Canadian Mobile Broadband: An Open Access Future

Soft-Floor Auctions: Harnessing Regret to Improve Efficiency and Revenue

A soft-floor auction asks bidders to accept an opening price to participate in an ascending auction. If no bidder accepts, lower bids are considered using first-price rules. Soft floors are common despite being irrelevant with standard assumptions. When bidders regret losing, soft-floor auctions are more efficient and profitable than standard optimal auctions. Revenue increases as bidders are inclined to accept the opening price to compete in a regret-free ascending auction. Efficiency is improved since having a soft floor allows for a lower hard reserve price, reducing the frequency of no sale. Theory and experiment confirm these motivations from practice. The research paper is at https://cramton.umd.edu/auction/ [https://cramton.umd.edu/auction/] Bergemann, Dirk, Kevin Breuer, Peter Cramton, Jack Hirsch, Yero S. Ndiaye, and Axel Ockenfels, “Soft-Floor Auctions: Harnessing Regret to Improve Efficiency and Revenue,” [https://cramton.umd.edu/papers2025-2029/bergemann-et-al-soft-floor-auctions-increase-efficiency-and-revenue.pdf] University of Maryland Working Paper, April 2025.

Canadian Mobile Broadband: An Open Access Future

On 7 April 2025, TheFutureEconomy.ca published Peter Cramton's "The Future of Mobile Broadband Can Arrive Early in Canada. [https://thefutureeconomy.ca/op-eds/the-future-of-mobile-broadband-can-arrive-early-in-canada/]" Cramton envisions a future for Canada's mobile broadband through an "open access" model. It critiques the current regulatory landscape involving the CRTC and ISED, which the author argues creates complexities and hinders innovation. Cramton proposes a shift towards a market design where spectrum holders must sell a portion of capacity in an open-access wholesale market managed by an independent operator. He contends this would foster greater competition, lower rates, and increased investment, ultimately benefiting consumers, regulators, and mobile operators alike. Professor Cramton argues a market based on continuous auctions for capacity offers a simpler and more efficient alternative to traditional regulatory instruments. Implementing open access would create a more future-proof and competitive digital ecosystem for Canada. His research lab has built an open-source platform for trade, which is freely available [https://forwardmarketdesign.com/].

Beyond the myths of social choice and a market design look at voting rules

This episode discusses a foundational paper by David Pearce and an applied paper on voting rules by Peter Cramton and his co-authors. Economists’ conceptions of utility and welfare reflect misguided attempts to mimic the physical sciences. The resulting tangle of ideas about meaninglessness, cardinality, and measurability forms a pyramid of misunderstandings that supports the wildly inappropriate standard interpretation of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. This paper is a quick primer on seeing past the myths. A natural reading of Arrow’s Theorem resolves the tension between abstract social choice theory and practical welfare analysis. No election rules are perfect, but they can be better. The Electoral College is increasingly failing to represent voter preferences in determining election winners. A path to reform begins with identifying election goals and establishing voting rules that best achieve these goals. The connection between the papers is discussed.

Policy Tracker podcast with Peter Cramton on TIMO, the Thailand Independent Market Operator

In this episode of the Spectrum Policy podcast, Martin Sims interviews Peter Cramton, an expert in spectrum auctions and economics. They discuss the proposal for a wholesale spectrum regulator in Thailand, exploring the evolution of spectrum auctions, the challenges faced by mobile communications, and the rise of satellite communications. Cramton emphasizes the need for competition in the Thai market and the potential benefits of a wholesale regulator to enhance market dynamics and consumer choice. Takeaways * Peter Cramton has been involved in spectrum auctions since 1982. * Spectrum auctions have raised hundreds of billions for governments globally. * The economics of mobile communications has struggled over the last decade. * Satellite communications, like Starlink, are transforming the market. * Regulatory processes can hinder competition and innovation. * A wholesale spectrum regulator could benefit Thailand's market. * Market dynamics can improve with the introduction of MVNOs. * Trading technology used in electricity markets can be applied to communications. * The proposal aims to create a competitive environment for consumers. * Regulators should focus on protecting consumers rather than special interests.

Universal service in Thailand. What policy is best?

Peter Cramton's response to a telecommunications journalist on February 12, 2025, outlines a market-based approach to achieving universal service in the global communications market. He critiques traditional methods, such as buildout obligations or administratively allocated subsidies, and advocates for competitive procurement auctions, a system proven effective in the U.S. under the FCC’s Rural Digital Opportunity Fund (RDOF). Cramton’s approach involves three key steps: (1) defining standard mobile and fixed broadband services (e.g., $50/month for mobile service with 10 Mbps speed and 15GB data), (2) identifying noneconomic areas where market forces fail to provide these services, and (3) conducting annual descending clock auctions to select the least-cost providers for three-year contracts. This ensures efficient resource allocation, reduces subsidies, and improves consumer services. Providers must meet service standards or face penalties and disqualification from future auctions. Cramton defends the proposed Thailand Independent Market Operator (TIMO) model as grounded in proven economic principles. He underscores the effectiveness of price mechanisms in guiding market behavior and critiques special interests that misrepresent policies to maintain inefficiencies. Supporting materials on auction design and open-access markets are available on his website. Supporting material is available on my webpage cramton.umd.edu/communications [http://cramton.umd.edu/communications] “A Study on Designing IMT Multiband Auction Formats for Thailand,” prepared for NBTC. [First Workshop YouTube [https://youtu.be/7jBbcAe4WEQ], Slides [https://cramton.umd.edu/papers2020-2024/cramton-thailand-multiband-auction-design.pdf], 17 December 2024] “An Open-Access Market for Global Communications” [https://cramton.umd.edu/papers2020-2024/cramton-et-al-open-access-global-communications-market.pdf] (with Erik Bohlin, Simon Brandkamp, Jason Dark, Darrell Hoy, Albert S. Kyle, David Malec, Axel Ockenfels, and Chris Wilkens) Telecommunications Policy, 48, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2024.102820 [https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2024.102820]. [Presentation [https://cramton.umd.edu/papers2020-2024/cramton-et-al-open-access-global-communications-market-slides.pdf], Interactive Demo [https://outernet.market/flow], Sample Code [https://cramton.umd.edu/papers2020-2024/simple-flow-trading.zip]] “An open-access obligation is the best way to enhance competition following consolidation in mobile communications,” [https://cramton.umd.edu/papers2020-2024/cramton-open-access-merger-remedy.pdf] University of Maryland Working Paper, 2025.