Turkey boosts Mali defence ties after separatist and jihadist attacks

Armenia election: what the vote could mean for Russia, the West and Azerbaijan

As Armenians vote in a parliamentary election seen as a test of Nikol Pashinyan’s pro-Western course, RFI asks two regional experts what the result could mean for peace with Azerbaijan and relations with Russia. Eight years after the street revolution that brought him to power, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is asking voters for a fresh mandate built around the promise of lasting peace with Azerbaijan and a reduced dependence on Russia. His opponents say he has conceded too much to Baku and damaged Armenia’s traditional alliance with Moscow. To understand what is at stake, RFI spoke to Joshua Kucera, an analyst with the International Crisis Group, and Richard Giragossian, director of the Regional Studies Center in Yerevan.

Turkey expands influence in Africa through military training

Turkey is expanding its military training programmes across Africa, with soldiers from Mali and Niger graduating from a special forces camp as Ankara seeks to deepen ties across the continent. The soldiers completed training this month at Turkey [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/turkey/]'s special forces camp in Isparta. The approach, known as the "Somalia model" after Turkey's largest overseas base, has become central to Ankara's strategy in Africa [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/africa/]. "The Somalia model is one of the Turkish military ideas to educate, train certain African states that are very much interested in military cooperation with Turkey," said Huseyin Bagci, an international relations professor at Ankara's Middle East Technical University. "Turkey has done it to Central Asian countries in the 90s, in the 2000s. So now the African is on the line, and this is the new development and is good for Turkey." Turkey has signed more than 20 military training cooperation deals across Africa in recent years. Turkey courts Libya's rival factions in bid to further Mediterranean ambitions [https://www.rfi.fr/en/podcasts/international-report/20260523-turkey-courts-libya-s-rival-factions-in-bid-to-further-mediterranean-ambitions] GROWING TIES "Somalia and Libya [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/libya/] are central where Turkey does have training bases," said Nebahat Tanriverdi Yasar, a defence expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. "But also, we are seeing growing ties with Sahelian countries, especially Niger, Mali, Nigeria." Turkey sees military training as a cost-effective way to increase its influence in Africa. "It is a relatively low-cost way to present itself in sensitive theaters, with fewer operational costs and risk of direct intervention. So in a way, those relations serve as a tool for defense diplomacy," Yasar said. Turkey has moved swiftly to capitalise on the vacuum left by France [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/france/]'s retreating military and fading diplomatic sway in West Africa [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/west-africa-1/] and the Sahel [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/sahel/]. Meanwhile, African nations increasingly view Turkey as a counterweight to the rising influence of Russia [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/russia/] and China [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/china/]. Turkey expands military footprint in Somalia as regional rivalries intensify [https://www.rfi.fr/en/podcasts/international-report/20260516-turkey-expands-military-footprint-in-somalia-as-regional-rivalries-intensify] LIBYA'S ROLE Turkey's training of Libyan forces linked to rival administrations also serves European interests because Libya has become a crucial gateway for people smugglers heading into Europe [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/europe/], said Aya Burweilla, a Libya expert at the Athens-based Center for Hellenic and Mediterranean Studies. "Libya with an army that can secure its borders is good for Europe, too," Burweilla said. "Libya has two seas, one in the desert and one on the Mediterranean. And you need a properly organized army that can keep the border safe." Turkey's military training programmes are also helping the country's booming defence industry. "If you train them, they should use Turkish weapons; this is very normal. When you look at the export of Turkish arms to the world, you see mostly to African countries," said Bagci. Turkey's growing defence ties are helping to bring African military and political leaders to industry events in Turkey. "It is not easy to make business, of course, with African countries, with the military leaders there, it is not easy. But when you look at military fairs in Istanbul [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/istanbul/], you see how many African countries' military and political leaders visit," Bagci said. Turkey boosts Mali defence ties after separatist and jihadist attacks [https://www.rfi.fr/en/podcasts/international-report/20260502-turkey-boosts-mali-defence-ties-after-separatist-and-jihadist-attacks] DEFENCE LINKS Turkish arms sales, such as military drones now found across Africa, often include extensive training, intelligence sharing and diplomatic engagement. Training junior officers in countries like Somalia, some destined to become future generals, could also help Turkey build long-term relationships, said Omar Mahmood, East Africa analyst at the International Crisis Group. "You invest in the up and coming of the Somali security force, and you'll have some sort of long-standing ties going forward," Mahmood said. "Some of them are trained in the Turkish language as well, so that creates these sorts of bonds. So, absolutely, I think that's part of their strategic plan. It kind of shows a longer-term vision as well."

Turkey enters political unknown after police raid opposition party headquarters

Turkey's main opposition CHP was thrown into fresh disarray Saturday as court-installed leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu made his first visit to party headquarters since a controversial court ruling scrapped a 2023 party primary. Ozgur Ozel, the CHP leader ousted by the decision, called for an urgent congress, telling thousands at an Ankara rally that the party "cannot be run by an appointed leader". The 21 May court ruling has plunged the CHP, Turkey's oldest political party, into a crisis. Three days after the order, riot police forced their way into the party's headquarters in Ankara, armed with pepper spray and batons, to remove CHP leader Ozgur Ozel – a key rival to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The court said Ozel's 2023 election as party leader was marred by irregularities, and restored the former leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu. In Turkey [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/turkey/], elections are overseen by the Supreme Election Council, which certified Ozel’s win, and its rulings are constitutionally final. It is just the latest move against the CHP, which scored a major victory over Erdogan's ruling AKP in the 2024 local elections and has since gained ground in the polls. PARTY PRIMARY Kilicdaroglu visited that party headquarters on Saturday to mark the final day of Eid, with a photo shared by his team on social media showing him seated at his desk with a copy of the party's bylaws placed prominently in front of him. "I will bring a ballot box for party congress before you as soon as possible," Kilicdaroglu said in an address, without providing a precise date. Ozel renewed his challenge to Kilicdaroglu to contest a party primary, saying he was willing to run "with whatever delegates he wants". With crowds chanting "Traitor Kemal!", Ozel said the party congress must be held "immediately", urging Kilicdaroglu to "hold a congress at once, with whichever delegates you wish. Give the party an elected leader without delay. The CHP does not accept appointments." He also demanded a primary election, saying that he would give up the party leadership if he received less than 85 percent support. Turkey expert Gonul Tol, a senior fellow at United States think tank, the Middle East Institute [https://mei.edu/] told RFI that Kilicdaroglu is "a convenient opponent for [President Recep Tayyip] Erdogan, because he "lost every major election during his 13 years at the helm of the party." Turkey riot police use tear gas to take opposition party HQ [https://www.rfi.fr/en/international-news/20260524-turkey-riot-police-use-tear-gas-to-take-opposition-party-hq-1] 'A BROADER CAMPAIGN' Ozel, 51, was elected leader at a party convention after 77-year-old Kilicdaroglu lost the 2023 presidential election. Ozel has revitalized the CHP, which now leads many opinion polls. Tol suggests Ozel's removal is part of a wider campaign. "This is the latest step in Erdogan's broader campaign to weaken the opposition," said Tol. “Last March, in another unprecedented move, authorities jailed Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoglu – he is Erdogan's top political rival. And since then, the government has systematically targeted CHP mayors through court cases and corruption investigations,” she added. Crackdown on Turkish opposition intensifies, with further arrests of mayors [https://www.rfi.fr/en/podcasts/international-report/20250712-crackdown-on-turkish-opposition-intensifies-with-further-arrests-of-mayors] Addressing protesters, Ozel vowed to flood the streets and squares in defiance of what he calls a judicial coup, while also appealing his removal. Kilicdaroglu, meanwhile, is promising to restore order to the party and cleanse it of “corrupting forces”. The government insists the judiciary is independent and denies any political agenda. Erdogan has remained silent on the issue. Still, some observers see the opposition’s upheaval as part of Erdogan’s grander vision for Turkey’s future. Political commentator Sezin Oney from independent Turkish media outlet [https://www.politikyol.com/] Politikyol notes that Erdogan [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/recep-tayyip-erdogan/] is eager to shape the post-Erdogan era. "He wants to design the succession, most probably to have a close family member replacing him. So he wants to shape the whole [political] terrain accordingly." 'OPPOSITION PSYCHE' Erdogan has ruled Turkish politics for almost 25 years, buoyed by both his political acumen and a fragmented opposition. But in the past year, Ozel’s energetic leadership has powered over 100 mass rallies nationwide, even in Erdogan’s strongholds, as Ozel taps into rising public frustration over crackdowns on dissent and skyrocketing food prices. The removal of Ozel as CHP leader is seen as a pivotal moment for Turkish democracy. “Turkey is moving closer to a Russia-style system where the leader decides who the opposition will be and ensures no real surprise can emerge at the ballot box,” predicts Tol. “Why is Erdogan taking such a massive political and economic risk? Erdogan knows he cannot win genuinely free and fair elections anymore." With Erdogan enjoying close ties with US President Donald Trump [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/donald-trump/] and the European Union [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/european-union/] increasingly looking to Turkey as a security partner, under the looming Russian threat, international reaction has been muted over the latest move against the opposition. Turkey steps up as Europe's indispensable and uncomfortable defence partner [https://www.rfi.fr/en/podcasts/international-report/20260426-turkey-steps-up-as-europe-s-indispensable-and-uncomfortable-defence-partner] Speaking to tens of thousands of people at a rally in Izmir on Tuesday, Ozel vowed to escalate protests. Rumours are swirling that he could launch a new party. One opinion poll found only 11 percent of respondents approved of the removal of Ozel. Yet the legal noose appears to be tightening, with reports suggesting his parliamentary immunity could be stripped and that he may soon join other top party members behind bars. “We don't have the opposition in political representation form, but the people are there. The opposition psyche of the people is still there. So you cannot absolutely nullify the people or their political views,” said Oney. “We don't know what's going to come out of it. We can make predictions, but it's something totally novel and new in Turkey, and Turkish history as well."

Turkey courts Libya's rival factions in bid to further Mediterranean ambitions

In a bold move by Ankara, Turkey this week brought together Libya’s two rival militaries for international exercises. While firmly supporting the Tripoli-based regime, Turkey is now extending an olive branch to the Benghazi administration, aiming to steady Libya and broaden its sway across the region. For the first time, Libya’s two military forces participated internationally together under one flag. According to the Turkish defence ministry, 501 personnel from both Libyan armies joined Turkey’s Efes 2026 military exercises. “There needs to be one unified army in Libya [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/libya/], one unified military force,” said Libya expert Aya Burweila of the Athens-based Centre for Hellenic and Mediterranean Studies. “I think these joint exercises help with that. They help facilitate closer cooperation with both sides, and that can only be a good thing.” Libya has been split since 2014, with the Government of National Unity ruling the west from Tripoli [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/tripoli/] and the Government of National Stability holding the east in Benghazi [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/benghazi/]. While Ankara has long championed Tripoli, analyst Burweila suggests that May’s joint exercises signal a new Turkish push to engage with Benghazi. “This is a huge, practical pivot towards the east [by Turkey]. It has huge implications for Libya’s stability. Turkey’s position now is that it has good relations with both sides,” said Burweila. “It’s not just joint military exercises. There are business interests, there are sales of weapons and drones, and so forth.”  Turkey and Italy boost cooperation in bid to shape Libya’s political future [https://www.rfi.fr/en/podcasts/international-report/20250813-turkey-and-italy-boost-cooperation-in-bid-to-shape-libya-political-future] ENERGY RESERVES For Ankara, courting the Benghazi administration, led by military commander Khalifa Haftar [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/khalifa-haftar/], is all about expanding Turkey’s influence in the eastern Mediterranean, argues Jalel Harchaoui of the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based defence think tank.  Harchaoui said Ankara needs Haftar’s support to enforce a 2019 memorandum of understanding that Turkey signed with the Tripoli administration to create a joint exclusive economic zone in Libyan waters.  “Now, if Ankara wants to enforce it, which it does, it needs to have the Haftar family on board,” Harchaoui explained. “The Haftar family can deliver on two very necessary things: the parliamentary ratification, because the parliament happens to be controlled by the Haftar family, and also the part of the coast that is involved in this arrangement is eastern Libya, not western Libya.” However, the Turkey-Libya exclusive economic zone, believed to have large untapped energy reserves, is strongly opposed by Greece [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/greece/] and Cyprus [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/cyprus/], who claim it violates their territorial waters. Neighbouring Egypt [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/egypt/] and Israel [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/israel/] have also voiced concerns. Haftar’s eastern Libyan government shares their reluctance. “Eastern Libya has very good relations with Egypt and has cordial relations with Greece as well. And this memorandum, at least from their side, violates their rights,” explained Libya analyst Burweila.  She added: “I think what lots of Libyans feel is: 'this fight is not our fight. We don't want to be involved in this kind of dispute.' So while this is a big priority for Turkey, it is not a priority for Libyans, and I think everybody there would prefer to kick this can down the road.” Egypt and Turkey's closer ties spark hope for peace among Libya’s rival factions [https://www.rfi.fr/en/podcasts/international-report/20241027-egypt-and-turkey-s-closer-ties-spark-hope-for-peace-among-libya-s-rival-factions] CARROT AND STICK Throughout 2025, Ankara wooed Haftar and his son Saddam, chief of staff of the Libyan National Army [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/libyan-national-army/], but saw little progress. According to analyst Harchaoui, Turkey [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/turkey/] has since toughened its stance, zeroing in on Haftar’s late-year military backing of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Turkish-made combat drones have been pictured [https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypts-drone-deployment-border-raises-stakes-sudans-civil-war-2026-02-02/] on airbases in southern Egypt, which like Turkey backs the Sudanese army in its fight against the paramilitary RSF. According to a New York Times investigation [https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/01/world/africa/egypt-sudan-drones.html], they have been used for strikes in Sudan [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/sudan/]. “This was a new development,” said Harchaoui, “It was basically Turkey saying, 'I smiled for most of 2025, and you did nothing for me. And you will have seen two faces. You will have seen the carrot, obviously, but also the stick.'” In April, Turkey delivered a new batch of military drones to Haftar’s army, continuing this carrot-and-stick policy. The Turkish defence ministry says it aims to hold further joint military exercises with both Libyan armies. While Turkey is stepping up its efforts to stabilise Libya, its goal of securing joint control of a huge swathe of the eastern Mediterranean [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/mediterranean/] threatens to drag the country further into an increasingly bitter regional rivalry.

Turkey expands military footprint in Somalia as regional rivalries intensify

Turkey’s role in Somalia is under growing scrutiny, with the East African country embroiled in controversy over elections and Israel stepping up efforts to challenge Turkey in the region. Over the last two years Turkey has ramped up its economic and military presence in Somalia [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/somalia/], building on decades of development. The East African country is home to Turkey’s largest overseas military base and this year it bolstered its military presence, deploying F16 fighter jets and tanks. Turkey is also constructing a space port for its rapidly advancing missile programme, and the two countries have signed agreements to exploit potentially vast energy reserves. But the deepening partnership is proving increasingly controversial, says Omar Mahmood [https://www.crisisgroup.org/who-we-are/people/omar-mahmood]of the International Crisis Group. While five or 10 years ago there would have been "quite high praise" for Turkey's role, that's changed over the last two years. "Some of these [Turkish] contracts and projects have tipped into [a much] greater scale and that has raised questions" he noted. Turkey boosts Mali defence ties after separatist and jihadist attacks [https://www.rfi.fr/en/podcasts/international-report/20260502-turkey-boosts-mali-defence-ties-after-separatist-and-jihadist-attacks] ELECTION DISPUTE A looming constitutional crisis is adding to the scrutiny of Turkey’s role in Somalia. The Somali government is insisting it has one year left of its electoral mandate, while the opposition claims elections should be held in May. "The core issue is that the political elite are infighting about the system,” explains Mahmood. “So anytime that happens, those who are against the government wind up complaining and then also looking at who is supporting the Somali government." Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/recep-tayyip-erdogan/] authorisation of $30 million in cash aid to the Somali government, which coincided with an April visit to Istanbul by his Somali counterpart, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, drew criticism from both the Somali and Turkish opposition. Famine looms in Somalia amid drought, dwindling aid and Middle East war [https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20260515-famine-looms-in-somalia-amid-drought-dwindling-aid-and-middle-east-war] “Turkey providing cash aid to the Somali government sparked the debate,” said African studies professor Elem Eyrice Tepeciklioglu [https://bce.asbu.edu.tr/en/akademik-personel/elemeyricetepeciklioglu], of the Social Sciences University of Ankara. “It seems some people think Turkey supports the ruling government, and provides support to the ruling government because they benefit from the relationship.” Ankara has strongly refuted accusations of interference in Somali politics. However, it could be paying the price for being too focused on Mogadishu in the past, given the diverse nature of Somalia's regions. “Turkey has started to learn from its mistakes,” said Tepeciklioglu. “They have started to increase their involvement with different states, with different regions, and have started to increase their engagement with local people as well.” RIVALRY IN THE REGION Turkey is also facing a growing challenge in the region from Israel [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/israel/], which in April appointed an ambassador to Somaliland – becoming the first country to recognise the breakaway republic, which seceded from Somalia in 1991. “It’s been useful probably for [Israel] to assert themselves against Turkey in an area where Turkey has firmly planted its flag,” said Norman Ricklefs [https://mq.academia.edu/NormanRicklefs]of geopolitical consultancy, the NAMEA Group. Israeli-Turkish relations remain strained over Ankara’s support of Hamas and Israel’s war against Gaza and Lebanon. The Israeli government has indicated it is considering a military presence in Somaliland [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/somaliland/], to counter the threat posed by the Houthis in Yemen.  “I don't think we're at that stage yet,” said Ricklefs. "But any Israeli military presence in Somaliland is going to raise angst amongst the neighbours – Somalia, Egypt, Turkey and potentially Saudi Arabia. Obviously, it's going to be destabilising.” The risky calculations behind Israel's recognition of Somaliland [https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20260109-the-risky-calculations-behind-israel-s-recognition-of-somaliland] The Horn of Africa could be a potential new flashpoint if Israel deploys military assets in Somaliland, agrees international relations professor Serhat Guvenc [https://khas.academia.edu/SerhatGuvenc] of Istanbul’s Kadir Has University. "The potential for conflict between Israel and Turkey is really high, because they're pursuing diametrically opposed objectives. If relations further deteriorate, then we may see tensions running high between the two countries because they would be in almost physical contact. Their military assets may run the risk of having dangerous encounters with each other." Israeli-Turkish rivalry in the region threatens to exacerbate existing tensions in an already volatile area. For Turkey, which has invested more than €1 billion in development in Somalia over the past decade, and is also eyeing major financial returns from its energy exploration in Somalian waters, the stakes are high.