Case Study: Cuba

Case Study in Guerrilla Warfare: Greece in World War II

A British demolition party drops into occupied Greece in 1942 to blow one bridge and cut Rommel's supply line. Two years later they're still there, refereeing a civil war-in-waiting between rival guerrilla factions while trying to keep a Communist-dominated resistance from inheriting the country. Drawing on the ARIS case study Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II, this episode traces how a clean military mission became a tangle of competing military and political needs, why German terror tactics backfired, and how the seeds of the Greek Civil War were sown in the choices made supporting the resistance.

Information As The New Domain

What actually makes something a "domain" of warfare? We treat land, sea, air, and space as obvious, yet there has never been a single agreed definition of "domain" in the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, in NATO doctrine, or internationally. This episode works through a 2009 paper that set out to fix that gap, and in doing so helped shape the thinking behind the founding of U.S. Cyber Command. Written by Dr. Patrick D. Allen and Dennis P. Gilbert, Jr. , the paper proposes a clean definition of a domain, a six-feature test for what qualifies, and a five-stage model for how new domains emerge over time, from first capability, to commonplace use, to institutional and financial support. The authors then apply that framework to the larger Information Sphere: the space defined by the relationships among actors, information, and information systems. In their argument, cyberspace is a subset of the Information Sphere, much as submarine and surface operations are both subsets of the sea domain. This is a framework-first episode in the tradition the show returns to again and again. It is not a single case study but a piece of analytic theory you can carry across every conflict you study. We unpack why the authors set aside "information environment" and "information domain" as too physical or too narrow, how the Information Sphere can sit separate from yet accessible to all four physical domains, and why effects in this domain are often delayed. A back door planted today, a belief seeded that blossoms years later. Presented for the analyst, the planner, and the professional thinking seriously about multi-domain operations and the contest over information itself. Source document available for download at theresistancehub.com. Follow The Resistance Hub on Spotify so new episodes reach you the day they drop. Built for the defense and security community thinking past the next headline.

Case Study: Revolutionary Warfare in Columbia

Four armed groups. Five decades. Hundreds of thousands dead. The Colombian conflict is the longest-running insurgency in the Western Hemisphere, and the ARIS case study on it is one of the most useful documents in irregular warfare literature precisely because Colombia doesn't fit a clean narrative. The leftist guerrillas didn't win. The state didn't decisively defeat them. Right-wing paramilitaries operated in collusion with the security forces. Drug money rewired the original ideological objectives of nearly every armed actor. And one group — M-19 — laid down arms and ended up writing the country's constitution. In this episode we walk through the USASOC ARIS Colombia case study and pull out what irregular warfare practitioners need: the political and historical conditions that made the conflict possible (La Violencia, the National Front, rural disenfranchisement), the comparative anatomy of the FARC, ELN, M-19, and AUC, the role of narco-finance in extending the conflict, and the Colombian government's long arc of countermeasures — including Plan Colombia and the paramilitary demobilization. Pairs naturally with our Cuba 1953–1959 episode for anyone tracking how the same analytic framework produces very different conclusions in different contexts. Source material: USASOC ARIS, Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Colombia 1964–2009.

Case Study: Cuba

Batista's regime had a 30,000-man army, U.S. backing, and a relatively prosperous economy. Castro's 26th of July Movement started with a failed barracks attack, returned from Mexican exile with about 80 men, and never won a decisive military engagement. So how did this end with Batista on a plane out of Havana? In this episode we walk through USASOC's ARIS case study on the Cuban Revolution and pull out the parts irregular warfare practitioners actually need: the structural weaknesses that made Cuba combustible despite its prosperity, the division of labor between the Sierra Maestra guerrillas and the urban underground, and the deliberate strategy of provoking the regime into counterterror that gutted its own legitimacy. We also look at what came after — how a movement that recruited on a platform of constitutional restoration consolidated into a one-party Marxist-Leninist state within two years, and what that says about the gap between a revolution's stated program and its operational logic. Source material: USASOC ARIS, Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Cuba 1953–1959 (revised edition).

State-Insurgent Strategic Competition

What if the most important battlefield in insurgency isn't a battlefield at all? What if it's a marketplace — one where states and armed challengers compete not over territory, but over who gets to govern? In this episode, we walk through The War Marketplace Framework: Insurgency as Competitive Governance, a contributing article by Moe Gyo that originally appeared on The Resistance Hub as a three-part series. The framework reframes insurgency as competitive governance provision under conditions of institutional failure, arguing that armed groups endure not because they fight well, but because they outcompete the state in delivering security, justice, public goods, and legitimacy to populations operating under coercion and uncertainty. Part One establishes the core model. Civilians are not spectators — they are constrained consumers allocating compliance based on which provider governs more credibly. Insurgents operate less like rebels and more like disruptive startups entering a stagnant monopoly, bundling violence within a broader governance offering. Part Two applies Porter's Five Forces to the war marketplace, examining how entry barriers, civilian bargaining power, supplier networks, substitute governance providers, and rivalry among armed actors create structural conditions that explain why some insurgencies regenerate endlessly, why others fragment into warlordism, and why certain conflicts resist decisive resolution regardless of military effort. Part Three gets into strategy — how states and insurgents manipulate the same five forces from opposite positions, why fragmentation prevents defeat but rarely produces victory, and why the most durable insurgent groups often face a brutal internal choice between governing well and surviving long. Whether you work in defense, security, conflict analysis, or policy, this episode challenges conventional thinking about why counterinsurgency campaigns fail and what it actually takes to collapse a rival governance market.