High Output: The Future of Engineering
Twenty minutes into our conversation, I asked Charity Majors how engineering leaders should be finding good junior engineers right now. “God, I don’t fucking know.” She apologized, then doubled back. “Sorry. Excuse me. You do need them. They’re not hard to find.” That answer is the whole interview in miniature. How a junior breaks into engineering today, Charity will tell you, is genuinely unresolved. None of the paths that worked for her exist anymore. How an engineering org builds a healthy pipeline, on the other hand, is not particularly hard. The two questions sit next to each other, and she refused to collapse them into a tidy answer. Charity is the co-founder and CTO of Honeycomb, twenty years into the industry, two O’Reilly books behind her and the second edition of one in progress. Her career has been built on distributed systems — production engineering at Parse, then Linden Lab, then founding an observability company. But most of what she said over the next half hour was about people, and she came back to one idea four or five times: engineering teams are not social systems and they are not technical systems. They’re sociotechnical systems, and the way you reason about one shapes the way you have to reason about the other. Idaho Charity grew up in the backwoods of Idaho. No computers, no phone line for most of her childhood. She got to college on a classical piano scholarship and noticed something there. “People who studied music were still hanging out working minimum-wage jobs in their thirties, forties, and fifties. And I was like, I grew up being poor. I am not going to be a poor adult. And so I switched lanes.” She got into tech in the late nineties. “Any smart kid who is willing to work weird hours and try a lot of stuff could make a go of it.” She doesn’t romanticize that. Tech was a toy then, she said, and now powers nuclear power plants, so the bar going up is correct. But twenty years on, she’s worried about what’s happened to the door behind her. “I think we really risk it becoming the sort of ivory tower where we keep out anyone who has a non-traditional background. You need to think harder about crafting paths into technology to meet the moment.” I asked how she got into management. “I was a reluctant manager.” She drew a line between management and leadership before I could follow up. These are sociotechnical systems, she said, “they’re not social or technical, or we could just take the great managers from Starbucks and put them in charge of engineering teams.” The reason she ended up doing the job at all was anger. “I got into people management the same way a lot of people do, which was enraged, because I didn’t like the way it was being done. And I was like, *god damn it, I guess I will do it differently. I will not make any of these mistakes.* So I made different mistakes, of course.” The self-correction is constant in conversation with her. She said something close to it three more times over the next half hour. The freeze When I brought up the AI-killing-the-junior-pipeline discourse, she pointed to something specific. She’d just read a piece by Annie Lowrey in the Atlantic that morning. The Job Market Is Hell [https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/09/job-market-hell/684133/]. Unemployment is around 4.7%, which is historically fine, but nobody is leaving their jobs and nobody is hiring. On both sides of the resume, AI is doing the talking. Recruiters feed inbound applications into screening tools. Candidates feed job listings into chatbots. “The result is there are no people talking to people. Nobody’s figured out how to do this.” The framing she rejected was the one that treats this as inevitable. “What I don’t like about the way people talk about bringing juniors into tech is they talk about it like it’s some force of nature that we have no control over, which is absolute horseshit. This is a world we create. It’s a world that we reinforce.” It’s a sequence of decisions made by people in rooms. And the people most responsible for those decisions, she would argue later, aren’t the ones the org chart suggests. Make friends with the discomfort Before she got to the operational claims, she walked me through what she thinks her generation of managers got wrong, because the failure mode shapes everything else. “My generation swung the other way and was like very rigorous about, *you should have work-life balance. Nobody should be pinging you after hours.*” The intent was correct. She was managing in reaction to the era of people sleeping under their desks. But she watched it overcorrect. “I see some managers being like, *you’re working more than 40 hours, stop.* And honestly, we live in a very complex, fast-changing world, and if you’re intrinsically motivated to be working, if you’re learning, if you’re having fun, nobody should be stopping you, because that really is the path to success.” She isn’t arguing for the swing back, either. I brought up 996, the Chinese nine-to-nine, six-days-a-week framing that’s been making the rounds on Hacker News. She had nothing nice to say about the swing-back. “It all swings back. It all swings back, doesn’t it?” Then, more bluntly: “That’s bullshit.” She read the cycle as a generational pattern, and she was harder on her own generation than on either pole. “If anyone had told me that, if I had followed that advice, I would not be where I am.” The piece of this that connects to junior hiring is the part most management writing skips. “You need to learn to make friends with the discomfort. You need to learn to find joy in the pain.” None of us, she said, evolved to handle data structures and algorithms, and the early years of an engineering career are genuinely agonizing. The juniors who make it through are the ones who learn to like the agony. A lot of senior engineers, looking back, have forgotten that they once lived through it. It’s a humanistic argument, not just an operational one. She talked for a while about school stamping out the curiosity children are born with. Twelve, twenty, twenty-five years of report cards, conditioning us to associate learning with extrinsic reward. What she loves about adulthood is the chance to rediscover the original instinct. Engineering is one of the few careers that pays you for it. 50 to 1 Her first operational claim was about team composition. “For every staff engineer that you have, let alone principal engineer, you need 50 intermediate engineers.” The number is a gesture. The shape of the argument is specific. Most companies have over-corrected toward senior hiring on the theory that they’ll get more leverage per dollar. The people who actually ship the bulk of features, she said, aren’t seniors. They’re intermediates. “Some of the most productive engineers that I’ve ever worked with have been intermediate engineers. They can just put on their headphones, beginning of the day, go deep, and just pound out the features and the bug fixes.” Heads down, pattern matching, finishing things. “Nobody who’s been in engineering for seven, ten years wants to do that. They’re sick of that.” The bored staff engineer is not a leverage win. “When people get bored, you do not get great work out of them. You get the best work out of people when they are working at that place that’s right on the edge of their ability.” And the supply chain only runs one direction. “Nobody stays a junior engineer for long, two years at most. So you’ve gotta keep feeding the system. You’ve gotta keep bringing new blood in.” Opening the barn door I asked what she’d recommend to companies that are paranoid about hiring right now. “I would advocate for opening the barn door a bit wider, giving more people a shot. Understanding that it means you will have to fire more of them. You will have to let more of them go. But I feel like it’s worse to never give people a shot.” The second half is the part she emphasized. A wider door costs you in faster, more honest performance management, and most engineering managers are bad at that part. “Nothing demoralizes a team more than when someone that they work with every day, who’s not pulling their weight, just hangs around forever.” The unsalvageable cases weren’t the ones that escalated. They were the ones that drifted. “Some of the most heartbreaking situations I’ve ever been in as a manager are when a person’s being let go after years of them doing exactly the same thing, and they’re legitimately dumbstruck.” There’s a side benefit she pointed out that I hadn’t considered. Junior engineers audit your systems in a way nobody else can. “If you’re an engineer joining a team where there is very low turnover, where people never join, where people never leave, that is not likely to be a very high functioning team either.” Old docs. Idiosyncratic mental models locked in three people’s heads. A dev environment that takes a month to set up because nobody’s tried in six. “If you’re used to bringing on junior engineers, oh boy, those kids will audit your systems like no one else.” That’s the sociotechnical argument in plain language. The team isn’t separable from the systems it owns, and the hiring policy isn’t separable from the operational health of the codebase. Both improve together or neither does. What she watches for in a junior The most optimistic moment came when I asked what she watches for in her own juniors. “Some of our junior engineers talk about how they are in conversation with Claude all day long. By the time they bring a question to their senior engineer, which they do very often, they have tried all the low-hanging fruit, they’ve tried a bunch of stuff, they’ve asked a lot of questions. So it is very well worth that senior engineer’s time.” That’s not the threatened-junior story most engineering leaders are telling right now. The juniors she described are using the model to exhaust the obvious before they ask, and arriving at the senior with the harder version of the question. I asked what the leading indicator is for a junior who’s going to make it. “Are they asking good questions? Are their questions getting better? Do they have a good sense of how to use their time and how to use their mentor’s time? That is the best leading indicator.” Not output. Not commit volume. Question quality, over time. She added, almost in passing, that her management chain handles the day-to-day evaluation. “I really trust Emily and all of them.” The broader discipline she described combines two things engineers tend to mistrust: the data, and the conversations. “It’s actually really important that there be data in addition to conversations, because the data and the conversations are bookends. They help you understand each other.” Lean on either alone, she said, and you get either a “people manager” with no technical judgment, or a manager who reads PR counts as a personality assessment. Both fail in different ways. Consent of the governed Near the end, I asked who she thought was actually responsible for fixing the junior pipeline. The pattern she described is counterintuitive. “The places that I know of that actually are successfully recruiting, hiring, bringing in junior engineers, and making them successful, it was *not* the engineering managers who pushed for that program. It was the senior engineers. They were the ones who were like: *we know what it takes to have a healthy, high-performing team. It takes a steady influx of new blood, and we feel this conviction so strongly that we’re gonna go make it happen ourselves.*” The senior ICs went to bat. The managers ran the mechanics afterward. Then the line that anchored the whole conversation: “There is no engineering leadership without the consent of the governed.” Charity has been an executive long enough to watch a lot of decisions get made about engineers, by engineers, with or around engineering management’s input. “If there’s anything that I have learned being in senior management, it’s how much power individual ICs have when they choose to flex it.” I asked whether she meant it literally. Were the senior ICs really the deciding force? She walked through the pattern again. The companies hiring juniors successfully are the ones where the senior engineers made it their problem. The ones not hiring are the ones where they didn’t. I came in expecting a programs-and-processes answer. Recruiting funnels, intern conversions, the mechanics of a pipeline. What I got back was about consent. The senior ICs in your org, the ones who don’t have manager in their title but have weight in every staffing conversation, are the people who decide whether the next generation gets in. Without their buy-in, no pipeline exists. With it, almost any pipeline works. The feedback loop of feedback loops I asked at the end what she’s working on now. She’s writing the second edition of *Observability Engineering*, and she was honest about how it’s going. “It’s not going super great.” She read the first edition recently and found it embarrassing, which is not how most authors I’ve talked to describe their own work. “But now I think my co-authors and I, we know who we’re writing for and we know what they need to hear.” Then she connected the book to the show in a way I wasn’t expecting. “It’s a true fact reality that high-performing engineering teams are about fast feedback loops, and observability is the feedback loop of feedback loops. It is the sense-making apparatus of engineering teams.” That landed for me. A lot of what she’d argued for over the prior half hour started looking like a feedback-loop argument. Open the barn door, but tighten the loop on managing out, so performance information moves fast. Watch question quality, because it’s a faster signal than output. Bring juniors in, because they shorten the loop on every undocumented assumption your team has accumulated. The senior ICs are the deciding force because they’re the only people positioned to keep all those loops short. A team is a sociotechnical system. The systems that team owns are sociotechnical systems too. The discipline of running both well is the same: short feedback, an honest signal, and the willingness to look at uncomfortable data. Charity’s question, the one I’ve been sitting with since we hung up: in your engineering org, who is actually deciding whether the next generation gets in? High Output is brought to you by Maestro AI [https://getmaestro.ai]. The thing Charity said that stuck with me most was about leading indicators. The junior worth investing in isn’t the one shipping the most code. It’s the one whose questions are getting better. The juniors using Claude well at Honeycomb are showing up to their senior engineers having already exhausted the obvious. That’s a different trajectory than the one most dashboards see. PR counts and cycle time can’t pick that distinction up. The work that builds judgment, or fails to, happens in the back-and-forth between an engineer and an AI agent, before any PR is opened. Your Anthropic bill tells you something is happening. Maestro tells you what. Maestro plugs into Claude Code and Cursor and looks at the work itself: how engineers scope a problem before they prompt, what they verify, what they accept on faith. Scored against shipped outcomes, not vibes. You can see which engineers are leveling up and which are accumulating comprehension debt. Visit https://getmaestro.ai [https://getmaestro.ai] to see how we help engineering leaders spot which engineers are developing real AI craft, and which are just generating more output. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit maestroai.substack.com [https://maestroai.substack.com?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_1]
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