facts to act upon. But this had been the first combat test for the Korea Army, which needed all the encouragement and assistance possible. Although Japanese field armies, notably the Kwantung Army, were notorious for insubordination, one could not overemphasize the fact that the Korea Army was meek and tractable. If Nakamura had concluded that Suetaka acted properly (which reports from Seoul indicated), the AGS could hardly demur. It would have been unrealistic to think that Tokyo, although cautious, was "softer" about the Russian problem than front-line forces. There had been no concern over time lags; details were Seoul's province. Reaction took time at every level of the chain of command. Decision making in the Japanese Army had been a many-layered process. The Army general staff had been of the opinion that initial guidance ought to have been provided to the Korea Army soon, particularly since there had been evidence of failure to convey intentions promptly to the front and no high command staff officer remained to direct matters. After hearing from Seoul twice about the Shachaofeng affair, the responsible Army general staff officers conferred at length. Stress had been laid on the indivisibility of the Shachaofeng and Changkufeng incidents. It had also been evident that further information was required. On that basis, a "handling policy for the Shachaofeng Incident" was drafted, and Tada notified the Korea and Kwantung armies accordingly on 30 July. Nakamura had received the telegram at 16:50 and had its contents retransmitted to Kitano, then at Kyonghun: "Shachaofeng Incident is progressing along lines of our policy, leave things to local units, which have been adhering to the principle of nonenlargement. Have them report on front-line situation without fail." The Army general staff and the Korea Army were calling for prudence, but the division, well down the rungs of the ladder of command, was initiating actions that jeopardized the government's basic policy. Earlier quibbling about restraints on "unit-size" elements crossing into Manchuria had been abandoned after the firefight near Shachaofeng on 29 July. At 15:30, Takenouchi's battalion, part of the 76th Regiment, had been directed to assist Senda near Yangkuanping; at 18:20 Suetaka was ordering the 75th Regiment to head for the Kucheng sector and be ready to assault the Russians in the Changkufeng area. Support was to be provided by Kobayashi's engineers, by Iwano's transportation men, and by Suzuki's heavy guns. Of particular interest had been Suetaka's acceptance of Sato's recommendation that elements be sent to occupy Hill 52, a measure linked with a possible Japanese attack against Changkufeng. Sato had decided by evening that the new situation required rapid deployment of his forces across the river. At Shikai, he conducted a briefing of his officers. Suetaka's orders conveyed orally by staff officers had stipulated: "The division will take steps to secure the border line immediately, even if the situation undergoes change. The Sato unit will advance immediately to the left shore, reinforce Senda's unit, and maintain a strict watch on the enemy in the Changkufeng area." Around 23:20, the last elements ordered forward arrived at Shikai station. Sato instructed only his headquarters and the Ito company to get off. The rest of the troop train primarily the 1st [Nakano's] Battalion was to move on to Hongui. From there, the soldiers proceeded to the Tumen near Sozan. With his staff and Ito's company, Sato trudged in silence through the mud from Shikai to the shore at Matsu'otsuho, starting at 00:30 and reaching the crossing site at 03:00. Reconnaissance had proved satisfactory, Sato remembered. At the crossings, the hardworking engineers rowed his 1st and 3rd battalions across, company by company. Near dawn, around 04:30, he traversed the river. The movement had been completed in about an hour. When Sato's infantry finally got across, they proceeded to the skirt of Fangchuanting and assembled in secrecy. Not until about 08:00 did the regimental headquarters, Ito's company, and Hirahara's battalion reach Hill 147, already held by Noguchi's company west of Changkufeng. By then, plans had fallen behind schedule by at least several hours because of difficulties in train movement forward. Sato also remembered torrential rains; other officers mentioned darkness. Members of Nakano's battalion pinpointed a shortage of engineer boats from Kucheng. Engineers rowed some boats downstream during the night, but six of them were kept at Matsu'otsuho. This left only three boats for moving the 400 men of the 1st Battalion, the unit slated to storm Changkufeng, across the river at Sozan. Sato had wanted all of his troops across well before dawn on the 30th. A division staff officer rightly thought that Suetaka had already advised Sato, in secret, to "attack at an opportune time," and that the night of 29–30 July had been intended for the surprise assault. "Perhaps there was not enough time for all the attack preparations." Kobayashi's engineers admitted problems in moving boats to Sozan: "Although the water level had gone up because of daily rains recently, there were still many shallows and the current was irregular. Not only was it hard to move downstream, but dense fog also complicated the work. Nevertheless, the units at both sites were able to accomplish the river-crossing operation approximately as scheduled". Meanwhile, after reconnoitering Soviet defenses along the Manchurian bank, Suzuki, commander of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, crossed the Kyonghun Bridge on 30 July with his 1st Battery and established positions on the edge of Shuiliufeng Hill. Once Captain Narukawa was attached to the 75th Infantry on 29 July, he dispatched his 2nd Battery by train to Shikai that night. Although firing sites had been surveyed northwest of Sho-Sozan, the battery had to traverse two weak, narrow bridges in the darkness. With two 15-centimeter howitzers to haul, plus five caissons and wagons, the unit faced tense moments. The gun sites themselves were worrisome: they were scarcely masked from observation from Changkufeng, and the single road to them from the unloading station ran through a paddy area and was similarly exposed. By 1200 hours on 30 July, Sato exerted operational control over the following units: his own forces, Nakano's battalion east of Fangchuanting; Hirahara's reinforced battalion west of Chiangchunfeng; a platoon from Nakajima's infantry company on Hill 52; and Noguchi's company on Hill 147; and from other forces, Senda's 2nd (Kanda) BGU Company; two reinforced companies from Takenouchi's battalion of Okido's 76th Regiment near Shachaofeng; and a 75-mm half-battery from the 25th Mountain Artillery on the Manchurian side with Sato. On the Korean shore, another half-battery comprising two 15-centimeter howitzers from Narukawa's unit of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery was in place. The 19th Engineers operated near the crossing sites, though one platoon remained at Fangchuanting. Sato said, "We were now deployed at last, to cope with any situation." His command post was set in foxholes on open ground at Chiangchunfeng, a central hill that offered excellent observation and control over actions around Changkufeng to the east and Shachaofeng to the north. Not content with suspending the pullout of units and deploying additional combat troops across the Tumen, Suetaka decided to recall division headquarters, mountain artillery, cavalry, signal, medical, and veterinary personnel from Nanam. At dawn on 30 July, Nanam issued orders for Colonel Tanaka to move 500 men and 300 horses to Agochi by rail; most of the increment came from Tanaka's horse-drawn 25th Mountain Artillery. The colonel reached the Korean side of the Tumen at 05:00 on 31 July. The preceding emergency measures were being implemented by Suetaka, even as he received Nakamura's calming telegram of 30 July enjoining nonexpansion. Changkufeng Hill was not even mentioned. Nakamura's concern was typified by Kitano flying to the front. At 10:00 on 30 July, Kitano sent the division chief of staff a cautious follow-up cable: "Based on the consistent policy for handling the Changkufeng Incident and on the army commander's earlier telegram, kindly take steps to ensure careful action in connection with the affair in the Shachaofeng vicinity lest there be enlargement." At 13:45, Nakamura transmitted another restraining message to Suetaka: "The division is to secure … Chiangchunfeng and … the heights southwest of Shachaofeng, using present front-line units. Unless there is an enemy attack, however, resort to force will depend on separate orders." Several hours later, at 16:50, Nakamura received instructions from Tada: the Shachaofeng case was being left to the local forces, who were pursuing the desired policy of nonenlargement, but prompt reporting was desired. At 19:30, the retransmitted message was received by Kitano, already at the front with Suetaka at Kyonghun. After his units had crossed the Tumen on 30 July, Sato Kotoku ordered a strict watch and directed preparations for an assault based on the plans. He conferred with Senda at Chiangchunfeng and observed the enemy. Even after dawn, the frontline commanders who had crossed the river remained uncertain about when the attack would be staged. While Sato's force conducted reconnaissance to prepare for a daytime offensive, orders arrived around 08:00 indicating, "We intend a night attack, so conceal your activities." Daytime movements were prohibited. Sato then explained the impression he had derived from Senda and the intelligence on which he based his estimates: " Exploiting the impasse in diplomatic negotiation, the enemy side had steadily reinforced front-line offensive strength and trespassed anew near Shachaofeng. They now had a battalion and a half of infantry plus 20 artillery pieces in the area, some south of Shachaofeng and the others at four positions immediately east of Lake Khasan. At least a dozen (maybe 20) tanks were deployed in the sector opposite us. About 300 well-armed, active Russian troops were at Changkufeng. I decided that an attack ought to be staged that night. First of all, we were going to chill the insolent enemy by a courageous night assault—a method characteristic of the Imperial Army. Then all kinds of fire power were to be combined in a surprise attack against the positions. Our intention was to jo lt the Russians, demonstrate the true strength of our combat fire, and, by a combination of night and dawn attacks, cut down losses which our left-flank units would have incurred if a night assault alone were staged. We had considered two plans—a night attack against Changkufeng by the 3rd Battalion from the north, or by the 1st Battalion from the south. On 30 July, I decided to execute the second plan, using my 1st (Nakano's) Battalion, to avoid simultaneous involvement around Shachaofeng where the foe was by now alerted." The Japanese Army ordinarily favored surprise assaults without supporting guns, since firepower was regarded as secondary in close combat and artillery was in short supply. According to the regimental journal, telephone contacts from the morning of the 30th indicated that the division commander shared the same line of thinking as Sato. By noon, Suetaka made his stance explicit. A phone call from Kucheng conveyed to Sato the gist of a critical division order: first, a detailed briefing on Soviet troop concentrations and dispositions, firing positions, troops, and armor south of Shachaofeng; entanglements and forces at Changkufeng; large concentrations behind west of Khasan; tanks and ground formations moving north of the lake; a heavy concentration near the lake to the northwest; one confirmed and two suspected positions along the eastern shore and another with artillery far to the south. Then the order stated that K. Sato's forces, including the Takenouchi battalion from the 76th Infantry, one mountain artillery platoon, and one engineer platoon were to strengthen their positions and, at the same time, promptly evict from Manchurian territory the intruding and advancing enemy. However, pursuit must not be pushed too far lest the border be crossed. Shortly after noon, Suetaka issued another order to form a new force under Senda, who was to strengthen border security along the Shuiliufeng–Hunchun line. As with Sato, Senda was to eject the intruding and advancing enemy from Manchurian soil but not pursue them across the border. By midafternoon, Sato knew not only what he wanted to do but also Suetaka's intentions. At 15:30, he assembled all subordinate officers at Chiangchunfeng and dictated minute attack instructions. Intelligence indicated that the enemy continued to fortify points of importance along the Changkufeng–Shachaofeng line. Sato's plan was to annihilate hostile elements that had crossed the border north and south of Changkufeng. His concept went beyond a frontal assault. While Nakano's battalion would jump off south of Changkufeng, one reinforced company, Takeshita's 10th was to attack north. Since the sun rose at about 05:00, Sato intended to wipe out the enemy during three hours of darkness. Another battalion, Hirahara's 3rd would be held in reserve, with Ito's 6th Company ready to launch a night attack against Changkufeng from the northwest if necessary. Small forces deployed southeast at Hill 52 were to block the arrival of Soviet reinforcements around the southern shores of Khasan. Only after Changkufeng was secured and fire swept the high ground south of Shachaofeng would a reinforced battalion, Takenouchi's 1st from the 76th Regiment undertake a dawn assault to clear the Russians from that sector. An engineer platoon would assist both the night and dawn assault battalions with obstacle clearing. There would be no artillery support until dawn, when the available guns were to provide maximum coverage. Notably, even the movement of a single antitank gun warranted mention. Sato concluded the attack order by directing that each unit mask its intentions after sunset. Takenouchi was to act to check the enemy as soon as the sun went down. In connection with the dawn barrage against the enemy southwest of Shachaofeng, key personnel were to study the best way to exploit sudden fire described as gale and lightning. They were also to be ready to destroy enemy tanks. A green star shell would be fired to signal the success of the night attack. The code words were shojiki "honesty" and ydmo "bravery". At midnight, the regiment commander would be at the northwest foot of Chiangchunfeng. The order stressed typical night-attack precautions: secrecy and concealment, avoidance of confusion, antitank defense, and flare signaling of success. Sato added his own flair with his daily motto as code words and the reference to "whirlwind" fire. Impending action times were explicitly set when the order was issued at 15:30 on the 30th, more than ten hours before the 1st Battalion was to jump off. The key to success in a night assault lay in an absolute prohibition on firing by their side, and bold, courageous charging. Sato reminded his men that life is granted again after death. Nakano then assembled his company commanders east of Fangchuanting and issued his battalion order at 18:30. A few hours after Sato's briefing of the assault commanders, Suetaka arrived at the 75th Regiment command post. This visit late on 30 July is central to allegations that Sato, not Suetaka, conceived and executed the night attack on his own initiative. Divisional orders giving Sato his core mission had already been conveyed by telephone. After 16:00, Suetaka boarded a motorboat at Kucheng and went to the Manchurian side to verify front-line conditions. Soviet snipers south of Yangkuanping fired several shots, but his craft reached the Matsu'otsuho landing and proceeded to Chiangchunfeng to meet Sato. Sato described the situation: "frontline enemy forces had been reinforced steadily and had begun a vigorous offensive. The foe was provoking us, and the matter had grown very serious. I had already issued orders at 15:30 to take the initiative and deal the enemy a smashing blow." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On a frost-bitten dawn by the Chaun and Tumen, Russia and Japan lock eyes over Changkufeng. Diplomats urge restraint, yet Tokyo's generals push a bold gamble: seize a hill with a surprise strike and bargain later. Japanese divisions, engineers, and artillery edge toward the border, while Soviet sentries brace for a confrontation that could widen the war.

3.177 Fall and Rise of China: Point of no return for the USSR and Japan

Last time we spoke about the Changkufeng Incident. In a frost-bitten dawn along the Chaun and Tumen rivers, a border notched with memory becomes the stage for a quiet duel of will. On one side, Japanese officers led by Inada Masazum study maps, mud, and the hill known as Changkufeng, weighing ground it offers and the risk of war. They glimpse a prize, high ground that could shield lines to Korea—yet they sense peril in every ridge, every scent of winter wind. Across the line, Soviet forces tighten their grip on the crest, their eyes fixed on the same hill, their tents and vehicles creeping closer to the border. The air hums with cautious diplomacy: Moscow's orders pulse through Seoul and Harbin, urging restraint, probing, deterring, but never inviting full-scale conflict. Yet every patrol, every reconnaissance, seems to tilt the balance toward escalation. #177 The point of no return for the USSR and Japan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Days passed and the local emissaries had not been released by the Russians. Domei reported from Seoul that the authorities were growing worried; the "brazen" actions of Soviet front-line forces infuriated the Manchurians and Japanese. From Seoul, too, came ominous news that villagers were preparing to evacuate because they feared fighting would soon begin in the Changkufeng area. While diplomatic activity continued in Moscow without effect, the Tokyo press continued to report intense military activity throughout the Soviet Far East—the greatest massing of troops in months, with planes, armored cars, and motorized equipment choking the Trans-Siberian railway. The press was dominated by commentary about the danger of war. One enterprising Tokyo publisher ran advertisements under the heading: "The Manchukuo-Soviet Border Situation Is Urgent—Ours Is the Only Detailed Map of the Soviet Far East: Newspaper-size, in seven clear colors, offset printed, only 50 sen." Although the Manchukuoan foreign office issued a statement on 20 July about the dire consequences the Soviets were inviting, it is probable that the next Russian actions, of a conciliatory nature, were reached independently. Either Moscow had taken almost a week to make the decision, or the diplomatic conversations there had had an effect. Local Japanese authorities reported inactivity on the Changkufeng front from the morning of 23 July. On the next day, word was received that the USSR proposed to return the two emissaries as "trespassers." At midday on 26 July, the Russians released the blindfolded agents at a border site along the Novokievsk road. After completing the formalities, the Japanese asked the Russians for a reply concerning local settlement of the incident. According to Japanese sources, the "flustered" Colonel Grebennik answered: "My assignment today was merely to turn over the envoys. As for any request about the Changkufeng Incident, our guard commander must have asked for instructions from the central government. I think this is the type of matter which must be answered by the authorities at Moscow through diplomatic channels." Grebennik's postwar recollection does not differ appreciably from the Japanese version. Soviet sources mention a second effort by the Japanese military to deliver a message under more forceful circumstances. On 23 July a Soviet border unit drove off a four-man party. Russian cavalry, sent to investigate, discovered that the Japanese had pulled down a telegraph pole, severed lines 100–150 meters inside Soviet territory, absconded with wire, and left behind a white flag and a letter. Undated, unsigned, and written in Korean, the message struck Grebennik as being substantively the same as the communication delivered formally by the emissaries on 18 July. Japanese materials make no reference to a second, informal effort by local forces, but there is little reason to doubt that such an attempt, perhaps unauthorized, was made. Although Japanese efforts at low-level negotiations came to naught, two observations emerged from the local authorities and the press. First, on-the-spot negotiations had broken down; it had been difficult even to reclaim the emissaries, and the Russians in the Posyet region were using various pretexts to refer matters to diplomatic echelons. Second, the Russians had released the men. Some interpreted this as the first evidence of Soviet sincerity; possibly, the USSR would even return Matsushima's body as a step toward settlement. Other Japanese observers on the scene warned the public that it was imperative to stay on guard: "All depends on how diplomacy proceeds and how the front-line troops behave." Yet the excitement in the Japanese press began to abate. It is difficult to ascertain the nature of the decision-making process on the Russian side after the Japanese attempted local negotiations. The Soviets contend that nothing special had been undertaken before the Japanese provoked matters at the end of July. Grebennik, however, admits that after receiving the two Japanese communications, "we started to prepare against an attack on us in the Lake Khasan area." He and a group of officers went to Changkufeng Hill and sent as many border guards there as possible. Although he personally observed Japanese troops and instructed his officers to do the same, he denied categorically that the Russians constructed trenches and fortifications. Only the observation of Manchurian territory was intensified while instructions were awaited from higher headquarters. For its part, the Korea Army was carrying out Imperial general headquarters first instructions while pursuing a wait-and-see policy. On 16 July, Korea Army Headquarters wired an important operations order to Suetaka. With a view toward a possible attack against intruders in the Khasan area, the army planned to make preparations. The division commander was to alert stipulated units for emergency dispatch and send key personnel to the Kyonghun sector to undertake preparations for an attack. Lt. Col. Senda Sadasue, BGU commander of the 76th Infantry Regiment, was to reconnoiter, reinforce nearby districts, and be ready for emergencies. Particular care was enjoined not to irritate the Soviet side. Maj. Gen. Yokoyama Shinpei, the Hunchun garrison commander, was to maintain close contact with the BGU and take every precaution in guarding the frontiers. Like Senda, Yokoyama was warned against irritating the Russians. Korea Army Headquarters also dispatched staff to the front and had them begin preparations, envisaging an offensive. Upon receipt of the army order, Suetaka issued implementing instructions from his Nanam headquarters at 4:30 A.M. on the 17th. The following units were to prepare for immediate alert: the 38th Infantry Brigade Headquarters, 75th Infantry Regiment, 27th Cavalry Regiment, 5th Antiaircraft Regiment, and 19th Engineer Regiment. The same instructions applied to the next units, except that elements organic to the division were designated: the 76th Infantry Regiment, 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment, and 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment. Another order enjoined utmost care not to irritate the Russians; Japanese actions were to be masked. Next came a directive to the forces of Senda and K. Sato. The former comprised mainly the 76th Infantry BGU and a cavalry platoon. The latter was built around the 75th Infantry Regiment, the Kucheng garrison unit, another cavalry platoon, two mountain artillery and one heavy field artillery battalion, and the 19th Engineers. Suetaka's idea about a solution to the border troubles had become concrete and aggressive. From the night of July 17, concentration would be accomplished gradually. The exact timing of the attack would be determined by subsequent orders; in Senda's area, there was no such restriction regarding "counteraction brought on by enemy attack." Division signal and intendant officers would conduct reconnaissance related to communications, billeting, food, and supplies. Sato and his subordinates were to reconnoiter personally. Having ordered the division to begin concentration and to stand by, Korea Army Headquarters was prepared the next morning, July 17, to direct the movement. Nevertheless, there was concern in Seoul that Suetaka's advance elements might cross the Tumen River into Manchurian territory, which could result in a clash with Soviet troops. Such an outcome might run counter to the principle established by Imperial general headquarters. Consequently, it was decided that "movement east of the river would therefore have to be forbidden in the Korea Army's implementing order." Nakamura transmitted his operational instructions to Suetaka at 6:00 on July 17: "No great change in latest situation around Lake Khasan. Soviet forces are still occupying Changkufeng area. Diplomaticlevel negotiations on part of central authorities and Manchukuoan government do not appear to have progressed. Considering various circumstances and with view to preparations, this army will concentrate elements of 19th Division between Shikai, Kyonghun, Agochi." Restrictions stipulated that the division commander would transport the units by rail and motor vehicle and concentrate them in the waiting zone in secret. Movement was to begin on the night of July 17 and to be completed the next day. Further orders, however, must govern unit advance east of the Tumen as well as use of force. The remainder of the division was to stay ready to move out. Troops were to carry rations for about two weeks. Late that day, Suetaka received an order by phone for his subordinates in line with Seoul's instructions. Senda would handle the concentration of elements assembling at Kyonghun, and Sato would do the same for the main units arriving at Agochi. A communications net was to be set up quickly. Caution was to be exercised not to undertake provocative actions against the opposite bank of the Tumen, even for reconnaissance. The division would dispatch two trains from Hoeryong and four from Nanam. At 11:58 pm on 18 July, the first train left Hoeryong for Agochi. Concentration of units was completed by dawn. By that time, the Japanese had dispatched to the border 3,236 men and 743 horses. Past midnight on 20 July, Division Chief of Staff Nakamura wired headquarters that the division was ready to take any action required, having completed the alert process by 11 pm. Japanese scouting of the Changkufeng sector began in earnest after mid-July. Although the affair had seemed amenable to settlement, Sato took steps for an emergency from around the 14th. His thoughts centered on readiness for an attack against Changkufeng, which simultaneously required reconnaissance for the assault and preparation to pull the regiment back quickly to Hoeryong if a withdrawal was ordered. After arriving at Haigan on 18 July, Sato set out with several engineers. At Kucheng, the officers donned white Korean clothing, presumably the disguise directed by the division—and boarded native oxcarts for a leisurely journey southward along the Korean bank of the Tumen across from Changkufeng. The seemingly innocent "farmers" studied the river for crossing sites and Changkufeng Hill for the extent of enemy activity. On the hill's western slope, in Manchurian territory, three rows of Russian entanglements could be observed 300 feet below the crest. Only a handful of soldiers were visible, probably a platoon, certainly not more than a company. Infantry Captain Yamada Teizo conducted secret reconnaissance of the entire Changkufeng-Hill 52 sector for 314 hours in the afternoon of 18 July. Even after intense scanning through powerful binoculars, he could detect no more than 19 lookouts and six horsemen; camouflage work had been completed that day, and there were ten separate covered trench or base points. Barbed wire, under camouflage, extended about four meters in depth, yet even Yamada's trained eye could not determine whether there was one line of stakes or two. He jotted down what he could see and compared his information with that learned from local police. Artillery Colonel R. Tanaka shared the view that the Soviets had intruded. When he went reconnoitering along the Korean bank, he observed Russian soldiers entrenched around the hilltop, easily visible through binoculars at a range of two kilometers. Trenches had been dug 20 to 30 meters below the crest on the western slope. Eventually, there were three rows of barbed wire, the first just below the trenches and the lowest 100 meters under the summit. Tanaka estimated Soviet strength at two companies (about 200 men). Suetaka's intelligence officer, Sasai, recalls seeing barbed wire after Japanese units deployed to the front on 18–19 July; he had surmised then that the entanglements were being prepared out of fear of a Japanese assault. To obtain first-hand information, the Gaimusho ordered a section chief, Miura Kazu'ichi, to the spot. Between 23 July and the cease-fire in August, Miura collected data at Kyonghun and transmitted reports from the consulate at Hunchun. On 28 July he visited Sozan on the Korean bank. He observed Soviet soldiers on the western slopes of Changkufeng, digging trenches and driving stakes. These actions were clearly on Manchukuoan territory even according to Soviet maps. Miura insisted that he saw no friendly troops on territory claimed by the Russians and observed no provocative actions by the Japanese. These statements are supported by a map drawn for him in early August by Division Staff Officer Saito Toshio, a sketch Miura retained as late as 1947. Miura's testimony is tempered by his assertion that he saw a red flag flying near the top of Changkufeng Hill. This contention conflicts with all evidence, as Russian lawyers at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East argued, it is improbable that a Soviet frontier post, highly interested in camouflage, would have hoisted a pennon so large that it could be seen from Sozan. Russian sources are unanimous in stating that no flag was put up until 6 August and that no trenches or entanglements were established by Soviet border guards in July, at least prior to the 29th. The two Army General staff consultants, Arisue and Kotani, arrived in Seoul on 16 July, the day Korea Army Headquarters was ordering an alert for the 19th Division "with a view toward a possible attack against enemy intruders." Inada dispatched them mainly to inspect the frontline situation; but he had not fully decided on reconnaissance in force. At Shikai, Arisue and Kotani donned Korean garb and traveled by oxcart on the Korean side of the Tumen, reconnoitering opposite the Shachaofeng sector. Kotani was convinced that hostile possession of Changkufeng posed a serious threat to the Korean railway. He agreed with the division's estimate that, if the Japanese did decide to seize Changkufeng, it ought not to be too difficult. Arisue, as senior observer, dispatched messages from Kyonghun to Tokyo detailing their analysis and recommendations. Meanwhile, in Tokyo, on 17 July the central military authorities received a cable from the Japanese envoy in Moscow, Colonel Doi Akio, reporting that prospects for a diplomatic settlement were nil. The USSR was taking a hard line because Japan was deeply involved in China, though there were domestic considerations as well. The Russians, however, showed no intention of using the border incident to provoke war. It would be best for Japan to seize Changkufeng quickly and then press forward with parleys. Meanwhile, Japan should conduct an intensive domestic and external propaganda campaign. There was mounting pressure in the high command that negotiations, conducted "unaided," would miss an opportunity. Based on reports from Arisue and Kotani, that army seemed to be contemplating an unimaginative, ponderous plan: an infantry battalion would cross the Tumen west of Changkufeng and attack frontally, while two more battalions would cross south of Kyonghun to drive along the river and assault Changkufeng from the north. Inada sent a telegram on 17 July to Arisue for "reference." Prospects had diminished that Soviet troops would withdraw as a result of negotiation. As for the attack ideas Arisue mentioned, Inada believed it necessary to prepare to retake Changkufeng with a night attack using small forces. To avoid widening the crisis, the best plan was a limited, surprise attack using ground units. The notion of a surprise attack drew on the Kwantung Army's extensive combat experience in Manchuria since 1931. The next morning, after the forward concentration of troops was completed, Suetaka went to the front. From Kucheng, he observed the Changkufeng district and decided on concrete plans for use of force. Meanwhile, Nakamura was curbing any hawkish courses at the front. As high-command sources privately conceded later, the younger officers in Tokyo sometimes seemed to think the commander was doing too good a job; there was covert sentiment that it might be preferable if someone in the chain of command acted independently before the opportunity slipped away. This is significant in light of the usual complaints by responsible central authorities about gekokujo—insubordination—by local commands. An important report influencing the high command's view arrived from Kwantung Army Intelligence on 19 July: according to agents in Khabarovsk, the USSR would not let the Changkufeng incident develop into war; Russians also believed there would be no large-scale Soviet intrusion into their territory. By 19 July, the Tokyo operations staff was considering the best method to restore control of the lost hill by force, since Seoul appeared to maintain its laissez-faire stance. On 18 July, Arisue and Kotani were instructed by Imperial General headquarters to assist the Korea Army and the 19th Division regarding the Changkufeng Incident. What the Army general staff operations officers sought was an Imperial General headquarters order, requiring Imperial sanction, that would instruct the Korea Army to evict the Russian troops from Changkufeng the way the Kwantung Army would, using units already under Nakamura's command. The sense was that the affair could be handled locally, but if the USSR sought to escalate the incident, it might be prudent for that to occur before the Hankow operation began. The IGHQ and War Ministry coordinated the drafting of an IGHQ order on 19–20 July: "We deem it advisable to eradicate Soviet challenges . . . by promptly delivering blow on this occasion against unit which crossed border at Changkufeng. That unit is in disadvantageous spot strategically and tactically; thus, probability is scant that dispute would enlarge, and we are investigating countermeasures in any case. Careless expansion of situation is definitely not desired. We would like you people also to conduct studies concerning mode of assault employing smallest strength possible for surprise attack against limited objective. Kindly learn general atmosphere here [Tokyo] from [Operations] Major Arao Okikatsu." The 20th of July proved to be a hectic day in Korea, and even more so in Tokyo. The division had informed the Korea Army that it was finally "ready to go," a message received in Seoul in the early hours. Then Arisue received a wire from Inada presenting limited-attack plans and noting that Arao was on the way. By that day, Japanese intelligence judged there were 400 Soviet troops and two or three mountain guns south of Paksikori. Russian positions at Changkufeng had been reinforced, but no aggressive intentions could be detected. Soviet ground elements, as well as materiel, appeared to be moving from Vladivostok and Slavyanka toward Posyet. Suetaka headed back to the front. Sato told him that it was absolutely necessary to occupy Chiangchunfeng Hill across the Tumen in Manchurian territory. Upon reaching the Wuchiatzu sector and inspecting the situation, Suetaka agreed to send a small unit to Chiangchunfeng on his own authority. Colonel Sato Kotoku had ordered one company to move across the Tumen toward Chiangchunfeng on 21 July, a maneuver that did not escape the Russians' notice. On 24 July, the same day another Japanese unit occupied Shangchiaoshan Hill, Marshal Blyukher ordered the 40th Rifle Division, stationed in the Posyet area to be placed on combat readiness, with a force of regulars assigned to back the Soviet border guards; two reinforced rifle battalions were detached as a reserve. According to Japanese records, Russian border patrols began appearing around Huichungyuan, Yangkuanping, and Shachaofeng from 26 July, but no serious incidents were reported at that stage. At about 9:30 am on 29 July, Captain Kanda, the 2nd Company commander of Lieutenant Colonel Senda's 76th Border Garrison Unit, was observing the Shachaofeng area from his Kucheng cantonments. Through his glasses, Kanda observed four or five Soviet soldiers engaged in construction on high ground on the west side of Shachaofeng. Kanda notified Senda, who was at BGU Headquarters inspecting the forward areas. Senda transmitted the information to Suetaka. Deciding to cross the Tumen for a closer look, Senda set off with Kanda. A little after 11 am, they reached Chiangchunfeng Hill, where the men from Captain Noguchi's company were already located. Senda verified, to his own satisfaction, that as many as 10 enemy infantrymen had "violated the border" to a depth of 350 meters, "even by the Soviets' contention", and were starting construction 1,000 meters south of Shachaofeng. Senda decided to oust the Russian force "promptly and resolutely," in light of the basic mission assigned his unit. He telephoned Suetaka, who was in Kyonghun, and supplied the intelligence and the recommendation. Subordinates recalled Suetaka's initial reaction when the BGU reported a Soviet intrusion about a mile and a half north of Changkufeng. "The arrogant Russians were making fools of the Japanese, or were trying to. At stake was not a trifling hill and a few invaders, but the honor of the Imperial Army. In the face of this insult, the general became furious. He insisted upon smashing the enemy right away." Kanda phoned 2nd Lieutenant Sakuma, who was still at Kucheng, and told him to bring his 25-man platoon across the river by 2 pm Sakuma crossed by boat and arrived at 1:30. Kanda set out from Chiangchunfeng at 2:20, took over Sakuma's unit, bore east, and approached within 700 meters of the enemy. He ordered the men not to fire unless fired upon, and to withdraw quickly after routing the Russians. It is said that the Japanese troops were fired upon as they advanced in deployed formation but did not respond at first. In a valley, casualties were incurred and the Japanese finally returned fire. Sakuma's 1st Squad leader took a light machine gun and pinned down the Russians facing him. Sakuma himself pressed forward with his other two squads, taking advantage of the slope to envelop the enemy from the right. At the same time, he sent a patrol to the high ground on the left to cover the platoon's flank. Thanks to the 1st Squad's frontal assault, the Russians had no chance to worry about their wings, and Sakuma moved forward to a point only 30 meters from the foe's rear. Kanda was now 50 meters from the Russians. When the enemy light machine gun let up, he ordered a charge and, in the lead, personally cut down one of the foe. Sakuma also rushed the Soviets, but when about to bring down his saber he was stabbed in the face while another Russian struck him in the shoulder. Grappling with this assailant, Sakuma felled him. Other Japanese attackers sabered two more Russians and shot the rest. By 3:10 pm the eight enemy "trespassers" had been annihilated. The covering patrol reported that five Soviet horsemen, with a light machine gun, were galloping up from Khasan. Sakuma had his platoon fire grenade dischargers, which smashed the enemy. Seventy more Russian soldiers now came, attacking from northwest of the lake and supported by fire from the east side. Using light machine guns and grenade dischargers, Sakuma checked them. Meanwhile, Miyashita's platoon, part of Noguchi's company, had departed from Chiangchunfeng at 2:20 pm and swung right until it reached the crestline between Changkufeng and Kanda's company. One squad faced 200 Russians on Changkufeng; the other faced the enemy south of Shachaofeng. Soviet forces opened intense machine-gun fire from Changkufeng and from the high ground east of the lake. After 20 minutes, Kanda's unit charged, two or three Russians fled, and Miyashita's platoon shot one down. Senda, who had gone with Miyashita, directed the platoon's movements and proceeded north, under fire, to Kanda's unit. Once the Russians had been cleared out, Senda forbade pursuit across the boundary and gradually withdrew his forces to the heights line 800 meters southwest. It was 4:30 then. By 5 pm Soviet reinforcements, apparently brought up from the Changkufeng and Paksikori sectors, advanced anew. With 80 men in the front lines, the enemy pushed across the border to a depth of at least 500 meters, according to the Japanese, and began to establish positions. Several tanks and many troops could be observed in the rear. Senda had Noguchi's company hold Chiangchunfeng. Kanda's unit, reinforced by 33 men from Kucheng, was to occupy the heights southwest of Shachaofeng, while Imagawa's company of the 76th Regiment was to occupy other high ground to the west. Senda then reported the situation to Suetaka in Kyonghun and asked for reinforcements. In Seoul, Army headquarters understood the developments reported by Suetaka as a response to the hostile border violation, and about 20 men of the Kucheng BGU under Lt. Sakuma drove the enemy out between 2:30 and 3 pm. Afterward, Sakuma pulled back to high ground two kilometers south of Yangkuanping to avoid trouble and was now observing the foe. Although Seoul had heard nothing about Japanese losses, Corp. Akaishizawa Kunihiko personally observed that Kanda had been wounded in the face by a grenade and bandaged, that Sakuma had been bayoneted twice and also bandaged, and that the dead lay on the grass, covered with raincoats. According to Suetaka "the enemy who had crossed the border south of Shachaofeng suffered losses and pulled back once as a result of our attack at about 2:30 pm". By about 4:30, Suetaka continued, the Russians had built up their strength and attacked the platoon on the heights southwest of Shachaofeng. Behind the Russian counterattack, there were now several tanks. Earlier, Suetaka noted ominously that several rounds of artillery had been fired from the Changkufeng area; "therefore, we reinforced our units too, between 5 and 6 pm., and both sides are confronting each other." Details as to the fate of Sakuma's platoon are not given, but it is now admitted that casualties were incurred on both sides. The Korea Army Headquarters consequently reported to Tokyo in the evening that, according to information from the division, 20 Japanese had driven out the Russians near Shachaofeng; 25 men from Senda's unit were occupying the heights 600 meters west of Changkufeng; and another 16 men were deployed in ambush at Yangkuanping. Such an enumeration would have tended to suggest that only a few dozen Japanese were across the Tumen on the 29th. But a review of the numbers of combat troops committed and the reinforcements sent by Senda reveals that Japanese strength across the river was in the hundreds by nightfall. In Moscow, Tass reported that on 29 July detachments of Japanese-Manchukuoan intruders had attempted to seize high ground apparently located 0.5 miles north of a Russian position. The assailants had been "completely repelled from Soviet territory, as a result of measures taken by Russian frontier guards," and instructions had been sent to the embassy in Tokyo to protest strongly. Walter Duranty, the veteran American correspondent in Moscow, heard that the Japanese press had published reports, likely intended for internal consumption, that hours of furious fighting had occurred at the points in question. Since the dispatches were unsubstantiated and "failed to gain credence anywhere outside Japan," Duranty claimed this may have forced the Japanese to translate into action their boast of "applying force" unless their demands were satisfied. "Now, it appears, they have applied force, unsuccessfully." The Soviet communiqué on the Shachaofeng affair, despite its firm tone, appeared unostentatiously in the following day's Pravda and Izvestiya under the headline, "Japanese Militarists Continue Their Provocation." The Japanese Embassy in Moscow heard nothing about the Shachaofeng affray until the morning of the 30th, when a wire was received from the Gaimusho that ten Russian soldiers had occupied a position northwest of Changkufeng and had begun trench work until ejected by frontier guards. Since the Russian communiqué spoke of afternoon fighting, American correspondents concluded that Soviet troops must have counterattacked and driven off the Japanese. No additional information was available to the public in Moscow on the 30th, perhaps because it was a holiday. Nevertheless, in the afternoon, Stalin's colleague Kaganovich addressed an immense crowd in Moscow on "Railroad Day" and at the conclusion of a long, vigorous speech said: "The Soviet Union is prepared to meet all enemies, east or west." It certainly was not a fighting speech and there is no reason to suppose the Soviet will abandon its firm peace policy unless Japan deliberately forced the issue. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Diplomacy flickered as Moscow pressed restraint and Tokyo whispered calculated bravado. As July wore on, both sides massed troops, built trenches, and sent scouts across the river. A tense, hidden war unfolded, skirmishes, patrols, and small advances, until a fleeting moment when force collided with restraint, and the hill's future hung in the frost.

3.176 Fall and Rise of China: Changkufeng Incident

Last time we spoke about the Soviet-Japanese Border Conflict. The border between Soviet Manchuria and Japanese-occupied territories emerges not as a single line but as a mosaic of contested spaces, marks, and memories. A sequence of incidents, skirmishes along the Chaun and Tumen rivers, reconnaissance sorties, and the complex diplomacy of Moscow, Tokyo, and peripheral actors to trace how risk escalated from routine patrols to calibrated leverage. On the ground, terrain functioned as both obstacle and argument: ridges like Changkufeng Hill shaping sightlines, river valleys shaping decisions, and markers weathered by snow, wind, and drift. In command tents, officers translated terrain into doctrine: contingency plans, supply routes, and the precarious calculus of restraint versus escalation. Both nations sought to establish firmer defensive barriers against the other. Inevitably they were destined to clash, but how large that clash would become, nobody knew. #176 The Changkufeng Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the last episode we broke down a general history of the Soviet-Japanese Border Conflict and how it escalated significantly by 1938. Colonel Inada Masazum serving as chief of the 2nd Operations Section within the Operations Bureau in March of 1938 would play a significant role in this story. When the Japanese command's attention was drawn to the area of Changkufeng, consideration was given to the ownership and importance of the disputed high ground. Inada and his operations section turned to an appraisal of the geography. The officers had been impressed by the strategic importance of the Tumen, which served to cut off the hill country from North Korea. In the Changkufeng area, the river was a muddy 600 to 800 meters wide and three to five meters deep. Japanese engineers had described rowing across the stream as "rather difficult." Russian roads on the left bank were very good, according to Japanese intelligence. Heavy vehicles moved easily; the Maanshan section comprised the Russians' main line of communications in the rear. To haul up troops and materiel, the Russians were obliged to use trucks and ships, for there were no railways apart from a four-kilometer line between the harbor and town of Novokievsk. Near Changkufeng, hardly any roadways were suitable for vehicular traffic. On the right, or Korean, bank of the Tumen, there were only three roads suitable for vehicular traffic, but even these routes became impassable after a day or two of rain. In the sector between Hill 52 to the south and Shachaofeng to the north, the most pronounced eminences were Chiangchunfeng and the humps of Changkufeng. Rocky peaks were characteristically shaped like inverted T's, which meant many dead angles against the crests. The gentle slopes would allow tanks to move but would restrict their speed, as would the ponds and marshes. In general, the terrain was treeless and afforded little cover against aircraft. Against ground observation or fire, corn fields and tall miscanthus grass could provide some shielding. Between Chiangchunfeng and the Tumen, which would have to serve as the main route of Japanese supply, the terrain was particularly sandy and hilly. This rendered foot movement difficult but would reduce the effectiveness of enemy bombs and shells. The high ground east of Khasan afforded bases for fire support directed against the Changkufeng region. Plains characterized the rest of the area on the Soviet side, but occasional streams and swamps could interfere with movement of tanks and trucks. The only towns or villages were Novokievsk, Posyet, Yangomudy, and Khansi. At Kozando there were a dozen houses; at Paksikori, a few. The right bank was farmed mainly by Koreans, whose scattered cottages might have some value for billeting but offered none for cover. On the left bank, the largest hamlets were Fangchuanting, with a population of 480 dwelling in 73 huts, and Yangkuanping, where there were 39 cottages. Shachaofeng was uninhabited. Japanese occupation of Changkufeng would enable observation of the plain stretching east from Posyet Bay, although intelligence made no mention of Soviet naval bases, submarine pens, or airstrips in the immediate area of Posyet, either in existence or being built in 1938. As Inada knew, the Japanese Navy judged that Posyet Bay might have another use, as a site for Japanese landing operations in the event of war. In Russian hands, the high ground would endanger the Korean railway. This line, which started from Najin in northeastern Korea, linked up with the vital system in Manchuria at the town of Tumen and provided a short cut, if not a lifeline, between Japan and the Kwantung Army and Manchuria from across the Sea of Japan. Even from relatively low Changkufeng, six or seven miles of track were exposed to Soviet observation between Hongui and Shikai stations. The port of Najin, with its fortress zone, lay 11 miles southwest; Unggi lay even nearer. It was not the danger of Japanese shelling of Vladivostok, at an incredible range of 80 miles that was at stake but the more realistic hypothesis of Russian shelling of the rail line, and Russian screening of the Soviet side of the border. Hills and questions were thought to have two sides. It was the consensus of Japanese that Changkufeng Hill's potential value to the Russians far outweighed its possible benefits to them, or at least that the Japanese had more to lose if the Russians took the high ground by the Tumen. Inada nurtured few illusions concerning the intrinsic value of the heights. Despite the fact that the high command always had good reasons for quiescence in the north, Inada believed that the latest border difficulty could not be overlooked. By mid-July 1938 Inada's thoughts crystallized. The Japanese would conduct a limited reconnaissance in force known as iryoku teisatsu in the strategic sense. Whereas, at the tactical schoolbook level, this might mean the dispatch of small forces into enemy territory to seek local combat intelligence, at the Imperial General Headquarters level the concept was far more sweeping. There would also be useful evidence of mobilization and other buildup procedures. The affair at Changkufeng was merely a welcome coincidence, something started by the Russians but liable to Japanese exploration. Inada had no intention of seizing territory, of becoming involved in a war of attrition at a remote and minor spot, or of provoking hostilities against the USSR. The Russians would comprehend the nature of the problem, too. If they were interested in interfering seriously with the Japanese, there were numberless better locations to cause trouble along the Manchurian front; those were the places to watch. The cramped Changkufeng sector, described as "narrow like a cat's brow," could too readily be pinched off from Hunchun to render it of strategic value to either side. The bog land to the north interfered with the use of armored forces, while artillery sited on the heights along the Tumen in Korea could as easily control the area as batteries emplaced east of the lake. It was Inada's professional opinion that the Russians could commit three or four infantry divisions there at most, with no mechanized corps—no heavy tanks, in particular. No decisive battle could be waged, although, once the Russians became involved, they might have to cling to the hill out of a sense of honor. The military action would be meaningless even if the Japanese let the Russians have the heights. For their part, the Japanese would ostensibly be fighting to secure the boundary and to hold Changkufeng peak, beyond which they would not move a step onto Soviet soil. There would be no pursuit operations. Troop commitment would be limited to about one division without tank support. Japanese Air Force intervention would be forbidden. Matters would be directed entirely by Imperial General Headquarters working through the Korea Army chain of command and carried out by the local forces. Calm, clear, and dispassionate overall estimates and instructions would be based on materials available only in Tokyo. The command would not allow the Kwantung Army to touch the affair. Inada foresaw that the Japanese government might also seek a settlement through diplomacy. Although border demarcation was desirable and should be sought, the command would not insist on it, nor would it demand permanent occupation of Changkufeng summit. As soon as reconnaissance objectives had been achieved, the local forces would be withdrawn. As Inada described it "In the process, we would have taught the Russians some respect and given them a lesson concerning their repeated, high-handed provocations and intrusions. If a show of force sufficed to facilitate the negotiations and cause the Russians to back down, so much the better; the affair would be over and my point proved." The instrument for carrying out Inada's strategic design appeared to be ideal, the 19th Division, strenuously trained and high-spirited. It could be expected to perform very well if unleashed within defined limits. Colonel Suetaka was just the commander to direct local operations. Since he had been pleading to fight in China, an operation at Changkufeng might prove to be an excellent "safety valve." His staff was full of experienced, fierce warriors eager for battle. Until recently, the Korea Army commanding general had wisely kept the aggressive division away from Changkufeng Hill, but now Imperial general headquarters had its own overriding ideas and needs. How could the Japanese ensure that any military action would remain limited if the Russians chose to respond with vigor? Naturally, one infantry division, without armor or air support, could not withstand all of the Soviet forces in the maritime province. Inada answered that the mission to be assigned the 19th Division was merely the recapture of Changkufeng crest. If the Japanese side had to break off the operation, evacuation would be effected voluntarily and resolutely on Imperial general headquarters responsibility, without considerations of "face." At worst, the Japanese might lose one division, but the affair would be terminated at the Tumen River without fail. "Even so, we ought to be able to prove our theory as well as demonstrate our true strength to the Russians." In case the Soviets opted for more than limited war, the Japanese were still not so overextended in China that they could not alter their strategic disposition of troops. Although the Kwantung Army's six divisions were outnumbered four to one and the Japanese were not desirous of a war at that moment, the first-class forces in Manchuria could make an excellent showing. In addition, the high command possessed armor, heavy artillery, fighters, and bombers, held in check in Manchuria and Korea, as well as reserves in the homeland. There was also the 104th Division, under tight Imperial general headquarters control, in strategic reserve in southern Manchuria. Inada recalled "How would the Russians react? That was the answer I sought. Victory in China depended on it." By mid-July, the high command, at Inada's urging, had worked out a plan titled, "Imperial General headqaurters Essentials for Dealing with the Changkufeng Incident." Tada's telegram of 14 July to Koiso described succinctly the just-decided policy: the central authorities concurred with the Korea Army's opinion regarding the Changkufeng affair, then in embryo. Considering that Changkufeng Hill posed a direct threat to the frontier of Korea, Imperial General headqaurters would immediately urge the foreign ministry to lodge a stern protest. Next day, Tojo sent a telegram stating the Japanese policy of employing diplomacy; whether the Russians should be evicted by force required cautious deliberation in case the USSR did not withdraw voluntarily. On the basis of the guidance received from Imperial General headqaurters, the Korea Army drew up its own plan, "Essentials for Local Direction of the Changkufeng Incident," on 15 July. Intelligence officer Tsuchiya Sakae was sent promptly to the front from Seoul. At the same time, military authorities allowed the press to release news that Soviet troops were constructing positions inside Manchurian territory in an "obvious provocation." The government of Manchukuo was demanding an immediate withdrawal. Even then, those Japanese most closely connected with the handling of the Changkufeng Incident were not in agreement that everybody at command level was as ardent a proponent of reconnaissance in force as Inada claimed to be. Some thought that most, if not all, of his subordinates, youthful and vigorous, were in favor of the notion; others denied the existence of such an idea. Inada remained clear-cut in his own assertions. Everything done by the local Soviet forces, he insisted, must have been effected with the permission of Moscow; it was customary for the USSR not to abandon what it had once started. The Japanese Army never really thought that the Soviet Union would withdraw just as the result of diplomatic approaches. Therefore, from the outset, preparations were made to deal the Russians one decisive blow. Inada had recommended his plan, with its clear restrictions, to his colleagues and superiors; the scheme, he says, was approved 14 July "all the way up the chain of command, through the Army general staff and the ministry of war, with unexpected ease." The only real opposition, Inada recalled, came from the navy, whose staff advised the army operations staff, in all sincerity, to give up the idea of strategic reconnaissance. Inada adhered to his opinion stubbornly. He never forgot the grave look on the face of Captain Kusaka, the UN operations section chief, as the latter gave in reluctantly. The navy view was that the Changkufeng affair typified the army's aggressive policies as opposed to relative passivity on the part of the navy. Like Kusaka, Japanese Navy interviewees shared the fear that Changkufeng might prove to be the most dangerous military confrontation ever to occur between the USSR and Japan. In view of navy objections, one wonders where Inada could have drawn support for his concept of reconnaissance in force. If one accepts the comments contained in a letter from a navy ministry captain, Takagi Sokichi, to Baron Harada Kumao at the beginning of August, in the army and in a portion of the navy there existed "shallow-minded fellows who are apt to take a firm stand in the blind belief that the USSR would not really rise against us, neglecting the fact that the Russians had foreseen our weak points." Takagi also had violent things to say about "white-livered" Gaimusho elements that were playing up to the army. Although Takagi's remarks, expressed in confidence, were sharp, cautious injunctions were being delivered by the high command to the new Korea Army commander, General Nakamura Kotaro, who was about to leave for Seoul to replace Koiso. Nakamura's attitude was crucial for the course and outcome of the Changkufeng Incident. More of a desk soldier than a warrior, he characteristic ally displayed a wariness that was reinforced by the guidance provided him. This personal quality assumes even greater significance if one believes that the Russians may have initiated the Changkufeng Incident by exploiting the special opportunities afforded them by the routine replacement of the Korea Army commander, the temporary absence from Moscow of Ambassador Shigemitsu Mamoru, and the geographical as well as subjective gap between the Kwantung and Korea armies that was exposed during the Lyushkov affair. At 10:00 on 15 July Nakamura was designated army commander by the Emperor at the palace. Soon afterward, he was briefed by Imperial General headquarters officers. Hashimoto, the operations bureau chief, recalled that when he saw Nakamura off on 17 July, Hashimoto stressed prudence, limitation of any military action, and diplomatic solution of the problem. The new commanding general, Inada asserted, promised full cooperation. There was no mention, at this level, of Inada's concept of reconnaissance in force. When Nakamura reached Seoul, he found an Imperial order from Tokyo dated 16 July awaiting him. This important document stipulated that he could concentrate units under his command in Korea near the border against the trespassing Soviet forces in the Changkufeng area. Resort to force, however, was dependent upon further orders. This message was followed by a wire from Kan'in, the Army general staff chief. The Imperial order, it was explained, had been designed to support diplomatic negotiations. Simultaneous approval was granted for concentrating forces to respond swiftly in case the situation deteriorated. As for implementation of the Imperial order, discretion should be exercised in line with the opinion expressed earlier by Korea Army Headquarters. Negotiations were to be conducted in Moscow and Harbin, the location of a Soviet consulate in Manchukuo. Meanwhile, the command was dispatching two officers for purposes of liaison: Lt. Colonel Arisue Yadoru in Operations and Major Kotani Etsuo a specialist in Soviet intelligence. Inada advised Arisue that, apart from liaison flights inside the frontiers, particular care should be exercised with regard to actions that might lead to air combat. Nevertheless, although Inada stated that the Imperial order called for "a sort of military demonstration," he admitted that it meant preparatory action for an attack. The Korea Army senior staff officer, Iwasaki, recalled hearing nothing about secret intentions. Nakamura briefed his staff about the need for restraint, especially during this key period of the Wuhan operation. Koiso had disposed of speculation that he had issued an order to concentrate the 19th Division before Nakamura arrived, although he and Nakamura did have the opportunity to confer in Seoul before he departed for Japan. The Imperial order of 16 July, in response to Koiso's inquiry received in Tokyo on 14 July, had arrived in Seoul addressed to Nakamura; thereupon, the Korea Army chief of staff, Kitano, had the message conveyed to the division. By 21 July Koiso was back in Tokyo where, the day afterward, he advised the war minister, Itagaki, "to act prudently with respect to the Changkufeng problem." Why did the high command dispatch two field-grade liaison officers to Korea from the outset of the Changkufeng Incident? The Korea Army lacked operations staff. Its commander had been allotted prime responsibility, within the chain of command, for defense of northeastern Korea. At the beginning, the highest-ranking staff officer at the front was a major. Since there were no fundamental differences of opinion between the command and the forces in Korea, it was proper to send experts from Tokyo to assist. Imperial General headqaurters would observe the situation carefully, devise measures on the basis of the overall view, and issue orders which the Korea Army would implement through ordinary channels. It had not been the type of incident which required the army commander to go to the front to direct. This was the Korea Army's first test, and political as well as diplomatic problems were involved that the army in the field should not or could not handle. If Tokyo had left decisions to the division and its regiments, the latter would have been held to account, which was not proper. Imperial General headquarters had to assume responsibility and reassure local commanders of its full support. Imaoka Yutaka explained that operational guidance by Imperial General headquarters and line operations conducted by the 19th Division formed the core of the affair; the Korea Army, placed between, was "shadowy." Koiso had not been enthusiastic; this set the mood among the staff. Nakamura, who arrived with a thorough comprehension of AGS thinking, was basically passive. The Korea Army staff, in general, included no "wild boars." There was an urgent need to monitor developments. Not only was the Korea Army unfamiliar with handling this type of incident, but many hitches occurred. There had been no practice in emergency transmission of coded wires between the Korea Army and Tokyo. Now telegram after telegram had to be sent; most were deciphered incorrectly and many were not decoded at all. Another problem centered on the lack of knowledge in Tokyo about the situation on the spot, which only visual observation could rectify. As a result, the two Army general staff experts, Arisue and Kotani, arrived in Korea on 16 July. Kotani recalled that he was to collect intelligence and assist the local authorities. One of the first duties that he and Arisue performed was to disseminate the principle that use of force required a prior Imperial order. Also on 16 July, Japanese newspapers reported that the USSR was still concentrating troops, that the Manchukuoan government was watching intently, "decisive punitive measures" were being contemplated by the Japanese-Manchukuoan authorities, and there were signs of a worsening of the crisis. Despite good reasons for this gloomy appraisal, the Japanese press had not yet given the incident page-one treatment. More alarming news was being disseminated abroad. Domei, the official Japanese news agency, reported that the situation would probably become worse unless Soviet troops were withdrawn. The position of the Japanese government impressed foreign correspondents as unusually firm. Informants characterized the Changkufeng Incident as the most serious affair since the clash on the Amur River in 1937. Irked by the Korea Army's timidity and eager for first-hand information, the Kwantung Army dispatched two observers to the front: from Intelligence, Ogoshi Kenji, and from Operations, Tsuji Masanobu. If you listen to my pacific war week by week podcast or echoes of war, you know I highlight Tsuji Masanobu as one of the most evil Japanese officers of WW2. No other way to describe this guy, he was a shithead. In his memoirs, Tsuji asserted that he and Ogoshi climbed Changkufeng Hill, discerned Soviet soldiers digging across the peak in Manchurian territory, and concluded that "probably even Tokyo could not overlook such a clear-cut case of invasion." Although his account aligned with the general thrust, Ogoshi contended that Tsuji could not have accompanied him. According to sources with the 19th Division, when Koiso learned that Tsuji and Ogoshi were disparaging the Korea Army's ability to defend Changkufeng, he ordered "those spies" ousted. Ogoshi replied that the army staff was not angry, but Koiso did become furious and ordered Ogoshi "arrested for trespassing." Ogoshi surmised that Koiso's concern was that emotional outsiders such as Tsuji could provoke trouble, perhaps even war, if they visited Changkufeng. This view was widely shared. Inada stated that he made a practice of keeping away to maintain the degree of detachment and impartiality required of high command authorities. One sidelight to the "fraternal" visit to the Changkufeng area by observers from Hsinking was provided by Lt. Colonel Katakura Tadashi, chief of the Kwantung Army's 4th Section, which handled Manchukuo affairs, primarily political direction. When Katakura visited the Operations Section, Tsuji and Ogoshi told him that an intrusion had been confirmed and that the Kwantung Army staff was studying ways to evict the Soviets. Katakura consulted Maj. General Ishiwara Kanji, acting chief of staff, who was already in possession of the draft of an operations order calling for offensive preparations by the Kwantung Army against the Russians at Changkufeng. Katakura asked for reconsideration of the order. This was not a matter to be handled solely by the operations staff. Borders and international affairs were involved; hence the 4th Section, along with the Manchukuoan government, the Gaimusho, and other agencies, were concerned. Field observers were expressing exaggerated personal opinions based on having seen Soviet sentries on a hilltop. If the matter fell within the Korea Army's defensive prerogative, that army ought to handle it. Apparently the Kwantung Army commander and Ishiwara agreed with Katakura, for the draft order was not approved. The so-called private message dispatched by a Kwantung Army staff officer just before Koiso's departure may have been provoked by this rejection of direct participation by forces under Kwantung Army command. Staff officers in Tokyo believed that Hsinking could not see the forest for the trees. In the high command's view, the Kwantung Army's deliberate escalation of a negligible frontier incident undoubtedly stemmed from a failure to grasp the strategic requirements of national defense—pursuit of the campaign in China, the nurturance of Manchukuo, and the buildup of operational readiness for the ultimate solution of the Soviet problem. The high command felt obliged to remind the Kwantung Army that, in dealing with the Changkufeng Incident, the central authorities pressed for a Russian pullback through diplomacy. Consequently, the Korea Army had been instructed to be ready to concentrate troops near Changkufeng as a "background." Meanwhile, it remained the Imperial will that utmost prudence be exercised. The Kwantung Army commander accordingly issued cautious instructions to subordinate units, especially those on the eastern border. The high command's injunctions did not end the discontent and recrimination at the lower levels of Kwantung Army Headquarters, nor did they quiet the concern felt in Tokyo. A former war minister told Baron Harada repeatedly in late July that the Kwantung Army was "no good," while the superintendent of police added that the Kwantung Army was embarrassing Foreign Minister Ugaki. Nevertheless, the Kwantung Army did exert self-restraint. For its part, the Korea Army naïvely sought to achieve entente with an antagonist who considered the case nonnegotiable. First, the government of Manchukuo was asked to lodge a formal protest with the USSR. The commissioner for foreign affairs at Harbin phoned V. V. Kuznetzov, the acting consul, on the night of 14 July and saw him on the 18th. Basing its contentions on maps, the Haensing regime demanded Soviet withdrawal from Changkufeng. The Japanese government was lodging similar protests within the framework of Japanese-Manchukuoan joint defense agreements. On the spot, the situation inflamed. During the afternoon of 15 July, a Japanese military police patrol from Korea reconnoitered at the foot of Hill 52, southeast of Changkufeng. The party came under Soviet gunfire and was driven back, abandoning the body of Corp. Matsushima Shakuni. Japanese sources claimed that a Russian ambush had been set inside Manchuria. The Russian side insisted that it was the Soviet frontier that had been violated by thirty meters. Kuzma Grebennik, the colonel commanding the 59th BGU, which covered the Posyet sector, asserted that Matsushima's effects included a notebook containing reconnaissance results and a camera with film of Soviet-claimed terrain, particularly Changkufeng Hill. According to Maj. Gilfan Batarshin, a subordinate of Grebennik, two Russian border guards from Podgornaya opened fire when the Japanese fled after being challenged. Japanese protests to the USSR about the death of Matsushima and the taking of his body were added to the negotiations concerning the disputed border and the alleged trespassing. Charge Nishi Haruhiko lodged a vigorous complaint in Moscow on 15 July but was answered by a counterprotest. Ambassador Shigemitsu underwent an identical experience during a conversation with Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov on 20 July. Shigemitsu retorted that the murder tended to exacerbate the negotiations. In his memoirs, he stated that the killing of Matsushima provoked the local Japanese border garrison unit. The shooting occurred as the Soviet military buildup continued, according to Japanese sources. Mechanized units were reported moving in the direction of Kyonghun from Barabash and Posyet Bay. Biplanes were reconnoitering the Hunchun Valley, within Manchurian territory, from the afternoon of 16 July. To the local Japanese authorities, it seemed that the Russians were adopting a challenging attitude. Although the Japanese-Manchukuoan side remained willing to negotiate—that is, to take no forceful actions if the Russians would withdraw, the latter appeared not to share such an intention. The Soviets were not only misinterpreting the Hunchun treaty to their advantage but were encroaching beyond what they claimed to be the line; they "lacked sincerity." Decisive use of force might have been imperative to secure the Manchurian border, which was Japan's legal responsibility. As far north as Tungning on the eastern Manchurian frontier, two Soviet ground divisions and considerable numbers of tanks and aircraft were reported massed in full view. At Changkufeng, Russian soldiers fortified the crest. Mountain guns were now seen with muzzles pointed toward Manchuria, and Japanese intelligence estimated that Soviet troop strength near Changkufeng had grown to 120 or 130 by the evening of 18 July. As Sawamoto Rikichiro, an Imperial aide, noted in his diary, "It would seem that settlement of the affair had become increasingly difficult." Korea Army staff officer Tsuchiya sent two emissaries bearing the notice to the Soviet border. The pair, "blazing with patriotic ardor,"set out on 18 July, carrying a message in one hand and a white flag in the other. From Kyonghun came the report the next day that there had been an urgent, well-attended Soviet staff meeting at BGU Headquarters in Novokievsk all night, and that the Russian side had been discomfited by the Japanese request, which had been transmitted to higher authorities. Still, the emissaries did not return, while a stream of reports indicated a Soviet buildup along a dozen frontier sectors. Russian authorities had reportedly forced the natives to evacuate an area twenty miles behind their borders. From Japanese observation posts, Soviet convoys of men, guns, and horses could be sighted moving toward Novokievsk after being unloaded from transports originating at Vladivostok. Japanese Army Intelligence reported that on 18 July a regimental-size force had arrived at Novokievsk; artillery displacements forward were particularly visible by night east of Khasan. A confidential Gaimusho message indicated that Soviet truck movements between Posyet, Novokievsk, and the front had increased since the 20th. Russian intrusions, kidnappings, and sniping incidents were reported along the Manchurian borders, from Manchouli on the west to Suifenho on the east, between 18 and 25 July. Aircraft on daytime reconnaissance were detected as far as three miles inside Manchurian territory in the Hunchun area. Although the Japanese asserted that their forbearance was being tested, Izvestiya charged "Japanese militarists" with manufacturing an affair at Ussuri as well as at Changkufeng. The Japanese themselves received reports from the Changkufeng front that by 20 July the Soviets had 250 soldiers, armed with field pieces, trench mortars, howitzers, and light and heavy machine guns, on the southern slopes. The Russians were putting up tents capable of holding 40 men each; officers could be observed for the first time. On the evening of the 20th, the Soviets lobbed illuminating shells toward Manchurian territory. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Inada Masazum, studying maps and mud, saw Changkufeng Hill as a prize with peril, a test of nerve rather than a conquest. Tokyo's orders pulsed through Seoul and Harbin: guard, probe, and deter, but avoid full-scale war. Across the border, Soviet units pressed closer, lights and tents flickering on the hillside. The sea within sight whispered of strategy, diplomacy, and a warning: a single misstep could redraw Asia. And so the standoff waited, patient as winter.

3.175 Fall and Rise of China: Soviet-Japanese Border Conflicts

Last time we spoke about the Changsha fire. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: defend Wuhan to the last man or flood the land to slow the invaders. He chose both, pushing rivers and rallying a fractured army as Japanese forces pressed along the Yangtze. Fortresses at Madang held long, but the cost was high—troops lost, civilians displaced, a city's heart burning in the night. Wuhan fell after months of brutal fighting, yet the battle did not break China's will. Mao Zedong urged strategy over martyrdom, preferring to drain the enemy and buy time for a broader struggle. The Japanese, though victorious tactically, found their strength ebbing, resource strains, supply gaps, and a war that felt endless. In the wake of Wuhan, Changsha stood next in the Japanese crosshairs, its evacuation and a devastating fire leaving ash and memory in its wake. Behind these prices, political currents swirled. Wang Jingwei defected again, seeking power beyond Chiang's grasp, while Chongqing rose as a western bastion of resistance. The war hardened into a protracted stalemate, turning Japan from an aggressive assailant into a wary occupier, and leaving China to endure, persist, and fight on. #175 The Soviet-Japanese Border Conflicts Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So based on the title of this one, you probably can see we are taking a bit of a detour. For quite some time we have focused on the Japanese campaigns into China proper 1937-1938. Now the way the second sino-japanese war is traditionally broken down is in phases. 1937-1938, 1939-1942 and 1942-1945. However there is actually even more going on in China aside from the war with Japan. In Xinjiang province a large full blown Islamic revolution breaks out in 1937. We will be covering that story at a later date, but another significant event is escalating border skirmishes in Manchukuo. Now these border skirmishes had been raging ever since the USSR consolidated its hold over the far east. We talked about some of those skirmishes prior to the Sino-Soviet war in 1929. However when Japan created the puppet government of Manchukuo, this was a significant escalation in tensions with the reds. Today we are going to talk about the escalating border conflicts between the Soviets and Japan. A tongue of poorly demarcated land extends southeast from Hunchun, hugging the east bank of the Tumen River between Lake Khasan to the east and Korea to the west. Within this tongue stands Changkufeng Hill, one of a long chain of highlands sweeping from upstream along the rivers and moors toward the sea. The twin-peaked hill sits at the confluence area several miles northwest of the point where Manchuria, Korea, and the Russian Far East meet. The hill's shape reminded Koreans of their changgo, which is a long snare drum constricted at the center and tapped with the hands at each end. When the Manchus came to the Tumen, they rendered the phonetic sounds into three ideographic characters meaning "taut drum peaks" or Chang-ku-feng. The Japanese admired the imagery and preserved the Chinese readings, which they pronounce Cho-ko-ho. From their eastern vantage, the Russians called it Zaozernaya, "hill behind the lake." Soviet troops referred to it as a sugar-loaf hill. For many years, natives and a handful of officials in the region cultivated a relaxed attitude toward borders and sovereignty. Even after the Japanese seized Manchuria in 1931, the issue did not immediately come to a head. With the expansion of Manchukuo and the Soviet Far East under Stalin's Five-Year plans, both sides began to attend more closely to frontier delimitation. Whenever either party acted aggressively, force majeure was invoked to justify the unexpected and disruptive events recognized in international law. Most often, these incidents erupted along the eastern Manchurian borders with the USSR or along the 350-mile frontier south of Lake Khanka, each skirmish carrying the seeds of all-out warfare. Now we need to talk a little bit about border history. The borders in question essentially dated to pacts concluded by the Qing dynasty and the Tsardom. Between the first Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 and the Mukden Agreement of 1924, there were over a dozen accords governing the borders. Relevant to Changkufeng were the basic 15-article Convention of Peking, supplementing the Tientsin Treaties of November 1860, some maps made in 1861, and the eight-article Hunchun Border Protocol of 1886. By the 1860 treaty, the Qing ceded to Tsarist Russia the entire maritime province of Siberia, but the meaning of "lands south of Lake Khanka" remained rather vague. Consequently, a further border agreement was negotiated in June 1861 known as "the Lake Khanka Border Pact", by which demarcations were drawn on maps and eight wooden markers erected. The border was to run from Khanka along ridgelines between the Hunchun River and the sea, past Suifenho and Tungning, terminating about 6 miles from the mouth of the Tumen. Then a Russo-Chinese commission established in 1886 drew up the Hunchun Border Pact, proposing new or modified markers along the 1860–1861 lines and arranging a Russian resurvey. However, for the Japanese, in 1938, the Chinese or Manchu texts of the 1886 Hunchun agreement were considered controlling. The Soviets argued the border ran along every summit west of Khasan, thereby granting them jurisdiction over at least the eastern slopes of all elevations, including Changkufeng and Shachaofeng. Since the Qing dynasty and the house of Romanov were already defunct, the new sovereignties publicly appealed to opposing texts, and the Soviet side would not concede that the Russian-language version had never been deemed binding by the Qing commissioners. Yet, even in 1938, the Japanese knew that only the Chinese text had survived or could be located. Now both the Chinese and Russian military maps generally drew the frontier along the watershed east of Khasan; this aligned with the 1861 readings based on the Khanka agreement. The Chinese Republican Army conducted new surveys sometime between 1915 and 1920. The latest Chinese military map of the Changkufeng area drew the border considerably closer to the old "red line" of 1886, running west of Khasan but near the shore rather than traversing the highland crests. None of the military delimitations of the border was sanctified by an official agreement. Hence, the Hunchun Protocol, whether well known or not, invaluable or worthless, remained the only government-to-government pact dealing with the frontiers. Before we jump into it, how about a little summary of what became known as the Soviet-Japanese border conflicts. The first major conflict would obviously be the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. Following years of conflict between the Russian Empire and Japan culminating in the costly Battle of Tsushima, Tsar Nicholas II's government sought peace, recognizing Japan's claims to Korea and agreeing to evacuate Manchuria. From 1918 to 1920, the Imperial Japanese Army, under Emperor Taishō after the death of Meiji, assisted the White Army and Alexander Kerensky against the Bolshevik Red Army. They also aided the Czechoslovak Legion in Siberia to facilitate its return to Europe after an Austrian-Hungarian armoured train purportedly went astray. By 1920, with Austria-Hungary dissolved and Czechoslovakia established two years earlier, the Czechoslovak Legion reached Europe. Japan withdrew from the Russian Revolution and the Civil War in 1922. Following Japan's 1919-1920 occupations and the Soviet intervention in Mongolia in 1921, the Republic of China also withdrew from Outer Mongolia in 1921. In 1922, after capturing Vladivostok in 1918 to halt Bolshevik advances, Japanese forces retreated to Japan as Bolshevik power grew and the postwar fatigue among combatants increased. After Hirohito's invasion of Manchuria in 1931–1932, following Taishō's death in 1926, border disputes between Manchukuo, the Mongolian People's Republic, and the Soviet Union increased. Many clashes stemmed from poorly defined borders, though some involved espionage. Between 1932 and 1934, the Imperial Japanese Army reported 152 border disputes, largely tied to Soviet intelligence activity in Manchuria, while the Soviets accused Japan of 15 border violations, six air intrusions, and 20 cases of "spy smuggling" in 1933 alone. Numerous additional violations followed in the ensuing years. By the mid-1930s, Soviet-Japanese diplomacy and trust had deteriorated further, with the Japanese being openly labeled "fascist enemies" at the Seventh Comintern Congress in July 1935. Beginning in 1935, conflicts significantly escalated. On 8 January 1935, the first armed clash, known as the Halhamiao incident, took place on the border between Mongolia and Manchukuo. Several dozen cavalrymen of the Mongolian People's Army crossed into Manchuria near disputed fishing grounds and engaged an 11‑man Manchukuo Imperial Army patrol near the Buddhist temple at Halhamiao, led by a Japanese military advisor. The Manchukuo Army sustained 6 wounded and 2 dead, including the Japanese officer; the Mongols suffered no casualties and withdrew after the Japanese sent a punitive expedition to reclaim the area. Two motorized cavalry companies, a machine‑gun company, and a tankette platoon occupied the position for three weeks without resistance. In June 1935, the first direct exchange of fire between the Japanese and Soviets occurred when an 11‑man Japanese patrol west of Lake Khanka was attacked by six Soviet horsemen, reportedly inside Manchukuo territory. In the firefight, one Soviet soldier was killed and two horses were captured. The Japanese requested a joint investigation, but the Soviets rejected the proposal. In October 1935, nine Japanese and 32 Manchukuoan border guards were establishing a post about 20 kilometers north of Suifenho when they were attacked by 50 Soviet soldiers. The Soviets opened fire with rifles and five heavy machine guns. Two Japanese and four Manchukuoan soldiers were killed, and another five were wounded. The Manchukuoan foreign affairs representative lodged a verbal protest with the Soviet consul at Suifenho. The Kwantung Army of Japan also sent an intelligence officer to investigate the clash. On 19 December 1935, a Manchukuoan unit reconnoitering southwest of Buir Lake clashed with a Mongolian party, reportedly capturing 10 soldiers. Five days later, 60 truck‑borne Mongolian troops assaulted the Manchukuoans and were repulsed, at the cost of three Manchukuoan dead. On the same day, at Brunders, Mongolian forces attempted three times to drive out Manchukuoan outposts, and again at night, but all attempts failed. Further small attempts occurred in January, with Mongolians using airplanes for reconnaissance. The arrival of a small Japanese force in three trucks helped foil these attempts; casualties occurred on both sides, though Mongolian casualties are unknown aside from 10 prisoners taken. In February 1936, Lieutenant-Colonel Sugimoto Yasuo was ordered to form a detachment from the 14th Cavalry Regiment to "drive the Outer Mongol intruders from the Olankhuduk region," a directive attributed to Lieutenant-General Kasai Heijuro. Sugimoto's detachment included cavalry guns, heavy machine guns, and tankettes. They faced a force of about 140 Mongolians equipped with heavy machine guns and light artillery. On February 12, Sugimoto's men drove the Mongolians south, at the cost of eight Japanese killed, four wounded, and one tankette destroyed. The Japanese began to withdraw, but were attacked by 5–6 Mongolian armored cars and two bombers, which briefly disrupted the column. The situation was stabilized when the Japanese unit received artillery support, allowing them to destroy or repel the armored cars. In March 1936, the Tauran incident occurred. In this clash, both the Japanese Army and the Mongolian Army deployed a small number of armored fighting vehicles and aircraft. The incident began when 100 Mongolian and six Soviet troops attacked and occupied the disputed village of Tauran, Mongolia, driving off the small Manchurian garrison. They were supported by light bombers and armored cars, though the bombing sorties failed to inflict damage on the Japanese, and three bombers were shot down by Japanese heavy machine guns. Local Japanese forces counter-attacked, conducting dozens of bombing sorties and finally assaulting Tauran with 400 men and 10 tankettes. The result was a Mongolian rout, with 56 Mongolian soldiers killed, including three Soviet advisors, and an unknown number wounded. Japanese losses were 27 killed and 9 wounded. Later in March 1936, another border clash occurred between Japanese and Soviet forces. Reports of border violations prompted the Japanese Korean Army to send ten men by truck to investigate, but the patrol was ambushed by 20 Soviet NKVD soldiers deployed about 300 meters inside territory claimed by Japan. After suffering several casualties, the Japanese patrol withdrew and was reinforced with 100 men, who then drove off the Soviets. Fighting resumed later that day when the NKVD brought reinforcements. By nightfall, the fighting had ceased and both sides had pulled back. The Soviets agreed to return the bodies of two Japanese soldiers who had died in the fighting, a development viewed by the Japanese government as encouraging. In early April 1936, three Japanese soldiers were killed near Suifenho in another minor affray. This incident was notable because the Soviets again returned the bodies of the fallen servicemen. In June 1937, the Kanchazu Island incident occurred on the Amur River along the Soviet–Manchukuo border. Three Soviet gunboats crossed the river's center line, disembarked troops, and occupied Kanchazu Island. Japanese forces from the IJA 1st Division, equipped with two horse-drawn 37 mm artillery pieces, quickly established improvised firing positions and loaded their guns with both high-explosive and armor-piercing shells. They shelled the Soviet vessels, sinking the lead gunboat, crippling the second, and driving off the third. Japanese troops subsequently fired on the swimming crewmen from the sunken ships using machine guns. Thirty-seven Soviet soldiers were killed, while Japanese casualties were zero. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested and demanded the Soviet forces withdraw from the island. The Soviet leadership, apparently shocked by the incident and reluctant to escalate, agreed to evacuate their troops. By 1938 the border situation had deteriorated. The tangled terrain features, mountain, bog, stream, forest, and valley, would have complicated even careful observers' discernment of the old red line drawn in 1886. Fifty years later, the markers themselves had undergone a metamorphosis. Japanese investigators could find, at most, only 14 to 17 markers standing fairly intact between the Tumen estuary and Khanka—roughly one every 25 miles at best. The remainder were missing or ruined; five were found in new locations. Marker "K," for example, was 40 meters deeper inside Manchuria, away from Khanka. Japanese military experts noted that of the 20 markers originally set along the boundaries of Hunchun Prefecture alone, only four could be found by the summer of 1938. The rest had either been wrecked or arbitrarily moved and discarded by Russian or Chinese officials and inhabitants. It is even said that one missing marker could be seen on display in Khabarovsk. The Chinese had generally interpreted the boundary as the road line just west of Khasan, at least in practice. Free road movement, however, had become a problem even 20 years before the Japanese overran Manchuria in 1931–1932 during the so-called Manchurian Incident. The Japanese adopted, or inherited, the Chinese interpretation, which was based on the 1886 agreement on border roads; the key clause held that the frontier west of Khasan would be the road along the lake. Japanese sources emphasize that local residents' anger toward gradual Soviet oppression and penetrations westward into Manchurian territory fueled the conflict. Many natives believed the original boundaries lay east of the lake, but the Soviets adjusted the situation to suit their own convenience. In practice, the Russians were restricting road use just west of Khasan by Manchurian and Korean residents. There was speculation that this was a prelude to taking over the ridgelines, depending on the reaction of the Manchukuoan–Japanese side. Villagers who went to streams or the lake to launder clothing found themselves subjected to sniper fire. Along a 25-mile stretch of road near Shachaofeng, farmers reported coming under fire from new Soviet positions as early as November 1935. Nevertheless, Japanese and Koreans familiar with the Tumen area noted agrarian, seasonal Korean religious rites atop Changkufeng Hill, including fattened pigs sacrificed and changgo drums beaten. Village elders told Japanese visitors in 1938 that, until early the preceding year, no Russians had come as far as Changkufeng Hill. Looking only at the border sector around Changkufeng, the easy days were clearly behind us. In the summer of 1938, Gaimusho "Foreign Ministry" observers described the explosive situation along the Korea–Manchuria–USSR borders as a matter of de facto frontiers. Both sides pressed against each other, and their trigger-happy posture was summed up in the colloquial refrain: "Take another step and we'll let you have it." Near dawn on 13 June 1938, a Manchurian patrol detected a suspicious figure in the fog swirling over Changlingtzu Hill on the Siberian–Manchurian frontier. Challenged at 15 feet, the suspect hurled two pistols to the ground and raised his hands in surrender. At headquarters, the police soon realized this was no routine border-trespassing case. The man was a defector and he was a Russian general, in fact he was the director of all NKVD forces in the Soviet Far East. Beneath a mufti of spring coat and hunting cap, he wore a full uniform with medals. His identification card No. 83 designated him as G. S. Lyushkov, Commissar 3rd Class, countersigned by Nikolai Yezhov, NKVD head in Moscow. Lyushkov was promptly turned over to the Japanese military authorities, who transferred him to Seoul and then to Tokyo under close escort. On 1 July, the Japanese press was permitted to disclose that Lyushkov had sought refuge in Japan. Ten days later, to capitalize on the commissar's notoriety and to confound skeptics, the Japanese produced Lyushkov at a press conference in Tokyo. For the Japanese and foreign correspondents, who met separately with him, Lyushkov described Soviet Far East strength and the turmoil wracking the USSR, because for those of you unfamiliar this was during the Stalinist purges. Clearly, the Japanese had gained a unique reservoir of high-level intelligence and a wealth of materials, including notes scratched in blood by suspects incarcerated at Khabarovsk. A general tightening of Russian frontier security had recently been reported. Natives of Fangchuanting asserted that a Soviet cavalry patrol appeared in June, seemingly for the first time. Contact with Yangkuanping, northwest of Khasan, was severed. More importantly, Japanese Army Signal Corps intelligence detected a surge of Soviet message traffic from the Posyet Bay district. After Lyushkov's defection, a drastic reshuffle in the local Russian command apparently occurred, and responsibility for border surveillance seems to have been reallocated. Japanese records indicate that the Novokievsk security force commander was relieved and the sector garrison replaced by troops from Vladivostok. Gaimusho intelligence also received reports that a border garrison unit had been transferred from Khabarovsk or Chita to the Tumen sector. The Kwantung Army signal monitors also intercepted two significant frontline messages on 6 July from the new Russian local commander in the Posyet region, addressed to Lieutenant General Sokolov in Khabarovsk. Decoded, the messages suggested (1) that ammunition for infantry mortars amounted to less than half the required supply; and (2) a recommendation that higher headquarters authorize Russian elements to secure certain unoccupied high ground west of Khasan. The commander noted terrain advantages and the contemplated construction of emplacements that would command Najin and the Korean railway. As a start, at least one Russian platoon should be authorized to dig in on the highest ground (presumably Changkufeng) and deploy four tons of entanglements to stake out the Soviet claim. Korea Army Headquarters received a telegram from the Kwantung Army on 7 July conveying the deciphered messages. On the same day, the 19th Division in North Korea telephoned Seoul that, on 6 July, three or four Soviet horsemen had been observed reconnoitering Manchurian territory from atop a hill called Changkufeng. The alarming intelligence from the Kwantung Army and the front warranted immediate attention by the Korea Army. Some Kwantung Army officers doubted the significance of the developments, with one intelligence official even suggesting the Russian messages might be a deliberate ploy designed to entrap the Japanese at Changkufeng. On 7–8 July, all staff officers in Seoul convened at army headquarters. The name of Changkufeng Hill was not well known, but maps and other data suggested that neither the Japanese nor the Russians had previously stationed border units in the ridge complex west of Khasan. As early as March 1936, Army Commander Koiso Kuniaki had distributed maps to subordinate units, indicating which sectors were in dispute. No patrol was to enter zones lacking definitive demarcation. Until then, the only Japanese element east of the Tumen was a Manchurian policeman at Fangchuanting. Ownership of the high ground emerged as an early issue. A number of other points were raised by the Kwantung Army: 1. At present, Soviet elements in the area were negligible. 2. The intrusion must not be overlooked. The Russians could be expected to exploit any weakness, and half-measures would not suffice, especially regarding the Japanese defense mission along a 125-mile frontier. 3. In Japanese hands, Changkufeng Hill would be useful, but two excellent observation posts already existed in the neighboring sector of the Manchurian tongue. 4. With dissidence and purges underway, the Russians may have judged it necessary to seal border gaps, particularly after Lyushkov's defection. They may also have sought to control Changkufeng to offset Japanese dominance of the high ground to the north. 5. Soviet seizure of Changkufeng would upset the delicate status quo and could provoke a contest for equivalent observation posts. 6. In broader terms, it mattered little whether the Russians sought a permanent observation post on Changkufeng Hill, which was of relatively minor strategic value. Japan's primary concern lay in the China theater; Changkufeng was peripheral. The Japanese should not expend limited resources or become distracted. 7. The matter required consultation with the high command in Tokyo. In the absence of more comprehensive intelligence, the assembled staff officers concluded that the Korea Army should, at a minimum, ignore or disregard Soviet actions for the time being, while maintaining vigilant observation of the area. The consensus was communicated to Major General Kitano Kenzo, the Korea Army chief of staff, who concurred, and to Koiso. Upon learning that the recommendation advocated a low posture, Koiso inquired only whether the opinion reflected the unanimous view of the staff. Having been assured that it did, he approved the policy. Koiso, then 58, was at the threshold of the routine personnel changes occurring around 15 July. He had just been informed that he would retire and that General Nakamura Kotaro would succeed him. Those acquainted with Koiso perceived him as treating the border difficulties as a minor anticlimax in the course of his command tour. He appeared unemphatic or relaxed as he prepared to depart from a post he had held for twenty-one years. Although neither Koiso nor his staff welcomed the Soviet activities that appeared under way, his reaction likely reflected a reluctance to make decisions that could constrain his soon-to-arrive successor. On 8 July Koiso authorized the dispatch of warnings to the 19th Division at Nanam, to the Hunchun garrison, and to the intelligence branch at Hunchun. These units were instructed to exercise maximum precautions and to tighten frontier security north of Shuiliufeng. In response to the initial appearance of Soviet horsemen at Changkufeng, the Kucheng Border Garrison Unit of the 76th Infantry Regiment maintained close surveillance across the Tumen. By about noon on 9 July, patrols detected approximately a dozen Russian troops commencing construction atop Changkufeng. Between 11 and 13 July, the number of soldiers on the slopes increased to forty; there were also thirty horses and eleven camouflaged tents. Operating in shifts on the western side, thirty meters from the crest, the Russians erected barbed wire and firing trenches; fifty meters forward, they excavated observation trenches. In addition to existing telephone lines between Changkufeng, Lake Khasan, and Kozando, the Russians installed a portable telephone net. Logistical support was provided by three boats on the lake. Approximately twenty kilometers to the east, well within Soviet territory, large forces were being mobilized, and steamship traffic into Posyet Bay intensified. Upon learning of the "intrusion" at Changkufeng on 9 July, Lt. General Suetaka Kamezo, the commander of the 19th Division, dispatched staff officers to the front and prepared to send elements to reinforce border units. The special significance of Suetaka and his division stemmed from a series of unusual circumstances. Chientao Province, the same zone into which Lyushkov had fled and the sector where Soviet horsemen had appeared, fell within Manchukuo geographically and administratively. Yet, in terms of defense, the configuration of the frontier, the terrain, and the transportation network more closely connected the region with North Korea than with southeastern Manchuria. Approximately 80% of the population was of Korean origin, which implied Japanese rather than Manchukuoan allegiance. Consequently, the Korea Army had been made operationally responsible for the defense of Chientao and controlled not only the three-battalion garrison at Hunchun but also the intelligence detachment located there. In the event of war, the Korea Army's mission was defined as mobilization and execution of subsidiary operational tasks against the USSR, under the control and in support of the Kwantung Army. The Korea Army ordinarily possessed two infantry divisions, the 19th in North Korea and the 20th stationed at Seoul, but the 20th Division had already departed for China, leaving only the 20th Depot Division in the capital. Beyond sparse ground units, devoid of armor and with weak heavy artillery, there were only two air regiments in Korea, the nearest being the unit at Hoeryong. The Korea Army was designed to maintain public security within Korea as well as fulfill minimal defensive responsibilities. Such an army did not require a full-time operations officer, and none was maintained. When needed, as in mid-1938, the task fell to the senior staff officer, in this case Colonel Iwasaki Tamio. In peacetime, training constituted the primary focus. Thus, the 19th Division was entrusted with defending northeastern Korea. Its commander, Suetaka, a seasoned infantryman, resented the fact that his elite force had never engaged in combat in China. He intensified training with zeal, emphasizing strict discipline, bravery, aggressiveness, and thorough preparation. Japanese veterans characterized him as severe, bullish, short-tempered, hot-blooded, highly strung, unbending, and stubborn. Nonetheless, there was widespread respect for his realistic training program, maintained under firm, even violent, personal supervision. His men regarded Suetaka as a professional, a modern samurai who forged the division into superb condition. Privately, he was reputed for sensitivity and warmth; a Japanese phrase "yakamashii oyaji" captures the dual sense of stern father and martinet in his character. At the outset, however, Suetaka displayed little aggression. Although not widely known, he did not welcome the orders from army headquarters to deploy to the Tumen. Until late July, he remained somewhat opposed to the notion of dislodging the Soviets from the crest, a proposition arising from neither the division staff nor, initially, Suetaka himself. Colonel Sato noted that, for a week after reports of Soviet excavation at Changkufeng, the division's response was limited to preparations for a possible emergency, as they perceived the matter as a local issue best settled through diplomacy. Korea Army officers acknowledged that, around the time the Soviets consolidated their outpost strength at Changkufeng, an informal and personal telegram arrived in Seoul from a Kwantung Army Intelligence field-grade officer who specialized in Soviet affairs. If the Korea Army hesitated, the Kwantung Army would be obliged to eject the Russians; the matter could not be ignored. While the telegram did not demand a reply and struck several officers as presumptuous and implausible, the message was promptly shown to Koiso. Koiso was driven to immediate action, he wired Tokyo asserting that only the Korea Army could and would handle the incident. One staff officer recalled "We felt we had to act, out of a sense of responsibility. But we resented the Kwantung Army's interference." The Korea Army staff convened shortly after receipt of the unofficial telegram from Hsinking. Based on the latest intelligence from the division dated 13 July, the officers prepared an assessment for submission to the army commander. The hypotheses were distilled into three scenarios: 1. The USSR, or the Far East authorities, desires hostilities. Conclusion: Slightly possible. 2. The USSR seeks to restrain Japan on the eve of the pivotal operations in China: the major Japanese offensive to seize Hankow. Conclusion: Highly probable. 3. The Posyet district commander is new in his post; by occupying the Changkufeng ridges, he would demonstrate loyalty, impress superiors, and seek glory. Conclusion: Possible. Late on 13 July or early on 14 July, Koiso approved the dispatch of a message to the vice minister of war, and the Kwantung Army chief of staff: "Lake Khasan area lies in troublesome sector USSR has been claiming . . . in accordance with treaties [said Secret Message No. 913], but we interpret it to be Manchukuoan territory, evident even from maps published by Soviet side. Russian actions are patently illegal, but, considering that area does not exert major or immediate influence on operations [Japan] is intending and that China Incident is in full swing, we are not going to conduct counterattack measures immediately. This army is thinking of reasoning with Soviets and requesting pullback, directly on spot. . . . In case Russians do not accede in long run, we have intention to drive Soviet soldiers out of area east of Khasan firmly by use of force." The message concluded with a request that the Tokyo authorities lodge a formal protest with the USSR, on behalf of Manchukuo and Japan, and guide matters so that the Russians would withdraw quickly. Dominant in Japanese high command thinking in 1938 was the China theater; the Changkufeng episode constituted a mere digression. A sequence of Japanese tactical victories had preceded the summer: Tsingtao fell in January; the Yellow River was reached in March; a "reformed government of the Republic of China" was installed at Nanking several weeks later; Amoy fell in early May; Suchow fell on the 20th. With these gains, northern and central fronts could be linked by the Japanese. Yet Chinese resistance persisted, and while public statements anticipated imminent Chinese dissension, private admissions acknowledged that the partial effects of Suchow's fall were ominous: control might pass from Chiang Kai-shek to the Communists, Chinese defiance might intensify, and Soviet involvement could ensue. A Hankow drive appeared desirable to symbolize the conclusion of the military phase of hostilities. The Japanese and their adversaries were in accord regarding the importance of the summer and autumn campaigns. Even after Suchow's fall, the government discouraged public insinuations that enemy resistance was collapsing; when Chiang addressed the nation on the first anniversary of hostilities, Premier Konoe prophetically proclaimed, "The war has just begun." Colonel Inada Masazum served as the Army General Staff's principal figure for the Changkufeng affair, occupying the position of chief of the 2nd Operations Section within the Operations Bureau in March 1938. A distinguished graduate of the Military Academy, Inada completed the War College program and held a combination of line, instructional, and staff assignments at the War College, the Army General Staff, and the War Ministry. He was recognized as a sharp, highly capable, and driveful personality, though some regarded him as enigmatic. Following the capture of Suchow, Imperial General Headquarters on 18 June ordered field forces to undertake operational preparations for a drive to seize the Wuhan complex. Inada favored a decisive move aimed at achieving a rapid political settlement. He acknowledged that Soviet intervention in 1938, during Japan's involvement in China, would have been critical. Although Japanese forces could still defeat the Chinese, an overextended Japanese Army might be fatally compromised against the Russians. Soviet assistance to China was already pronouncedly unwelcome. The Soviets were reported to possess roughly 20 rifle divisions, four to five cavalry divisions, 1,500 tanks, and 1,560 aircraft, including 300 bombers with a range of approximately 3,000 kilometers, enabling reach from Vladivostok to Tokyo. Soviet manpower in Siberia was likely near 370,000. In response, Japanese central authorities stressed a no-trouble policy toward the USSR while seeking to "wall off" the border and bolster the Kwantung Army as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, the envisaged correction of the strategic imbalance could not occur before 1943, given shortages in ammunition, manpower, and materiel across existing theaters in China. By the end of 1937 Japan had committed 16 of its 24 divisions to China, bringing the standing force to roughly 700,000. Army General Staff planners reallocated three ground divisions, intended for a northern contingency, from north to central China, even as the Kwantung Army operated from a less favorable posture. Attitudes toward the northern problem varied within senior military circles. While concern persisted, it was not universal. As campaigns in China widened, planning at the high command level deteriorated, propagating confusion and anxiety to field armies in China. The Japanese Navy suspected that the Army general staff was invoking the USSR as a pretext for broader strategic aims—namely, to provoke a more consequential confrontation with the USSR while the Navy contended with its own strategic rivalries with the Army, centered on the United States and Britain. Army leaders, however, denied aggressive intent against the USSR at that time. The Hankow plan encountered substantial internal opposition at high levels. Private assessments among army planners suggested that a two-front war would be premature given operational readiness and troop strength. Not only were new War Ministry officials cautious, but many high-ranking Army general staff officers and court circles shared doubts. Aggressive tendencies, influenced by subordinates and the Kwantung Army, were evident in Inada, who repeatedly pressed Tada Shun, the deputy army chief of staff, to endorse the Wuhan drive as both necessary and feasible, arguing that the USSR would gain from Japan's weakening without incurring substantial losses. Inada contended that Stalin was rational and that time favored the USSR in the Far East, where industrial buildup and military modernization were ongoing. He argued that the Soviet purges impeded opportunistic ventures with Japan. He posited that Nazi Germany posed a growing threat on the western front, and thus the USSR should be avoided by both Japan, due to China and Russia, due to Germany. While most of the army remained engaged in China, Tada did not initially share Inada's views; only after inspecting the Manchurian borders in April 1938 did he finally align with Inada's broader vision, which encompassed both northern and Chinese considerations. During this period, Inada studied daily intelligence from the Kwantung Army, and after Lyushkov's defection in June, reports suggested the Soviets were following their sector commander's recommendations. Russian troops appeared at Changkufeng, seemingly prepared to dig in. Inada recollects his reaction: "That's nice, my chance has come." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The simmering Soviet–Japanese border clashes centered on Changkufeng Hill near Lake Khanka, set within a broader history of contested frontiers dating to Qing and Tsarist treaties. Japan, prioritizing China, considered Changkufeng peripheral but ready to confront Soviet encroachment; Moscow aimed to consolidate border gains, with high-level war planning overlaying regional skirmishes. Conflict loomed over Manchuria.