Dialectic restricting temperance to pleasures of body and to sense of touch (NE III.10)

Desiring People vs Desiring natural pleasure

This lecture examines Aristotle's distinction between natural/common pleasures and chosen/specific pleasures in Jewish ethics, focusing on food and sex as the two bodily pleasures subject to temperance. The instructor argues against materialist reductions of desire, showing how sexual and gustatory desires are mediated by narrative and cultural scripts rather than being purely physical phenomena. The mitzvah of kiddushin (marriage sanctification) transforms base physical desire into interpersonal, story-laden desire directed toward one's spouse, making proper measure a question of direction and context rather than mere quantity or self-control.

Obesity Epidemic isn’t a failure of Temperance (NE III.11)

This lecture examines Aristotle's hierarchy of human goods and the virtue of temperance, distinguishing between natural bodily desires (shared by all humans) and cultivated, qualitative preferences (specific to individuals and cultures). The instructor argues that modern obesity is primarily a physiological regulation problem rather than a failure of temperance—true temperance concerns *what* and *how* we consume (choosing refined over base pleasures), not merely *how much*. Jewish dietary laws like kashrut exemplify genuine temperance by imposing qualitative order on eating, though modern food abundance presents challenges even these traditional structures struggle to address.

Dialectic restricting temperance to pleasures of body and to sense of touch (NE III.10)

Dialectic restricting temperance to pleasures of body and to sense of touch (NE III.10)

Broad and Specific meanings of Sôphrosunê or Zehiurs

This shiur examines the virtue of zehirus (temperance/self-control) as presented in Rambam's Shemonah Perakim, tracing how abstract virtue-language developed from Biblical Hebrew's verb-based expressions to the Sages' philosophical terminology. The discussion analyzes three rabbinic terms—zehirus, yirat chet (fear of sin), and nefesh shefalah (lowly soul)—showing how they correspond to the Greek concept of sophrosyne, which Aristotle restricted from Plato's general self-control to specifically mean proper desire for physical pleasures. The Rambam follows Aristotle's narrow definition, understanding these virtues not as external control over appetite but as trained aversion to inappropriate physical pleasures, particularly in food and sexuality.

Authority, Form, and Content in Prophecy

Religious truth operates across three distinct dimensions that are often confused: authority (the source of truth), content (what is being taught), and form (how it is expressed and transmitted). While modern discourse tends to collapse these categories—either demanding blind acceptance of authority or claiming content alone matters—the most critical yet overlooked dimension is form: the specific strategies and vessels through which divine knowledge reaches humanity. Major religious movements succeed not merely through true content or divine authority, but through novel forms of revelation that work powerfully once but become exhausted after use—explaining why there are so few major religions, why prophecy appears to have ceased, and why future religious leadership must discover unprecedented strategies rather than repeat biblical patterns that any contemporary person could imitate.