Wittgenstein Tractatus Propositions 3 and 4

Wittgenstein Tractatus Propositions 6 and 7

Joel and Travis finish Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in this episode. Why do smart people, like babies, stare at the finger rather than where it is pointing? And what does this have to do with talk of God and debating empirical data? Also, when should we be silent? All that is answered...sort of...in this podcast.

Wittgenstein Tractatus Proposition 6 (continued)

Joel and Travis discuss whether God is a toaster, the metaphysical value of pizza, and why it seems so hard to get anywhere in debates about opposing worldviews (like in apologetics). And all this with just some of Proposition 6 of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. This is the penultimate podcast in this series on the Tractatus.

Wittgenstein Tractatus 5 and 6

Joel and Travis discuss propositions 5 and some of 6 from Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, a book perhaps most famous for no one in their right mind (outside of professional philosophy) reading it. Nevertheless, it has had tremendous, if confused, influence on philosophy and may be the most important book written last century.

Wittgenstein Tractatus Propositions 3 and 4

Joel and Travis talk Wittgenstein's Tractatus, propositions 3 and 4. Joel says stuff about what can be said and what can only be shown, how this relates to not saying what cannot be said, and says showing a sad shed should sell said shed's shady sheerness . Well, he doesn't talk about that last bit, but he does try to explain Wittgenstein's thoughts on stuff like the say-show distinction, and related matters, which is almost as interesting as silly tongue twisters.

Wittgenstein Tractatus Props 1 and 2

Joel and Travis talk Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, a book that, if you were to read it, would add the "cus" to your "philosophi". But you need not worry, Joel and Travis have your back. They start digging into the book in this episode, working through some of the difficult stuff, while helping you keep an eye on what Wittgenstein is aiming toward--something brilliant, rich, and important.