AI Economics Research Podcast
This episode dives into a Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report that explores a critical challenge in information disclosure: how to ensure a sender, like a bank regulator, can truly commit to a disclosure rule without manipulating signals after the fact. We'll break down how the paper introduces 'Receiver-Private Certified Bayesian Persuasion,' revealing why cryptography, specifically secure two-party computation, is not just a tool but a necessary condition to prevent ex-post information suppression in economic settings like bank stress tests. This episode explains a real academic paper in plain English for a general audience. Source paper: MAY 2026 and Cryptography Bayesian Persuasion and Cryptography - Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports https://doi.org/10.59576/sr.1194 Keywords: central banking, financial stability, information disclosure, stress testing, cryptography, economic commitment
31 episodes
Comments
0Be the first to comment
Sign up now and become a member of the AI Economics Research Podcast community!