New Opinions: Breaking Down the Five June 23rd Opinions

Opinion Summary: Cisco Systems v. Doe I | SCOTUS Blocks Aiding and Abetting Lawsuit

PART 1: SHOW NOTES Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I | Case No. 24-856 | Docket Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-856.html | Argued: 04/28/2026 | Decided: 06/23/2026 Overview: The Supreme Court ended corporate accountability under two federal human-rights statutes, ruling that courts carry no authority to create new Alien Tort Statute lawsuits and that the Torture Victim Protection Act reaches only direct perpetrators — not their corporate enablers. Question Presented: Whether the ATS and TVPA authorize civil aiding-and-abetting liability against a U.S. technology company that allegedly helped a foreign government torture a religious minority. Posture: Ninth Circuit reversed dismissal and allowed aiding-and-abetting claims; Supreme Court granted certiorari January 9, 2026. Main Arguments: * Cisco (Petitioner): * (1) Post-Sosa and Egbert precedents stripped courts of authority to create any new ATS cause of action — that power belongs exclusively to Congress; * (2) Central Bank forecloses implied civil aiding-and-abetting liability absent express statutory text; * (3) TVPA's "subjects" covers command responsibility only — not remote corporate assistance far removed from custody or physical control of victims. * Falun Gong Practitioners (Respondents): * (1) Aiding-and-abetting violations of the law of nations itself violated international law at the Founding — the First Congress built that liability into the ATS; * (2) Central Bank applied ordinary statutory interpretation, not a blanket clear-statement rule, and both statutes support aiding-and-abetting claims under that same analysis; * (3) Congress chose the broad verb "subjects" over the narrower "commits" to reach secondary actors — legislative history confirms it. Holding: Federal courts carry no authority to create new causes of action under the ATS, and the TVPA's "subjects" language does not reach those who aided and abetted torture. Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justice Kagan. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson as to Parts I–III and V. Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. Opinion: Here [https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-856_kjfm.pdf] Majority Reasoning: * (1) Post-Sosa precedents — especially Egbert v. Boule (2022) — establish that creating causes of action belongs exclusively to Congress, eliminating courts' residual ATS common-law authority Sosa described as "slight"; * (2) Central Bank of Denver forecloses implied civil aiding-and-abetting liability absent express congressional text, and neither the ATS nor the TVPA supplies it; * (3) ATS cases categorically raise foreign policy and separation-of-powers concerns that always counsel deference to Congress — no judicial cause of action survives that constraint. Separate Opinions: * Justice Jackson (concurring in judgment in part / dissenting in part, joined by Kagan): Agreed TVPA's "subjects" excludes aiding-and-abetting but rejected the majority's deployment of Central Bank as a magic-words test; dissented from the ATS holding alongside Justice Sotomayor. * Justice Sotomayor (dissenting, joined by Kagan and Jackson as to Parts I–III and V): Accused the majority of covertly overruling Sosa without stare decisis analysis; argued "subjects" covers corporate complicity in torture; flagged the logical contradiction of preserving the Blackstone three while eliminating all other ATS implied claims. Implications: * (1) American companies now face near-zero civil exposure in U.S. courts for knowingly helping foreign governments commit human rights abuses; * (2) Torture and atrocity victims must pursue accountability through Congress or the political branches — federal courts stepped out; * (3) Congress must enact express aiding-and-abetting liability before courts reenter this territory. The Fine Print: * Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." * Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, § 2(a)(1): "An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation — subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual." Primary Cases: * Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004): Courts retain "narrow" authority to recognize new ATS causes of action for international-law violations meeting a strict two-step specificity test — authority the majority now declares nonexistent. * Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. (1994): Civil aiding-and-abetting liability under a federal statute requires Congress to expressly provide for it; statutory silence implies nothing. Oral Advocates: * Petitioners (Cisco Systems): Kannon K. Shanmugam of Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP * Respondents (Doe I, et al.): Paul L. Hoffman of Schonbrun DeSimone Seplow Harris & Hoffman, LLP * Amicus Curiae (United States): Curtis E. Gannon of the Department of Justice

New Opinions: Breaking Down the Five June 23rd Opinions

Overview: * Five opinions released June 23rd, 2026 — one day, across immigration, international human rights, foreign sovereign immunity, religious freedom, and property rights. * Four of five decisions split 6–3: identical conservative majority, identical liberal dissent, four consecutive times. * The fifth — a Michigan family's $2,241 tax bill and a home sold at auction for $76,008 — drew near-unanimous agreement across ideological lines. * Every conservative Justice authored a majority; Chief Justice Roberts joined all five without writing one. * Justice Jackson led all Justices in separate opinion output — three opinions across the five cases. * This episode breaks down all five decisions: authors, vote splits, key holdings, separate opinions, and real-world consequences. Blanche, Acting Attorney General versus Lau | No. 25–429 * Border officers need not hold clear and convincing evidence before treating a returning lawful permanent resident as an admission-seeker based on a crime involving moral turpitude. * 6–3. Justice Thomas authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. * Justice Jackson dissented, joined by Sotomayor and Kagan. * Second Circuit vacated and remanded. Cisco Systems, Inc. versus Doe | No. 24–856 * Courts may not create new causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute; the Torture Victim Protection Act does not cover aiding-and-abetting liability. * 6–3. Justice Barrett authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. * Justice Jackson concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Kagan. * Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Kagan and Jackson as to Parts I–III and V. * Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. Exxon Mobil Corp. versus Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba) | No. 24–699 * The Helms-Burton Act itself abrogates the sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities; plaintiffs need not separately satisfy FSIA exceptions. * 6–3. Justice Kavanaugh authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. * Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson. * D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded. Landor versus Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety | No. 23–1197 * Individual state prison officers may not face personal liability under RLUIPA unless they voluntarily and knowingly consented to answer suits under the statute. * 6–3. Justice Gorsuch authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. * Justice Jackson dissented, joined by Sotomayor and Kagan. * Fifth Circuit affirmed. Pung, Personal Representative of the Estate of Pung versus Isabella County, Michigan | No. 25–95 * Just compensation following a tax sale equals the auction sale price, not the property's hypothetical fair market value; the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause claim fails. * Near-unanimous. Justice Alito authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, and by Thomas except as to Part II–B. * Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, joined by Gorsuch and Jackson. * Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Gorsuch except as to footnote 1. * Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded.

Oral Argument Re-Listen: United States v. Hemani | The Fed Felony Trap Snaps Shut on the Government

United States v. Hemani | Case No. 24-1234 | Docket Link: Here [https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-1234.html] | Argued: 03/02/2026 | Decided: 06/18/2026 Overview: A federal law strips gun rights from regular drug users without proof of danger. This case tests how far the Second Amendment's history-and-tradition standard limits Congress's power to disarm marijuana users. Oral Advocates: * For Petitioner (United States): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues for Petitioner United States. * For Respondent (Hemani): Erin Murphy of Clement & Murphy, PLLC argues for Respondent Hemani. Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(3) violates the Second Amendment as applied to a marijuana user with no history of violence. Posture: District court dismissed the indictment; Fifth Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted certiorari. Main Arguments: * Petitioner (United States): (1) Habitual drunkard laws from the founding era supply a historically analogous tradition for disarming regular drug users; (2) Vagrancy, civil-commitment, and surety laws targeted a similarly dangerous category of people; (3) Section 925(c) offers a constitutional safety valve through individualized relief. * Respondent (Hemani): (1) The government's historical analogues fail the why-and-how test since habitual drunkard laws targeted only the incapacitated, not regular users; (2) No genuine circuit split warrants review; (3) Section 925(c)'s recent restoration cannot retroactively cure a violation that predates it. Holding: The government's prosecution of Mr. Hemani under §922(g)(3)'s unlawful user provision is inconsistent with the Second Amendment. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor. Justice Alito wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment joined by Justice Kagan. Affirmed. Opinion: Here [https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1234_g2bh.pdf] Majority Reasoning: (1) The government's "habitual drunkard" historical analogues targeted only the incapacitated, not regular or even heavy users, undercutting the claimed "why"; (2) Those laws aimed to protect drunkards and the public from idleness or financial ruin, not categorically violent people, further undercutting the "why"; (3) Historical laws required pre-deprivation process, while Section 922(g)(3) disarms automatically with none, failing the "how." Separate Opinions: * Justice Thomas (concurring): Thomas joins the majority fully but argues Section 922(g) likely exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause power, since prosecutors need only show a firearm once crossed state lines, inviting a future challenge to the statute's constitutional foundation. * Justice Jackson (concurring, joined by Justice Sotomayor): Jackson joins the majority fully but renews her call to replace the Bruen history-and-tradition test with means-end scrutiny, arguing the current framework cannot meaningfully assess whether a law's burden fits the government's stated justification. * Justice Alito (concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Kagan): Alito agrees Hemani wins but would rest the decision on narrower ground: the government never proved how much marijuana Hemani used or whether it affected his judgment, unlike incapacitated historical "habitual drunkards." Implications: (1) Federal prosecutors need more than admitted regular drug use to bring a 922(g)(3) charge; (2) Marijuana users in legal-marijuana states gain real protection from automatic federal gun prosecution; (3) Defense attorneys gain a roadmap for similar challenges, while bans on addicts, intoxicated possessors, and felons stay untouched. The Fine Print: * Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." * 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3): "It shall be unlawful for any person...who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance...to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition." Primary Cases: * New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022): Gun laws must match the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation, not just serve a strong government interest. * United States v. Rahimi (2024): The government need not identify a historical "twin," only a law "relevantly similar" in why and how it operated. Timestamps: [00:00:00] Case Preview [00:01:02] Oral Argument Begins [00:01:08] United States Opening Statement [00:03:09] United States Free for All Questions [00:26:14] United States Round Robin Questions [01:00:32] Hemani Opening Statement [01:02:37] Hemani Free for All Questions [01:31:01] Hemani Round Robin Questions [01:50:46] United States Rebuttal

Oral Argument Re-Listen: Hunter v. United States | Judicial Review for Pleas that Cause A Miscarriage of Justice

Hunter v. United States | Case No. 24-1063 | Docket Link: Here [https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-1063.html] | Argued: 03/03/2026 | Decided: 06/18/2026 Overview: A plea deal's appeal waiver collides with a forced-medication sentence, pushing the Supreme Court to decide when courts can void a waiver — reshaping appellate rights for the ninety-five percent of federal defendants who plead guilty. Oral Advocates: * For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt of Williams & Connolly LLP argued for Petitioner Hunter. * For Respondent: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued for Respondent United States. Question Presented: Whether an appeal waiver remains enforceable when enforcing it would create a miscarriage of justice in sentencing. Posture: Fifth Circuit dismissed Hunter's appeal under the waiver; Court granted certiorari to resolve a split. Main Arguments: * Petitioner (Hunter): (1) Contract defenses like frustration of purpose render the waiver unenforceable for egregious sentencing errors; (2) the judge's on-record statement granting appeal rights, paired with the prosecutor's silence, voids the waiver; (3) courts must recognize a miscarriage-of-justice exception to prevent egregious, unconstitutional sentencing conditions from escaping all appellate review. * Respondent (United States): (1) A knowing and voluntary appeal waiver binds the defendant according to its plain terms; (2) only two narrow exceptions ever excuse a waiver — ineffective assistance and an above-maximum sentence; (3) a broad miscarriage-of-justice exception floods appellate courts and undercuts the value of plea bargaining nationwide. Holding: An agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice — meaning, when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute. Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Kagan wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Alito and Barrett. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Vacated and remanded. Opinion: Here [https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1063_5ifl.pdf] Majority Reasoning: (1) Hunter's claim that the judge's statement and prosecutor's silence voided the waiver fails, since the agreement requires written, signed modifications and the government's chance to enforce the waiver arises only after a notice of appeal; (2) courts retain independent authority over plea waivers, since judges must approve every agreement and appellate courts control enforcement; (3) a miscarriage-of-justice standard, requiring an obvious and egregious error, replaces both the government's absolute-enforcement rule and the Fifth Circuit's narrow two-exception rule. Separate Opinions: * Justice Gorsuch (concurring): Traces plea bargaining's coercive growth and catalogues a broader set of miscarriage-of-justice examples, including guideline-calculation errors, while questioning whether prospective appeal waivers can ever satisfy the Constitution's knowing-and-voluntary requirement. * Justice Kavanaugh (concurring): Joins the majority in full but writes separately to argue Gorsuch's reading sets a lower bar than the majority opinion actually adopts. * Justice Barrett (concurring): Grounds the new rule in "procedural common law" rather than the Court's disputed supervisory power, offering a doctrinal source distinct from the majority's framing. * Justice Thomas (dissenting): Dissents alone, arguing the majority cites no genuine source of law for its rule and warns the new standard floods appellate courts with new claims. Implications: * (1) Defendants nationwide gain a new, though narrow, path to challenge sentencing errors despite signed appeal waivers; * (2) defense attorneys and judges must now weigh whether unusual sentencing conditions risk surviving appellate review; * (3) the Fifth Circuit must decide on remand whether Hunter's forced-medication condition clears the new bar. The Fine Print: * 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(9): "undergo available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment" * Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(3)(A): "[T]he court may accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision" Primary Cases: * United States v. Mezzanatto (1995): Some baseline of fair procedure survives no matter what a defendant agrees to waive in a plea deal. * Santobello v. New York (1971): Plea agreements remain subject to judicial oversight and "sound judicial discretion," not just prosecutorial control. Timestamps: [00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview [00:01:00] Oral Advocates [00:01:11] Oral Argument Begins [00:01:18] Hunter Opening Statement [00:03:10] Hunter Free for All Questions [00:27:27] Hunter Round Robin Questions [00:45:07] United States Opening Statement [00:46:54] Hunter Free for All Questions [01:15:22] United States Round Robin Questions [01:33:51] Hunter Rebuttal

Opinion Summary: United States v. Hemani | The Fed Felony Trap Snaps Shut on the Government

United States v. Hemani | Case No. 24-1234 | Docket Link: Here [https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-1234.html] | Argued: 03/02/2026 | Decided: 06/18/2026 Interview with Adeel Bashir: Here [https://scotus-oral-arguments.captivate.fm/episode/ab-interview-final-audio/] Overview: A federal law strips gun rights from regular drug users without proof of danger. This case tests how far the Second Amendment's history-and-tradition standard limits Congress's power to disarm marijuana users. Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(3) violates the Second Amendment as applied to a marijuana user with no history of violence. Posture: District court dismissed the indictment; Fifth Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted certiorari. Main Arguments: * Petitioner (United States): (1) Habitual drunkard laws from the founding era supply a historically analogous tradition for disarming regular drug users; (2) Vagrancy, civil-commitment, and surety laws targeted a similarly dangerous category of people; (3) Section 925(c) offers a constitutional safety valve through individualized relief. * Respondent (Hemani): (1) The government's historical analogues fail the why-and-how test since habitual drunkard laws targeted only the incapacitated, not regular users; (2) No genuine circuit split warrants review; (3) Section 925(c)'s recent restoration cannot retroactively cure a violation that predates it. Holding: The government's prosecution of Mr. Hemani under §922(g)(3)'s unlawful user provision is inconsistent with the Second Amendment. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor. Justice Alito wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment joined by Justice Kagan. Affirmed. Opinion: Here [https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1234_g2bh.pdf] Majority Reasoning: (1) The government's "habitual drunkard" historical analogues targeted only the incapacitated, not regular or even heavy users, undercutting the claimed "why"; (2) Those laws aimed to protect drunkards and the public from idleness or financial ruin, not categorically violent people, further undercutting the "why"; (3) Historical laws required pre-deprivation process, while Section 922(g)(3) disarms automatically with none, failing the "how." Separate Opinions: * Justice Thomas (concurring): Thomas joins the majority fully but argues Section 922(g) likely exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause power, since prosecutors need only show a firearm once crossed state lines, inviting a future challenge to the statute's constitutional foundation. * Justice Jackson (concurring, joined by Justice Sotomayor): Jackson joins the majority fully but renews her call to replace the Bruen history-and-tradition test with means-end scrutiny, arguing the current framework cannot meaningfully assess whether a law's burden fits the government's stated justification. * Justice Alito (concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Kagan): Alito agrees Hemani wins but would rest the decision on narrower ground: the government never proved how much marijuana Hemani used or whether it affected his judgment, unlike incapacitated historical "habitual drunkards." Implications: (1) Federal prosecutors need more than admitted regular drug use to bring a 922(g)(3) charge; (2) Marijuana users in legal-marijuana states gain real protection from automatic federal gun prosecution; (3) Defense attorneys gain a roadmap for similar challenges, while bans on addicts, intoxicated possessors, and felons stay untouched. The Fine Print: * Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." * 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3): "It shall be unlawful for any person...who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance...to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition." Primary Cases: * New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022): Gun laws must match the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation, not just serve a strong government interest. * United States v. Rahimi (2024): The government need not identify a historical "twin," only a law "relevantly similar" in why and how it operated. Oral Advocates: * For Petitioner (United States): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues for Petitioner United States. * For Respondent (Hemani): Erin Murphy of Clement & Murphy, PLLC argues for Respondent Hemani.