Insight Myanmar

Both Sides Now

Episode #459: This is the third episode in a three-part series that emerged from a three-day Digital Storytelling Workshop hosted by Insight Myanmar Podcast, with support from ANU and IDRC. What began as a room of strangers slowly became a community through the simple act of sharing stories. We were reminded that communication is not just the exchange of information, but the creation of a shared emotional world, built through attention and care. “Tell me more” became our refrain, and this episode is an invitation to step into that circle. On this episode, you’ll hear the result of those few transformative days: honest voices, emerging perspectives, and storytellers beginning to find their footing. First up is Chit Tun, a teacher and marketing manager before the coup, who now lives as a refugee in Thailand with his family. The 2021 coup transformed his life. With his wife pregnant, he refused to let his child grow up under dictatorship. He supported her CDM participation, and became a protest leader before joining the armed resistance. However, he became disillusioned with some resistance groups, and eventually fled to Thailand. To make ends meet, he aids fellow refugees, teaches Burmese, and produces a podcast amplifying revolutionary voices. Zue, a Burmese language teacher and artist, roots her work in the beauty of her rural childhood, where weaving looms, bullock carts, and open fields shaped her creative and educational passions. After years of volunteer teaching and curriculum work, she founded the online Akkhaya Burmese Language Institute during COVID-19. Her YouTube and podcast projects also advance cultural preservation and pride. She was Myanmar’s sole recipient of the selective Global Ambassador Fellow granted by the International Council on Human Rights, Peace and Politics (ICHRPP). Zue hopes to continue her teaching and art work to better serve communities. August describes a shift from engineering to the study of religion and philosophy after becoming disillusioned with Myanmar’s education system. His academic path grows out of his work as a gender and LGBTQ rights trainer, where he has seen religion repeatedly misused to justify discrimination. He argues that Buddhist teachings emphasize compassion, morality, and nonviolence, not stereotyping or exclusion, and he wants to ground this claim in textual and scholarly evidence. Drawing on experiences with LGBTQ individuals from religious communities, he highlights the heavy social pressure they face. August hopes education can challenge conservative mindsets and support social change.

ASEAN in the Balance

Episode #458: Lilianne Fan is a long-time Myanmar analyst and advocate who served as an adviser to the ASEAN Special Envoy on Myanmar and as part of Malaysia’s advisory group during its ASEAN chairmanship. Drawing on that insider role, she argues that ASEAN’s response to the 2021 coup must be judged by how ASEAN actually functions, not by expectations of decisive moral intervention. Fan explains that ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus was never meant to resolve Myanmar’s crisis. Its real purpose was to create a diplomatic framework that allowed ASEAN to remain engaged while denying the junta regional legitimacy. Most significantly, it institutionalized the exclusion of Min Aung Hlaing from high-level ASEAN meetings, preventing the military from claiming regional endorsement. She acknowledges ASEAN’s early failures, particularly its initial reliance on shuttle diplomacy with the junta and its slow recognition of Myanmar’s mass civilian resistance. Over time, however, ASEAN adapted. Under Indonesia and especially Malaysia, engagement broadened to include resistance actors, ethnic organizations, and civil society. Fan highlights Malaysia’s chairmanship as a turning point. Kuala Lumpur invested heavily in preparation and conflict analysis, convening confidential, structured Track One meetings with resistance stakeholders, complemented by Track 1.5 dialogues with experts and civil society. These processes treated resistance groups as serious political actors without granting formal recognition. She also points to a major humanitarian shift: ASEAN’s formal acknowledgment that aid cannot rely solely on the AHA Centre and must include cross-border assistance and local delivery networks. Fan concludes that while ASEAN cannot force outcomes or reform the military, it plays a critical role in maintaining political red lines, preventing premature legitimization of the junta, and slowly reshaping ASEAN’s own approach to conflict and legitimacy.

Neither Free Nor Fair

Episode #457: Brang Min, a Kachin State civil society organizer and student activist with the Kachin State Civil Movement; Thinzar Shunlei Yi, a leading organizer and deputy director of the Anti-Sham Election Campaign Committee representing the General Strike movement; and Aung Moe Zaw, a veteran democracy activist associated with the Democratic Party for a New Society, discuss the upcoming elections. Despite their differing backgrounds, all three agree that the 2025 election is designed to entrench military power under a civilian façade. Brang Min grounds his analysis in conditions in Kachin State, where airstrikes, artillery attacks, displacement, and internet shutdowns dominate daily life. Under such circumstances, he argues,elections are irrelevant. Having voted in 2020 with hopes for political change, he views the current election as fraudulent, and intended to manufacture legitimacy rather than reflect popular will. He acknowledges that some ethnic minority parties may participate in hopes of gaining limited influence, but maintains that this dynamic is shaped by coercion. With fighting ongoing, ordinary Kachin civilians who participate do so under pressure, while military-aligned actors engage willingly. Thinzar Shunlei Yi explains that the military revealed its intentions immediately after the 2021 coup by dismantling the Union Election Commission and rebuilding it under junta control. She argues that elections have always been treated as a tactical reset, not a democratic process. She emphasizes widespread disenfranchisement, noting that of Myanmar’s 330 townships, the junta’s phased election plan initially included only 193; elections are already cancelled 56 of those, and others remain uncertain as fighting continues. She also describes intensified repression, including arrests under “election protection” laws and escalating violence to secure territory ahead of polling. Aung Moe Zaw places the election in historical context, describing decades of manipulated votes, overturned results, and tightly controlled political participation. He argues that opaque electoral laws and proportional representation systems are designed to guarantee military victory and obscure accountability. All three conclude that the election will not weaken resistance. They warn against international acceptance of the electoral façade and stress that Myanmar’s democratic future depends on sustained internal struggle, accountability for war crimes, and rejection of military-imposed political frameworks.

Abandoned in Plain Sight

Episode #456: “We will not leave them behind,” says Simon Billenness, director of the Campaign for a New Myanmar and a Burma policy advocate with more than three decades of experience lobbying the United States Congress on sanctions policy, congressional appropriations, and accountability for Myanmar’s military. In his second appearance on the podcast, Billenness focuses on the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s decision to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Burmese nationals, which he views as both a humanitarian crisis and a sharp rupture in longstanding U.S. policy. Billenness explains that TPS had allowed nearly 4,000 Burmese nationals to remain legally in the United States because conditions at home made safe return impossible. With DHS giving recipients just sixty days before protections expire, he describes the consequences as stark. Many TPS holders, he notes, have been told by immigration attorneys that no realistic legal pathways remain for them to stay, leaving forced return to a conflict as a terrifying prospect. He emphasizes that those affected are not abstractions or mere statistics. Many arrived as students or professionals before or shortly after the 2021 coup and remained because returning home would expose them to grave danger. Some support the Civil Disobedience Movement from abroad; others belong to ethnic or religious minorities targeted by the military. Young men face forced conscription, while all confront a country still engulfed in instability, indiscriminate military violence, and overall repression. From Billenness’s perspective, ending TPS misrepresents both American interests and values. He argues that TPS recipients are among the United States’ strongest allies within Myanmar society and that their presence strengthens American communities. DHS’s justification—citing ceasefires, elections, and stability—he dismisses as false and misleading and moreover, contradicting the State Department’s analysis. The elections, he says, are sham exercises under military rule, while airstrikes on civilian populations continue despite so-called ceasefires. While legal challenges and congressional efforts to restore TPS move forward, Billenness stresses that sustained constituent advocacy remains the most effective tool. Even amid an unpredictable moment for U.S. foreign policy, he insists on endurance and resolve, concluding, “We will fight back. We will not abandon the Burmese people.”

The Bloodiest Election

Episode #455: Mon Zin, a Myanmar-born pro-democracy activist based in Sydney, is a founding member of the Global Myanmar Spring Revolution, a network that coordinates Burmese diaspora communities around the globe. GMSR’s advocacy targets sanctions, diplomatic recognition, and the financial lifelines of the junta, particularly revenues from oil and gas. In this conversation, Mon Zin analyzes the upcoming military-led elections, which she emphasizes are fraudulent and dangerous. She argues that the junta’s phased election is not intended to reflect popular will but to test whether the appearance of an election can secure international acceptance. She contends Min Aung Hlaing seeks to rebrand himself from war criminal to electedhead of state, thereby legitimizing continued violence. She believes this will only spur increased, armed resistance, intensifying the country’s downward spiral. Mon Zin cites reporting by the Asian Network for Free Elections that argues the system is structurally rigged in favor of the military-aligned USDP. Rather than relying on crude ballot-stuffing, she says the military’s election mechanisms are cleverly designed to seem legitimate: an apparently contested election at the local level that also feeds into proportional representation. However, with opposition parties banned, criminalized, or tightly constrained—along with rampant fear, surveillance, electronic voting machines without independent audits, and manipulated diaspora voting—local election outcomes are all but predetermined. Moreover, while proportional representation is normally used to give parties with smaller vote shares locally some level of representation at the regional and/or national level, the military has distorted the design to amplify the majority votes of the (predetermined, military-backed) local winners, thus giving the junta a complete stranglehold on local, regional and national governance in the guise of fair elections. The results will then be certified as legitimate by junta-aligned and other authoritarian nations, such as Russia and China. She warns the election will intensify violence, deepen sanctions, and worsen economic hardship, while enriching military affiliates. Still, she urges diaspora communities to refuse legitimacy, support resistance efforts, speak openly, and hold emerging political movements accountable, insisting that long-term freedom depends on building a genuinely democratic system.