Conspiracy Theorists and Monological Belief Systems, Part 1: “Conspiracy Theorists Believe Mutually Contradictory Theories,” and Other Misleading Academic Memes

Conspiracy Theorists and Monological Belief Systems, Part 2: Social Scientists and Double Standards

Part 2 of a 2-part podcast series, based on the article: "Conspiracy Theorists and Monological Belief Systems" (Argumenta 2018), by Kurtis Hagen  https://www.argumenta.org/article/conspiracy-theorists-monological-belief-systems-special-issue/ [https://www.argumenta.org/article/conspiracy-theorists-monological-belief-systems-special-issue/]  ABSTRACT of Article: Recent scholarship has claimed to show that conspiracy theorists are prone to simultaneously believe mutually contradictory conspiracy theories, as well as believe entirely made up conspiracy theories. The authors of those studies suggest that this supports the notion that conspiracy theories operate within “monological belief systems”, in which conspiracy theorists find support for conspiratorial beliefs in other conspiratorial beliefs, or in related generalizations, rather than in evidence directly relevant to the conspiracy in question. In this article, I argue that all of that is either wrong or at least misleading.

Conspiracy Theorists and Monological Belief Systems, Part 1: “Conspiracy Theorists Believe Mutually Contradictory Theories,” and Other Misleading Academic Memes

This podcast episode is a modified portion of an article entitled, “Conspiracy Theorists and Monological Belief Systems,” published in an open-access online academic philosophy journal called Argumenta, in 2018, by Kurtis Hagen. This podcast episode focuses on the claim that conspiracy theorists believe obviously mutually inconsistent theories and also the notion that they readily believe competely made up theories. https://www.argumenta.org/article/conspiracy-theorists-monological-belief-systems-special-issue/  ABSTRACT of article: Recent scholarship has claimed to show that conspiracy theorists are prone to simultaneously believe mutually contradictory conspiracy theories, as well as believe entirely made up conspiracy theories. The authors of those studies suggest that this supports the notion that conspiracy theories operate within “monological belief systems”, in which conspiracy theorists find support for conspiratorial beliefs in other conspiratorial beliefs, or in related generalizations, rather than in evidence directly relevant to the conspiracy in question. In this article, I argue that all of that is either wrong or at least misleading.

NIST and the World Trade Center Catastrophe

This podcast episode is a modified excerpt from the Appendix, “9/11 and Epistemic Authorities,” taken from the book Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique, published in 2022, by Kurtis Hagen. This excerpt focuses on the reliability of the National Institute of Standards and Technology regarding the destruction of the Twin Towers and Building 7 of the World Trade Center on 9/11 2001.

Is the Mainstream Media Reliable Regarding Conspiracy Theories? Part 3: A Couple Examples involving 9/11

This podcast episode is the third part of a three-part series on the reliability of the media regarding conspiracy theories. It is mostly an excerpt from the Appendix, “9/11 and Epistemic Authorities,” taken from the book Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique, published in 2022, by Kurtis Hagen.

Is the Mainstream Media Reliable Regarding Conspiracy Theories? Part 2: Contingencies, Conflicts of Interest, and Toxic Truths (a further response to Keith Harris)

This is the second part of a three-part series on the reliability of the media regarding conspiracy theories. This episode is based on material taken from an article entitled, “Is Conspiracy Theorizing Really Epistemically Problematic?” published in the journal Episteme in 2020, by Kurtis Hagen, which is a response to an article by philosopher Keith Harris. The discussion of the media’s reliability is somewhat tangential to the main argument of the article, having been included there in order to address the concerns of a reviewer who seemed to share Harris’s optimistic view. In this podcast version, some of the material from the article’s footnotes are integrated into the presentation for richer detail. The abstract of the article from which this material is taken reads as follows:  ABSTRACT: In an article based on a recent address to the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Keith Harris has argued that there is something epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorizing. Although he finds “standard criticisms” of conspiracy theories wanting, he argues that there are three subtle but significant problems with conspiracy theorizing: (1) It relies on an invalid probabilistic version of modus tollens. (2) It involves a problematic combination of both epistemic virtues and vices. And, (3) it lacks an adequate basis for trust in its information sources. In response, I have argued that, like other generalist critiques of conspiracy theories, the arguments offered by Harris do little to undermine conspiracy theorizing as such. And they do not give us good reasons to dismiss any particular conspiracy theory without consideration of the relevant evidence.