115. 15 Layers Deep: Supporting Soldiers with Geospatial Intelligence

119. No Winning Without Fighting: How China’s View of Hybrid Warfare Has Evolved with Dr. Howard Wang

“The PLA expected Russia to run the same playbook it did with Crimea on a larger scale.  And it didn’t work.” [Editor’s Note:  Today’s post welcomes back proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. Howard Wang, who recently served as a subject matter expert on our Ukraine, the Middle East, and Proxy Wars around the Globe:  Emergent Trends and Associated Implications for the Joint Force panel discussion [https://youtu.be/tixyiZKLX0o?si=UZeiS3fmoM20C4-y] during the T2COM G-2’s Mad Scientist / William and Mary Great Power Competition & Conflict in the Age of Authoritarian Collusion virtual event [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ncKr1fSjkIf8N64amH8dzNUC48-LFudS/view?usp=sharing] on 27 January 2026 — check out the top ten take-aways from this informative event here [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/561-the-new-rules-of-the-game-10-key-lessons-on-great-power-competition/]. In this episode of The Convergence podcast, Dr. Wang explores how China’s observations of Russia’s protracted war in Ukraine have transformed their approach to contemporary conflict, challenging their long-held precept of “winning without fighting” and forcing the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) re-calibration of its hybrid warfare concept — with cognitive warfare now being harnessed to complement kinetic operations to achieve battlefield success.  Dr. Wang also describes how the U.S. can harden itself against the PLA's "systems destruction warfare" -- Enjoy!] Dr. Howard Wang is a political scientist at RAND [https://www.rand.org/about/people/w/wang_howard.html].  From 2024-2025, he was detailed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense as a China Policy Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. Prior to RAND, he was a policy analyst for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, where he researched U.S.-China military competition and deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Dr. Wang’s primary research interests include Chinese Communist Party (CCP)  political decision-making and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strategy and doctrine. He completed his Doctorate in International Affairs (DIA) at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, where he was awarded distinction for his thesis research on the CCP’s sea power strategy. Dr. Wang completed his Master’s in Public Policy at Georgetown University McCourt School of Public Policy and his bachelor’s degree at Boston University.  Dr. Wang co-authored China’s Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War: Perceived New Strategic Opportunities and an Emerging Model of Hybrid Warfare [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3141-4.html], RAND Report, 22 May 2025. In our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, we sat down with Dr. Wang to discuss China’s approach to hybrid warfare, the implications of their “win without fighting” strategy, and what this means for the U.S. Army and Joint Force. The following bullet points highlight key insights from our conversation with him: * Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine led China’s PLA to shift its thoughts on hybrid warfare.  Following Russia’s failed gambit to rapidly seize Ukraine in 2022, the PLA became more accepting of the idea that a confrontation with the U.S. may result in a large-scale conflict. Rather than abandoning their hybrid warfare concept, they adjusted it to incorporate a number of non-kinetic methods to help the PLA achieve kinetic success on the battlefield.  * The PLA is resigning itself to the idea that winning without fighting will fail, and believe that the U.S. may in fact instigate conflict in any confrontation over Taiwan, especially as China grows closer to power parity with the U.S. It is impossible to say whether the CCP will have the political will to engage in a protracted conflict with the U.S., but the PLA has been steadily preparing for it — with the CCP calling on the Chinese people to prepare for total war.  The CCP has sharply stepped up this rhetoric, especially given Russia’s stalemated war of attrition in Ukraine. * The PLA will seek to use the Cognitive Domain [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/547-challenging-reality-chinese-cognitive-warfare-and-the-fight-to-hack-your-brain/]to exploit seams in U.S.-Western alliances and partnerships and sow domestic discord across the U.S. The PLA will also employ cyberattacks to target U.S. Command and Control systems and deepfakes of U.S. Joint Force commanders giving fake orders to undermine unity of command. They may even seek to generate ethnic strife between the U.S. and its Allies and partners through its disinformation machine.  The objective of these gray zone tactics is to disrupt U.S. Joint Force decision making at all levels and echelons, in the event of a conflict.  * The PLA has an inflated perception of Starlink’s capabilities and has a worst-case mindset regarding its role the Space Domain. They believe, through Starlink’s modular payloads, that the U.S. has achieved real-time sensing, processing, and transmission of battlefield data -- seamlessly integrating data links to achieve precise position, navigation, timing, and target surveillance.  The PLA believes this satellite constellation provides the U.S. with one-way battlefield transparency — an asymmetric advantage. The PLA will likely adopt a comprehensive strategy to counter Starlink, including electronic warfare, cyber warfare, and anti-satellite lasers and microwaves.  * While the PLA sees fewer opportunities to deter any future conflict with the U.S., this does not mean war is inevitable. Still, the U.S. can posture itself for any potential conflict with China by continuing to develop capabilities that harden us against the PLA’s “systems destruction warfare” — i.e., its ability to disrupt our understanding and perception of the battlespace, induce paralysis, neutralize our ability to function, and negate our ability to project power and wage warfare — by building redundant communications capabilities and procedures to combat disinformation across all echelons.Plans like the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR) can also identify concrete opportunities that enhance combined lethality, leverage shared capabilities, and strengthen the defense industrial base amongst the U.S. and its Indo-Pacific Allies and partners, presenting a formidable challenge to China, should deterrence fail. Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for future insightful episodes of The Convergence [https://theconvergence.castos.com/] podcast! If you enjoyed this post, check out the T2COM G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise [https://oe.t2com.army.mil/] web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight, including: Our T2COM OE Threat Assessment 1.0, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/the-operational-environment-2024-2034-large-scale-combat-operations/] Our China Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/china-landing-zone-how-china-fights/], full of information regarding our pacing challenge, including ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics [https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN34236-ATP_7-100.3-001-WEB-3.pdf], T2COM OE Threat Assessment 1-1, How China Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/how-china-fights-in-large-scale-combat-operations/], T2COM OE Threat Assessment 1-1.1, How China Fights Against a U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team [https://oe.t2com.army.mil/product/how-china-fights-against-a-u-s-army-brigade-combat-team/], 10 Things You Didn’t Know About the PLA [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/10-things-you-didnt-know-about-the-pla/], and BiteSize China [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/how-china-fights/bite-size-china/] weekly topics. Our Russia Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/russia-landing-zone-how-russia-fights/], including T2COM OE Threat Assessment 1-2, How Russia Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/how-russia-fights-in-large-scale-combat-operations/] and the BiteSize Russia [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/russia-landing-zone-how-russia-fights/#russia-landing-zone-bite-size-russia] weekly topics.  If you have a CAC, you’ll be especially interested in reviewing our weekly RUS-UKR Conflict [https://armyeitaas.sharepoint-mil.us/teams/TR-G2Russia-UkraineObservations/Shared%20Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx?id=%2Fteams%2FTR-G2Russia-UkraineObservations%2FShared%20Documents%2FGeneral%2FRU-UK_RunningEst_KAs_LSCOchallenges&p=true&ga=1] Running Estimates and associated Narratives, capturing what we learned about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine in 2022 and 2023 and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across DOTMLPF-P. Our Iran Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/iran-landing-zone-how-iran-fights/], including the Iran Quick Reference Guide [https://g2webcontent.z2.web.core.usgovcloudapi.net/OEE/Iran%20LZ/Iran%20Quick%20Reference%20Guide.pdf] and the Iran Passive Defense Manual [https://armyeitaas.sharepoint-mil.us/sites/TR-HQ-G2-OEConnect/Products/Forms/GalView.aspx?id=%2Fsites%2FTR-HQ-G2-OEConnect%2FProducts%2FLanding%20Zones%20Products%2FIran%20LZ%2FIranian_Passive_Defense_Manual.pdf&viewid=06793748-2b67-4e1f-9972-a8788cc87860&parent=%2Fsites%2FTR-HQ-G2-OEConnect%2FProducts%2FLanding%20Zones%20Products%2FIran%20LZ] (both require a CAC to access). Our North Korea Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/north-korea-landing-zone-how-north-korea-fights/], including Resources for Studying North Korea [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/north-korea-resources-deck/], Instruments of Chinese Military Influence in North Korea [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/instruments-of-chinese-military-influence-in-north-korea/], and Instruments of Russian Military Influence in North Korea [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/instruments-of-russian-military-influence-in-north-korea/]. Our Irregular Threats Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/irregular-threats-landing-zone-how-irregular-threats-fight/], including TC 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces [https://g2webcontent.z2.web.core.usgovcloudapi.net/OEE/VEO%20LZ/TC%207-100.3_Irregular-Opposing-Forces_2014.pdf], and ATP 3-37.2, Antiterrorism [https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_d/ARN32978-ATP_3-37.2-000-WEB-1.pdf] (requires a CAC to access). Our Running Estimates [https://armyeitaas.sharepoint-mil.us/teams/TRG2OERunningEstimateFY24/Shared%20Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx?ga=1&id=%2Fteams%2FTRG2OERunningEstimateFY24%2FShared%20Documents%2FGeneral%2FOE%20Running%20Estimates&sortField=Modified&isAscending=false&viewid=c50383d2-82bb-4342-ae90-10a1398a100d] SharePoint site (also requires a CAC to access) — documenting what we’re learning about the evolving OE (including Russia’s war in Ukraine war since 2024 and other ongoing competitions and conflicts around the globe).  Contains our monthly OE Running Estimates, associated Narratives, and the quarterly OE Assessment Intelligence Posts. … as well as previous Mad Scientist Laboratory content, exploring this aspect of the Operational Environment: Challenging Reality: Chinese Cognitive Warfare and the Fight to Hack Your Brain [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/547-challenging-reality-chinese-cognitive-warfare-and-the-fight-to-hack-your-brain/], by Dr. John Ringquist  A Katechon for the Cognitive Domain [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/562-a-katechon-for-the-cognitive-domain/], by proclaimed Mad Scientist Kevin Williamson In the Cognitive War – The Weapon is You! [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/158-in-the-cognitive-war-the-weapon-is-you/] by Dr. Zac Rogers An Intelligentized PLA: A FICINT Scenario for INDO-PACOM [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/559-an-intelligentized-pla-a-ficint-scenario-for-indo-pacom/], by proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. James Giordano AI as a Propaganda Accelerant [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/545-ai-as-a-propaganda-accelerant/], by Aldrin Yashko Influence at Machine Speed: The Coming of AI-Powered Propaganda [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/55-influence-at-machine-speed-the-coming-of-ai-powered-propoganda/] by MAJ Chris Telley The Exploitation of our Biases through Improved Technology [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/351-the-exploitation-of-our-biases-through-improved-technology/], by Raechel Melling Damnatio Memoriae through AI [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/165-damnatio-memoriae-through-ai/] and What is the Threshold? Assessing Kinetic Responses to Cyber-Attacks [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/156-what-is-the-threshold-assessing-kinetic-responses-to-cyber-attacks/], by proclaimed Mad Scientist Marie Murphy China and Russia: Achieving Decision Dominance and Information Advantage [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/364-china-and-russia-achieving-decision-dominance-and-information-advantage/], by Ian Sullivan Information Advantage Contribution to Operational Success [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/389-information-advantage-contribution-to-operational-success/], by CW4 Charles Davis Gaming Information Dominance [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/433-gaming-information-dominance/] and Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Sign Post to the Future (Part 1) [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/400-russia-ukraine-conflict-sign-post-to-the-future-part-1/] by Kate Kilgore Sub-threshold Maneuver and the Flanking of U.S. National Security [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/301-sub-threshold-maneuver-and-the-flanking-of-u-s-national-security/] and Is Ours a Nation at War? U.S. National Security in an Evolved — and Evolving — Operational Environment [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/383-is-ours-a-nation-at-war-u-s-national-security-in-an-evolved-and-evolving-operational-environment/], by Dr. Russell Glenn The Erosion of National Will – Implications for the Future Strategist [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/296-the-erosion-of-national-will-implications-for-the-future-strategist/], by Dr. Nick Marsella A House Divided: Microtargeting and the next Great American Threat [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/323-a-house-divided-microtargeting-and-the-next-great-american-threat/], by 1LT Carlin Keally Weaponized Information: What We’ve Learned So Far… [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/253-weaponized-information-what-weve-learned-so-far/], Insights from the Mad Scientist Weaponized Information Series of Virtual Events [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/277-insights-from-the-mad-scientist-weaponized-information-series-of-virtual-events/], and all of this series’ associated videos [https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLx2Zn7hPXT7fiCsXXWltQL8QItU09GVPk]  Weaponized Information: One Possible Vignette [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/190-weaponized-information-one-possible-vignette/] and Three Best Information Warfare Vignettes [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/254-three-best-information-warfare-vignettes/] LikeWar — The Weaponization of Social Media [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/87-likewar-the-weaponization-of-social-media/] The Death of Authenticity: New Era Information Warfare [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/149-the-death-of-authenticity-new-era-information-warfare/] Active Defense: Shaping the Threat Environment [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/519-active-defense-shaping-the-threat-environment/] and The Information Disruption Industry and the Operational Environment of the Future [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/238-the-information-disruption-industry-and-the-operational-environment-of-the-future/], by proclaimed Mad Scientist Vincent H. O’Neil , as well as his associated video presentation [https://youtu.be/B1PJxEl6Gqs?si=e-OPrm9FAI8VjZiE] from 20 May 2020, part of the Mad Scientist Weaponized Information Series of Virtual Events. Non-Kinetic War [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/436-non-kinetic-war/], Global Entanglement and Multi-Reality Warfare [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/353-global-entanglement-and-multi-reality-warfare/] and associated podcast [https://episodes.castos.com/5e1729439f1d05-67192808/BanachFinal.mp3], with COL Stefan Banach (USA-Ret.) Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of War, Department of the Army, or the U.S. Army Transformation and Training Command (T2COM).

118. Sinews of War: A gaming Approach to Sustaining the Force

[Editor’s Note:  Regular readers of the Mad Scientist Laboratory blog site know that wargaming is a vital cognitive tool for understanding the complexities of the evolving Operational Environment [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/] (OE). Wargaming helps facilitate “cognitive warfighting proficiencies” among its practitioners.  Unlike passive classroom lectures, wargames provide an immersive environment where Soldiers and Leaders can follow their ideas to their logical conclusions, test new concepts, and—crucially—experience failure in a safe, consequence-free setting. This “safe failure” is seen as essential for developing the creativity and agility required to avoid operational surprise on the actual battlefield. Today’s episode of The Convergence podcast features COL Mike Barnett and returning proclaimed Mad Scientist Joe Chretien, both from the Sustainment Exercise and Simulation Directorate, Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), Fort Lee, Virginia.  We discussed how they incorporated their Sinews of War: Theater Sustainment Operations wargame into Practical Exercises in the Sustainment Center of Excellence’s Programs of Instruction (POIs).  Read on to learn how wargaming is providing our Sustainment Soldiers and Leaders with fail-safe experiences to learn critical warfighting skills — enabling them to reflect on experiential, shared events with their peers during Professional Military Education (PME)]. [If the podcast dashboard is not rendering correctly for you, please click here [https://episodes.castos.com/5e1729439f1d05-67192808/2321533/c1e-m960uqrx16txop4g-rk2dvrz2bn1w-hbnzcx.mp3] to listen to the podcast.] Following 15 years in various Armor enlisted and officer assignments, COL Mike Barnett became a Functional Area 57, Models and Simulations (M&S) Officer in 2011.  He served as the Chief of Knowledge Management at the First Infantry Division and 8th Army, in both deployed and garrison operating environments.  COL Barnett is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College and the U. S. Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania.  In his current assignment, COL Barnett leads the Sustainment Exercise and Simulation Directorate at Ft. Lee, Virginia, where he and his team support Army-wide sustainment simulations for Division, Corps, and Army Service Component Command collective command post training events.   Joe Chretien is a retired M&S Army Lieutenant Colonel who has served in multiple roles — including wargame developer and facilitator for the U.S. Army War College, where he incorporated experiential educational methodologies into the curriculum.  Of note, Mr. Chretien is the co-author of several Matrix Wargames such as Kaliningrad, One-Belt-One-Road, Crisis in the South China Sea, First Contact, and  Sinews of War: Theater Sustainment Operations.  He currently serves as a Department of the Army Civilian assigned as the Deputy Director, Logistics Exercise and Simulation Directorate (LESD) for the National Simulation Center.  He is responsible for managing, planning, organizing, and directing an authorized workforce of military and Department of the Army Civilians.  He additionally oversees contractor deliverables in support of the LESD mission. In our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, we sat down with COL Barnett and Mr. Chretien to talk about Sinews of War — a new game they designed to help teach and train Army Sustainers, their experience play testing it, and what they see as the future of wargaming in the Army.  The following bullet points highlight key insights from our conversation with them: * Within the Sustainment Exercise and Simulation Directorate at the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), COL Barnett and Mr. Chretien created the Sinews of Warwargame that helps U.S. Army Sustainers (e.g.,  Ordnance, Transportation, Quartermaster, and Logistics Corps Soldiers and Leaders) visualize the fight and think critically about their role sustaining combat operations and making decisions on the battlefield.  * They argue that wargames like Sinews of Warenhance training and education because students are actively invested in the learning via engaging practical exercises, as opposed to more passive learning methods (e.g., lectures via presentations — aka “death by PowerPoint”).  Wargaming is experiential learning — providing students both agency and motivation that boosts their critical thinking and problem solving.  * One of the biggest lessons learned from this game is just how vital protection is as a Warfighting Function — critical to mission success at all echelons on the battlefield.  Sustainers experienced how assets positioned or emplaced without the requisite protection [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/486-the-hard-part-of-fighting-a-war-contested-logistics/] inevitably led to their loss and, eventually, a breakdown in the rearm/refuel/resupply chain.  Gaming provides students an iterative process within a safe-to-fail environment, enabling them to learn from their mistakes and develop the requisite skill sets to win decisively on the battlefield.  * COL Barnett and Mr. Chretien theorized that a wargame — possibly one that is digitized — could be a more effective learning tool since that’s what younger Soldiers and the next generation of recruits will be comfortable with.  Soldiers are quick to adopt the gaming aspect of learning — a connection that past instructors may not have been able to establish as effectively through traditional methods of instruction.  * However, Mr. Chretien is not overly sanguine regarding the future of wargaming in the Army — he senses the institutional will to embrace it as an effective learning mechanism doesn’t exist throughout the force.  If the Army values this type of learning, it has the opportunity to increase its reliance on wargaming across PME — integrating it into POIs within its Centers of Excellence and Schools. In contrast to the Army, he noted that the U.S. Air Force and the Marine Corps have embraced and successfully integrated wargaming into their respective curricula.  Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for future insightful episodes of The Convergence [https://theconvergence.castos.com/] podcast! If you enjoyed this post, check out the T2COM G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/] web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight, including: Our T2COM OE Threat Assessment 1.0, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/the-operational-environment-2024-2034-large-scale-combat-operations/] Our China Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/china-landing-zone-how-china-fights/], full of information regarding our pacing challenge, including ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics [https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN34236-ATP_7-100.3-001-WEB-3.pdf], T2COM OE Threat Assessment 1-1, How China Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/how-china-fights-in-large-scale-combat-operations/], 10 Things You Didn’t Know About the PLA [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/10-things-you-didnt-know-about-the-pla/],  and BiteSize China [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/how-china-fights/bite-size-china/] weekly topics. Our Russia Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/russia-landing-zone-how-russia-fights/], including T2COM OE Threat Assessment 1-2, How Russia Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/how-russia-fights-in-large-scale-combat-operations/] and the BiteSize Russia [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/russia-landing-zone-how-russia-fights/#russia-landing-zone-bite-size-russia] weekly topics.  If you have a CAC, you’ll be especially interested in reviewing our weekly RUS-UKR Conflict [https://armyeitaas.sharepoint-mil.us/teams/TR-G2Russia-UkraineObservations/Shared%20Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx?id=%2Fteams%2FTR-G2Russia-UkraineObservations%2FShared%20Documents%2FGeneral%2FRU-UK_RunningEst_KAs_LSCOchallenges&p=true&ga=1] Running Estimates and associated Narratives, capturing what we learned about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine in 2022 and 2023 and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across DOTMLPF-P. Our Iran Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/iran-landing-zone-how-iran-fights/], including the Iran Quick Reference Guide [https://g2webcontent.z2.web.core.usgovcloudapi.net/OEE/Iran%20LZ/Iran%20Quick%20Reference%20Guide.pdf] and the Iran Passive Defense Manual [https://armyeitaas.sharepoint-mil.us/sites/TR-HQ-G2-OEConnect/Products/Forms/GalView.aspx?id=%2Fsites%2FTR-HQ-G2-OEConnect%2FProducts%2FLanding%20Zones%20Products%2FIran%20LZ%2FIranian_Passive_Defense_Manual.pdf&viewid=06793748-2b67-4e1f-9972-a8788cc87860&parent=%2Fsites%2FTR-HQ-G2-OEConnect%2FProducts%2FLanding%20Zones%20Products%2FIran%20LZ] (both require a CAC to access). Our North Korea Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/north-korea-landing-zone-how-north-korea-fights/], including Resources for Studying North Korea [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/north-korea-resources-deck/], Instruments of Chinese Military Influence in North Korea [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/instruments-of-chinese-military-influence-in-north-korea/], and Instruments of Russian Military Influence in North Korea [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/instruments-of-russian-military-influence-in-north-korea/]. Our Irregular Threats Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/irregular-threats-landing-zone-how-irregular-threats-fight/], including TC 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces [https://g2webcontent.z2.web.core.usgovcloudapi.net/OEE/VEO%20LZ/TC%207-100.3_Irregular-Opposing-Forces_2014.pdf], and ATP 3-37.2, Antiterrorism [https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_d/ARN32978-ATP_3-37.2-000-WEB-1.pdf] (requires a CAC to access). Our Running Estimates [https://armyeitaas.sharepoint-mil.us/teams/TRG2OERunningEstimateFY24/Shared%20Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx?ga=1&id=%2Fteams%2FTRG2OERunningEstimateFY24%2FShared%20Documents%2FGeneral%2FOE%20Running%20Estimates&sortField=Modified&isAscending=false&viewid=c50383d2-82bb-4342-ae90-10a1398a100d] SharePoint site (also requires a CAC to access) — documenting what we’re learning about the evolving OE (including Russia’s war in Ukraine war since 2024 and other ongoing competitions and conflicts around the globe).  Contains our monthly OE Running Estimates, associated Narratives, and the quarterly OE Assessment Intelligence Posts. Then review the following related Mad Scientist Laboratory content: Seven Reflections of a “Red Commander” — Lessons Learned Playing the Adversary in DoD Wargames [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/513-seven-reflections-of-a-red-commander-lessons-learned-playing-the-adversary-in-dod-wargames/], Would You Like to Play a Game? Wargaming as a Learning Experience and Key Assumptions Check [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/281-would-you-like-to-play-a-game-wargaming-as-a-learning-experience-and-key-assumptions-check/], and “No Option is Excluded” — Using Wargaming to Envision a Chinese Assault on Taiwan [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/337-no-option-is-excluded-using-wargaming-to-envision-a-chinese-assault-on-taiwan/], by Ian Sullivan From Campus to Command: The William & Mary Wargaming Lab [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/550-from-campus-to-command-the-william-mary-wargaming-lab/] and associated podcast [https://theconvergence.castos.com/episodes/117-from-campus-to-command-the-william-mary-wargaming-lab-with-luke-miller], with Luke Miller. “Best of” Calling All Wargamers Insights (Parts 1 [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/507-best-of-calling-all-wargamers-insights-part-1/] and 2 [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/511-best-of-calling-all-wargamers-insights-part-2/]) Whipping Wargaming into NATO SHAPE [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/510-whipping-wargaming-into-nato-shape/] and associated podcast [https://theconvergence.castos.com/episodes/106-whipping-wargaming-into-nato-shape-with-col-arnel-david], with proclaimed Mad Scientist COL Arnel David Wargaming: A Company-Grade Perspective [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/509-wargaming-a-company-grade-perspective/], by CPT Spencer D. H. Bates Taking the Golf Out of Gaming [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/508-taking-the-golf-out-of-gaming/] and associated podcast [https://theconvergence.castos.com/episodes/105-taking-the-golf-out-of-gaming-with-sebastian-bae], with proclaimed Mad Scientist Sebastian Bae Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response (CHMR) Considerations in Wargaming LSCO [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/501-civilian-harm-mitigation-and-response-chmr-considerations-in-wargaming-lsco/], Achieving Victory & Ensuring Civilian Safety in Conflict Zones [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/506-achieving-victory-ensuring-civilian-safety-in-conflict-zones/], and associated podcast [https://theconvergence.castos.com/episodes/104-achieving-victory-ensuring-civilian-safety-in-conflict-zones-with-andrew-olson] with proclaimed Mad Scientist Andrew Olson Brian Train on Wargaming Irregular and Urban Combat [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/505-brian-train-on-wargaming-irregular-and-urban-combat/] Hybrid Intelligence: Sustaining Adversary Overmatch [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/512-hybrid-intelligence-sustaining-adversary-overmatch/] and associated podcast [https://theconvergence.castos.com/episodes/107-hybrid-intelligence-sustaining-adversary-overmatch-with-dr-billy-barry-ltc-blair-wilcox-tim], with proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. Billy Barry and LTC Blair Wilcox Live from D.C., it’s Fight Night (Parts One [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/466-live-from-d-c-its-fight-night-part-one/] and Two [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/473-live-from-d-c-its-fight-night-part-two/]) and associated podcasts (Parts One [https://theconvergence.castos.com/episodes/87-live-from-dc-its-fight-night-part-1-with-the-hon-mac-thornberry] and Two [https://theconvergence.castos.com/episodes/89-live-from-dc-its-fight-night-part-two]) Using Wargames to Reconceptualize Military Power [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/411-using-wargames-to-reconceptualize-military-power/], by proclaimed Mad Scientist Caroline Duckworth Gaming the System: How Wargames Shape our Future [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/412-gaming-the-system-how-wargames-shape-our-future/] and associated podcast [https://theconvergence.castos.com/episodes/63-gaming-the-system-how-wargames-shape-our-future], with guest panelists Ian Sullivan, Mitchell Land, LTC Peter Soendergaard, Jennifer McArdle, Becca Wasser, Dr. Stacie Pettyjohn, Sebastian Bae, Dan Mahoney, and Jeff Hodges Gamers Building the Future Force [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/341-gamers-building-the-future-force/] and associated podcast [https://theconvergence.castos.com/podcasts/5043/episodes/40-gamers-building-the-future-force-with-air-force-gaming] >>>Announcement:  Annotate your calendars now — the Army Mad Scientist / William & Mary Great Power Competition & Conflict in an Age of Authoritarian Collusion Virtual Event, on Tuesday, 27JAN26: Who:  The Army Mad Scientist Initiative and William & Mary’s Whole of Government Center of Excellence What:  A virtual event exploring the Operational Environment implications of emerging trends gleaned from contemporary conflicts and proxy wars, as well as the expanding adversarial influence and presence in the Global South and polar regions, through the lens of authoritarian collusion When:  Tuesday, 27 January 2026 Where:  Virtual via Zoom.gov; in-person on campus for local T2COM G-2 and FCC participants Why:  To learn from subject matter experts within academia and the Department of War about the implications of authoritarian collusion, ultimately expanding our understanding of the Operational Environment Register to attend this informative event virtually at our EventBrite [https://www.eventbrite.com/e/1977962540203?aff=oddtdtcreator] site. >>>Reminder:  Army Mad Scientist is CALLING ALL CREATORS with our Multi-Media Contest for imaginative thinkers who seek to showcase their ideas about Army Transformation in novel, alternative ways. Check out the contest’s guidelines here [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/555-calling-all-creators-2026-an-army-mad-scientist-multi-media-contest/], consult your inner muse, unleash your creative talent, get cracking developing your entry, and submit it to ArmyMadSci@gmail.com — Deadline for submission is 14 February 2026! Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, or the Transformation and Training Command (T2COM).

117. From Campus to Command: The William & Mary Wargaming Lab with Luke Miller

[Editor’s Note:  Army Mad Scientist and the Georgetown University Wargaming Society co-hosted our Game On! Wargaming & The Operational Environment Conference at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, last November, exploring: * Trends in hobbyist wargaming;  * How wargames can address unconventional and neglected aspects of the Operational Environment;  * How wargaming can provide experiential learning for Professional Military Education (PME); and  * How technology is enhancing wargaming.  Attended by approximately 150 participants, with an additional 20-odd virtual participants live streaming it remotely, the conference facilitated an open dialogue with wargamers from both inside and outside the military (e.g., professional, commercial, and hobbyist gamers). At that conference, we hosted a Gen Z & Wargaming Round Table for the sizeable contingent of students attending the conference from Georgetown University, the University of Nebraska Omaha, and the College of William & Mary.  Today’s episode of The Convergence podcast features Luke Miller, who attended our conference last year, is a wargame designer, and is this academic year’s Director of the William & Mary Wargaming Lab.  Army Mad Scientist sat down with Mr. Miller to discuss the role of wargaming and the university’s on-going wargaming projects with the War Department, his thoughts on wargame design and education in the military, and the future of wargaming — Read on!] [If the podcast dashboard is not rendering correctly for you, please click here [https://episodes.castos.com/5e1729439f1d05-67192808/2137041/c1e-xk9vc93q8vfr0qqk-v64rzm21uv36-0ga9ay.mp3] to listen to the podcast.] Luke Miller is an undergraduate student at the College of William and Mary, studying International Relations and Economics.  During the Summer of 2024, he was an e-Intern with the TRADOC G-2, where he researched national security threats to the U.S. and proposed solutions for Army adaptation to emerging challenges.  Specifically, Mr. Miller conducted focused research on U.S. Army preparedness for a potential conflict with China over Taiwan.  Mr. Miller is also a member of The Alexander Hamilton Society, a Global Scholar with the William & Mary Global Research Institute, and game designer and now Director of the William and Mary Wargaming Lab. In our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, we sat down with Luke Miller to discuss the value of wargaming as part of higher education, designing games for both students and defense partners, and emulating an accurate and realistic red team.  The following bullet points highlight key insights from our conversation: * The College of William and Mary’s Wargaming Lab, within their Whole of Government Center of Excellence, is known as the first fully undergraduate-led wargaming design initiative in the country. Through support from subject matter experts in the defense and national security fields, the Lab creates wargames and games for national security policy analysis and career professionals.  * The Wargaming Lab designs wargames from the ground up, including researching content, game mechanics, and Specifically, the team has created various scenario-based micro-games, table-top games, and boardgames, focusing on qualitative results that can support policy analysis for specific customers, such as General Mark Matthews (USAF-Ret.). * The beauty of working through this problem set in an academic forum are the different perspectives brought by each individual student, using background knowledge from their varying degrees, such as international relations, economics, and physics, to create a well-rounded and effective tool to help make decisions.  * The resurgence of great power competition has played a pivotal role in the national defense and security field’s growing focus on wargaming, as wargames can be a useful way to abstract many major aspects that feed into large-scale combat operations (LSCO). Wargames are inherently better at representing two or more great powers in a LSCO fight than counterterrorism or counterinsurgency.  * As academic wargaming labs are becoming more abundant and established, the U.S. Army has the opportunity to partner with these groups as an inexpensive and productive way to leverage their broad sets of expertise and alternative, innovative approaches to tackling hard problems.  Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next insightful episode of The Convergence  [https://theconvergence.castos.com/]on 02 October 2025! If you enjoyed this post, check out the TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations [https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/100.ATSC/26EDC9BD-A6C6-4BD8-B663-88DB4528F896-1734185694520/TP525-92_Final.pdf] Explore the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/] web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight, including: Our China Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/china-landing-zone-how-china-fights/], full of information regarding our pacing challenge, including ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics [https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN34236-ATP_7-100.3-001-WEB-3.pdf], How China Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/how-china-fights-in-large-scale-combat-operations/], BiteSize China [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/how-china-fights/bite-size-china/] weekly topics, and the People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces Quick Reference Guide [https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/operational-environment-and-threat-analysis-directorate/m/documents/377746]. Our Russia Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/russia-landing-zone-how-russia-fights/], including How Russia Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/how-russia-fights-in-large-scale-combat-operations/] and the BiteSize Russia [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/russia-landing-zone-how-russia-fights/#russia-landing-zone-bite-size-russia] weekly topics.  If you have a CAC, you’ll be especially interested in reviewing our weekly RUS-UKR Conflict [https://armyeitaas.sharepoint-mil.us/teams/TR-G2Russia-UkraineObservations/Shared%20Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx?id=%2Fteams%2FTR-G2Russia-UkraineObservations%2FShared%20Documents%2FGeneral%2FRU-UK_RunningEst_KAs_LSCOchallenges&p=true&ga=1] Running Estimates and associated Narratives, capturing what we learned about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine over the past two years and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across DOTMLPF-P. Our Iran Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/iran-landing-zone-how-iran-fights/], including the Iran Quick Reference Guide [https://g2webcontent.z2.web.core.usgovcloudapi.net/OEE/Iran%20LZ/Iran%20Quick%20Reference%20Guide.pdf] and the Iran Passive Defense Manual [https://armyeitaas.sharepoint-mil.us/sites/TR-HQ-G2-OEConnect/Products/Forms/GalView.aspx?id=%2Fsites%2FTR-HQ-G2-OEConnect%2FProducts%2FLanding%20Zones%20Products%2FIran%20LZ%2FIranian_Passive_Defense_Manual.pdf&viewid=06793748-2b67-4e1f-9972-a8788cc87860&parent=%2Fsites%2FTR-HQ-G2-OEConnect%2FProducts%2FLanding%20Zones%20Products%2FIran%20LZ] (both require a CAC to access). Our North Korea Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/north-korea-landing-zone-how-north-korea-fights/], including Resources for Studying North Korea [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/north-korea-resources-deck/], Instruments of Chinese Military Influence in North Korea [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/instruments-of-chinese-military-influence-in-north-korea/], and Instruments of Russian Military Influence in North Korea [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/instruments-of-russian-military-influence-in-north-korea/]. Our Irregular Threats Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/irregular-threats-landing-zone-how-irregular-threats-fight/], including TC 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces [https://g2webcontent.z2.web.core.usgovcloudapi.net/OEE/VEO%20LZ/TC%207-100.3_Irregular-Opposing-Forces_2014.pdf], and ATP 3-37.2, Antiterrorism [https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_d/ARN32978-ATP_3-37.2-000-WEB-1.pdf] (requires a CAC to access). Our Running Estimates [https://armyeitaas.sharepoint-mil.us/teams/TRG2OERunningEstimateFY24/Shared%20Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx?ga=1&id=%2Fteams%2FTRG2OERunningEstimateFY24%2FShared%20Documents%2FGeneral%2FOE%20Running%20Estimates&sortField=Modified&isAscending=false&viewid=c50383d2-82bb-4342-ae90-10a1398a100d] SharePoint site (also requires a CAC to access) — documenting what we’re learning about the evolving OE.  Contains our monthly OE Running Estimates, associated Narratives, and the quarterly OE Assessment TRADOC Intelligence Posts (TIPs). Then review the following related Mad Scientist content: From Data to Dominance: AI & Gaming to Create Decision Advantage [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/544-from-data-to-dominance-ai-gaming-to-create-decision-advantage/] and associated podcast [https://theconvergence.castos.com/episodes/114-data-to-dominance-ai-gaming-to-create-decisi9ry], with Jonathan Pan “Best of” Calling All Wargamers Insights (Parts 1 [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/507-best-of-calling-all-wargamers-insights-part-1/] and 2 [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/511-best-of-calling-all-wargamers-insights-part-2/]) The agenda, presenter and panelist biographies, their respective presentations, and associated videos from Army Mad Scientist’s  Game On! Wargaming & the OE [https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/mad-scientist/p/gameon] Conference at Georgetown University, 06-07 November 2024, as well as the Report from Game On! Wargaming & The Operational Environment Conference, 06-07 November 2024 [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/516-report-from-game-on-wargaming-the-operational-environment-conference-06-07-november-2024/] Battle Tested: Revolutionizing Wargaming with AI [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/528-battle-tested-revolutionizing-wargaming-with-ai/] and associated podcast [https://theconvergence.castos.com/episodes/112-battle-tested-revolutionizing-wargaming-with-ai-featuring-dr-billy-barry], with proclaimed Mad Scientist Dr. Billy Barry Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

116. Do Androids Dream of Electric War: The Reality of Autonomous Weapons with Dr. Mark Bailey

“I think there’s a moral question that one has to ask in general about whether it’s appropriate for a machine to make a decision as to whether or not a human ought to live or die” [Editor’s Note:  As observed in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations [https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/100.ATSC/26EDC9BD-A6C6-4BD8-B663-88DB4528F896-1734185694520/TP525-92_Final.pdf]: “The increase in the production, employment, and success of uncrewed systems means the Army can expect to encounter these systems across the breadth and depth of LSCO.” Contemporary conflicts in Ukraine [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/488-revolutionizing-21st-century-warfighting-uavs-and-c-uas/] and Middle East [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/527-asymmetric-warfare-across-multiple-domains/] have witnessed the burgeoning use of autonomous weapons — empowering lesser states (i.e., Ukraine) and non-state actors (i.e., the Houthi Movement in Yemen) to conduct asymmetric strikes against nations with more robust military capabilities (i.e., Russia and Israel, respectively).  These capabilities are transforming warfighting in both the air/land and land/sea littoral, eroding and possibly negating traditional concepts of air and naval superiority.  The battlefield successes achieved using these autonomous technologies has led to them being rapidly proliferated around the globe, with Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO) like the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) effectively employing armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) against both their criminal competitors and the Mexican authorities alike. In the ongoing race to develop more effective (read lethal) combat systems capable of overcoming kinetic and electromagnetic countermeasures, some nations are integrating Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Vision (MV) with Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) — in essence removing human operators from within or on the OODA loop [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/198-integrating-artificial-intelligence-into-military-operations/].  U.S. policy on LAWS is documented in DoD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems [https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf], which includes the following statement: “Autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems will be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.” Per the U.S. Congress’s Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems [https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11150#:~:text=The%20U.S.%20government%20does%20not,collateral%20damage%22%20or%20civilian%20casualties.]: “U.S. policy does not prohibit the development or employment of LAWS. Although the United States is not known to currently have LAWS in its inventory, some senior military and defense leaders have stated that the United States may be compelled to develop LAWS if U.S. competitors choose to do so. At the same time, a growing number of states and nongovernmental organizations are appealing to the international community for regulation of or a ban on LAWS due to ethical concerns.” Today’s episode of The Convergence podcast features Dr. Mark Bailey [https://www.linkedin.com/in/mmbailey/], Department Chair, Cyber Intelligence and Data Science, National Intelligence University, exploring the tension that exists between the rapid convergence of AI and battlefield autonomy and our national values requiring transparency and oversight in our use of lethal force.  With this tension, there is also an associated asymmetry in ethics [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/304-insights-from-the-robotics-and-autonomy-series-of-virtual-events/] — our adversaries are racing ahead with their plans to harness the power of AI on the battlefield.  Military thinkers within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) embrace its prospects as a leapfrog technology that could allow China to skip technological development stages and rapidly overmatch [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/170-own-the-night/] U.S. capabilities.  Russia’s Vladimir Putin proclaimed [https://mindmatters.ai/2020/10/russia-is-systematically-copying-u-s-military-ai-robotics/] “Artificial intelligence is the future not only of Russia but of all of mankind… Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.”  Read on to learn more about the implications of LAWS in the Operational Environment!]   Dr. Mark Bailey writes about the intersection between artificial intelligence, complexity, and national security.  He is an associate professor at the National Intelligence University, where he is the Department Chair for Cyber Intelligence and Data Science, as well as the Director of the Biological and Computational Intelligence Center.  His work has appeared in publications such as the journal Futures, Nautilus, and Homeland Security Today, and he was named to Homeland’s 50 Trailblazers of 2023 [https://trailblazers.hstoday.us/mark-bailey/].  Previously, he worked as a data scientist on several AI programs in the U.S. Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community.  He is also an Officer in the U.S. Army Reserve.  In our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, Army Mad Scientist sat down with Dr. Bailey to discuss his thoughts on AI and autonomous weapons, how their rise is impacting the U.S. Army, and how our adversaries may be poised to use them against us.  The following bullet points highlight key insights from our conversation: * Contemporary AI systems that rely on large quantities of parameters present a challenge when attempting to decipher their “thought process” for making predictions – the “black box” issue.  The military acquisition system is predicated on the notion that technology will perform reliably and predictably in different types of operational environments.  If AI systems cannot be aligned to human expectations, it becomes much more difficult to control which is a critical aspect of military applications, such as LAWS.  * When addressing the link between AI and lethal weapons, a larger discussion becomes whether it’s appropriate for a machine to decide whether a human ought to live or die.  Removing this aspect of humanity or cost of war makes way for a much more brutal battlefield.  * Overwhelmingly, the speed at which technology is developed far outpaces our ability to reflect on its appropriate use.  Updating the military’s acquisition process to respect the uncertainty around AI systems will support an improved defense innovation structure that can successfully leverage these emerging technologies.  Our acquisition process must account for aspects of AI, such as explainability and alignment, to ensure its application is effective and suitable.  * According to the AI community, artificial general intelligence (AGI) – AI that is cognitively equivalent to a human in all areas – is on the horizon, leading to artificial super intelligence (ASI) – AI that far exceeds human capability.  The line between weak AI systems that do one thing well and this more general type of intelligence will continue to be blurred with significant improvements to Large Language Models (LLMs) that fall in the middle.  * Adversaries will likely view the morality of using LAWS differently than the U.S. — we must be prepared for this asymmetry of ethics in planning to achieve strategic outcomes. Ideally, a global consensus on the appropriate use of AI in military applications, similar to that of nuclear weapons, will act as a deterrent.  Ironically, with the democratization of AI technology, nuclear components are much easier to interdict, creating an additional challenge for the global community.  * The integration of AI into lethal military applications, such as autonomous weapons, is happening now.  The Operational Environment is becoming much more dangerous, creating a challenge the U.S. Army must grapple with, while remaining true to our national values and ethical standards.  Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next insightful episode of The Convergence  [https://theconvergence.castos.com/]on 11 September 2025, when we sit down with Luke Miller, Director of the College of William and Mary’s Wargaming Lab, to discuss the university’s on-going wargaming projects with the DoD, his thoughts on wargame design and education in the military, and the future of wargaming. If you enjoyed this post, check out the TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations [https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/100.ATSC/26EDC9BD-A6C6-4BD8-B663-88DB4528F896-1734185694520/TP525-92_Final.pdf] Explore the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/] web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight, including: Our China Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/china-landing-zone-how-china-fights/], full of information regarding our pacing challenge, including ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics [https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN34236-ATP_7-100.3-001-WEB-3.pdf], How China Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/how-china-fights-in-large-scale-combat-operations/], BiteSize China [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/how-china-fights/bite-size-china/] weekly topics, and the People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces Quick Reference Guide [https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/operational-environment-and-threat-analysis-directorate/m/documents/377746]. Our Russia Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/russia-landing-zone-how-russia-fights/], including the BiteSize Russia [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/russia-landing-zone-how-russia-fights/#russia-landing-zone-bite-size-russia] weekly topics. If you have a CAC, you’ll be especially interested in reviewing our weekly RUS-UKR Conflict [https://armyeitaas.sharepoint-mil.us/teams/TR-G2Russia-UkraineObservations/Shared%20Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx?id=%2Fteams%2FTR-G2Russia-UkraineObservations%2FShared%20Documents%2FGeneral%2FRU-UK_RunningEst_KAs_LSCOchallenges&p=true&ga=1] Running Estimates and associated Narratives, capturing what we learned about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine over the past two years and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across DOTMLPF-P. Our Iran Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/iran-landing-zone-how-iran-fights/], including the Iran Quick Reference Guide [https://g2webcontent.z2.web.core.usgovcloudapi.net/OEE/Iran%20LZ/Iran%20Quick%20Reference%20Guide.pdf] and the Iran Passive Defense Manual [https://armyeitaas.sharepoint-mil.us/sites/TR-HQ-G2-OEConnect/Products/Forms/GalView.aspx?id=%2Fsites%2FTR-HQ-G2-OEConnect%2FProducts%2FLanding%20Zones%20Products%2FIran%20LZ%2FIranian_Passive_Defense_Manual.pdf&viewid=06793748-2b67-4e1f-9972-a8788cc87860&parent=%2Fsites%2FTR-HQ-G2-OEConnect%2FProducts%2FLanding%20Zones%20Products%2FIran%20LZ] (both require a CAC to access). Our North Korea Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/north-korea-landing-zone-how-north-korea-fights/], including Resources for Studying North Korea [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/north-korea-resources-deck/], Instruments of Chinese Military Influence in North Korea [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/instruments-of-chinese-military-influence-in-north-korea/], and Instruments of Russian Military Influence in North Korea [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/instruments-of-russian-military-influence-in-north-korea/]. Our Irregular Threats Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/irregular-threats-landing-zone-how-irregular-threats-fight/], including TC 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces [https://g2webcontent.z2.web.core.usgovcloudapi.net/OEE/VEO%20LZ/TC%207-100.3_Irregular-Opposing-Forces_2014.pdf], and ATP 3-37.2, Antiterrorism [https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_d/ARN32978-ATP_3-37.2-000-WEB-1.pdf] (requires a CAC to access). Our Running Estimates [https://armyeitaas.sharepoint-mil.us/teams/TRG2OERunningEstimateFY24/Shared%20Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx?ga=1&id=%2Fteams%2FTRG2OERunningEstimateFY24%2FShared%20Documents%2FGeneral%2FOE%20Running%20Estimates&sortField=Modified&isAscending=false&viewid=c50383d2-82bb-4342-ae90-10a1398a100d] SharePoint site (also requires a CAC to access) — documenting what we’re learning about the evolving OE.  Contains our monthly OE Running Estimates, associated Narratives, and the quarterly OE Assessment TRADOC Intelligence Posts (TIPs). Then review the following related TRADOC G-2 and Mad Scientist Laboratory content: Adaptation… Ukraine Conflict’s UAV Evolution [https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/mad-scientist/m/articles-of-interest/485195], by Colin Christopher Thoughts on AI and Ethics… from the Chaplain Corps [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/479-thoughts-on-ai-and-ethics-from-the-chaplain-corps/], by Dr. Nathan White On the Ground and In the Air in Ukraine [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/504-on-the-ground-and-in-the-air-in-ukraine/], and associated podcast [https://theconvergence.castos.com/episodes/103-on-the-ground-and-in-the-air-in-ukraine-with-wolfgang-hagarty] with Wolfgang Hagarty Insights from Ukraine on the Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Warfare [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/407-insights-from-ukraine-on-the-operational-environment-and-the-changing-character-of-warfare/] Learning from LSCO: Applying Lessons to Irregular Conflict [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/465-learning-from-lsco-applying-lessons-to-irregular-conflict/], by Ian Sullivan and Kate Kilgore Asymmetric Warfare across Multiple Domains [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/527-asymmetric-warfare-across-multiple-domains/], by Ethan Sah Integrating Artificial Intelligence into Military Operations [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/198-integrating-artificial-intelligence-into-military-operations/], by Dr. James Mancillas “Own the Night [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/170-own-the-night/],” as well as Former Deputy Secretary of Defense and proclaimed Mad Scientist Mr. Bob Work‘s presentation from the Disruption and the Future Operational Environment Conference on AI and Future Warfare: The Rise of the Robots (and Army Futures Command) [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CDQPbeWTK5w&list=PLx2Zn7hPXT7fh0UcE_JkGbSq1ziEO3hc4&index=5&t=1606s], and his Modern War Institute podcast [https://mwi.usma.edu/mwi-podcast-former-deputy-defense-secretary-robert-work-assesses-future-battlefield/] assessing the future battlefield. Unmanned Capabilities in Today’s Battlespace [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/462-unmanned-capabilities-in-todays-battlespace/] Revolutionizing 21st Century Warfighting: UAVs and C-UAS [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/488-revolutionizing-21st-century-warfighting-uavs-and-c-uas/] Death From Above! The Evolution of sUAS Technology [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/464-death-from-above-the-evolution-of-suas-technology/] and associated podcast [https://theconvergence.castos.com/episodes/86-death-from-above-the-evolution-of-suas-technology-with-col-usa-ret-bill-edwards], with COL Bill Edwards (USA-Ret.) The Operational Environment’s Increased Lethality [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/468-the-operational-environments-increased-lethality/] Top Attack: Lessons Learned from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/317-top-attack-lessons-learned-from-the-second-nagorno-karabakh-war/] and associated podcast [https://theconvergence.castos.com/episodes/32-top-attack-lessons-learned-from-the-2nd-nagorno-karabakh-war], with proclaimed Mad Scientist COL John Antal (USA-Ret.) Jomini’s Revenge: Mass Strikes Back! [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/171-jominis-revenge-mass-strikes-back/?doing_wp_cron=1597329444.8897631168365478515625] by proclaimed Mad Scientist Zachery Tyson Brown Insights from the Robotics and Autonomy Series of Virtual Events [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/304-insights-from-the-robotics-and-autonomy-series-of-virtual-events/], as well as all of the associated webinar content [https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/mad-scientist/p/webinar] (presenter biographies, slide decks, and notes) and associated videos [https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLx2Zn7hPXT7d8Mgtz_k5fnujQZ6mWcEQo] Through Soldiers’ Eyes: The Future of Ground Combat [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/376-through-soldiers-eyes-the-future-of-ground-combat/] and its associated podcast [https://theconvergence.castos.com/episodes/48-through-the-soldiers39-eyes-the-future-of-ground-combat-with-denys-antipov-heydar-mirza-nolan-peterson-john-spencer-jim-greer-and-col-scott-shaw] “Intelligentization” and a Chinese Vision of Future War [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/199-intelligentization-and-a-chinese-vision-of-future-war/] The PLA and UAVs – Automating the Battlefield and Enhancing Training [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/352-the-pla-and-uavs-automating-the-battlefield-and-enhancing-training/] A Chinese Perspective on Future Urban Unmanned Operations [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/306-a-chinese-perspective-on-future-urban-unmanned-operations/] China: “New Concepts” in Unmanned Combat and Cyber and Electronic Warfare [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/285-china-new-concepts-in-unmanned-combat-and-cyber-and-electronic-warfare/] The PLA: Close Combat in the Information Age and the “Blade of Victory” [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/225-the-pla-close-combat-in-the-information-age-and-the-blade-of-victory/] “Once More unto The Breach Dear Friends”: From English Longbows to Azerbaijani Drones, Army Modernization STILL Means More than Materiel [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/300-once-more-unto-the-breach-dear-friends-from-english-longbows-to-azerbaijani-drones-army-modernization-still-means-more-than-materiel/], by Ian Sullivan. Rapid Adaptation [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/478-rapid-adaptation/] Turkey and the TB-2: A Rising Drone Superpower [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/415-turkey-and-the-tb-2-a-rising-drone-superpower/] and its associated podcast [https://theconvergence.castos.com/episodes/65-turkey-and-the-tb-2-a-rising-drone-superpower-with-karen-kaya], with Karen Kaya Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

115. 15 Layers Deep: Supporting Soldiers with Geospatial Intelligence

[Editor’s Note:  As observed in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations [https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/100.ATSC/26EDC9BD-A6C6-4BD8-B663-88DB4528F896-1734185694520/TP525-92_Final.pdf]: “LSCO will be marked by the democratization and proliferation of advanced technologies and hyperconnected global communications, creating an increasingly transparent battlefield that makes it difficult to hide from the enemy.” Today’s The Convergence podcast features Jason Feser from the U.S. Army Geospatial Center exploring just how transparent the contemporary battlefield has become.  With the convergence of sensing technologies, democratized space, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) / Machine Learning (ML), this capability is empowering our Soldiers with a granular situational awareness of the Operational Environment, down to an eight-digit (plus!) grid reference.  Modern LSCO is now a competition between the hiders and the finders — if a target can be seen, it can be killed!  Our adversaries have similar sensing capabilities — but in the contemporary Operational Environment, warfare favors those who can innovate tactically.  The tactical advantage offered by this granular level of battlefield transparency is lost if it can’t be shared with and used by Warfighters at the bleeding edge of the fight — Read on!] CW4 Jason Feser (USA-Ret.) currently serves as Branch Chief for Data Generation and Production, Warfighter Support Division, within the U.S. Army Geospatial Center (AGC).  In this role, Mr. Feser oversees a staff of civilians and contractors that enable geospatial data collection, processing, and dissemination to the U.S. Army’s generating and operating force.  Mr. Feser is responsible for three critical product lines to meet the Army’s requirements for digital mapping and geospatial analysis for customers at all echelons — the AGC’s Engineer Route Study, Regional Terrain Planner, and Urban Tactical Planner.  This includes updating the production pipelines, managing Army Geospatial Engineer Teams, and leveraging capabilities and tools found within the broader U.S. Army Corps of Engineer Research Development Centers and Joint Communities. Prior to joining the AGC as a civilian, Mr. Feser spent 27 years in the Army as a Geospatial Engineer and Geospatial Engineering Technician, before retiring in 2019.  Mr. Feser spent over fifteen years at the tactical level before moving on to Joint and Strategic assignments.  His assignments included serving in multiple Engineer Brigade Headquarters in Heavy Divisions; a Branch Chief in the IDG at JAC Molesworth; NATO Special Operations Intel Branch at the NATO Intel Fusion Center; Senior Geospatial Officer and Commander at the 512th Geospatial Planning Cell; and Military Advisor to the AGC Director.  Mr. Feser’s career included deployments to Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Jordan.  He holds an Undergraduate degree in Applied Science, with an Emphasis in Geospatial Information Systems, and he has completed professional military technical training throughout his career. In our latest episode of The Convergence podcast, Army Mad Scientist sat down with Mr. Feser to explore the AGC, the role advanced technologies play in battlefield transparency, and our adversaries’ capabilities to observe and sense the Operational Environment.  The following bullet points highlight key insights from our conversation. * Geospatial engineers are embedded within U.S. Army formations to conduct Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) analysis on elements of the Operational Environment that will impact operations, including cultural, institutional, and physical aspects that may challenge our forces across multiple domains. The Army Geospatial Center (AGC) supports these geospatial engineers by providing critical data sets and services necessary to support command and control systems, broad area analysis, and specialized products.  * AGC uses numerous Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) to analyze imagery, tabular data, and unstructured data to build databases of information that are tied to the Earth’s surface.  This information consists of many different categories of data – for example, vector data that can describe the road material composition and durability of a Main Supply Route (MSR), along with its width, changes in elevation (from laser Light Detection and Ranging [LiDAR]), and satellite imagery of choke points and potential ambush sites.  * Terrain is of vital importance to any unmanned system employed in the Operational Environment.  Unmanned Ground Vehicles and Aerial Systems (UGVs/UAVs) require a detailed, high–resolution understanding of terrain so that these autonomous systems can conduct specific missions — even with limited access by a remote operator. Unmanned systems will also enable the U.S. Army to collect extensive geospatial information — specifically from the intersection of modality sensing (e.g., Electro-Optical [EO], LiDAR, and radar) — to create an improved, granular understanding of the Operational Environment.   * In the commercial space, efforts are underway to embed 15 modalities into a single satellite image (e.g., LiDAR, elevation, EO, radar, gravity, etc.) for every 10–meter pixel. This creates a 64-bit description of that 10m space that informs the Warfighter regarding battlefield conditions impacting on operations.    * Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) will impact our ability to generate detailed data on key terrain features at a faster and cheaper rate. These capabilities will also provide discrete data classification and additional fidelity — enabling us to produce more accurate assessments for operations — at machine speed.   * In Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian forces are employing Electronic Warfare (EW) to disrupt UAV and UGV operations.  With increased fidelity from AI/ML support, autonomous systems can continue to operate in EW-jammed environments, relying on accurate geospatial information onboard to guide their navigation.   * China and Russia have similar geospatial technology, but they do not have the same mission command mentality as the U.S. — Russian soldiers below the O-6 level do not have access to geospatial information or maps.  Neither China nor Russia empowers their soldiers at the lowest echelons to make decisions. Geospatial information grants the U.S. Army and its Warfighters an operational advantage by empowering mission command in a LSCO fight. Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next insightful episode of The Convergence  [https://theconvergence.castos.com/]on 28 August 2025, when we sit down with Dr. Mark Bailey, Department Chair, Cyber Intelligence and Data Science, National Intelligence University, and author of Unknowable Minds: Philosophical Insights on AI and Autonomous Weapons [https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AUPress/Book-Reviews/Display/Article/4209408/unknowable-minds-philosophical-insights-on-ai-and-autonomous-weapons/]. We’ll talk with Dr. Bailey about the “black box” implications of AI, the legality and ethics of autonomous weapons, and how our adversaries are approaching and responding to these same issues. If you enjoyed this post, check out the TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations [https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/100.ATSC/26EDC9BD-A6C6-4BD8-B663-88DB4528F896-1734185694520/TP525-92_Final.pdf] Explore the TRADOC G-2‘s Operational Environment Enterprise [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/] web page, brimming with authoritative information on the Operational Environment and how our adversaries fight, including: Our China Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/how-china-fights/], full of information regarding our pacing challenge, including ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics [https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN34236-ATP_7-100.3-001-WEB-3.pdf], How China Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/how-china-fights-in-large-scale-combat-operations/], BiteSize China [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/how-china-fights/bite-size-china/] weekly topics, and the People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces Quick Reference Guide [https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/operational-environment-and-threat-analysis-directorate/m/documents/377746]. Our Russia Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/how-russia-fights/], including the BiteSize Russia [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/how-russia-fights/bite-size-russia/russia-weekly-updates/] weekly topics. If you have a CAC, you’ll be especially interested in reviewing our weekly RUS-UKR Conflict [https://armyeitaas.sharepoint-mil.us/teams/TR-G2Russia-UkraineObservations/Shared%20Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx?id=%2Fteams%2FTR-G2Russia-UkraineObservations%2FShared%20Documents%2FGeneral%2FRU-UK_RunningEst_KAs_LSCOchallenges&p=true&ga=1] Running Estimates and associated Narratives, capturing what we learned about the contemporary Russian way of war in Ukraine over the past two years and the ramifications for U.S. Army modernization across DOTMLPF-P. Our Iran Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/iran-landing-zone-how-iran-fights/], including the Iran Quick Reference Guide [https://g2webcontent.z2.web.core.usgovcloudapi.net/OEE/Iran%20LZ/Iran%20Quick%20Reference%20Guide.pdf] and the Iran Passive Defense Manual [https://armyeitaas.sharepoint-mil.us/sites/TR-HQ-G2-OEConnect/Products/Forms/GalView.aspx?id=%2Fsites%2FTR-HQ-G2-OEConnect%2FProducts%2FLanding%20Zones%20Products%2FIran%20LZ%2FIranian_Passive_Defense_Manual.pdf&viewid=06793748-2b67-4e1f-9972-a8788cc87860&parent=%2Fsites%2FTR-HQ-G2-OEConnect%2FProducts%2FLanding%20Zones%20Products%2FIran%20LZ] (both require a CAC to access). Our North Korea Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/north-korea-landing-zone-how-north-korea-fights/], including Resources for Studying North Korea [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/north-korea-resources-deck/], Instruments of Chinese Military Influence in North Korea [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/instruments-of-chinese-military-influence-in-north-korea/], and Instruments of Russian Military Influence in North Korea [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/instruments-of-russian-military-influence-in-north-korea/]. Our Irregular Threats Landing Zone [https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/irregular-threats-landing-zone-how-irregular-threats-fight/], including TC 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces [https://g2webcontent.z2.web.core.usgovcloudapi.net/OEE/VEO%20LZ/TC%207-100.3_Irregular-Opposing-Forces_2014.pdf], and ATP 3-37.2, Antiterrorism [https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_d/ARN32978-ATP_3-37.2-000-WEB-1.pdf] (requires a CAC to access). Our Running Estimates [https://armyeitaas.sharepoint-mil.us/teams/TRG2OERunningEstimateFY24/Shared%20Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx?ga=1&id=%2Fteams%2FTRG2OERunningEstimateFY24%2FShared%20Documents%2FGeneral%2FOE%20Running%20Estimates&sortField=Modified&isAscending=false&viewid=c50383d2-82bb-4342-ae90-10a1398a100d] SharePoint site (also requires a CAC to access) — documenting what we’re learning about the evolving OE.  Contains our monthly OE Running Estimates, associated Narratives, and the quarterly OE Assessment TRADOC Intelligence Posts (TIPs). Then check out the following related Mad Scientist Laboratory blog post content: Nowhere to Hide: Information Exploitation and Sanitization [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/126-nowhere-to-hide-information-exploitation-and-sanitization/] and War Laid Bare [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/115-war-laid-bare/], by Matthew Ader Future Dynamics of Warfare: Everyone is a Player, Everything is a Target [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/490-future-dynamics-of-warfare-everyone-is-a-player-everything-is-a-target/], by Team Sullivan’s Travels Integrated Sensors: The Critical Element in Future Complex Environment Warfare [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/46-integrated-sensors-the-critical-element-in-future-complex-environment-warfare/], by Dr. Richard Nabors The Future of Ground Warfare [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/309-the-convergence-the-future-of-ground-warfare-with-col-scott-shaw/], and associated podcast [https://theconvergence.castos.com/episodes/30-the-future-of-ground-warfare-with-col-scott-shaw] Timeless Competitions [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/7-timeless-competitions/] Unmanned Capabilities in Today’s Battlespace [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/462-unmanned-capabilities-in-todays-battlespace/] Revolutionizing 21st Century Warfighting: UAVs and C-UAS [https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/488-revolutionizing-21st-century-warfighting-uavs-and-c-uas/] Disclaimer: The views expressed in this blog post do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Army Futures Command (AFC), or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)