Hot takes happy hour with Elise and Dany

Power, politics and the World Cup

More than five billion people are expected to watch some part of the 2026 World Cup. In much of the world, soccer is more than a sport. It is identity, nationalism, and, for some, something approaching religion. Which is why veteran foreign correspondent Conor Powell spent years investigating the people who control it. He joined me Tuesday to discuss before the start of the tournament. What began as a podcast about FIFA became something much bigger. His series Lords of Soccer [https://podnews.net/press-release/lords-of-soccer] traces how a relatively obscure governing body became one of the most powerful institutions on earth - one that negotiates with presidents and kings, influences national policy, and shapes how entire countries see themselves. After reporting the story, Conor arrived at a simple conclusion: FIFA is not really a sports organization, but a political institution that happens to run a sport. The popular mythology presents soccer as a game that transcends politics. As Conor argues, politics has been in FIFA’s DNA from the start. Founded in Paris in 1904 - by, as he puts it, “the same old European men who ran everything else” - FIFA made a habit of working with whoever held power. He calls the organization “probably the biggest political backer of South African apartheid outside of the British government,” and the pattern held for decades: military juntas in Latin America, monarchies in the Gulf, democracies seeking prestige. The clients changed. The business model didn’t. Then television turned the World Cup into one of the most valuable properties in global entertainment, and the money poured in. So did the corruption - bribery, vote-buying, kickbacks, patronage networks stretching across continents. When the U.S. Justice Department unveiled its sweeping case in 2015, many casual fans were stunned. Conor Powell was not. A central theme of Lords of Soccer is that the corruption was never the work of a few bad actors. It was how FIFA accumulated and maintained power. Development funds and tournament slots doubled as political tools, dispensed by an organization that is, on paper, a Swiss nonprofit. Yet FIFA survived. If anything, it emerged stronger. Enter Gianni Infantino, who inherited an organization facing an existential credibility crisis. To his credit, real reforms followed: more transparency, sturdier governance, and a harder environment for the old envelope-passing culture. Conor doesn’t dismiss those changes. He just declines to confuse reform with the disappearance of power. Infantino may be cleaner than previous FIFA presidents - a low bar, but a real one. He is also the most politically connected, having cultivated relationships with world leaders across continents, including Donald Trump, to whom FIFA presented its own freshly created peace prize last December. That relationship matters now. The upcoming World Cup, spanning the United States, Canada, and Mexico, will be the largest ever held. It promises record revenues, record audiences, and record attention - which to FIFA are three ways of saying the same thing. It also faces a uniquely geopolitical environment. Iran has qualified - and reports suggest its team may stay in Mexico and fly in for matches rather than risk complications entering or remaining in the United States. FIFA’s promise of universal participation may collide with national security considerations beyond its control. Nor is Iran the only problem. In a tournament built around global inclusion, access itself is becoming political. A World Cup referee from Somalia was denied entry into the United States days before the tournament because of what U.S. officials called “vetting concerns.” Then there is the cost. Ticket prices are pushing ordinary supporters further from the world’s biggest sporting event, and fans will not be allowed to bring their own water into stadiums in the summer heat. The host countries build the stadiums and run the trains; FIFA collects the broadcast money. It still markets soccer as the people’s game. But the people, increasingly, are priced out of it. That is an irony FIFA can live with, because it has no competition and knows it. “The problem with FIFA,” Conor told me, “is that there is just no amount of money they won’t chase.” Complaining about FIFA is itself something of a global pastime, and it has never once dented the ratings. The larger question hanging over 2026 is whether the World Cup can still bring people together. It is a cliché of international sport, but it feels unusually relevant today. And yet every four years, billions of people gather around the same event. For a few weeks, citizens of rival nations share a common experience. The same goals, wins and upsets become collective memories. After years spent cataloguing FIFA’s flaws, Conor remains fascinated by that paradox. The organization may be political, commercial, and imperfect, but the world’s game endures anyway. That may be FIFA’s greatest achievement - and its greatest source of power. You can listen to Lords of Soccer [https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/lords-of-soccer/id1627302406] wherever you follow your podcasts. It is an excellent series worthy of your time. Thank you Cash Flow Collective [https://substack.com/profile/300136071-cash-flow-collective], David Galinsky [https://substack.com/profile/45930167-david-galinsky], Jane M Myers [https://substack.com/profile/102632416-jane-m-myers], Melissa Ebel [https://substack.com/profile/228570892-melissa-ebel], Edward Gregory Jones [https://substack.com/profile/428505248-edward-gregory-jones], and many others for tuning into my live video with conor [https://substack.com/profile/700277-conor]! Join me for my next live video in the app. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.cosmopolitics.news/subscribe [https://www.cosmopolitics.news/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_2]

The deal Iran really wants

If you’re trying to follow the current state of the Iran war without losing your mind, retired military officers, former officials or Washington journalists are probably not the people to call. You call Arash Azizi [https://substack.com/profile/3023930-arash-azizi]. Because while Washington is busy arguing over whether a naval skirmish in the Strait of Hormuz counts as a ceasefire violation, a “love tap,” or the opening act of World War III, Arash is focused on something more useful: what Iran actually wants. And right now, that may be the most important question in the region. When we spoke this week — a follow-up to our conversation [https://www.cosmopolitics.news/p/iran-is-fighting-a-war-and-itself] last month about Iran as a regime in transition — Arash argued that despite the missile exchanges, maritime confrontations, Trump Truth Social posts written in what increasingly feels like ALL CAPS diplomacy, and the general fog-machine atmosphere surrounding this conflict, both Tehran and Washington are moving toward the same conclusion: Neither side actually wants to go back to full war. That does not mean peace is imminent. It means reality is beginning to intrude. The latest sign came this week as reports emerged that the United States and Iran are inching toward a short memorandum of understanding that would effectively freeze the conflict and open a 30-day negotiating window on the harder issues: Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions relief, frozen assets, and future security arrangements in the Strait of Hormuz. In other words: after months of maximalist rhetoric, threats of capitulation, and military escalation, everyone may be slowly rediscovering diplomacy. Which, awkwardly, is where this probably was always headed. That tension — closest to renewed fighting and closest to a deal at the same time — has become the defining feature of this moment. The military phase of the conflict has not produced decisive victory for either side. Iran absorbed enormous damage but did not collapse. The United States demonstrated overwhelming military superiority but failed to force capitulation. And “Project Freedom” — the Trump administration’s latest attempt to reopen the Strait of Hormuz through naval escort operations — now appears suspended after only a few days of operation amid continued confrontations in the Gulf. Trump, meanwhile, continues to oscillate between threatening Iran with devastating force and hinting at imminent breakthrough agreements. One day the ceasefire is under strain. The next day the latest exchange of fire is merely “a love tap.” It is all very confusing. Which, to be fair, may not entirely be an accident. But underneath the chaos, Arash sees a more coherent logic emerging. “Success for Iran,” he said, “looks like preservation of the regime, but also recognition of Iran’s role in the region.” That word — recognition — came up repeatedly in our conversation. Not domination. Not conquest. Not some endless revolutionary project stretching from Tehran to the Mediterranean. Recognition. Iran wants sanctions relief. It wants economic normalization. It wants acceptance as a legitimate regional power with acknowledged interests and influence. And, crucially, Arash believes significant parts of the Iranian leadership — including elements of the Revolutionary Guards — may be willing to make meaningful concessions on the nuclear issue to get there. That is not how this conflict is typically framed in Washington. American debate tends to oscillate between two poles: either Iran is on the verge of collapse, or it is an irredeemably expansionist power that only understands force. What gets lost is the possibility that parts of the Iranian system may actually want integration more than permanent confrontation. “I think they want integration,” Arash said. “They want to be recognized as a major power in the region.” He is careful to note that this in no way makes the regime benign. Iran has backed militant proxies, fueled regional conflicts, and helped sustain Bashar al-Assad’s brutal war in Syria. He describes the Islamic Republic as containing contradictory impulses — part ideological revolutionary project, part traditional nation-state seeking stability and influence — and argues the second is now ascendant. One theory — increasingly visible in some parts of the Gulf — is that integrating Iran into a more stable regional framework could actually moderate its behavior over time. Another theory is that normalization would simply empower Tehran to pursue the same destabilizing policies with more money and legitimacy. As implausible as it sounds, Arash leans toward the former as the best way of restraining Iran. That argument will make many people deeply uncomfortable, particularly in Israel and among hardline Iran hawks in Washington. But it also reflects a reality becoming harder to ignore after months of war: Iran is not Libya. It is not Iraq. Despite immense economic pressure, assassinations, sanctions, cyber operations, and sustained bombing, Iran has not folded. Which raises an uncomfortable possibility for the Trump administration: maybe Iran cannot simply be bludgeoned into submission. That does not mean Tehran is winning. Far from it. Iran’s economy remains under severe strain. Inflation is soaring. The currency continues to weaken. Regional proxies like Hezbollah have been degraded. The regime itself remains deeply unpopular with much of its own population. But Arash argues that many in Washington fundamentally misunderstand how the Islamic Republic absorbs pressure. The question is not whether Iran is suffering — it clearly is. The question is what suffering produces politically. For years, American policy has operated on the assumption that enough pressure would eventually force either regime collapse or unconditional surrender. Two months of war appear to have complicated both theories. “What led to this particular war,” Azizi said, “was this temptation Trump had that he could dramatically change everything through military action. And that’s proven not to be the case.” Which helps explain why diplomacy — however chaotic, contradictory, and half-denied by all involved — is creeping back into the picture. The emerging framework reportedly under discussion would pause enrichment for more than a decade, require Iran to move highly enriched uranium out of the country, and create a broader negotiating process tied to sanctions relief and maritime security. It is not a peace treaty. It is barely even a roadmap. It is, essentially, an acknowledgment that nobody has found a military solution to the underlying problem. And perhaps that is the real story here. Not the skirmishes. Not the Trump posts. Not even the endless speculation over whether the ceasefire technically still exists. The real story may be that after all the fire and fury, everyone is slowly arriving back at the same uncomfortable conclusion: this ends with negotiation. The question is whether the politics — in Tehran, Washington, and across the region — will allow anyone to admit it out loud. As promised, Arash’s latest: Iran War -- deal or conflict [https://substack.com/home/post/p-196737831] Iran’s Leaders Mostly Want a Deal [https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/05/iran-infighting-negotiation-qalibaf/687020/] Is a Militia Running Wartime Iran? [https://arashazizi.com/2026/04/22/is-a-militia-running-wartime-iran/] and don’t forget to subscribe to Arash’s Substack [https://arashazizi.substack.com/] There’s no shortage of shows built around people confirming what their audience already believes. That’s good for engagement. It’s not always good for understanding the world. What I try to do here is something different: conversations with people like Arash Azizi, whose understanding of Iran comes not from cable news panels or think tank groupthink, but from deep historical knowledge, real sourcing inside the country, and a willingness to challenge easy narratives. You may not always agree with what you hear. But ideally, you’ll come away thinking about these issues a little differently. That’s the point. If you value that type of coverage, I hope you will consider becoming a paid subscriber. Thank you Herman Jacobs [https://substack.com/profile/4300597-herman-jacobs], Linda Perry [https://substack.com/profile/3289516-linda-perry], Mara [https://substack.com/profile/206370671-mara], Patty VanDyke [https://substack.com/profile/46379774-patty-vandyke], and many others for tuning into my live video with Arash Azizi [https://substack.com/profile/3023930-arash-azizi]! Join me for my next live video in the app. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.cosmopolitics.news/subscribe [https://www.cosmopolitics.news/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_2]

Live with Elise Labott: Lebanon on the edge

Iran, Lebanon, the King’s speech, the WHCD shooting and more…. Danielle Pletka [https://substack.com/profile/4302763-danielle-pletka] and I are back in full force! Join us TODAY at 5:30 ET for some cocktails and what promises to be a lively discussion. We had an audio glitch at the very end of the last question, but by then the essential point was clear: Lebanon is not just another front in the Iran war. It is where that war’s contradictions are most exposed — and where any real resolution will be tested. In a wide-ranging conversation with former U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Jeffrey Feltman, one theme kept resurfacing: across the region, there is motion without clarity. Ceasefires, negotiations, military pressure — all of it suggests activity, but not direction. Nowhere is that more true than in Lebanon. The war with Iran has settled into a strategic stalemate. Both Washington and Tehran face the same constraint: compromise looks like weakness. So nobody is compromising. Meanwhile, Iran has discovered leverage it didn’t know it had. The Strait of Hormuz — long a theoretical choke point — is now central to the conflict. As Feltman put it, the nuclear file concerned a handful of countries. Hormuz concerns the world. Tehran has noticed. It is against that backdrop that Lebanon matters — and why President Trump’s push for a ceasefire there is about more than Lebanon. Feltman’s read: the president didn’t want an additional reason for Iran not to negotiate. Whether that’s grand strategy or triage is an open question. What’s not in question is that this moment has produced something genuinely unusual: direct talks between Israel and Lebanon, conducted openly and over Hezbollah’s explicit objections. One Hezbollah spokesman reminded President Aoun of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s fate after talking to the Israelis. Aoun proceeded anyway. For decades, that would have been unthinkable. That alone marks a shift. And while the Lebanese state is negotiating, it does not control the forces driving the conflict. Hezbollah is not simply a militia and a terrorist group. It is a political party, a social services network, and a military force whose capabilities rival the Lebanese Armed Forces. It answers to Tehran. And since its leader Hassan Nasrallah’s death, even more so — his successor Naim Qassem is, in Feltman’s words, essentially a fully owned subsidiary of Iran, without Nasrallah’s ability to balance Lebanese politics against Iranian demands. But Israel’s continued occupation of southern Lebanon risks handing Hezbollah back the resistance narrative that made it powerful in the first place. This is the same ground Israel occupied from 1982 to 2000 — and Hezbollah was born in the rubble of that occupation. It knows how to tell that story. It’s been telling it for forty years. There is one shift working against Hezbollah from within. The war has displaced more than a million people from the Shia south — the very constituency Hezbollah claims to protect. The group no longer has the deep pockets it had after the war in 2006 to rebuild and buy back loyalty. That erosion of support is real. Whether the Lebanese government can translate it into political movement before the moment passes is another question entirely. The Aoun government is attempting something genuinely difficult: asserting sovereignty without triggering collapse. Push too hard against Hezbollah and you risk fracturing Lebanon’s sectarian balance. Move too slowly and you hand Israel and Washington the argument that Lebanon cannot act — which, Feltman notes, they are already making. The Lebanese Armed Forces are part of the problem. It is not just capability — though a soldier earning $200 a month is not rushing into a fight with Hezbollah’s drone units. It is cohesion. Any direct confrontation risks the army splitting along sectarian lines. The opportunity, if there is one, exists not because these problems have been solved but because the political space for incremental movement may briefly exist. The Aoun government’s best path, Feltman argues, is not sweeping declarations but tangible steps that are hard to dismiss — replacing Hezbollah’s social services with state services, implementing the goverment’s security plan and eroding the political narrative that sustains the group’s legitimacy. None of it will happen quickly. None of it without significant support. And the risk, as always in Lebanon, is that pressure outruns capacity — that Israel and Washington lose patience before Beirut has had time to show what it can do. If this effort fails, the outcome is unlikely to be a return to the status quo, but could be a broader, more destructive conflict. If it succeeds — even partially — it could begin to shift the balance toward a Lebanese state that actually governs its own territory. For now, Lebanon remains suspended between those two outcomes. Balanced, precariously, on a line that has broken before. There’s no shortage of podcasts where two people who already agree sit down and spend an hour being outraged together. It’s good for the algorithm. It doesn’t tell you anything you didn’t already know. That’s not what we’re doing here. I’m convinced the people worth talking to are the ones who make you reconsider something — not the ones who confirm what you already think. That means serious conversations with diplomats, intelligence officials, and policy architects who’ve actually been in the room. People like Jeff Feltman, who was there for the 2006 war in Lebanon, survived an assassination attempt by Hezbollah, met with the late Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and has spent twenty years watching the same dynamics repeat themselves. You might not always agree with what you hear. You’ll probably learn something anyway. That’s the point. If it sounds like your kind of show, I hope you’ll subscribe. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.cosmopolitics.news/subscribe [https://www.cosmopolitics.news/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_2]

Hot takes happy hour with Elise and Dany

Lebanon is having a moment, people! After decades of successive government failures, Hezbollah’s stranglehold on the country, and Iran pulling the strings of its very own “Party of God” terrorist army — complete with missiles tucked behind hospitals and under UN posts — there may finally be a window. Trump picked up the phone, brokered a ceasefire (for now), and told Netanyahu and Lebanon’s new president to get in a room, which could help the President in negotiations with Iran. Whether this is an Abraham Accords moment or just a diplomatic sugar high remains to be seen, but we’ll take it. Meanwhile, the Strait of Hormuz standoff continues to be both entirely about nuclear leverage and somehow also not about that at all — depending on which hour of the day you’re reading the president’s Truth Social feed. The Saudis, bless them, are quietly rerouting their pipelines and taking the wind out of Iran’s sails. Literally. And Orban lost! The man who turned Hungary into MAGA’s favorite field trip destination — who got CPAC, JD Vance, and a Trump phone-in rally — got voted out. Turns out gutting democratic institutions is fine until the economy tanks and people actually have to live there. Who knew. Bottom lines: Lebanon has a window, but don’t redecorate yet. Iran negotiations are murky and the Strait is murkier. Orban is out, but the MAGA-Hungary romance tells us something interesting about where Vance wants to take this party by 2028. And Pete Hegseth quoted Pulp Fiction thinking it was scripture. We can’t make this up. A final note for this week We know a lot of people spend their days doom-scrolling and venting about the politics of the moment — and honestly, sometimes we do too. What we try to offer here is something different: a dispassionate look at the administration’s foreign policies, the week’s news, and the geopolitical forces shaping what comes next. Despite having plenty of our own outrage, we’ll leave that to everyone else — understanding the forces at play feels a lot more useful than preaching to the choir. We don’t always agree, but we disagree agreeably — with respect, some experience, and occasionally some humor. We hope our community appreciates what we’re trying to build here. And if this isn’t your thing, no hard feelings — there are thousands of other Substacks out there to scratch your particular itch. We do hope to see you next week! Preamble, A slap in the face for the right [https://thepreamble.com/cp/194358455] Cosmopolitics Live with Steven Cook [https://www.cosmopolitics.news/p/economic-chicken-with-a-side-of-nuclear] #WTH The Hormuz blockade, [https://whatthehellisgoingon.substack.com/p/wth-the-hormuz-blockade]and podcast with Miad Maleki [https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/wth-the-iran-blockade-miad-maleki-explains/id1467993804?i=1000761790625] #WTH A ceasefire with Hezbollah, for now, [https://whatthehellisgoingon.substack.com/p/wth-a-ceasefire-with-hezbollah-for] Cosmopolitics, Ceasefire selfies in the Strait, [https://www.cosmopolitics.news/p/ceasefire-selfies-in-the-strait] For those interest in energy, read this Substack [https://robertbryce.substack.com/] by Robert Bryce [https://substack.com/profile/4835943-robert-bryce] Vice President JD Vance speech to Turning Point [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zaq_f18dJpo&themeRefresh=1] Hegseth quoting the “bible [https://www.instagram.com/p/DXPWN_NDhLD/]” sure does sound a lot like the Pulp Fiction version [https://www.instagram.com/reel/DXM6w_3yn6L/] Thank you Cash Flow Collective [https://substack.com/profile/300136071-cash-flow-collective], Marcie Alexander [https://substack.com/profile/21902605-marcie-alexander], Herman Jacobs [https://substack.com/profile/4300597-herman-jacobs], Sanlugonena@25 [https://substack.com/profile/214776663-sanlugonena25], and many others for tuning into my live video with Danielle Pletka [https://substack.com/profile/4302763-danielle-pletka]! Join me for my next live video in the app. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.cosmopolitics.news/subscribe [https://www.cosmopolitics.news/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_2]

Economic chicken with a side of nuclear talks

Seven weeks in, the war with Iran has morphed into an economic game of chicken — with a side order of nuclear negotiation. Having failed to get Iran to capitulate on the battlefield, the United States is now trying to squeeze Tehran into submission financially. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent this week called the naval blockade “the financial equivalent of the bombing campaign.” Iran’s answer was to threaten to shut down trade across the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and Red Sea entirely. Both sides are turning the screws. Neither is blinking. And somehow, in the middle of all this, the two countries are also trying to negotiate a nuclear deal. I sat down with Steven A. Cook [https://substack.com/profile/6060484-steven-a-cook], one of the sharpest Middle East analysts working today, to make sense of the current moment — the collapsed talks in Islamabad, the blockade, the nuclear negotiation that has somehow materialized in the middle of a war about a strait. His bottom line was not reassuring. Trump backed himself into this war convinced Iran would fold in days. When it didn’t fold on the battlefield, he sought negotiations. When those broke down, he escalated. “This,” Cook told me, “is the most half-assed war ever.” No clear objectives going in. No clear theory of what winning looks like. No clear sense of what the administration is actually willing to settle for. The shrug emoji🤷🏻 he said, is basically his reaction to what the president is thinking. The problem with the blockade is that it cuts both ways. Yes, it puts economic pressure on Iran — whose economy was already teetering after six weeks of bombardment. But it also keeps the strait closed, which means oil prices stay elevated, which means Americans keep feeling it at the pump. Trump needs a deal before the midterms. Iran knows that. And Tehran has a long history of using negotiations not to reach agreements but to buy time — getting adversaries to ease military pressure in exchange for talks that go nowhere. The new old regime will run the same play. The nuclear talks, ostensibly the reason the US went to war in the first place, only complicate matters. The U.S. wants a 20-year suspension of enrichment. Iran offered five years. Those positions are far apart. But the deeper problem is that Washington is now asking Tehran for two concessions simultaneously: give up the nuclear program and relinquish control of the strait. Before this war, the nuclear program was Iran’s primary leverage. Now Iran also controls Hormuz — not hypothetically, but actually, with mines in the water and ships turning back. A negotiated settlement that leaves Iran with any formalized role over the strait puts Tehran in a stronger position than it was on February 28, before the war started. As Cook put it: who would take that deal? If you value serious foreign policy journalism that cuts through the partisan noise and smart conversations with experts like Steven, please consider becoming a paid subscriber. The ceasefire expires April 22. Three aircraft carriers are now in the region and thousands of additional troops are en route to the region. At the same time, Trump is telling Fox Business the war is “very close to over” and gas prices will be down by the midterms. Maybe. Or maybe this is what a stalemate looks like when one side needs an exit and the other side knows it. Thank you Marcie Alexander [https://substack.com/profile/21902605-marcie-alexander], David Galinsky [https://substack.com/profile/45930167-david-galinsky], Barbara [https://substack.com/profile/30263987-barbara], Judy [https://substack.com/profile/143367321-judy], Christopher Grassi [https://substack.com/profile/6463154-christopher-grassi], and many others for tuning into my live video with Steven A. Cook [https://substack.com/profile/6060484-steven-a-cook]! Join me for my next live video in the app. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.cosmopolitics.news/subscribe [https://www.cosmopolitics.news/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_2]