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Battling Archetypes

Podcast door Disinfolklore

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Over Battling Archetypes

Battling Archetypes applies the Twelve Tools of the Disinfolklore analytical method to the folkloric structures hiding inside modern propaganda, memes, and geopolitics. Each episode decodes how Russia, MAGA, and other Disinfolklorists archetype reality — and how Counter Disinfolklore can unmask the wolf in sheep’s clothing. www.disinfolklore.net

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aflevering Podcast | The Don’t Poke the Bear Meme: AFD and Russian Information Projection artwork

Podcast | The Don’t Poke the Bear Meme: AFD and Russian Information Projection

What I’m trying to do is also communicate a form of literacy. I learned to see archetypes in data and in stories in 2016, in Russia-occupied eastern Ukraine, in a story I’ve told before. I’ve spent the last 10 years unpacking that insight into what I call the Disinfolklore Analytical Method, whose main exposition is on the disinfolklore.eu website, where we have the 12-tool way. For people who want a bit more detail, they’ll look in there, they’ll see all the origins — it’s about a million and a half words, divided into about two and a half thousand short passages, purposefully like that so that it’s very accessible. I also publish on disinfolklore.net, decodingtrolls.net, and powerofmana.net. Those three projects’ Substacks you can subscribe to, and they all meld into one. I’m currently building — well, I’ve completed this week — the building of the architecture of a training set to fine-tune an open-weights LLM, large language model, locally. That’s very exciting. The architecture is based on the 12-tool way, and based on the contents of disinfolklore.eu. The Don’t Poke the Bear Meme: AFD and Russian Information Projection The first thing I wanted to talk about today was really because it’s kind of in the news. Many of you have heard me talk about the most successful Disinfolklore meme ever, which is “don’t poke the bear.” It’s probably obvious to people, when I get your eye in, that this is Disinfolklore, because it’s about the bear, it’s from fairy tales, it’s from folk tales. This week we saw Russia projecting that meme, that piece of Disinfolklore, into our information space, through the mainstream of the German information space, through a political party which has been funded by the Russians. The AFD may have been founded in a virtuous way, although it was founded to deal with migrants — and the entire Syrian migrant crisis was on purpose provoked by Russia accelerating its carpet bombing in Syria in September 2015, when it wanted a bit more leverage at the so-called mythical negotiation table. That had a lot of concatenating effects, including Law and Justice being elected on an anti-migrant Polish nationalist agenda in Poland, Orbán consolidating his position, Brexit being done, and Merkel famously allowing in one million Syrian migrants to give them a path to citizenship. I’m sure they’re contributing greatly to German society and the German economy now, so it’s not all bad, and amazing lives have been changed by it. However, AFD consolidated its power out of this, out of this othering, and we see it projecting this “don’t poke the bear” troll. On its surface, it’s a piece of folk wisdom. It sounds reasonable. It sounds cautious. It sounds like the kind of thing a thoughtful person might say to counsel restraint: don’t provoke Russia, don’t escalate. The Mana in the Meme: Russia as Bear Don’t poke the bear — attend to the mana. In my understanding, the mana is the energy, the charge in the meme. What is the energy imminent in this meme? First, the mantra: look for the mana in the meme, which is one of the 12 tools. First, the bear. Russia is a bear — not a government, not a collection of decision-makers, not a bureaucracy with budgets, logistics and internal politics. A bear: a force of nature, unchallengeable, primordial, amoral in the way that nature is amoral. You do not blame the bear for mauling you. You blame yourself for getting too close. The archetype is the wild, the untameable, the power that cannot be reasoned with but only accommodated. This is not analysis — it’s mythology. Its function is to strip Russia of agency and responsibility simultaneously. The bear does not choose to attack; it is provoked. The causality is reversed. The victim is the author of their own destruction. The Poke: Infinitely Elastic Provocation Second, the poke. What constitutes poking? In practice, everything Ukraine does to assert its sovereignty is poking. Joining NATO? Poking. Joining the EU? Poking. Speaking Ukrainian? Poking. Existing? Poking. The concept is infinitely elastic. It expands to encompass any action by any party that Russia finds inconvenient. Because the bear is a force of nature, the pokee has no legitimate grievance. You do not file a complaint against a thunderstorm. You take shelter. The implicit instruction of “don’t poke the bear” is: submit. The Don’t: A Command Third, the “don’t.” This is a command. Not a suggestion. Not an analysis. Not an invitation to consider multiple perspectives. A command addressed to a potential victim, instructing them to modify their behaviour to avoid provoking their own destruction. The entire moral weight of the meme rests on the victim. The aggressor, the bear, has no moral weight at all. It simply is. The Charge: Pure Mana This is pure mana. The factual content of the phrase is zero. There’s no claim to fact-check. There’s no argument to rebut. There’s only a charge. Notice the RG in “charge,” the same RG in “energy.” It’s the same RG in “reign” and in “right” — this is the second most important cryptotype, which I write about. There’s only a charge. A dense package of archetypal energy — again, the RGE in “energy,” “right,” “reign,” “regency,” “regiment” — that, once received, restructures the recipient’s perception of the conflict. Russia becomes nature. Ukraine becomes the provocateur. The West becomes the foolish hiker who ignored the warning signs. All of this happens below the threshold of conscious evaluation, in the half-second between hearing the phrase and feeling its truth in your gut. Naming as Disarmament The mana tool — look for the mana in the meme — asks you to notice this, to slow down, to feel the charge, and then to name it. Naming is the beginning of disarmament, real disarmament. Once you can say “this meme encodes the archetype of the untameable wild, and deploys it to invert the moral relationship between aggressor and victim,” the mana loses its grip. Not entirely, not permanently — mana is resilient. Naming it creates a gap, a space between the charge and your response. In that gap, adjudication becomes possible. You can decide whether or not to share the meme. You can decide whether or not to support AFD. You can make a decision to step back and stop yourself becoming emotionally moved by this, or scared. 847 Instances in the Luhansk Archive I found 847 instances of bear-related metaphors in the 10,000-item foundational corpus of the Disinfolklore Analytical Method, which is what I call the Luhansk Archive — this collection of propaganda items that I collected while in Russia-occupied Ukraine between 2015 and 2018, and hand-labelled according to the archetypal imminences within it. Not all of these 847 instances were “don’t poke the bear” specifically, but they all drew on the same archetypal reservoir: Russia as elemental force, Ukraine as irritant, the West as naive interloper in a drama it does not understand. The consistency was remarkable. It was not the consistency of a coordinated campaign — though coordination was certainly part of it — but the consistency of a deep cultural archetype being activated and amplified across thousands of individual acts of communication, which reached over a million ears almost every day. This is what makes Disinfolklore so difficult to counter, or even to perceive if you’re caught up in fact-checking. It’s not imposed from the outside. It resonates with something already present in the cultural substratum. The mana was already there. The propagandist merely increases the volume. The mana has been collecting its energy and its charge for 6,000 years, from the first Indo-Europeans who stood on the edge of forests on the steppe in ancient Ukraine, to those who returned to tell stories of the elemental bear. That is the mana charge. That’s when the mana charge in this particular meme began collecting. This week we saw AFD activating it inside the minds of all of us, unbeknownst to us. Perhaps they don’t even know what they’re doing, but they received their orders and they followed them. Unpacking the AFD Statement: The Twelve Signatures Let’s look at what it means when AFD said that, by helping Ukraine with its attack on Russia, Germany was provoking Russia and making an attack on Germany more likely. That was communicated through this meme of “don’t poke the bear.” 1. Inner / Outer Realm Sleight of Hand The first aspect of it is inner/outer realm sleight of hand. As many of you will know, inner/outer realm switching, othering — what Donald does when he others migrants, or women, or Iranians, or trans, or whatever. This is in-realm and out-realm switching. I call it the witch switch — switching scapegoats. It had this geographical positioning for me on the bridge in eastern Ukraine, on Stanytsia Luhanska, where, depending on where you stood, the inner realm of Russia-occupied Luhansk was being protected from people like me and outsiders and Ukrainians by the Russians, by the merciful sovereign. Inner realm equals the Germans — that’s her constituency, even though she lives in Switzerland. Outer realm: the bear, Russia, framed as predator. Ukraine, the actor actually defending itself, has disappeared from the analytical frame entirely. This deletion of the victim from the analytical space is itself a recurring signature. Some of you will remember I wrote a piece a few weeks ago on Palantir and Maven — all of this hand-wringing by certain people in the American chain of command about the advent of automated targeting — and Ukraine was completely absent from this. It turned out the only AI involved in this was a decision about which targets to take; humans were involved in pressing the button. Whereas Ukraine is dealing with this issue on a technical level hundreds, if not over a thousand, times a day, deciding when to let the human take over in the descent of a drone. We see this signature, this mana signature. It’s actually in absence — when Ukraine is not part of the conversation. This week we saw Russia again trying to promote the troll that Europe doesn’t have a chief negotiator already, but they don’t like Kaja Kallas because she was born in the Soviet Union, she understands them. They suggest all these bizarre, other bizarro suggestions. The mana, the energy in there is: Ukraine doesn’t matter. Ukraine is an empty vessel. This is a deal to be done by the adults at the table. That’s the essential meaning of it. That deletion of the victim, we see so much of the time. Most of us are very hyper-aware to that. 2. Agency Inversion Second thing: agency inversion. Germany helping Ukraine drone-bomb Russia makes Germany the active party. Ukraine becomes the receiver of help rather than the attacked party defending itself. The original aggressor, Russia, is reframed as the passive recipient of aggression. A three-step agency reversal. It’s very powerful — just in five words, that’s basically the effect of what they’re doing. 3. War Magic Operation Third, it’s a war magic operation. I did that series of talks before Christmas on sympathetic magic — how the law of contagion (which are mental aspects of the mentality of, well, anthropologists claim all humans — I’ll go as far as saying all Indo-European humans) — the law of contagion, the law of similarity, and the law of difference. The war magic is: when Alice Weidel, whatever her name is, talks about “don’t poke the bear,” then millions of minds suddenly get this fear that they’re going to be annihilated, and that they should stop helping Ukraine. It moves them. War magic operation: making Germans insecure. Declaring Germans insecure performatively. This manufactures the insecurity, like “Make America Great Again.” America was great. It didn’t need people going around with “Make America” on their hat — which was actually promoting the troll that America is not great, and was not great. Basically, these are tricks. It’s like so-called pickup artists. Their opener is to neg their potential victim, to make them insecure and vulnerable, so that they can fill their emotionally charged mind with ideas and memes which aren’t in their interests. This is the same substrate-summoning mechanism that Buchanan’s Cultural War speech enacted in 1992 at the Republican National Convention. Pat Buchanan declared there was a cultural war between transnational elites, cosmopolitan elites, and traditionalist values. A generation of academics parsed that and looked into it, and discovered and determined beyond all reasonable doubt that there was no such division. However, by declaring there was a cultural war, the statement became the act. This is the same with this German person — or rather, the Swiss politician modelling herself as a German politician. She is basically inferring to Germans that they’re going to be attacked by Russia for helping Ukraine defend itself. 4. The Axis of Misogyny Coalition Tell AFD is documented by me as being part of what I call the Axis of Misogyny. I don’t talk about the axis of authoritarianism — I don’t think that’s very insightful. I talk about the Axis of Misogyny. When have you ever seen China have a female leader? How many female leaders are there in Iran? I think one minister is a female leader. How many proper professional kinds of women do you see around the new Prime Minister of Hungary? Zillions. He’s surrounded by effective people, competent-looking people — as indeed was President Biden, and all good leaders today. You never see real women with real power around Donald, or around authoritarians, and the same thing with Putler around them. AFD is a documented Axis of Misogyny Coalition member. Authoritarian groups now model themselves in the modern way by getting women into positions of power, but those women are promoting authoritarian rhetoric. There’s no difference in their rhetoric or in their modes of decision-making between them and authoritarian males — essentially the Putin–Buchanan trans-civilisational adoption pattern, which is the Cultural War Declaration. In December 2013, Pat Buchanan wrote a piece. For those who don’t know, Pat Buchanan advises Donald Trump to this day. He was caught up in Watergate for his famous Dividing Democrats memo. Then in 1992 he declared this cultural war. Whenever you hear the term “culture war,” he is the originator of this strategy — the strategy of dividing societies and communities by declaring what are, in fact, human rights to be merely matters of choice or culture. This is all part of the strategy to destroy the post-World War II legal and social order. You say that human rights, protected by law, are just a cultural norm of the West rather than universal. That was Hersch Lauterpacht, the Ukrainian international lawyer, and his book The Rights of Man, 1945, who taught in my law school as well. He managed to convince everyone that human rights should be protected as a matter of law, universally — not a cultural issue. This was the really clever strategy that is copied, a model copied by the so-called far right — because they are usually sinister, they are usually left — around the world. This predicts that AFD will deploy “don’t poke the bear” specifically because their coalition partner’s continued ability to wage war benefits from Western non-intervention. The Disinfolklore framework can flag this as a coalition signature, not just an individual statement. Basically, you excuse the sexual crimes by blaming the victim. On a personal level, we’ve seen many authoritarians do that. That extends to geopolitics — you can make predictions about the kinds of victim-blaming, blaming Ukraine for wearing a short skirt, for just existing, that will carry through into policies. 5. Stealth Genocide Enabler and the Doubly Inverted Merciful Sovereign I’ve talked before about Stealth Genocide — this idea of changing the identities of Ukrainians from the inside out using Disinfolklore, unbeknownst to them and not in the open. By doing that, you eradicate their culture and make them susceptible to being sent off on meat assaults. Refusing Ukraine self-defence enables continued Russian atrocity production. AFD positions itself as the Merciful Sovereign for Germans, while structurally enabling the Merciless Sovereign act against Russian-language-speaking Ukrainians. You’ll remember I’ve spoken the last two weeks — you won’t remember last week because you didn’t hear it, but I did post it on my Substack, disinfolklore.net, if you’re interested to hear last week’s talk. Last week I talked about the drone attack on the mother and the maiden — her daughter — with the mother trying to protect her as they hid in a park in Kramatorsk by a tree, evading a Russian drone. Putler modelled himself as the merciful sovereign by invading Ukraine to save native Russian-language-speaking Ukrainians from what he was characterising as the merciless sovereign based in Kiev. In the moment we see the drone hunting this mother and the maiden — the mother being someone who probably was a native Russian-language-speaking Ukrainian in Kramatorsk, maybe even an IDP there from further east — in that moment you see this is the supposed merciful sovereign, who came and sent his forces into Ukraine to save them, and his drone is now hunting the very people he sent to save. In that very moment, he transformed, transmogrified in our minds, if we are attentive enough, into the merciless sovereign. That is the doubly inverted merciful sovereign nesting. It is the deepest detection signal here, because AFD is “protecting” German people by creating more Mariupol drama theatres. 6. The World War II Restart Signature The sixth element is the World War II restart signature. Germany ratified the UN Charter precisely because the previous regime initiated World War II alongside the Russians. AFD’s framing argues against the very legal apparatus Germany committed itself to upholding after 1945. When we see senior American officials meeting AFD officials, or Elmo promoting AFD — we know their project is to destroy the post-World War II legal and social order, not least because they are guilty of the war crimes. Certainly the commander-in-chief is, and the defence secretary, and those below him in the chain of command, involved in multiple extrajudicial murders in the Caribbean, and also in Iran, and who knows — actually it seems in Mexico as well. AFD is joined with all of them. The Axis of Misogyny is also united in their wanting to destroy the International Criminal Court, for instance. I don’t know if it’s confirmed, but we heard that Donald attempted to form a coalition with China, with Xi — or with Eleven — the other day, to destroy the International Criminal Court. AFD and Russian state framing are convergent on dismantling Article 51 of the UN Charter — the inherent right to self-defence as one of the factors of sovereignty, which Ukraine has. 7. Drone-Bomb Verbal Conversion Seven: drone-bomb verbal conversion. “Bombing” — rather than “targeting military infrastructure, refineries, supply lines” — verbally converts Ukrainian lawful self-defence into something morally indistinguishable from aggression. Article 51’s inherent right of self-defence is rhetorically erased. 8. The Outer Realm Mask Signature Eight: the outer realm mask signature. Germany is Indo-European Germanic substratum, Indo-European culture. Russia is Indo-European Slavic substratum — sister branches. AFD is reactivating Germanic-versus-Slavic othering. This reactivates exactly the deep cultural template Germany formally committed to never reactivating after 1945. The mask is performing distance from a substratum Germany is in fact cognate to. It’s claiming that Russia is a bear, is an alien. Then it is invoking these rivalries deep in the psyches of Germans and Slavs, not least from the Second World War, where the Germans treated Slavs as slaves — inverting this and drawing into people’s consciousness, as they go to look through their timeline, all of these ancient rivalries and worries about going into the forest or crossing the river. 9. Reflexive Control: Conditioned Response Nine: reflexive control — which was the subject of that series of five talks I gave. Reflexive control: conditioned response. Russia has spent years training Western publics to internalise the “we should not be Russia’s enemy” logic. The AFD leader is performing the reflexively conditioned response. I say this is a very generous interpretation on my part, if I don’t mind saying so myself. She is performing the reflexively conditioned response the training was designed to produce. She is the operation’s output, not its independent originator. She should be lecturing her community into not poking the bear, because that’s what she — who is particularly receptive to this messaging — has been conditioned to say. 10. The Bear Retaliates If Poked Ten: the bear retaliates if poked. Sustained by fear, not by demonstrated retaliation. Russia has not actually retaliated proportionally against Germany for past arms supplies. The archetype’s life depends on continued fear, not continued evidence. I share Iona’s pain, which she expressed today, just hearing Putler threatening us again with nuclear annihilation, Tomahawks — which seems to be, which I presume now means it’s on the cards. It means somehow Russia knows that, as part of these drone deals which probably will never come, because they’re such rubbish negotiators now in Washington, Tomahawks might be on the menu. I do share Iona’s pain, because — God — it still goes on. They haven’t retaliated proportionately to the Kursk invasion, or to these attacks in Moscow. They’re trying to pretend it hasn’t happened, which is very funny for most of us watching it. The archetype’s life depends on continued fear, not continued evidence. The AFD leader’s statement sustains the fear archetype. She’s transmitting the fear archetype under the guise of this folksy wisdom. That makes future Russian aggression rhetorically permissible and more likely. 11. The Temporal Stratification Check Eleven. The antidote is basically the temporal — what I call the temporal — the time-related stratification check. The framing of the bear requires forgetting Mariupol, Bucha, Izyum, Kharkiv. The framing’s coherence depends on amnesia. That’s also what she’s doing. She’s putting a spell on us to forget Mariupol, Bucha, Izyum, Irpin — all of these places which will haunt us, and haunt the Russians, and haunt Ukrainians, and haunt humanity until the end of time. The framework’s insight tool — my tool, in my framework — surfaces what’s been disappeared from the temporal record by reminding us of this. 12. Bear Archetype Reinforcement Twelve: the bear archetype reinforcement. The AFD leader is reinforcing Russia’s preferred self-archetype. It’s a raid on cryptotypes — the meanings, the semantic signalling systems which I have identified as operating imminent in folklore, obviously, but also in Disinfolklore. “Don’t poke the bear” is so mana-rich with all of these aspects that I’ve mentioned. Finally, anyone amplifying this AFD framing is transmitting Disinfolklore. Anyone sharing the speech without careful framing is at risk of transmitting Disinfolklore. Certainly those who report it straight are just one person removed from being an information warfare operative. The Provocation Mirror: Reflexive Control in the Luhansk Corpus I was going to go back to — because it’s so important — this reflexive control, which I spoke about over those five speeches, and what I call the provocation logic cycle. “Don’t poke the bear” is imminent in that. It is this really complicated idea, which is so common in our information space from the Russians — that’s why I go on about it so much. There’s a recurring sentence machine in Russia’s propaganda from occupied Luhansk that I want to take apart for you now. It’s one of the deepest structures in the Russian Disinfolklore apparatus. I call it the provocation mirror. In my corpus of 10,000 propaganda items, 184 items are tagged with the bare formula — not “the bear,” the bare formula, i.e. the naked formula — “provocation.” The underlying logic is in hundreds more. Zolote Checkpoint and the Four-Step Sentence Machine Here’s the core. 31st of March 2016, lug-info.com: “Kiev has opened Zolote Checkpoint in order to blame LPR in violating the Minsk Agreement. Kiev’s opening of Zolote Crossing Point in the area of Pervomaisk has a provocative aim and could be used to accuse LPR of breaking the Minsk Agreements.” For those who don’t know, Zolote was at the contact line closest to the area where I lived for three years, from 2015 to 2018, in Severodonetsk. Our teams used to go there, and there was a whole thing about “let’s get the checkpoint open,” and it’s opened. It’s basically a mirror image of what Russian borders specialise in everywhere — all across the former Soviet Union — what they specialise in, I’ve come to realise: whether it’s in Georgia or in Ukraine, different parts of Ukraine, is creating obstacles at these intermission points, interaction points, on rivers. Let me read it again: Kiev has opened Zolote Checkpoint in order to blame the Luhansk Folk’s Republic for violating the Minsk Agreement. One of the signatures I noticed early on of Disinfolklore — and of Russian information warfare — is this: in the absence of everything else, if you just don’t have the brainpower in a particular moment to work out what’s going on with this kind of thing, when you see the complexity of it and your brain starts going “what are they saying?” — that in itself is the signature. You’re being trolled. I just say that, but I am going to unpack it. I’ll read it again. Kiev — they’re saying “Kiev,” not “Kyiv” — Kiev has opened Zolote Checkpoint. Remember, this is an interaction zone, where on one side you have a community, on the other side you have a community, and those communities were able to interact freely before February 2014. Which reminds me, actually — James — the Little Green Men. The European Court of Human Rights determined that the occupation began in February 2014, which was the moment the Little Green Men, the polite people — the folkloric characters who were very important to my detection of Disinfolklore as an analytical method, as Russia’s means of brainwashing us. Of course: Little Green Men, green, Robin Hood, the polite people, like little fairies — these very disarming descriptions of these genocidal invaders by Putler and all around him, turning them into a bit of a joke. That began in February 2014. I’m sure today is an anniversary of something as well. “Kiev has opened Zolote Checkpoint in order to blame LFR” — I call them Luhansk Folks Republic — “in violating the Minsk Agreement.” A checkpoint is a civilian facility. It lets pensioners cross. It saves lives. Ukraine, grammatically, opened a humanitarian crossing — which the Russians had closed — and Morochko’s statement frames the opening as a provocation. This is the provocation mirror. It’s a four-step sentence machine. Step 1: The victim, Ukraine, takes a defensive or humanitarian action. Step 2: Russia labels the action a provocation. Step 3: Russia warns that if anything bad happens, it will be Ukraine’s fault because of the provocation. Step 4: When Russia itself subsequently attacks, Russia claims it was responding to the provocation. I’ve catalogued hundreds of these in my corpus. A Ukrainian checkpoint opens? Provocation. A Ukrainian pension paid? Provocation. An OSCE monitor like me visits? Provocation. A NATO exercise happens 600 km away? Provocation. A Ukrainian election campaign advertises? Provocation. A Minsk negotiator speaks? Provocation. Every act by Ukraine, no matter how benign, can be folded into the sentence machine as provocation. The Word “Provocation” as Signal Often the signal for this is this term “provocation,” which I noticed so frequently on the bridge speaking to the occupiers and to Ukrainian soldiers. I’ve spent 10 years unpacking, examining this, and collecting examples. I’ve got hundreds of them from the normal media as well, where provocations are asserted. Usually, the word “provocation” will be involved in it. You, now becoming more literate in the Disinfolklore Analytical Method: whenever you hear that word, you can search for this little module in your brain and remember this mantra. The person accusing the other of the provocation — that accusation is the attack. When you don’t have the wavelength or the energy to think it through in the moment, just think: this person is talking about a provocation — i.e. Germany helping Ukraine, and Ukraine defending itself by sending drones into Russia. The person trolling about the provocation, they are the attacker. That’s hard to see. They’re operating in stealth, and they’re operating as if they have this great concern for the German people. Of course, if they had great concern for the German people, they would ensure that Germany arms Ukraine properly to go and take Crimea back and expel the Russians, so the Russians can’t do this again. It’s designed to disguise the fact that they are actually attacking us, and injecting this meme into our information space. That’s just a little saw to help you cut through it in the moment. These are really complicated things, and in the complexity they can smuggle all sorts of trolls in. Pick 100 people in a room and each of us is going to focus on different phrases. This three-sentence news item from 2016 is so complex that, if you had a room of 100 people, you would have almost 50 different ways of confusion and interpretation of it. That’s why it’s so clever, and why it in itself constitutes an attack. The Abusive Spouse Logic It’s the same logic used by the abusive spouse: “Look what you made me do. If you had not burned the dinner, I’d not have to hit you.” The dinner was the provocation. Russian military doctrine calls this reflexive control: creating conditions in which the enemy’s only available actions are all framed in advance as aggression. The victim loses the ability to act innocently or lawfully. Every movement is already marked. That is also the function of AFD. They’re marking that movement. They’re closing it off. They’re saying: if you help Ukraine, that will lead to an attack on Russia. Some people will be moved by that. Why does it work? Because it parasitises a genuine human capacity — the capacity to recognise provocations. Real provocations do exist. Bar fights start with them. My cat provokes me into feeding them. Duels start with them. Wars start with them. We’re all trained to watch for the first move. Russian Disinfolklore hijacks this training by defining the first move as whatever Ukraine does next. The provocation cycle always begins with Ukraine’s actions, or the West’s actions. If they were proper historians, they would go back to actually who invaded Ukraine. You’re so confused and immobilised mentally by someone accusing Ukraine of provoking them, when all you are doing is just trying to look nice for yourself or for your friends. Russia has pre-claimed the position of responder, no matter what happens. The Counter: Refusing the Mirror The counter is to refuse the mirror. When you see the word “provocation” — you don’t always see it, but it’s a start — you can sense its energy. I’m trying to train a computer, a neural network, to detect these archetypes in data, these imminences. Obviously the keyword “provocation” is very easy to spot, but thankfully the large language models now are so powerful that they can spot archetypes and imminences in data. It’s a really interesting process I’m going through at the moment, to train them to see it. When you do — let’s just stick with keywords — when you see the word “provocation” in a Russian-sourced report or from AFD, ask: who is the actual first mover in the causal chain that produced the moment of alleged provocation? In Luhansk, Russia invaded in February 2014. Every Ukrainian “provocation” since is a branch of that tree. Any genuine provocation analysis must begin at the root of that tree, not at one of its late leaves. Name the root. Keep naming it. Each naming breaks the mirror. I’ll leave it at that for this week. Out. Lexicon’s Question: Trito and the Indo-European Myth The Trito myth, which I’ve spoken about before, is the most attested story in Indo-European culture — attested in Celtic, Iranian, Vedic, early Indian, Germanic — in practically every tradition. Usually, often, using the name Trito. In that archetypal story, the Trito loses his cattle, he restores his cattle with the intercession of Sky Father, and then makes the first sacrifice. Trito is the third man, after Manu and Yama — the third man who establishes the right of sacrifice as a contract with Sky Father, and then our cultures live in that way. That’s the archetypal imminence in the story. You were just saying, Lexicon, that the hero is Trita. One of my insights, which I write about, is that both the serpent (or the dragon — sometimes it’s the dragon but usually it’s the serpent) and Trita claim that they’re restoring rightful sovereignty, or rightful control over the community’s capital or cattle. The word “capital” emanates etymologically from “cattle,” as does “chapter” — I was interested to know — as does “captain.” Both sides model as Trita. Donald and Putler model as Trita: the heroes on the bridge, saving the community, restoring, “making America great again,” restoring to Russia its rightful new territories. We have the post-World War II legal order to determine who is truly Trita. In the case of Ukraine, President Zelensky is Trita, and Ukrainians are. They are fighting to restore their sovereignty, security, and control. Trita Always Wins The good news for Ukraine is — and we all have this kind of idea in our heads as well, and it doesn’t just come from Bollywood or Disney, the happy ending — Trita always wins, the rightful Trita always wins. The sound “right,” “writ,” is in Trita. It’s in the middle, as it is in “territorial integrity” and “right,” and both “integrity” and “territory.” These are deep codes encoded into us, and Trita always wins. That is what differentiates most of us, apart from the data. We have been sure since day one that Ukraine will win. It will be victorious. There’s no way the serpent is going to succeed here. We have been clear that Ukraine is Trita. Others have been trying to promote the troll that Putler is rescuing Russian-language-speaking Ukrainians from the monster, or from the serpent — or that Donald is saving America from these outer realm migrants, the Mexicans, and all of that malarkey. I’m pretty clear they will end up — they will have to account for their crimes in the end anyway. I’m even more sure of that. That story’s in there. The Bully and His Lunch Money I feel your pain, Lexicon, because when I first worked this out I thought all I had to say to a friend of mine — who would say to me that if we help Ukraine they’re going to nuke us — I thought all I had to do is explain to him: if the bully asks you — I love the way Chuck Pfarrer is always going on about the bully and his school money, or his lunch money — that’s it. If you give him his lunch money one day, he’s going to keep on coming back for it. If you allow the bully to — As I also learned once when I was on a board of directors, in this nightmare situation, I was trying to defend what was right, against one person who was trying to promote what was not right, what was sinister, what was left. No one else really supported me. I remember one wise counsellor telling me afterwards: in a group of people, most people will just keep their heads down. They won’t put their heads above the parapet. That’s the kind of realpolitik, the kind of knowledge about psychology, that AFD and others are relying on when they say this. The Eurobarometer and Solidarity for Ukraine The good news is, I saw this polling — the Eurobarometer polling — you may have seen it. Support for Ukraine across the European Union is solid as a rock. I think the figure in Ireland I looked at was something like only nine percent of people thought that Russia was right, was Trita. That is despite all of the propaganda for years. As we see — and it pains all of us, particularly because of the kinds of personalities we have — they’re not doing everything they could do. I’ll be humble and say: I’m not doing everything I could do. I’m trying to do work in the information space. Most people won’t help. They’ll cheer Trita on, but they’ll basically be doing deals with the serpent on the side until — as Will always assures us, and I think hopefully it’s coming true at the moment — when people see that Ukraine’s a winner, then they’ll all pile on. That’s how I would parse what you said, Lexicon. I remember you were learning about the Ukrainian folkloric monsters and stuff when you were in Lviv, so that resonance is there as well. Out. Continued from: First in series: Get full access to Disinfolklore at www.disinfolklore.net/subscribe [https://www.disinfolklore.net/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_4]

21 mei 2026 - 51 min
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Podcast | Minsking Coyote Lawyer

Zelensky’s Red Square Coordinates: Sovereign Trolling I was happy to see this week when President Zelensky posted the executive order, for want of a better term, talking about how the coordinates — the very accurate, I think it was eight-digit grid coordinates, or maybe even ten — of Red Square in Moscow would be safe from Ukrainian missiles. I noted with great pleasure how everyone recognised that as trolling, and that interested me. There was no argument that this was what this was about. It was about trolling using the threat of force, or the non-threat of force, but in the sense of weapons. Here is a sovereign with the capacity to direct an army, missiles to kill people, using Twitter. I noted the Prime Minister of Ukraine and many ministers tweeted out the executive order, as did President Zelensky himself. That’s the online aspect of it. It was a very specific message within a complicated concatenation of negotiations that most of us are following on a day-by-day basis, but which most normal people wouldn’t follow. The venue was online in some senses, but everyone recognised it as trolling, not only because it was online. It had real-world aspects to it, and that pleased me enormously, because that was what I noticed about trolling in eastern Ukraine: it is a multi-arena activity that we have a sense of understanding what it is. It’s mainly encountered online, but when something happens like President Zelensky signing that executive order as part of a strategy to get 1,000 Ukrainian hostages back from Russia, we recognise that as trolling. That is in the context of the trolling series, which we’ll go into. Archetypal Literacy and the Luhansk Corpus The second element is this archetypal literacy. On disinfolklore.eu [https://Disinfolklore.eu], the website, the main expression of my work, there’s what I archetype: the Disinfolklore Analytical Method as the 12-tool way [https://disinfolklore.eu/Disinfolklore/Twelve-Tools/]. The first tool is archetypal literacy. As part of my learning — I’m still learning — to be archetypally literate, to see archetypes immanent in data, I hand-labelled this massive corpus of over 10,000 propaganda items that I collected while working in eastern Ukraine from inside the Russia-occupying media space inside Luhansk. I refer to this as the Luhansk Corpus. These are hand-labelled as the archetypal imminences inside these stories. What I started here about five weeks ago was talking you through these stories and the different archetypes within them. Some of you might remember I was talking about the merciful sovereign. Inside the entire structure of the situation, Putler plays the merciful sovereign by saying that he is rescuing Ukrainians from the drug-addicted leaders and all of that nonsense, and the Nazis and all of that nonsense. When Putler is talking like that, he is archetyping himself as a merciful sovereign. The Mother and the Maiden Some of you might remember from a long time ago — it is a year, over a year now, that we’ve been doing these weekly, and I’ve only missed, I think, one or two weeks — that one of the very first ones I talked about was The Mother and the Maiden [https://www.disinfolklore.net/p/on-the-origin-of-the-disinfolklore]. This was an incident in eastern Ukraine where, in a blinding flash, I realised that there was something artificial about the use of this term: underage mother and her underage daughter who were about to be cut into tiny pieces by a Ukrainian Nazi. Again, this is a form of trolling, and it’s a very typical situation in some respects, but it also has real-world effects. It begins in the information space. It passed into my chain of command and down to me as a patrol group leader of a team of international diplomats on the border with Russia-occupied Ukraine. We were dispatched to go into a forest to look for this mother and her underage daughter who were about to be chopped into tiny pieces. As I recounted, what that was doing was trying to archetype, was trying to trigger us — me and my team, and those in my chain of command who ordered us on this ridiculous task — which, even before I even had the word archetype, only me and one other colleague who were sent on this task realised: this is ridiculous, this is not true, this is an artificial situation that we’re being sent on. I subsequently found out that the mother and the maiden are what Carl Jung calls primordial archetypes. As spoken about before, I disagree with Carl Jung on the universality of archetypes. My other work in Power of Mana establishes that all of the different traditions from which Jung was gathering evidence of the universality of archetypes were Indo-European traditions. The Kramatorsk Video: The Switch from Merciful to Merciless [https://www.disinfolklore.net/p/mother-and-the-maiden-shelter-from] This last week we saw this picture, this video — some of us will have seen this — of a mother sheltering her daughter, her young daughter, by a tree in a park that I’ve been to in Kramatorsk, while drones hunted them in the sky. The video lasts for about two and a half minutes. What we have there, for me, was a very significant video, quite apart from the human aspect of it and the barbarity of it. I did my best to share it because it hopefully will bring home to people one of the reasons why the mother and the maiden is a primordial archetype: it moves us. It should move us. It should move people in our lives who don’t really know about the drone safaris. The person filming that in the park may well have had no awareness of Carl Jung or why this particular scene — while that film was being filmed, while the person was standing there (I don’t know if it was a man or a woman who came across this scene while the drone was going overhead) — they themselves had to shelter from it, as we saw in the rest of the video. They themselves, while their life was in danger, were so drawn to the picture of this mother and the maiden, and because they had their phone they were able to film them. There’s a great beauty about these two and a half minutes. It’s kind of like an intermission in reality, where it goes into archetypal Disinfolklore in the sense of that video was capturing the horror of what the Russians are doing. The merciful sovereign Putler is — I’m going to go out on a limb here and say that mother and her daughter, certainly the mother, was probably a native Russian-language-speaking Ukrainian. That is the person like the mother and the daughter that I wrote about in one of my first Disinfolklore pieces [https://www.disinfolklore.net/p/disinfolklore-10], who brought their child to shelter in the drama theatre in Mariupol and then was annihilated. In the moment of their annihilation, they were turned from the person the merciful sovereign was going to rescue — because they were being ruled by a crowd of drug-addicted Nazis from Kiev, according to the Disinfolklore — and in the moment of their annihilation, of being turned into biological dust, they were transformed into Nazis. Now, thankfully, I’ve made the link that in that very moment, the merciful sovereign turns into the merciless sovereign, and that switch is a reciprocal process. Immanent in that video we saw of the mother and the maiden in Kramatorsk last Friday was the transformation in the eyes of people viewing it of the merciful sovereign Putler as he was playing himself into the merciless sovereign, and the further entrenchment of President Zelensky as the merciful sovereign, who, as all of us know, is doing everything in his power to ensure the protection of his people. These are very, very old categories. Apart from that, this is a method to analyse particular situations that I find personally quite useful, and also very rich. Training the Neural Network on the Disinfolklore Analytical Method The point of me hand-labelling these and speaking and doing podcasts is — what I’m also doing is training an artificial neural network algorithm to think like I think. This week I finished creating the architecture and the inputs, the dataset which I input into the neural net, into the large language model to train it. The architecture itself of the neural network which I designed is based on the 12-tool way. The process of doing this is absolutely fascinating. As I’ve mentioned before, I think this is the future for all of us. We will have our own little neural nets running all the time. Some people will never have the ability to train their particular personal neural net. My vision for the Disinfolklore Analytical Method is a module that we can add on to our cognitive system, our cognitive structures. At the moment it’s available on the website. It’s available listening to me and gaining some sense of archetypal literacy, so that we can parse the data and the data streams coming through us into structural elements that help us understand what’s going on when Russia, for instance, is playing the merciful sovereign by saying it’s trying to rescue Ukrainians from something. We know the only harm in Ukraine is being caused by Russia. Equally, in the American example, this method translates perfectly to Donald and what Donald is doing. I talked before about the archetyping of himself as a sovereign through the use of the ballroom from Cinderella, from Louis XIV’s, and also this triumphal arch — again, the RCH, the right — archetyping himself as an emperor. The method should translate into all those things. In order to train the neural network algorithm, and in order to get the architecture, it is necessary to label, hand-label algorithms. This is what I’m going to talk to you right now about, which is the walk-in. Stephanie Baker’s Bloomberg Article on the Walk-In There was a great article in Bloomberg published this week [https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2026-russia-disinformation-storm-1516-videos/] — very, very detailed article — and it was featured on the Daily Telegraph podcast, which I listen to every now and again these days, reluctantly. I do see this story of them kind of becoming more human and more European. Hearing the Daily Telegraph kind of eulogise Kaja Kallas and other people in Europe is a great joy to me, having gone through the whole Brexit malarkey. That’s a side point. One of the things in this Bloomberg article — her name is Stephanie Baker, well worth following on Twitter — one of the things she mentioned about analysing this particular Russian information operation, Disinfolklore operation, Combat 1614 or something like that, which I’ve talked about before in the context of the piece I did about five weeks ago on the European Union’s External Action Service Report, Fourth Report on FIMI Threats, which you’ll find on my Disinfolklore.net Substack from about five weeks ago. In it I analysed the Fourth Threat Report and joined it with the Disinfolklore Analytical Method, and made some very gentle and humbly offered suggestions about how they can improve their FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) report in the light of the Disinfolklore Analytical Method. I offered a few ways we could work together. I mentioned these particular operations. One of them, I think, was called Combat 1614 or something like that. Stephanie Baker in this Bloomberg report has really done the definitive study of it. Basically, the modus operandi is to pay somebody in an African country — probably highly educated, someone in Senegal or somewhere else, or maybe somewhere where Wagner is operating — get some university PhD student or whatever, or actors in an African country or in Western countries as well. You get these actors to say: “I worked in Chloé and Olena Zelenska came in and she bought a yacht,” or “I’m an estate agent in Abu Dhabi and President Zelensky has just bought 50 mansions.” They make massive amounts of these videos, and the credibility in people’s minds is established by the testimony, the first-hand testimony of a real person. Millions of views happen. The Walk-In in Eastern Ukraine This is exactly what I experienced in the first Disinfolklore story, which was in eastern Ukraine, where the MGB — the security service, the Russian occupier security service in occupied Luhansk — was called the MGB, which is the precursor to the KGB. The Russian occupiers decided to archetype their internal security service with the predecessor to the KGB. This was back in 2014. The MGB had gone to the people ahead of me in the chain of command — two or three people above me — and said: we’ve just had this walk-in, and this walk-in has given this testimony. The testimony is: he received a phone call from a Ukrainian Nazi in a government-controlled area, and that Ukrainian Nazi says he’s going to chop my wife, my common-law wife, and her underage daughter into tiny pieces if I don’t cross the River Donets — cross from the inner realm, the protective inner realm where the sovereign protector, the merciful sovereign Russia, is protecting us. I didn’t know any of this about archetypes then, but I did know this was a really odd operation for me then to be sent on, in two armoured vehicles, with my team of outsiders, of Westerners, of diplomats including Eastern and Central European, former senior NATO officers and the like. What I did notice also was how the idea of a mother and her underage daughter being chopped into tiny pieces really motivated some of my colleagues who weren’t that motivated by much of our work. Suddenly they were mobilised and they just wanted to go to this cottage in the woods and save them. Stephanie Baker in the Bloomberg article noticed how one of the tropes — one of the main indicators that you’re dealing with a Russian operation — is these first-hand testimonies from whistleblowers. I made the conceptual link between these whistleblowers and the walk-ins. The Walk-In: Stage Defectors and the MGB The first little story I’m going to tell you is about a walk-in, called The Walk-In: Stage Defectors and the MGB. One of the most carefully architected characters in Russian Disinfolklore apparatus is the walk-in. He appears in my corpus 189 times. He has many faces, many aspects, but a single structure. I call him the walk-in. Stephanie Baker called him the whistleblower, but they’re the same archetype, they’re the same character. The walk-in is the Ukrainian — sometimes a soldier, sometimes a civilian, sometimes a doctor, sometimes a defector, sometimes the former spokesperson for President Zelensky — who, according to Russian-backed outlets, voluntarily walks into an interview with some pro-Russian American preppy guy who thinks he’s going to be the next President of the United States of America. Who voluntarily walks into a Luhansk Folks Republic or a Donetsk Folks Republic — so-called, I’m air-quoting here — Ministry of State Security office, and confesses. The confession always serves one of two purposes: to incriminate Ukraine, or to justify an occupation security action. Let me read one of them. 10th of March 2017, lug-info.com: “NATO instructors trained the DRG involved in the murder of Anishenko — MGB Luhansk Folk’s Republic. NATO instructors carried out special training of Ukrainian saboteurs from the 8th Regiment of the Special Operations Forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces operating in the territory of the Luhansk Folk Republic. This was announced today by the Minister of State Security of the Luhansk Folk Republic, Leonid Pashnik.” Pause on that. In a single sentence, the occupation security minister tells us a Ukrainian sabotage group trained by NATO assassinated Oleg Anishenko, a Luhansk Folk’s Republic military officer, inside the territory of Luhansk Folk’s Republic. How does he know? A walk-in. Somewhere, someone has walked into the MGB office and told the story. The story is then released to lug-info.com, then to dninews.com — another Russian occupying media — then laundered through a couple of lateral outlets to Russian state TV, and finally looped back into Western coverage as “sources in the self-proclaimed republic say.” The Walk-In as Folkloric Lure The walk-in is a narrative device with deep folkloric roots. In the folktale tradition, the character who arrives at the cottage from outside with an urgent message. Did anyone else note the background, the kind of Aspen background, wooden shed that Carlson was interviewing the walk-in Yulia Mendel in yesterday? This is the character who arrives at the cottage from outside with an urgent message, and that urgent message changes the plot: the messenger wolf, the ragged pilgrim, the old woman who knocks at the door asking for bread. In every tradition, the walk-in is a device for introducing information that the audience could not have discovered on their own. Russian Disinfolklore repurposes this device industrially. Every walk-in confirms exactly what the occupation administration needs confirmed on that particular day. We don’t know when the walk-in Yulia Mendel interview was filmed. It could have been filmed a long time ago. Notice the convenient temporality. The MGB does not release the walk-in’s confession weeks later after verification. It releases it the same day, packaged, scripted, media-ready. This is not how genuine intelligence works. This is how theatre works. One of the premises of all of my work from the very beginning has been that what I saw on this micro scale in Russia-occupied Luhansk — working there between 2015 and 2018, and then between 2018 and 2022, being based in Dnipro but constantly, very closely watching the media in Russia-occupied Luhansk and Donetsk — one of the premises of my work is that what I saw there on a micro scale, we are now familiar with on a macro scale through Donald’s antics. There we see Tucker Carlson in what for me is a transparent Russian operation with Yulia Mendel. These different dimensions, these different Disinfolklore galaxies, these different methods — the walk-in troll, for instance, the walk-in character here — is the same in each, with Brexit, with all of this nonsense about the ballroom and the reflecting pool and Iran and all of these things. On the one hand, this is an area of the world which doesn’t matter to most people in our normal lives. It obviously matters to us because we’re interested in Ukraine. For me, from the very first moment I was there, I thought: well, this is really curious what’s going on here. When Donald got elected the first time, when Brexit happened — really unusual happenings — I realised that what I was witnessing in Russia-occupied Ukraine was being rolled out across the world. That’s why it’s relevant. Quite apart from the archetypal literacy element, or understanding the news, or creating an architecture for a neural network algorithm and then creating the model itself: you need data, a lot of data, which is archetypally rich data like this, hand-labelled, because I have to teach a computer to automatically recognise archetypes in any generated data. The Walk-In Story Recounted The walk-in I described from my own experience in The Mother and the Maiden tale: a doctor walks into the MGB. I’m air-quoting “doctor,” because sometimes he was an ambulance, he was a healer, he was an archetype, he was a caricature. A doctor walks into the MGB, says his common-law wife and her underage daughter are being cut into pieces by a Ukrainian Nazi across the river — across the Donets River, across this interzone, across this dividing line between the inner and the outer realm. An outer realm creature, a monster, across the river, outside the jurisdiction of the merciful sovereign, from the perspective of the Russian occupiers. Within hours, Western diplomats are being dispatched to the cottage in the woods, and I was one of those Western diplomats. This is the walk-in as folkloric lure. The narrative forward motion, the urgency, the drama, the rescue quest — that is the weapon. Some of my colleagues, when they heard this — when I got the phone call from my boss to say, “oh, could you just swing by this cottage in the woods? There’s a woman and her daughter about to be chopped into tiny pieces. Could you just swing by there and then go to the bridge on your normal patrol?” I was like: hold your horses here. This was being told to me straight by the head of operations. I had to press them and eventually get a copy of the handwritten letter. At each moment I was trying to wake them from their dream, because this was a ridiculous operation. While this was going on, some of my colleagues were champing at the bit, because we were supposed to just be leaving our base and going to Stanytsia Luhanska. They were listening to this. I was hoping they would hear this crazy operation, which we were about to be sent on, on the basis of a walk-in to the Russian occupiers’ state security apparatus. I expected them to have the same impression I had, which is: I don’t really understand this, but this is nuts. Only one of my colleagues had that reaction. The rescue quest involving this rescue of a woman, a defenceless woman and her vulnerable daughter, the urgency — that is the weapon. It pulls the target deep into the forest. It separates the target from the safety of their normal critical faculties. Naming the Walk-In: The Counter The counter is to name the walk-in as a genre. When you hear that someone came forward to security services and confirmed a politically convenient story, your first question should not be: what did they say? What did Yulia Mendel say? Your first question should be: does this have the structural signature of a walk-in? If the confession arrived pre-packaged, same day, with media-ready quotation marks, that’s not intelligence, it’s theatre. I fell for a walk-in myself, or I nearly did, in 2016. I walked into a forest on the strength of one — or more correctly, I drove in an armoured vehicle into a forest on the strength of one — until I managed to come up with a formula of words that would wake someone up high in the chain of command, without violating the chain of command. The formula of words I used was the precise formula of words that was used in the text of the walk-in. I hoped — even though that didn’t wake the head of operations or their boss when I repeated it to them, it didn’t wake most of my colleagues from their dream-like ecstasy of envisioning going into this cottage and somehow rescuing this mother and her child from being chopped, unarmed (I may add), chopped into tiny pieces. Intuitively I composed the text to the head of security for the mission and I said: “Please confirm order to go into cottage in the woods where a mother and her underage daughter are about to be chopped into tiny pieces.” He rang me immediately and said: “I’m not authorised to stop operations, but I’m telling you to stop this, and I will go around my chain of command and ensure this operation stopped.” He had the same reaction that I had to it — which I kind of hoped he would — which was: this is so inauthentic, and it’s such a crazy operation to be sent on, it cannot be true. Even though I at the time didn’t have any idea about the walk-in as a genre, or archetypal Disinfolklore, or Jung’s archetypes, it was such a strange operation it woke me from my slumber. I only escaped because my head of security parsed the folktale structure that I had texted him. The folktale structure is the escape route. Name the walk-in, name the genre, and stay out of the forest. The Minsk Coyote Lawyer: Dinego and Juridical Theatre The second story I wanted to tell you tonight was about the character which I call the Minsk Coyote Lawyer. Many of you will know I’m very interested in the M-N- sound and the cryptotype, so Minsk is very interesting to me. I’m also interested in this other cryptotype, which is represented by the Don, the Donetsk, the Dnipro, the Dniester, and the Danube — the D-N- — which basically emanates from the idea of Danu, which is the embodiment of a river in early Indo-European culture. A river as a boundary zone, as an interaction zone. I’m fascinated by that area that divides Enerhodar from Nikopol, that divides where we see these islands which, as I understand, Ukraine has reconquered all along the Dnieper River, right in the area of Zaporizhzhia where Indo-European languages — all living Indo-European languages — emanate from. Dinego, this coyote, Minsk Coyote Lawyer, was the main negotiator — so-called negotiator — appointed by the Russians. I had to shake his hand once for the Luhansk Folk’s Republic in Minsk. Let’s call this The Minsk Coyote Lawyer: Dinego and Juridical Theatre. I’ve spoken before in my previous archetypal Disinfolklore stories about Morochko, who’s the folksy colonel of the Russian occupation of Luhansk. Vladislav Dinego is his Coyote Lawyer. In my corpus he appears 345 times. His title: LFR Envoy to the Trilateral Contact Group. His stage: the Minsk Peace Negotiations. The Trilateral Contact Group was the OSCE, the Russians, and the Ukrainians. The Russians, of course, were pretending that they’re not a party to the conflict; they’re merely helping to represent the organic revolutions of the Luhansk Volksrepublik. Obviously the Russians have appointed all of the structures and all of the people in the structures. His stage is the Minsk peace negotiations; his function, to perform legitimacy through the motions of juridical argument. In every folk tradition, there’s a trickster who argues his way past the guardians of the threshold: the coyote in the Pueblo tales, Anansi in the Akan, Renard the Fox in medieval France, Till Eulenspiegel in Low German. The coyote lawyer argues with a straight face that he has the right to the chicken, the corn, the seller, the bride, the Ukraine. His argument is not meant to be believed on its merits. It’s meant to consume the time of the guardian, to multiply the complexity of the refusal, and to plant the seed of doubt in the audience. Dinego’s function in the Minsk process was exactly this. Let me read from my well of 10,000 propaganda pieces. Reading from the Corpus 7th of August 2015, lug-info.com: Dinego stages a press conference from Heroes of the Great Patriotic War Square. Remember last week we talked about how this is the Soviet revenant plus juridical theatre, one venue: the heroes of the great patriotic square. Every word in the press release, every word in the journal article, is an example of what I call Disinfolklore. It’s brain hacking. We get focused on perhaps the substance of it — what’s said at the press conference — without realising that we’re actually being brainwashed by the article talking about where the press conference actually is. 5th of November 2015: Dinego hosts a group of — I’m air-quoting here — “European experts” to inspect the water supply facilities in Luhansk Folk’s Republic. Remember, I mentioned this last week. He meets them, he mediates with the management of Luhansk Voda Company, which I did all the time as well. Notice: the envoy of an armed proxy group is performing this role of hydraulic minister, looking after the fertility of the inner realm. The coyote is wearing the waterworks inspector’s hat today. 11th of April 2017, lug-info: Dinego and Denis Pushilin jointly insist on ecological inspection of mines of Kiev-controlled Donbass area. The coyote lawyer is arguing that his chicken-coop inspection must extend to the Ukrainian side of the fence. The argument is absurd, but the absurdity is the point. Every hour spent discussing it is an hour Ukraine does not spend reinforcing a lie. 7th of March 2017, lug-info.com: “SMM representatives leave Stanytsia area 30 minutes before disengagement — envoy.” Here, Dinego accuses the OSCE monitors — that’s me — of leaving on purpose to sabotage disengagement. The coyote lawyer now trolls the impartial guardian. The impartial guardian becomes an accomplice of the outer realm. That was me. We went through this — I think it lasted about two and a half years. Every day there was supposed to be disengagement. Every day, there was something that came from stage left to prevent the Russians from disengaging — that they couldn’t disengage if we weren’t there, and if we were there they wouldn’t disengage because of some other excuse, but if we left, then we were archetyped as the reason why they didn’t disengage, and therefore it’s our fault. We, the impartial guardian. The impartial guardian becomes an accomplice of the outer realm. Putler, no doubt, has some excuse for why Russia hasn’t released these 1,000 hostages that it was agreed to release. Donald himself will come up with some reason why it’s not Putler’s fault — it’s Ukraine’s fault for doing something. It’s the same kind of blame game. It’s all an act. It’s theatre. The people executing it know it’s theatre. We, as the viewers, should treat it as theatre, not as sacrosanct news. The Invariant Shape Every appearance follows the same shape. Dinego arrives. Dinego makes a plausible-sounding legal or administrative argument. Dinego demands a procedural concession. Dinego accuses the other party of violating a procedural norm. The content is fungible — water, mines, elections, disengagement, monitoring, humanitarian corridors. The shape is invariant. Why does it work? Because the legal process itself carries archetypal authority. This is the meaning, I believe, of Donald and his peace talks, and of Putler and his peace talks and ceasefire. They’re talking about concepts which have archetypal authority. In Indo-European folk memory, the figure who knows the law — the Druid, the Brehon in Ireland, the Senator, the Qadi — is one of the legitimate heirs of sovereignty. By dressing as a lawyer envoy, Dinego colonises some of that archetypal authority for his stateless armed group. Every time Western diplomats sit across from him, photograph him, quote him, his archetypal authority accrues a tiny bit of interest. Over three years, the interest compounds enormously. The Counter to the Coyote Lawyer The counter to the coyote lawyer is to refuse the procedural invitation. Do not argue his merits. Name the coyote. This is not a juridical envoy. This is a costume. Every minute spent rebutting his specific arguments is a minute he has won. Every minute spent naming his role is a minute he has lost. I’ll leave it at that for tonight. I won’t get on to trolling because I don’t want to take up too much of your time. I’ll leave it at that. Out. Previous Episode [https://www.disinfolklore.net/p/podcast-the-creature-of-moral-ambivalence] Get full access to Disinfolklore at www.disinfolklore.net/subscribe [https://www.disinfolklore.net/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_4]

15 mei 2026 - 42 min
aflevering Podcast | The Creature of Moral Ambivalence and The Grandmother at the Checkpoint artwork

Podcast | The Creature of Moral Ambivalence and The Grandmother at the Checkpoint

Some of you may remember that two weeks ago I started a new series, looking at trolling and trolls. I am interspersing each week: one week on archetypal analysis of what I call the Luhansk archive, and then I move into the trolling. Trolling as Emotion-Moving Activity Just to remind everyone how I conceive of trolling: it is an emotion-moving activity of body, speech, and mind. I arrived at that definition through the story I am telling you tonight, and that I told you last time — that trolling is about movement, and what binds the use of artillery in eastern Ukraine, which I witnessed a lot, with Donald’s trolling about Iran, or anything else on the internet, with indeed President Zelenskyy’s trolling about his ceasefire offer this week and Ukraine’s great response to that. What binds all of these uses of the term trolling — which do describe the phenomena I have described — is movement, and the movement of emotions. What unites an artillery barrage with a tweet, or with the kind of way you might communicate with your pet cat, or the way someone you love communicates with you when they are trying to persuade you to do something that initially you did not want to do, but it is in your interests — this is all about a movement of emotions, and there is an activity which moves the emotions. I just wanted to fix you on that as we go through this. The Journey from Factiva to Eastern Ukraine What I am doing is bringing you on the journey I went on, which is: how do you link that aspect with the use of trolling as a term — trolls and trolling — for a phenomenon that most of us did not have any awareness of before, say, 2010? I did not have any awareness of trolling before about 2018 as a signifier. I remember the moment I received an email from a friend who just mentioned, oh, they were on YouTube trolling some people. I did not know what he was talking about at the time. I do remember that. What that signifier describes has been around forever, and I can say that with certainty because I have looked into what it means. The meaning which I deduce from the Dow Jones Factiva database of the uses of the term trolling and trolls — 65,000 uses of those terms in the world’s largest database of media, 33,000 media sources — that was my starting point. My friend used this term, it intrigued me, and I did not know what he was talking about, but I was seeing it a lot around. I wanted to see how this term has been used over time. That led me on this journey. It was my insight in eastern Ukraine that actually the meaning of this phenomenon — that has a meaning in early computer culture from California, and also with the advent particularly of Facebook and Twitter around 2008, this explosion of the use of trolls and trolling in the media around the world — what united those uses with what I was seeing in eastern Ukraine was the fact that there was a troll: as a person, as a metaphor to describe a person, or as a metaphor to describe a tweet, or what I now understand as any emotion-moving activity. The activity could be a flick of your eyebrow. It could be a tweet by the President of the United States. It could be a piece of legislation. All of these phenomena are united by the fact that they are emotion-moving activity, and they do move others’ emotions. Two Springs: Fishing and Folklore Last time I spoke about this, I was talking about looking at the term, how it arose in the Oxford English Dictionary, and how it went from fishing — from the discourse of fishing. It was used as a metaphor to talk about how you troll for souls. That was some of the earliest uses. Then in 2006, the Oxford English Dictionary, the definitive account of the English language, used the term from computer culture for the first time — trolling for bait, in the sense that my friend used it. That was a proposed amendment in 2006. There are these two springs from which this idea of trolling and trolls comes. One is fishing, and that goes back to the 13th century. The other is folklore. Today I am going to talk about folklore, and the connection there obviously with what I was doing in Ukraine: I was on a bridge with bridge trolls. The troll’s tale described the structural situation that I was in in eastern Ukraine. There were all these colliding meanings and associations which I have spent years trying to work out and work through. First spring, fishing. Second spring, folklore — the creature under the bridge. On the older of the two streams that fed the word troll, the Scandinavian folk creature: the bridge, the billy goats, the Moomins, and the long moral ambivalence of the figure in the folk imagination, before it met the English verb at the bottom of the hill. I took you on the first of the two streams that fed the word troll. I took you on the angler on the river in 1606, the clergyman who wrote that God trolls for souls. Tonight I will take you on the second stream. This one is older, it is colder, and considerably stranger. The Creature of Moral Ambivalence The creature is not unambiguously malign. The creature is not unambiguously benign. The creature has a long, murky career as a figure of moral ambivalence. To understand what happened to the word in the last 30 years — because this is really what I am doing, telling you about the development of this word in most of our lifetimes, and the development of the practice of trolling from early computer culture in California, to the use of trolling as a weapon of war by Iran, by Russia, indeed by Ukraine, and by the United States of America — you have to see what happened to the figure across the last thousand years. When I say that the troll is ambiguous: we do associate trolls with negative connotations, but the literary history we have also has them as positive creatures. Why is this significant to the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska, where on one side you had the Russian bridge trolls protecting their inner realm, Russia-occupied Ukraine? From the perspective of the inner realm, they were using their Disinfolklore to convince the people inside Russia-occupied Ukraine that those imprisoning them were actually protecting them from Ukrainian bogeymen, from Ukrainian Nazis. From that side, from the inner realm of Russia-occupied Luhansk, you look at the bridge troll and you are being brainwashed into thinking that is a positive creature. If you are MAGA, you look at Donald as someone who is going to protect America. He is standing on the bridge. He is protecting the inner realm of white-dominated America from the marauding migrants who are coming in over the bridge. From the perspective of MAGA adherents, or those who fall for the Donald troll, he is a positive creature. Obviously, from all of our perspectives — I am making assumptions here, but I think it is a good assumption to make — from our perspectives, he is a troll in a negative sense, and he is destroying the inner realm of America. That ambiguity depends on where you stand. Understanding that helps us understand the complexity of the act of trolling, where you can very gently troll someone into doing something that is in their best interests, and vice versa. Yet it is the same activity you are really doing. It is persuasion, it is courting, it is expressing love. It is like if your child or your pet is trying to get you to do something. Old Norse: A Category, Not a Creature The Old Norse word trolls — spelt troll, without the S, in the sagas — does not, in the oldest attestations, name a single specific creature. It names a category. In Indo-European culture, we have this category with different monikers everywhere. The category is something like: a supernatural being, larger and stronger than a human, not clearly divine, usually hostile, sometimes intermarriageable with humans, often associated with remote places — mountains, forests, caves, the underside of bridges, the far side of rivers. Every one of those elements can be found in the Prose Edda, which is one of the earliest texts in a Germanic language, and in the Heimskringla, and in the Icelandic family sagas of the 13th century. The creature is pre-Christian in origin, and most of the surviving texts were written down after the Christianisation of Iceland in 1000 AD, and the Christian scribes have already imposed a layer of demonisation. You find trolls who are pitiable or even noble. One of the oldest story types in the corpus that I collected is the story of a human hero who is trapped in the wilderness — on a mountain pass, in a cave during a storm at night, on a lonely road — and is rescued from the wilderness by a troll woman, who turns out, under hideous exterior, to be a supernatural figure of rescue. Here we have, in the other series I am doing, where we talk a lot about the merciful sovereign — when Donald or Putler create the crisis and then act as the merciful sovereign to get the Hormuz Strait open. This is an essential aspect of the early use of the troll. The troll woman gives the hero food, shelter, a magical object, crucial knowledge. The hero goes on to do his great deed because of the troll woman’s gift. This is not the story the Grimm brothers would later tell about ogres. It is a story that acknowledges that the creature outside the human community has gifts the community cannot provide, and that the hero who needs those gifts must be willing to accept them from the figure the community fears. Three Billy Goats Gruff: Moral Simplification Three Billy Goats Gruff — which is the foundational story for me on the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska, because I realised that not only was it a structural description of what I was going through there, but it is a structural description of all encounters with the other world and all encounters in interaction zones — in airports, on the Hormuz Straits, wherever you have one community defining itself against an outer realm community. The Three Billy Goats Gruff is really a moral simplification in the classic Norwegian telling of it. As some of you might remember, I have innovated in the interpretation of it. It was first written down in the 1840s and published in English by George Webbe Dasent in 1859, and it immediately became a success. I know that because I looked at this archive, and you could see references to how important it was. It rose above all the other troll tales by a degree. The troll under the bridge is purely an obstacle, and the Three Billy Goats Gruff outwit him by scale. The smallest comes first and promises a bigger one is on his way — so deception. The middle one comes next. This is the version of the troll that most English-speaking readers first encounter. It is not the only version. The Moomins: Recovering the Older Troll Consider the Moomins. In 1945, Tove Jansson published The Moomins and the Great Flood, the first of the Moomin novels. The Moomins are trolls. This is not a marketing decoration. When you look at the archive, trolls as an entity in our culture really start taking off in the 1950s. A guy in Oakland in California registered the trademark of troll dolls, and trademark disputes over people using troll dolls appear in this Factiva database regularly. Every few years there would be explosions in interest in trolls, usually through troll movies. There would be lots of lawsuits all related to these troll dolls. In 1945, when Tove Jansson was writing about them, people were aware of trolls and most children would have been read stories about them, but they were not a huge part of our movie culture or popular culture as we call it today. Jansson is explicit that her round, hippopotamus-shaped protagonists belong to the Scandinavian troll family. They live in a valley. They are gentle, curious, philosophically inclined, and slightly anxious. This is NAFO. This describes many of us who are either NAFO-adjacent or NAFO. Their visitors include the Snufkin, who plays a mouth organ and leaves every autumn; the Hemulen, who is rigid and rule-bound; the Snork; the Snork Maiden; and a variety of other morally ambiguous creatures. Nothing about the Moomins is frightening. They are 20th-century Finnish-Swedish rewritings — so Indo-European and Finno-Ugric, two different of the great language families alive today — rewriting the folk figure into the tradition of quiet, reflective, slightly melancholy kindness. Tove Jansson is, in effect, recovering the older version of the troll, the troll woman in the cave who gives the traveller shelter, from the moral simplification of Billy Goats Gruff. The Icelandic Tradition: Trolls in the Landscape Consider too the trolls of the Icelandic tradition, another great Indo-European culture. In the 20th century, Guðmundur Finnbogason, Sven Lundgren, the folklorists who preserved the Icelandic material, collected stories in which trolls turn to stone at sunrise; in which trolls are tricked by the hero, but sometimes bless the hero; in which trolls are the ancestors of specific mountain formations and rock arches; in which the troll is explicitly connected to the earth itself. The trolls of this tradition are features of the Icelandic landscape, physical manifestations in the landscape, because the Icelandic folk imagination read the landscape as the petrified bodies of trolls. The figure is not a simple villain. The figure is in the theology of a place. Iceland’s most famous natural monuments are its trolls. This is not a culture that thinks that the troll is merely wicked. Why Did the Billy Goats Gruff Version Win in English? Why, in the English language imagination, has the Billy Goats Gruff version won? I have three answers. The first is the Grimm effect. When the English translator rendered the Norwegian tales into English, he imported them into a Victorian children’s literature framework that already expected moral clarity. Grimm’s Tales had been translated into English in 1823, and the Grimm pattern — I have talked before about the relationship of the Grimm brothers to Herder, and Herder’s call in 1777, where he wanted to find a means of uniting the ten historic mythological German tribes that Tacitus, the Roman historian, had written about 40 years after the Common Era. He wanted a means of uniting them around a common culture. Herder, I have spoken about before, asked: where is our Shakespeare? In 1777. Out of this call emanated this great pouring of German culture, which 90 years later led to the first unified German state. The Grimm brothers answered this call, as did Goethe and later Wagner. It was their work — collecting folklore, putting to music these ancient legends — which led to the unification of the German state. The connection with Disinfolklore here, and with what the Russians were doing in eastern Ukraine, was that the Russians were doing the reverse of this. They were manufacturing a culture through these stories they were generating in this situation on the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska, where I was for three years, and inside Russia-occupied Ukraine, where they were creating this prison, brainwashing everyone in it and saying that they were the merciful sovereign, saving them from the wicked West of freedom and human rights and LGBTIQ equality and justice, all the rest of it. This is Disinfolklore, and the use of Disinfolklore — which Donald obviously uses as well to brainwash people — is the inorganic use of the same methods that Herder and the Grimm brothers used to unite the ten German tribes. That model of creating a national culture out of literature, the literature collected from songs from the folk and stories from the folk — that model was copied all over Europe: Ireland, Ukraine, Greece, almost every European nation state owes its existence to its own use of this model, creating a national culture and then claiming statehood and becoming states from the late 19th century on. The second answer is the 19th-century folklore collectors’ project, which I will give its own talk on. Men like MacRitchie and Kennedy, an anonymous correspondent of The London Magazine — I read many of these from the 19th century, who travelled to Scandinavia, to Ireland, to Greece, to the Orkneys, collecting folktales and writing them up for a metropolitan Victorian audience. Their interest was explicitly archaeological. They wanted the creature at its most pagan, the troll that most resembled a pre-Christian demon, so it could be analysed as a relic. The ambivalent troll woman of the older sagas was not interesting to them. The frightening underground creature that had to be defeated by Christianity was interesting to them. The collectors filtered the figure through their own theological needs, and the figure that emerged was darker than the folk had ever painted it. The third answer is the one I have been circling in this series and in all of my work: the English verb troll already had a pejorative hook inside it. The 1567 Fenton “trolls and corrupters of youth” reference that I talked about two weeks ago; the 1575 Awdeley Orders of Knaves, which I will take up in the next talk. When English readers encountered the Scandinavian folk creature, they had a verb waiting — a verb that had already named a category of bad person. The creature and the verb fused in the English imagination in a way that they had not fused in the Norse imagination. In Scandinavia, the troll was a class of supernatural being with a complex moral life, whereas in England, a troll was a kind of knave, and the folk creature arrived to be slotted into the knave category. This is why the popular English-language troll is the Billy Goats Gruff troll. It is not because the Scandinavian original was unambiguously evil; it is because the English reception system wanted a simple villain and had a category to put them in. My Innovation on the Three Billy Goats Gruff The interpretation I add to The Three Billy Goats Gruff is the one I have hinted at earlier: whether the troll is the hero, or the three goats crossing are the heroes, depends on your perspective. If you are in the inner realm and you do not want people to come in and adulterate your culture with their different aspect — you do not want them to adulterate the sovereignty or the security or the fertility of your inner realm. You do not want them to come in and steal your sons or your daughters in marriage and adulterate the bloodline. Then the troll is a hero. It is interesting to me that it is the troll most people, most children focus on, and yet the troll loses in this interaction. For the average MAGA voter or an England Reform voter, where the migrant goat coming over the bridge is the enemy, the troll should be the hero. It is quite a complex tale in that sense, where you have the goats as economic migrants just wanting to get some food on the other side of the bridge. Of course, when you tell that to your child it sounds so innocent — but that is the precise tale that Donald spoke at the bottom of the gold escalator in Trump Tower in 2016. That is the tale we hear a thousand times a day. That is the archetypal troll tale we hear among politicians. Politicians who, in many cases with good justification, are talking about the complexity of the migration debate. I listened to Meloni this week talk about all the different relationships between migrants and democracy and sovereignty and security and being manipulated by malign forces, and how this undermines our democracy — a really sophisticated critique. This troll tale does have that sophisticated critique, but I accept that most people do not see that when they first see films about it. The Moomins are not obscure. The Moomin novels have been translated into more than 16 languages. These are positive trolls, avant la lettre — positive trolls, way before NAFO. Tove Jansson was nominated for the Hans Christian Andersen Medal in 1966, and won it. They are very much part of the establishment. Finnish state Moomin-themed stamps have been issued. They have sovereign authority in every decade since 1992. The Moomins have their own theme park in Naantali and an entire museum in Tampere. There is also a small museum in Covent Garden in central London. Millions of Scandinavian children grow up with the Moomins as their primary image of what a troll is. In Finland and Sweden and Japan, where the Moomins are immensely popular, the word troll, in its folkloric register, retains its older sense. I mention this because when the English-language culture war of the last 20 years imported the pejorative troll into global usage, it imported a moral simplification that many of the cultures that the word passed through already knew was wrong. When a Finnish reader encounters the headline “Trolling Jail Terms” in 2010 — these are pop culture references to English pop culture, and Moomin trolls sitting by the fire. The cognitive work required to let the first picture override the second is real. In much of Scandinavia it has not entirely been done. The older picture is still available. The Code of Positive Trolls and Distinguishing Folklore from Disinfolklore How do you distinguish folklore from Disinfolklore? Mockers’ mocking tone, and the way she tells these stories of doom — that is folklore. The Code of Positive Trolls, this six-element test: generosity — is it generous? Right — is it ethically disciplined? Patient — does it provoke us into making urgent decisions, or is it a bit chilled? Mana, energy, and focus — i.e. mindfulness. Should we let this into our brain, into our inner mind, to affect us? Is there any wisdom in it? The Code of Positive Trolls can draw on the positive residue. I am not going to try to rescue the negative meaning of troll in our contemporary culture. I will stick with the Code of Positive Trolls because we all troll all the time. If you accept that as part of the definition, then we need a means to decide what is positive and what is negative. I use the six-element evaluative framework. When I wrote at the end of March 2022 in my “Let’s Compare Trolls” tweet — of President Zelenskyy as the arch 21st-century troll, compared to Duncey Putler as the arch 20th-century troll — I was using the Code of Positive Trolls to distinguish between the two of them. It is simply not right to sign into law and into international law, as Putler did in 2003, the state border of Russia and Ukraine, and then invade it and claim that Ukraine belongs to Russia. That breaches law. It breaches right. Therefore, he is the negative troll in that sense. The Moomin, the troll woman of the saga at the beginning, the petrified giant of Þingvellir in Iceland — these are folk figures that contain the possibility of a troll who is the giver of gifts to the traveller in the wilderness, not merely a taker of tribute at the bridge. All of us who have been following NAFO since its inception, and have been helping to keep NAFO in everyone’s minds, understand this. They are positive trolls, not merely takers of tribute on the bridge. If you are building a practice, you can build it with that residue. If you are fighting the public meaning of the word, you cannot win, but you can behave properly, and accept that you are trolling — for instance, if you are a NAFO member. The Troll Predominantly Negative, Even in Scandinavia The negative evidence is really not about rescue in the Scandinavian folk record itself. Even before the Grimm filter, the troll is predominantly negative — predominantly, not universally, but predominantly. Most of the sagas treat the creature as something to be defeated. The benign troll woman is the minority case, not the majority. The troll’s association with bridges is an association with toll-taking, with the forced extraction of resources. We go to the Strait of Hormuz with the forced extraction of resources from travellers who cannot go around. The troll’s association with darkness is an association with inversion of the sun’s moral order. In the Eddas, when Thor fights Hrungnir and Þrymr and Skrymir and the other giant trolls, the fight is presented as the legitimate defence of Asgard against encroachment. The moral geometry favours the gods. The trolls lose. In the moral folkloric reading that Janteloven codifies — Janteloven, some of you, I know I am not pronouncing it correctly. Is anyone there? We have a Tove. We have proper Scandinavians there who are going to correct me on all of this. I cannot pronounce Janteloven properly, but since I was introduced to it, it is amazing. Janteloven was first codified by a novelist, but the rules which it represents are the dominant means of keeping community together in Scandinavia. It is the Scandinavian social principle that nobody should think of themselves as special, that the community is the unit of moral reference, that outliers are suspect. The troll is the figure who lives outside the community. The troll rejects Jante. In the Scandinavian moral imagination, this is not neutral — it is the definition of deviance. The troll under the bridge is not just a robber, he is a heretic against the commune. When Scandinavians invented Facebook comment moderation tools and began prosecuting trolls under the Swedish penal code in the 2010s, they were acting on a folk intuition about the commune heretic that is more than a thousand years old. To be honest, the folk record shades slightly towards the negative, even in Scandinavia. The Moomin and the troll woman in the cave are real, but they are the minority. The Billy Goats Gruff troll, the mountain ogre, the bridge toll-keeper are the majority. The English reception system did not distort the original. It selected for the dominant moral reading. When the Two Streams Met: Negative Gravity Pulls Neutrality Down The two streams that fed the word — the fishing stream of the angler’s running line and the folklore stream of the Scandinavian creature — had different moral centres of gravity before they met. The fishing stream was morally neutral. The folklore stream was morally ambivalent in the sagas, morally polarised in the Grimm-era reception, and morally recoverable only in pockets like the Moomins, the Icelandic landscape tradition, and indeed in Disinfolklore, the tradition I created. When the two streams met at the bottom of the hill — first in Elizabethan London, with Fenton and Awdeley and Fulwell, and then again in Usenet in 1992 — the folklore stream’s negative gravity pulled the fishing stream’s neutrality with it. Remember the meaning of neutral. The tra, the movement in there — neu-tral. It is no movement against this axis between right and the dream state, or right and trickery. The neutral is neutral: no movement. The angler of 1606 who fished for souls became, 400 years later, the troll under the bridge demanding his toll. The gospel bait — remember where the clergyman was comparing trolling for sinners to fishing — the gospel bait became the flame bait. The river became the comment thread. The strike remained a strike. The word, which could hold both the positive and the negative as late as 1891, when Andrew Lang was editing fairy tales and writing angling sketches and using troll in both senses without confusion — the word, in our lifetime, collapsed into the negative. It collapsed not because the language changed, but because the behaviour the word described had, at industrial scale and with state sponsorship, become negative in a way it had not been before. The rest of the series is the story of how that happened. In the next talk, in two weeks’ time, I will take you back to three English books in the 1560s and the 1570s, when the negative was already in the word, 300 years before the Grimm brothers picked up a pen. The Elizabethans had a whole taxonomy of troll knaves before Iceland was Christianised in any way that mattered for English literature. The Grandmother at the Checkpoint: The Luhansk Corpus I will leave the trolling at that. If you have the patience, I will quickly switch streams back into the archetypal stream and look at one of the archetypal readings of the Luhansk corpus, this 10,000 propaganda items which I collected and which is the empirical basis of Disinfolklore. From the Stanytsia Luhanska footbridge — back to the bridge between 2015 and 2018 — I watched the same woman cross a thousand times. Not literally the same woman: a grandmother-shaped, headscarfed, thin-coated, plastic-bag-carrying woman who came across at first light, stood in the queue to have her papers inspected by men with rifles, crossed into Ukrainian-controlled territory, went to Oschadbank — who thankfully got its assets back from Hungary today — went to Oschadbank in Stanytsia Luhanska to collect her pension, bought her medicine, visited the grave of her husband, and crossed back before dark. 10,000 of her crossed every day. I was the diplomat on the bridge, me and my colleagues, helping to secure her passage. She is an archetype. The grandmother at the checkpoint is the third most common character in the Russian occupation propaganda repertoire, after the folksy colonel and the Ukrainian Nazi. In my corpus of 10,000 items, 144 of them are tagged pensioner, grandmother. The occupier uses her in a very specific way. Because I was there for three years, every day, I can tell you she was not just an archetype. She was a real person that I interacted with, and had thousands of conversations with, and I still have the notes of those conversations. She was both a real person and an archetype in the propaganda, in the Disinfolklore the Russians were using to brainwash her and her neighbours in Russia-occupied Ukraine. Let me read one of them, 24th of May 2016, lug-info.com. This is a story I participated in several different times. “A man died in a long queue created by the Ukrainian Customs Service in Stanytsia Luhanska — People’s Militia. An elderly man died while waiting in a queue artificially created by the Ukrainian Customs Service at Stanytsia Luhanska crossing point, said People’s Militia representative Major Andrei Maroshko.” The man is real. The death is real. I walked that bridge. I may well have been around the day he died. I may well have been part of this episode. This bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska was in this biosphere reserve, this idyllic place which was not a border until the Russians invaded. The Russian occupiers are claiming this man died because of an artificially created queue by the Ukrainians. For a long time it was very confusing for me to understand. Being on the bridge every day, seeing the different tempo on different periods, it was very hard to know who was causing it. Eventually I did work out that the entire scene was created by the Russians in order to provide a platform for all of these stories, and to provide content for these stories. This is what they do. They create the distress and then they purport to solve it. We recognise that in a lot of these chaos merchants. Archetype Reversal: Kyiv Starves Its Own Grandmothers Every word in that sentence is aimed at a specific target: the listener’s protective instinct towards grandmothers and grandfathers. The Ukrainian state grammatically creates the queue — not climate, not war, not the failure of both sides to staff the checkpoint adequately, or the fact that Russia wanted to create the queue so that it would have stories to tell, Disinfolklore in order to brainwash the population, so that seven years down the line they would be able to use them in meat assaults, because they would no longer see their Ukrainian neighbours as human beings. Not the fact that Russia shelled the bridge to rubble in 2015 and blocked its repair for years. Ukrainian Customs Service creates the queue, and the queue kills an old man. Therefore, unspoken but inevitable, Ukraine is the killer of Luhansk’s grandfathers. This is a classical archetype reversal. In any Indo-European folktale tradition, the elderly are untouchable. To threaten a grandmother is the blackest possible crime. Russian Disinfolklore uses this sacred category by positioning Ukraine structurally as the entity that threatens her. Every pension-queue death is folded into the narrative: Kyiv starves its own grandmothers. What is left unsaid? That Russia’s occupation created the need for the queue in the first place. That before 2014, Ukrainians crossed no checkpoints in Luhansk province. That the queue is the shadow of the occupation itself. That the woman in the plastic bag and headscarf cohort is crossing out of Russian-controlled territory because the Ukrainian state is where she can still collect a pension, see her doctor, buy medicine she trusts, bury her sister, visit her parents’ grave in the ground where her mother lies. Every one of those 10,000 daily crossings was a vote. They walked, carrying plastic bags and patience across a bridge under gun-sights, away from the Russian occupation, because life was better on the other side. No referendum in the occupation ever recorded this vote, but the bridge recorded it every day for years, and I was there and watched it. The counter story is what I saw: the dignity of the queue. The jokes told in it. The people who fed a cat — one of whom I managed to get out of there, Henry the checkpoint cat, who I wrote about in one of my first stories on Substack on Decoding Trolls. The chocolate slipped into a grandchild’s pocket at the checkpoint. The whispered message to the friend at the other side. These grandmothers were not Maroshko’s props. They were Ukraine’s witnesses, and real people. I will leave it at that for today, and the next time we will come back to a few more archetypes. Why People Stayed: Brave Refusal to Leave You have probably read this story, because especially with older people, it is their home. They were being boiled quite slowly in water by this Disinfolklore. I thought at the beginning, when they had to cross over into Stanytsia to get their pension, that they would then realise that their fellow Ukrainians were not ogres. The power of Disinfolklore is to convince you otherwise. They had to cross over because their life, their pension depended on it, but it was made such a vastly unpleasant experience by the Russians that it was not a very pleasant operation for them. Of course, over a million and a half people did leave, and they left within days of the Russian occupation in April 2014. There was, for instance, the last fast train. I do not know whether you have seen these amazing trains — they are much more comfortable than trains in most parts of Western Europe. The last fast train left Luhansk city probably around the 15th of April 2014. I knew people who were on that train. It is quite a famous train. A million and a half people did leave. Some of them left with their parents, their families. I met one amazing family who had this massive house and horses in Crimea, which they left — just left everything immediately, took as many horses as they could and headed to Luhansk in early March 2014. Then the Russians kind of followed them to Luhansk and took over, and they had to go to Kyiv with their horses. There are literally a million and a half stories of people who did leave, but a lot of people did not leave, for a whole really complex set of reasons. They would go over for their pensions. Certain people we know — at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, I was encouraging friends of mine to leave immediately, and trying to help them find places in western Europe to live. These people, who recently were terribly affected when my apartment building in Dnipro was bombed two weeks ago, that I talked about, and my neighbour’s mother was killed in that attack — I often reflect on how brave these people were. These are younger people with the means to leave, with the financial means and the cultural means to go, but their attitude is: this is my home, I am not leaving. The Russians — this is why the Russians are still stuck a thousand kilometres east of Kyiv: because so many people refuse to leave. It is just friction for them, quite apart from fighting. I admire it greatly. It would not be my intuition, but it is a really interesting question, Wendy. Get full access to Disinfolklore at www.disinfolklore.net/subscribe [https://www.disinfolklore.net/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_4]

6 mei 2026 - 51 min
aflevering Podcast | Mobile Armies of Archetypes artwork

Podcast | Mobile Armies of Archetypes

A couple of weeks ago, I started a new series, and this is going to be the third episode of it, where I am going through what I call the Luhansk archive, the Luhansk corpus, which was the data set from which I generated the Disinfolklore analysis. I am going through the different archetypal identities in each of these stories. This is a core part of the analytical method: this idea I have of mobile armies of archetypes — really, archetypal identities. You have the signifier, you have the surface, the phenomenon. You have the gold in Donald’s office in the White House — that is surface. That is an archetypal identifier. Then you have the identity associated with it, which is what it is supposed to signify on the surface level, but also subconsciously. I talk in all my work about archetypes and archetypal identities and archetyping, but this mode of analysis was generated from this corpus, which I gathered, collected, and analysed, and tried to understand what on earth was going on when I first encountered it in eastern Ukraine. Why This Is Relevant to Ukraine: A War of Symbols Why is this relevant to Ukraine? We are all here for Ukraine. We obviously have the connection between Donald and America and Ukraine, which has just been spoken about. We also have, on the level of the war itself, that it is a war of symbols. It is a war of archetypes. When we see Russia sending a thousand humans to their doom each day, they are trying to affect and project archetypal identities into the minds of the decision-makers and the non-decision-makers like normal people like us. They are trying to impact the minds of humanity and to persuade us that they are strong. That sacrifice is being made — despite us knowing in this space that they are not strong — to try to convince people that they are strong. Strength and strongman is an archetype, and the archetypal identity is between Putler and a strongman, or between Donald and a strongman. Of course, we understand the true archetypal identity there is between, say, President Zelenskyy with the Ukrainian people and strength. That is also why it is relevant. The Ballroom: Folkloric Motif Before Architecture This week, we saw the obsession with the so-called ballroom. This is the relevance of the Disinfolklore analytical method. As far as I am aware, nobody else has noticed this phenomenon yet, despite it being so obvious. You can get your eye in because you have been reading me or listening to me. The ballroom. The repetition of the ballroom — that phrase, that archetype, which we all remember from children’s stories, from Cinderella: you will not go to the ball, you will go to the ball, the slipper, Disney. That is the payload. It is everywhere in our information space, whether you want the ballroom built or whether you do not want the ballroom built. People this afternoon are sharing photographs of the gold in the Oval Office. By sharing a photograph of this gold in the Oval Office, we are actually participating in the embedding of an archetypal identity that we may or may not agree with. From the standpoint of the intelligence and the people who are trying to affect our moods, our intentions, and our motivations by using these archetypes, this idea of the ballroom — they do not care, because the energy is being continued, and the picture is being continued. What I try to do in all my work is just give us a bit of a guide, because I see it. I see the same energy, the same tactics that were used in eastern Ukraine, and it can help us understand what is going on in today’s world. I wrote a piece this week — I have been meaning to write it for a very long time — because of this obsession and this repetition, this mantra, like Hunter Biden. This is the point of it: whether you are for or against it — ballroom, ballroom. Yes, I could fall into that trap, but I am claiming a special exemption. I can use the archetype ballroom, ballroom, ballroom here, because I am trying to explain a perspective on what it means and its impact, and why suddenly this is in everyone’s minds — everyone who is tuned into the American infospace. The ballroom is a folkloric motif before it is an architectural one. We have to understand that. A lot of the debate is showing pictures of the destruction of the East Wing, which is one archetype: destroy the heart of American identity. Yes, if you want to destroy that, then you physically destroy the building. That is one element, one archetype. I am not focusing on that. I am focusing on this idea that a Republican Party — whose moniker, whose archetype is as a Republican — will be banging on about a ballroom. Three Inflections of the Ballroom: King’s Hall, Mead Hall, Cinderella It is a folkloric motif. Three of its inflections are doing the work here. The first is the King’s Hall. Some of you know my Finding Manuland project, the exchange of mana. Part of my motivation to look for that was reading in Irish mythological tales. So many of them are set in the King’s Hall. It is a table replete with food, and it is about the exchange of what I call mana. Homer — the composite individual, Homer who toured, and the different other people who toured the coast, the western coast of Anatolia, of today’s Turkey — and spoke at certain festivals where food was exchanged. The king, the monarch, would pay for these huge feasts, and these tales — a bit like I am regaling you with a tale now — would be told. Those eventually were written down, and that is the Iliad and the Odyssey. We see it also in Indian culture. It was just a curiosity to me, because it is quite alien from most of our lives. I think it is important to sit down in a room — but for some people who went to older universities, or old boys, or Rotary Club, there is all this thing about food and the exchange of energy in those rooms, so there is part of that. The gilded Oval Office, his gold card, his own face engraved on it, his Mar-a-Lago, Rococo mirrors, and now his East Wing ballroom — they are all operating in the same gift economy of sovereign favour, in the same idiom of polished gold. I went once to the mansion that Yanukovych — who was president of Ukraine until he ran away in February 2014 — owned. I was expecting this mythical place that had been built. I think it cost maybe 100, 150 million dollars. It had a Spanish galleon on it. I do not think it had any zebras, but they were not there when I went to visit it. I was expecting to hate it, but actually I had never been anywhere like it. It was just every detail: from the gold loo brushes to the underground corridors, to the perfectly sculpted rooms to resemble the Holy Grail and suits of armour, brand-new suits of armour, all done — and then you move into modernity and John Lennon, a Steinway piano, and just beauty, and birds fluttering around, singing songbirds. It was one of the most beautiful houses I have ever been in. On the face of it, it seemed gaudy. I draw that in because, while many people advertise this gold and this royal stuff, we think we are making a point by saying it is gauche. There is a semiotic and archetypal reason why this is being done, and why it has the effect it has. Whether he understands it on the level I am talking about now or not, he does understand the effect of it on people. This is why he is where he is today. The second inflection is the Mead Hall, the room in which the king becomes the king. Many of us have perhaps wondered about Mar-a-Lago. It is just so sad. It is such a weird thing. Many of us would just prefer to be at home or be with our family and our pets, yet he wants to reside in this public space, because that is where the king becomes the king. It is Versailles. He is quoting, he is representing, Louis XIV in 2026. That is the antithesis. It is the reversal of the Republic. It is the reversal of 300 years of history. It is completely consistent with the idea to destroy and eradicate every memory of the post-World War II legal order, and indeed even the constitutional order before it. The reference is not generic luxury. It is the particular memory of a court that danced while the country starved. That is the citation by an administration whose Project 2025 and DOGE and all of that is about producing disequilibrium, and disequilibrium-analysing the entire globe all the time, while supposedly running a fake blockade on the Strait of Hormuz, except letting through — and this is where the axis of misogyny operating on the level of oligarchy let through this big Russian yacht the other day. Iran, Oman, and the United States colluded to allow through this oligarch’s yacht. That is the props. The third inflection is the Cinderella ballroom, the room in which status is confirmed. The whole passport thing is also part of this — the room in which the door closes at midnight on those whose invitation has expired. The presidential ballroom is by its nature a guest list. A Republican space by its nature is not. The Law of Similarity and the Gilded Monarchy Set I have talked a bit before about the law of similarity: things that look alike are treated alike. This is why we fall for trolls, why we look at photographs of people and think we are looking at something real. It is very important in disinformation. The gold leaf, the crystal, the Rococo mirroring produce similarity by association. It is the archetype of monarchical sovereignty. I posted this yesterday morning. The eye reads the whole, and the unconscious reads the king, the monarch. Read alongside the long-link “to the King” Truth Social post, where he is archetyping himself as king; the AI-generated crown portraits; the Mar-a-Lago oval; the gold card; the military parade — the ballroom is not an ornament. It is the missing room in a coherent set. The set’s archetypal payload is gilded monarchy. Adjudicated against the Code of Positive Trolls, the ballroom fails generosity, because it is exclusionary by definition. It fails right, because it inverts the meaning of the White House, the building it is bolted onto. It fails patronisation. A folktale is being installed where a constitution used to stand. Archetyping and the R-CH Element: The Sovereign’s Rod About an hour later I posted this bit, and this was the essence of my fourth-anniversary speech and the move I made, which is very important to my work and the idea of archetyping. You have that R-IC, that R-CH element in archetyping. Monarchy at the end of it: R-C-H. Right, writ, rule — all from the early Indo-European root to stretch a rod, straight, a straight rod, which symbolised sovereignty. When President Zelenskyy was inaugurated, there is a picture I often share of him. In his right hand — always in his right hand — he holds a mace, a right rod with an orb at the top of it: the symbol of sovereignty. When Charles became king, likewise, in his right hand. These are the accoutrements of Indo-European sovereignty. They go back 6,000 years. Why is this relevant? They go back 6,000 years to Ukraine, to Zaporizhzhia, to Mykolaivka village on the right bank. We now know this because these symbols are used to manifest kingship in every Indo-European culture, from Celtic Ireland through now Germanic Britain — formerly Celtic Britain — to India and to Iran. We know this because we have the seals, the writing, the language, the rit; our “right” sound is in there. The rik, the rich element — it is also in rich, rich person. The rik element performs the same function as the rik element in archetype. It is also in archetype. It is in monarchy, an archetype. It installs the rik encoded in the archetype being used. This is one of my big insights over the past year. The ballroom archetype is the folkloric trope of the monarch — the rach in archetype and in monarch, right, Reich. This is what is going on here. Disinfolklore works through deeply encoded archetypes that penetrate our minds and recode what we perceive as right, as Reich. We begin our political career as a Republican. We believe in the rule of law. We think the best thing ever was the American Revolution. We call our party the Republican Party. Then 30, 40, 50 years later, if you are Lindsey Graham, you spend the whole day banging on about a ballroom. What you are doing by banging on about that ballroom is installing a new idea of what is right. You are not saying that out loud. The clue is, if you use the word archetyping. If you say: what is he doing? Well, he is archetyping American democracy now as needing a ballroom. What is really going on underneath there is this same change which I saw going on in eastern Ukraine. The Russians are not letting up in current Ukraine. They are still trying to convince people that what is right is that Ukraine should capitulate, and that somehow, if they capitulate, Russia will stop bombing Dnipro or stop eviscerating Ukraine and killing people. I have reason to believe President Zelenskyy and others see this and understand it and are not going to let it happen. This is why this is relevant. It all, for me, originates on this journey that I began in Luhansk. The Eighth Archetype: The Grammar of Passive Victimhood I wanted to talk about the grammar of passive victimhood. This is the eighth archetype that I have been talking about. I have done two episodes on this. One did the first to fourth, and then last time, two weeks ago, did fifth to seventh. From September 2014, when the first Minsk Protocol was signed in the wake of MH17, until the full-scale invasion of February 2022, Russian outlets in Russia-occupied Luhansk used one sentence in variation every single working day. In my corpus of over 10,000 documents, the formula appears 511 times, to be precise. It is the most repeated formula I have ever catalogued, and the formula is this: “Kyiv forces violate the ceasefire.” Why is this relevant to today? Or, on the other hand, why is talking about fake ceasefires in Iran relevant here? Because it is the same trick. These are the same linguistic tricks. It is the same strategy. In some cases it is the same people — Paul Manafort, for instance — providing the content, the strategy, for Donald, for America. “Kyiv forces violate the ceasefire.” Five words. Let me take them apart one at a time, because each word is doing Disinfolklore work. Kyiv — not Ukraine, not the Ukrainian armed forces, not the Ukrainian state. Reducing Ukraine to its capital city performs a geographic demotion. It archetypes the real state as a single belligerent municipality, the way a medieval chronicle might speak of Prague or Novgorod. The purpose is not to report the war. The purpose is to install in the occupied population a stable emotional identity: we are the ones attacked, they are the ones who attack. Once that identity is stable, any Ukrainian counter-offensive is self-evidently criminal. Any Russian expansion is self-evidently defensive. Russia’s February 2022 invasion of the rest of Ukraine was not a new story to the people of occupied Luhansk. It was the eighth year of the same sentence. The counter is a different sentence: “Russian forces in occupied Luhansk shelled Ukrainian positions today, as they have done almost every day since 2014.” The agent is named, the violation is stated, the duration is marked. The listener’s mind is offered a different grammar and begins to build a different story. The Invented Cossack: Kazachi Vestnik and the Factory Masquerade The next is the invented Cossack: Kazachi Vestnik and the factory masquerade. In November 2015, I picked up a four-rouble newspaper from a kiosk. They were using roubles there — they changed between November and December 2015 from hryvnia back to Russian roubles in occupied territory while I was there. I picked it up from a kiosk in Stakhanov, which it was called. It was Kazachi Vestnik. It is important to note that Stakhanov itself was a rebranding, a re-archetyping. Most of us may not know very much about Russia, but we will remember this mythological Stakhanov guy who did a lot of work in one day. Kadiivka was the Ukrainian city, and that was rebranded, re-archetyped as Stakhanov. The archetypal identity there is to make it very familiar to people, to remind them, to re-encode their minds, and to provoke in their minds this memory of the past, of the Soviet past. It is the attachment of a new name to an existing place, to a modern European city, and then to identify with that the past and the present of the terror. That is what I mean by archetypal identities. It was called Kazachi Vestnik, the Cossack Herald, edition 5,500 copies weekly, published since November 2014. Russia started their occupation in February 2014, according to the European Court of Human Rights, and of Luhansk in April 2014. In November 2014, it established this newspaper. That was three months before I arrived there and encountered this ever-intensifying information space, which looks very familiar now when you look at the American information space. 5,500 copies weekly. Again, this is November 2014, not November 1814 or 1890. It was just really curious to me that they would use newspapers even then. Its masthead described it as the official printed source of the First Regiment named after Platov of the Cossack National Guards. Platov, if the name does not immediately surface in your mind, was a 19th-century Don Cossack ataman, a hero of the 1812 campaign against Napoleon. He was picked out deliberately from the deep well of Russian folk memory and hung above the masthead of a small-town occupation newspaper 200 years later. Why? Because Stakhanov, the town itself, is named after a Soviet coal miner, Alexei Stakhanov, who in 1935 was turned into a Stalin-era labour hero for mining 14 times his quota in a single shift. Stakhanov, the name, was a Soviet propaganda fiction layered onto a real miner. The town was built on factories, coach-building, mines. The men who lived there were, for three Soviet generations, industrial proletarians, not Cossacks. There were no Cossack stanitsas in Stakhanov. There was no Platov lineage. There was a coach-building plant. This is the invented Cossack in action — one of the most documented archetypes in my corpus, 444 items tagged, and one of the most brazen. Russia’s occupation did not just seize the territory, it rebranded the inhabitants. The welder became a Cossack. The pensioner became a stanitsa elder. The miner’s son became a Cossack — a warrior of the warrior caste that had never existed in that place. The newspaper handed him his new identity in four-rouble weekly instalments. This is the classical move that historians of nationalism call the invented tradition. Scottish kilts, as we know, were Victorian. The German folk songbook was assembled by Herder and the Grimms, who I have spoken about previously. The Welsh Eisteddfod, which my niece participated in, was largely an 18th-century theatre. None of these inventions were unique to Russia. What is distinctive about the Russian case is the analogy with people we know who went MAGA. This is not a case of organic or inorganic positive nationalism, which most European countries went through following Herder — this model which was invented by Herder, or the original piece of Disinfolklore, the faked Ossian tales, which were created in Scotland and which I have talked about before, and which became a phenomenon across the whole of Europe and inspired these movements that then led to the creation of the first nation states. It is all right for Eric Hobsbawm to be a bit sniffy about this, but this is how we create a community through stories. What I realised — and this is the power of Disinfolklore and the Disinfolklore analytical method — is that the apple doesn’t lie. No one is above the law. Every single one of these elements of our identity as Americans is in the open air being assaulted, and a new Reich is being installed in our minds, a new idea of what it means to be American. This is precisely the modus operandi in Russia-occupied Ukraine. Why did they choose the Cossack? They chose it because the Cossack is a deep archetypal character in Russian folk memory. He is the frontier warrior, the border guardian, the man of the Don and the Dnipro. He is, in Russian iconography, the one who stands between the motherland and the outer realm. To dress the men in Stakhanov as Cossacks is to cast them, without their consent, in a role. It primes them for the role’s next scene: to defend, to fight, to participate in meat assaults, to be sent across a river — the Donetsk River — with a rifle, to go and kill their fellow Ukrainians, as they did in their hundreds in Kreminna on the 11th of March 2022. I did not know that in 2015. In 2015, this was just a weird phenomenon that I noticed was unusual, and I did not understand it, but I understood something rum was going on — just as I understand something rum is going on when a US president tweets, as he did about eight hours after I wrote about how the ballroom is about to re-archetype the Republic as a monarchy. He wrote that “Two Kings” tweet — and again, everyone shares it, and this is problematic. They share it with a moan, but they keep it going. This primes them for the next scene. In 2022, the invented Cossack is also a changeling archetype. It swaps the identity in the cradle. It is also a merciful sovereign archetype: the occupier claims to be restoring something that was stolen. It is a fake state liturgy archetype, because the First Regiment named after Platov of the Cossack National Guard is a paper institution — with a uniform and a newspaper and no legitimate lineage whatsoever. The counter, as with all invented traditions, is to name the factory. When a man in uniform claims his grandfather was a Cossack, ask what his grandfather actually did for a living. Ask him what the name of the town means. It is not Stakhanov; it is Kadiivka, and it will be Kadiivka again. Ask him where the coach-building plant went. It is now destroyed by Ukraine, by HIMARS strikes. The invented Cossack dissolves when the actual grandfather is summoned back into the room. Water as a Fertility Weapon: Dumézil’s Third Function Under Threat The next one I wanted to talk about was water as a fertility weapon, and Dumézil’s third function under threat. I have talked before about this amazing French comparativist who, in the 1930s, suddenly worked out that at the foundation of all Indo-European traditions is a tripartite split of our communities into sovereignty, security, and fertility. The monarch or the priest; then security, the warrior; then fertility, the farmer, the woman, prosperity. Those three. It is always those three. Manifest, for instance, in the Indian caste system. The third aspect of it is the fertility function. This is what Russia is doing when it steals children. It is deliberately subverting the fertility function. It is attempting to destroy the reproduction of Ukraine, of the community. This is an age-old weapon. Georges Dumézil, the French Indo-Europeanist, argued that every Indo-European culture organises its self-image around three functions: sovereignty, which is the legal-magical authority — magical authority, Donald is a magician in this sense, a magus. He gets millions of people to share his memes about a ballroom and to talk about a ballroom yesterday. That is as magical as you get. Security, the warrior. And fertility, prosperity, the provider. Russia’s propaganda in occupied Luhansk performs all three. The function I want to speak about today is the third: fertility, prosperity, the water and the grain. Very apt today, given the second ship apparently delivering grain to Israel, Haifa — stolen Ukrainian grain — because the corpus shows something distinctive. Russia mobilises water as a weapon and then positions itself as the only hydraulic saviour. I know this myself, because we spent about a year in eastern Ukraine in the early years of the occupation trying to solve water shortage problems. The story we were operating on was that the water shortage problems had occurred as a result of the occupation. Then through accident, basically, the diplomatic mission I was a part of discovered it had always had water problems. As I got to know Ukraine better and the Soviet legacy better, especially going to visit the elected hromada leaders in southern Zaporizhzhia, in areas which are now temporarily occupied, the stories I would hear from the elected officials were striking. Literally, if you wanted to get water, in many places it came in tankers. That whole area around southern Zaporizhzhia, for instance, is extremely dry. One of the big things which these new decentralised communities had to solve after they were established in 2014 — which I loved going to meet them and hear about, these heroic plans, all funded by USAID, the European Union, and the central government in Ukraine — were the result of leaders in all of these communities trying to solve problems which had been embedded structurally in them. For instance, access to water. We discovered in Luhansk that actually these water problems were historical. The Russian story coming from the Russian side was constantly trying to get us, me as a diplomat, to engage and solve problems and pay for water pumping stations. The water pumping stations were on one side of the river, the occupiers on the other side, and they were always being blown up. There were always these stories to do with water. What Russia was doing there, I now understand, was hammering away at this third function, the fertility function, which is a perennial function. 306 items in my Luhansk well — which I call “the well,” the corpus. There is a photograph of me by a well in Luhansk, a really old-school kind of well, which any of us who have been to Ukraine and travelled around will remember seeing everywhere — all around Chernobyl, all of those villages. Every house has a well. It is exactly the kind of well we would have seen as children reading folktales in New York or London. 306 items are tagged by water infrastructure, and most come from occupier-aligned outlets — luginfo.com and dninews.com. Let me walk you through the plot arc they collectively tell. While I was reading and collecting all of this, I was also participating in many of these stories, going to see pumping stations when, say, people from the World Bank or from aid agencies were visiting. We might be asked to be there too, and to guarantee what we called windows of silence, under which the Russians would not shell. I spent a lot of time standing around helping with these windows of silence, or going to pumping stations, talking to the heads of the pumping stations, just trying to understand these really complex systems. Actually, it was pretty simple what was going on in the end. Three Acts of the Hydraulic Saviour This is a really typical story; I participated in so many of these. Act 1, November 2015. A group of European experts is brought to inspect the water infrastructure of the self-declared LFR, Luhansk Folk’s Republic. The spokesperson framing the visit is Vladislav Deynego — whose hand I once had to shake, and at the time it really fascinated me that he, if you Google him, has the appearance of Trotsky in the 1890s, or of a ragged Russian intellectual from a Tolstoy book. The whole aesthetic — I now understand — was a flex. It was a style. It was an act of archetyping, like Melania wearing gangster moll chic to archetype herself as Alphonse Capone’s moll. I did not understand that then. It was just a real matter of curiosity to me. He was the occupier’s envoy to the Minsk trilateral contact group. The subtext was: the international community is here, looking at the plumbing, finding it acceptable; Russia is a responsible hydraulic custodian. This is a mirror of what I was doing on the other side of the river, because none of this really ever happened on their side of the river — no one in their right mind would go there, and could not go there. There were no guarantees of safety. If you read the media, they were trying to archetype themselves as a normal republic, like Kosovo — a group of people who had managed to achieve statehood and were just, with the help of the international community, developing — whereas in fact this was a military occupation masquerading as an organic republic, like Ireland establishing itself or like the United States establishing itself. Act 2, February 2017. Plotnitsky — who was the Russian-occupier leader, and both of whose parents died from picking poisonous mushrooms (again, one of my early intimations that something folkloric was going on) — and Zakharchenko, who was the head of the Donetsk People’s Republic, issued a joint statement, which was pretty rare, because they all hated each other. There was a lot of stuff about them joining together and uniting and all this nonsense, which was trying to make them seem like organic entities. They issued a joint statement in February 2017 demanding that Kyiv let the republics’ — again archetyping as republics — observers carry out inspections of industrial facilities on the Ukrainian-controlled side. The chutzpah of that. Notice the grammatical reversal: the occupier demands inspection rights over territory it does not control. Where have we heard that before? It is the same chutzpah we are still getting now. Act 3. The republics are now in hydraulic guardianship. The Minsk envoy of both Russian-backed statelets insists on ecological inspection of mines in the Kyiv-controlled Donbas area. The language has escalated from “demands” to “insists.” Each repetition is a ratchet. I am just choosing at random, but there are hundreds of these, day after day. The Wound and the Bandage as a Single Gesture What is happening here? Russia is weaponising Dumézil’s third function. Water, pensions, mines, gas, grain, the fertility of the land are being moved onto the propaganda stage, and Russia is auditioning for the role of the provider. Not just the warrior — these were the daily briefings, the shelling count I talked about two weeks ago. Not just the sovereign — the people’s, the folk’s republic liturgy, where they talk about establishing courts and banks. But the father of the land, the hydraulic monarch who ensures the harvest. What did Donald do in California? He ordered them to release billions of gallons of water, which then caused havoc, not only because they should not have been released then, but also because farmers could not — the water was not available when they needed it this season. This is, again, Donald using the same old tricks. This is classical Indo-European propaganda. The Vedic king was responsible for the monsoon. The Roman emperor was responsible for the grain ships from Egypt. This is, again, the Disinfolkloric element of what the Russian-mafia-run government of Israel is now participating in: this Russian mafia installation of these same archetypal stories. It is really horrific to see the grain — this whole grain thing — but it is the same tale. It is the same story. The Tsar was father because he stood between his people and the famine. Russia in 2015, 2017 is writing itself into this oldest script. It creates the problem, then it offers itself as the merciful sovereign. This is, again, what Donald does. It is the same game, the same trick, day after day. Every European expert who inspects LFR pipelines is a certificate of hydraulic legitimacy. Every demand to inspect Ukrainian mines is a bid for fatherly custody of the river. Meanwhile — this is the dark cemetery — in 2014, Russia blew up the water pipeline at Petrovske with its own artillery. In 2015, it shelled the Donets River filter station 13 times. This is the place I spent a lot of time in, trying to sort out the aftermath of these shellings. After February 2022, it occupied the Kakhovka dam, as we all know, and destroyed it, flooding a whole province, killing billions of sentient beings — but archetyping itself as the father in this. Meanwhile, the hand that plays the hydraulic saviour is the hand that is causing the problem, that breaks the pipe. This is the single most important thing to understand about Russian Disinfolklore. On the third function, Russia performs the wound and the bandage as a single gesture. The water crisis is manufactured so that the water saviour can claim custody of the manufacture. The counter is specificity. Name the pipe. Name the shell that hit it. Name the date, the coordinates, the brigade. Disinfolklore thrives in abstraction: “the ecological situation,” “the infrastructure,” “the republic’s observers.” Every specific pipe you can name is a counter-liturgy. The Soviet Revenant: The Great Patriotic War Square The perennial one: the Soviet revenant, the Great Patriotic War Square. In European folklore, the revenants are the dead who will not stay dead — the walking corpse, the ghost with unfinished business, the ancestor who shows up at the door, dirty, uninvited, demanding the bread from the hearth. In Russia-occupied Luhansk, there is a revenant in every public square, and his name is the Soviet Union. It is a “his.” In my corpus, 285 items are tagged Lenin, Soviet memory. Let me read you one of the smallest and most revealing. 7th of August 2015, luginfo.com. “Press conference announcement. At midday, the official representative of the LFR People’s Militia, Taras Kolotkov, on the situation along the contact line. Address: Heroes of the Great Patriotic War Square 9. Ploshchad Geroyev VOV 9.” Read the address again: Heroes of the Great Patriotic War Square. This is the address the occupation uses to send correspondence to a briefing on shelling. The address itself is a Disinfolklore item. It is doing the work here before a single word in the briefing is spoken. The Great Patriotic War — this itself, this is the Russian name for what the West calls the Second World War. It is the Eastern Front. 27 million Soviet dead — and I think most of us who have been watching their military tactics in eastern Ukraine understand why so many people died, and unnecessarily. The most sacred memory in Russian public life, the memory that the Soviet state and then the Putin Federation curated for 70 years, is the ultimate moral foundation: we defeated Nazism, we saved the world, we paid in blood, we are the good side of history. Most of us will understand. The United States provided, what was it, like 14,000 ships, 20,000 aeroplanes, et cetera — and that is why they were able to hold the line. When Russia occupies Luhansk in 2014 and summons journalists to a briefing, it does not use a neutral address. It uses Heroes of the Great Patriotic War Square, because the address does three things at once. First, it archetypes the occupation as the spiritual continuation of the Soviet victory. The men standing at the podium in 2015 are, by spatial association, the grandsons of the men who took Berlin. To attend their briefing is to attend a memorial service. Second, it casts Ukraine, the enemy of the briefing, in the only remaining role left by the liturgy. If the LFR is standing on Great Patriotic War Square, then Ukraine, grammatically and spatially, is cast as the Nazi. The square makes the bogeyman. The bogeyman makes the invasion. Third, it summons the revenant. The Soviet Union is officially dead. It expired on the 25th of December 1991. But in Luhansk’s Ploshchad Geroyev, it is not dead. It is walking. It has an address. You can post a letter to it. This is why in my corpus you will find Victory Day parades, Immortal Regiment processions, St George ribbons, Stalin-era Young Guard imagery, and Komsomol-style youth formations all persisting in occupied Luhansk, as if the clock had not turned. The Soviet revenant — who for me is personified by this guy, Vladislav Deynego — is the spine of the occupation’s emotional architecture. It is how the occupation persuades its captive population that they have not been conquered, but returned. The cognitive move is brutal. Most residents of Luhansk lived a substantial part of their lives in the USSR. Many grieve its loss. The Russian occupation offers them, in the form of public squares, parades, flags, and vocabularies, the feelings of the lost thing. It sells them a ghost, and the ghost is warm. The counter is to remember what the USSR actually did. The Holodomor. The gulag. The suppression of Ukrainian language. The deportations. The stagnation. The queues. The revenant is sentimental. The real dead are not. Name the ghost. Ask what year it died. Ask why it is walking. The connection there I would make with Donald, and this attempt to install monarchy just at the time he is at 33 per cent in the polls — that is the ghost which is walking through the White House. Next time you see someone posting all that gold in the Oval Office and going snobbily, “Oh, this is so gauche” — reflect for a second, or as you look into the Rococo mirror, reflect in its reflection for a second, and see: this is what the Russians did after the Second World War, and what they did in Luhansk. Continued from: First in series: Get full access to Disinfolklore at www.disinfolklore.net/subscribe [https://www.disinfolklore.net/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_4]

30 apr 2026 - 51 min
aflevering Podcast | Trolling as Geostrategic Doom Magnetism artwork

Podcast | Trolling as Geostrategic Doom Magnetism

New Second Series and the Starting Point I have been thinking about some of the archetypes and seeing their application. Frankly, I have been hearing more people say the method is useful for figuring out what is going on in the world. I am glad this is something that is catching on with some important people, the people I work with. It matters. It really is helpful to understand how Russia thinks and how we can use this against them. My vision is that we will have two series going on together at the same time, one week on, one week off. The other series, which I started a few weeks ago, is looking at this well of data that I collected between 2015 and 2018 in Luhansk from the Russian occupier media, broken down into the various archetypes. I have been going through that. This series I wanted to start was to look at trolling and the emotion-moving activity of body, speech, and mind. I have spoken about this before. I did a lot of work on this from the autumn, from the fall of 2019 onwards, and particularly from March 2020 onwards. I went through 60,000 or 70,000 entries under the terms trolling and trolls in the Dow Jones Factiva database of 33,000 sources. That is the largest media source database on planet Earth. What I wanted to look at was how the terms trolling and trolls are used in the modern era, as evidenced by these 60,000 or 70,000 entries in the database. Recently, I have been able to analyse the results in a way that I had not had the space and the time to do before. In some ways, you have seen the results of it, which is Decoding Trolls and all of my work, the Code of Positive Trolls, and things I have talked about in Disinfolklore. The Insight from Eastern Ukraine: Artillery and Emotions I am going to start with the insight which I had in eastern Ukraine, which was the continuity between, for example, artillery strikes on the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska — the continuity between that and the emotions you feel when you see them or feel them or hear them — and the emotions you feel when you read articles written about them. I had this insight, this vision, that actually there is no real difference in terms of quality, the content of trolling through artillery strikes, for example, and using Twitter to troll. The same effect on people’s emotions comes from these two different examples. I had started off on this journey because I wanted to understand how Donald Trump was able to use Twitter to provoke people’s emotions. That is essentially why trolling seemed to me important as a concept. It is my luck — I use that in a very classic sense — it is my luck that Donald was re-elected and we have seen his self-realisation move towards this apex. The White House Meme Apparatus in the Iran War My starting point really is the White House meme apparatus in the Iran war. Between the 28th of February 2026 and the launch of Operation so-called Epic Fury and the two-week Hormuz Strait ceasefire — or if it was a ceasefire, which has supposedly been extended today — the Trump White House ran the most aggressive presidential office social media war propaganda campaign in American history. What had been in the first Trump term a hobbyist’s Twitter feed has been fully institutionalised. The White House X, TikTok, and Untruth Social accounts, together with the Rapid Response 47 feed, have posted over 100 short-form videos mashing up real Iran strike footage with Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas, Mortal Kombat, Halo 2, Call of Duty, Wii Sports, Top Gun: Maverick, Gladiator, John Wick, Transformers, Deadpool, Star Wars, Iron Man, Breaking Bad, Better Call Saul, Yu-Gi-Oh, and SpongeBob SquarePants. This is clearly within my jurisdiction. This is all Disinfolklore. This is the use of contemporary folkloric tropes and memes to communicate national policy. Six Archetypal Moves Inside the Iran Theatre There are six archetypal moves I have managed to trace inside this, all running simultaneously. The first is drama as war. Real killings are edited into video games. Ludic frames — wasted, flawless victory — close the Epic Fury montage after Iranian trucks and ships are blown up. This is Surkov-style dramaturgy imported into the world’s largest military. For those of us who are Americans, it is a moment of epic shame. The second archetype is accusation in a mirror, Minab edition. The Shajira Tayeba school was destroyed by a US Tomahawk on the first day of the war. Bellingcat, BBC Verify, the New York Times, and preliminary Pentagon findings all attributed responsibility to the United States. Donald, on the 7th of March, said the strike was done by Iran because Iranians are very inaccurate with their munitions. Leavitt, at the 4th of March podium, said “not that we know of” when asked if the US had killed the girls, and called the reporting propaganda. The third archetype is war magic by repetition and opposites. The White House reframed a war of choice, unsupported by a UN Security Council mandate and unsupported by any armed attack on the United States, as “peace through strength” — another archetype, the exact phrase that Reagan coined and that Leavitt in November 2025 attributed to Donald. The words crushes, decisive, overwhelming strength, lethal precision recur verbatim across the White House Epic Fury page, the CENTCOM press release, the DOD fact sheets, and the Rapid Response 47 feed. Just to remind people: in the past, wars were fought — sure, we had CNN in the first Gulf War, and Baudrillard famously wrote about how the Gulf War only happened on TV. At that time, there were also diplomatic channels, the UN Security Council, meetings between allies. The war itself was separate in some sense that it is no longer separate from this meme war. The fourth archetype is the provocation logic cycle, which I did that series of five on — reflexive control. Donald’s Truth Social cycle — open the Strait, you crazy b******s, or you will be living in hell — his Easter week threats to bomb every bridge, every power plant, every desalination plant, all AI-generated — exactly the escalation ladder that let him claim victory by ceasefire hours before his own deadline expired. Iran’s forced reopening of the strait under threat was branded a diplomatic win. The test was invented to produce the outcome. The fifth archetype is the foreign scapegoat switch. Iran was slotted into the same scapegoat rotation machine that has cycled through trans service members, Haitian immigrants, Venezuelan gang members, universities, law firms, trans athletes — Donald is on about athletes again today, university athletes — and the press corps. The Iran theatre gives the administration what domestic scapegoats cannot: kinetic footage. That footage feeds the meme engine, which feeds the ratings, which feed the podium. The sixth archetype is stealth via AI targeting. The Maven — again, a Disinfolklore moniker — the Maven so-called smart system from Palantir — again, a Disinfolklore moniker, the magic stones from Lord of the Rings. Palantir is a $1.3 billion Pentagon programme of record, with Anthropic’s Claude embedded to rank targets and draft legal justifications. Palantir has been around for about ten or twelve years. Many people have said it is basically just a shell; they have nothing, there are no magic stones underneath it. Here we find out that basically — because it was Palantir’s magic stones which were involved in the targeting of this school — Palantir is using Claude. It is using Anthropic’s systems. Anthropic was a company begun four years ago. From my experience, it does have the most powerful available AI engine ever created. Here we have Palantir. They are just basically trying to scapegoat Claude. By scapegoating Anthropic’s Claude for the mis-targeting, they are admitting that they have nothing. It is just like a holding company. Even though they have had access to so many governments’ records — the National Health Service in the UK handed over the entire database to Palantir under the last government, continued by this government — yet, despite having all this massive amount of data, Palantir never seemed to build any AI engine capable of properly processing these data into actionable predictions. We know what Ukraine has done with the Delta battlefield system. One of Palantir’s great products was to sell NATO their real-time battlefield intelligence system. Ukraine has just built its Delta system from the ground up, which is, as far as we were aware, better than anything NATO or Palantir could come up with. Palantir used Anthropic’s Claude to rank targets and draft legal justifications. This compressed what had been days of human analysis into minutes. The Minab school was hit because DIA-supplied coordinates were outdated. As we now know, you could have looked on Google Maps and seen it was a school, but six years ago it was not a school. The system did not catch that the school had been fenced off from the IRGC compound. Between 2013 and 2016, the kill chain accelerated faster than the error-correction loop. When the atrocity surfaced, the administration’s first move was denial through social media. Second was propagandising the denial. Third was the meme. In my Disinfolklore framework, this is what I call a negative chain: coercive control, war magic, stealth, and drama, all running on full throttle in the Iran theatre. The meme apparatus is the drama. The archetypal insurance the administration is taking out — through Leavitt’s podium denials, Trump’s Old Testament Hormuz thunder, Hegseth’s no-quarter pledge, and the White House’s cartoons — is the war magic that legitimises the stealth and re-archetypes a war of choice as an existential one. The Code of Positive Trolls — the six-element code which I came up with in February 2020 — has never been more clearly needed and more clearly absent. A Confession About the Word Trolling I want to begin with that, but also then focus on what runs through all of it: trolls and trolling. For almost a decade, I defended a definition of trolling that no one else was willing to defend. I told everyone who would listen, and many who would not, that trolling is any action, any activity of body, speech, or mind that moves another’s emotions. I said it on bridges in eastern Ukraine. I said it to diplomats. I said it to my students. I said it to agents. The definition was not invented. I had lifted this definition — any emotion-moving activity of body, speech, and mind — from the word itself. The idea of movement is embedded in it: motion, emotion, motion. I had spent the better part of two years reading every sense the Oxford English Dictionary gave for the verb to troll and all the data which it referenced. What I found was a word that refused to stand still. I found a word that over 650 years kept escaping the narrow room dictionary-makers tried to lock it into. Here was I, trying to lock it into another narrow room: an emotion-moving activity of body, speech, and mind. Tonight I want to walk you through what the OED, the Oxford English Dictionary — the definitive statement of the state of the English language — actually says about this verb, because the shape of the entry is the shape of my problem, and I will argue by the end the shape of an answer. The OED Entry: Forms, Etymology, and the Warning Label I have started with Iran to remind us of where we are with trolling and how trolling has migrated: from the hobbyist using page eight to big himself up in the 1980s New York real estate high-society world, through the first presidency, through to the use of Twitter to mobilise and execute an insurrection against the United States on January 6th — as those of us who have read the January 6th federal indictment will remember how Jack Smith begins the indictment on election night, when Donald first starts tweeting that the election was stolen, and then catalogues the use of Twitter all the way through those months to summon the mob over the course of months. That version of trolling: moving people’s emotions so that they felt their highly valued democracy was in doubt, mobilising them, getting them to perform and conduct and engage in an insurrection against the United States. Then all the way up to where we are now. The OED lists the forms before it lists the senses. Troll has gone under the shapes — it has different spellings: two Ls, one L, an E following the L, a W; trowle, trowle with an E, trolle — like French; trull, trull with an E. In Scottish dialect through the 18th century, the word was trowl. The etymology is candid about its own uncertainty. The editors write that the verb is “a word or series of words of uncertain origin and of which all the senses do not go closely together.” That single line is the archaeologist’s warning label, and it is what I thought I had solved. The sense I used troll in, after conducting this very long survey through Factiva and also through ProQuest — which has basically every pamphlet and article, everything you can imagine from the 16th century produced in England, scanned and now searchable — the emotion-moving activity of body, speech, and mind, for me, was something that crossed all of these boundaries. To use a metaphor I take from Dnipro, which was another starting point for me — looking into a burial mound on the outskirts of Dnipro in May 2021 — we are digging into a mound that may contain more than one burial. The dictionary’s best guess is that the word comes from Old French trolle, a hunting term meaning to quest, to go in quest of game without purpose. That is a sense which any police officers listening from America will understand — trolling for criminals. The companion guess is German trollen, to roll. Both senses are present in English, and the editors note that English has acquired further senses not found in either parent tongue. One of the things I learned from looking at the OED at this time was that most English words are cited as beginning around the 12th or 11th century and came in from French or from German. The proto-Indo-European element, where many of our words come from proto-Indo-European roots, from the earliest Indo-European languages, is somewhat blind. I just make that health warning. The Common Denominator: Emotion-Moving Motion If I want to claim that trolling is any action of body, speech, or mind that moves another’s emotions, then Langland’s trolling pilgrim and Shakespeare’s trolled catch, Dekker’s trolled bowl and the psalm troller of the Reformation, and the Tudor angler with his running line must all be doing the same thing at the level of structure. In a certain Buddhist way, they are. Each one sets something in motion that moves another person. The pilgrim who approaches. The singer who passes the melody. The host who passes the bowl. The minister who trolls the soul towards God. The angler who trolls the bait towards the pike. Movement of body, speech, or mind directed at another. That is the shape. I was not making the definition up. I was reading it off the page, although I am the first person to put it in that way. The common denominator of the five OED families is emotion-moving motion: literal motion in family one, articulated motion in family two, social motion in family three, musical motion in family four, predatory motion in family five. The T-R sound itself, as I will argue in a future episode and have argued before, carries the semantic charge of transport, traverse, transition, trajectory, trans. Every living Indo-European language builds its verbs of motion out of that consonant pair. That definition is in the phoneme of trolling. Remember, for me, I did not know anything about Indo-European studies when I started this journey. This was my porthole. I opened the window and started looking at this. I said: if the word is this capacious, why not rescue it? Why not let the Christmas bowl and the pedagogical Usenet newbie trap and the pilgrim on the road all sit together? Why not build a discipline — the Code of Positive Trolls — that asks us to troll well, to troll positively in the old merry sense, rather than to troll viciously in the new sense? I spent nine years on that answer. The Four Words That Stopped Me Then one morning I opened the OED to the bottom of the troll verb entry and I read the four words that stopped me. The OED had added them in a box headed “Draft Additions, March 2006.” The words: intransitive, computer slang — to post a deliberately erroneous or antagonistic message on a newsgroup or similar forum with the intention of eliciting a hostile or corrective response. I began with Iran. Trolling in the computing slang is now the main means of the United States of America — the greatest community of people that has ever lived and gathered, together with the greatest army that has ever been assembled — now being run through social media accounts and memes. It began, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, as recently as March 2006, when they entered it as computing slang: to post a deliberately erroneous or antagonistic message on a newsgroup — not on Twitter, not to the Iranian government — with the intention of eliciting a hostile or corrective response. The earliest citation they use is October 1992, the Usenet group alt.folklore.urban. The message is: “Maybe after I post it, we could go trolling some more and see what happens.” The OED is the most cautious lexicographic institution in the English-speaking world. It does not redraft an entry lightly, and it does not add a computing sense to a 14th-century verb unless its evidence base is overwhelming. Between 1992 and 2006, a 14-year window, the Usenet sense accumulated enough citational weight that the dictionary had to concede: troll now means also to post provocative content to elicit reaction. The gloss is narrow, clinical, and pejorative. It does not describe the bowl. It does not describe the psalm. It does not describe the pilgrim. I emphasise that this work is mine. As far as I know, no one has ever really looked into this word in this detail. There are a lot of books on trolls — folklore trolls and other aspects — but to look at it from a geopolitical, political discourse point of view, as far as I know, no one else has really looked into it in this detail. I will take you all the way back to this morning, where the President of the United States has told a White House adviser that he wants to appear on social media as unstable and insulting as possible, because “instability is a language the Iranians would understand.” That is a very important aspect of what Donald is doing. He is using trolling because he wants to appear as unstable and insulting as possible. It is a direct quote — I think it was in the New York Times — by advisers to Donald. The only way to serve this word, this verb trolling that will not stay still, is to stop trying to hold it in one place and to build instead a code — a set of six practices that can be applied whenever the verb happens to mean next. That code is the subject of this series. Tonight I just wanted to show you the verb in all its seven families, so that when you hear me argue later that troll is the phonological mirror of truth, you will know that I did not arrive at that argument lightly. I arrived at it after 650 years of motion refused to stop — and in the end, after the motion killed 49 people on a Tuesday night in April because the wrong man was holding the bait. The Fishing Stream: The Angler’s Running Line There are two discourses which trolling comes from, really, in a nutshell: fishing and folklore. Let me look at fishing. Fishing is the older of the two streams that fed the word troll. The angler’s running line. The OED theorised that it may have come from trolle, early French for hunting, which is obviously quite close to fishing. The angler’s verb, the running line, and the clergyman of 1606 who said God trolls for souls. I told you that the verb to troll belongs to several families of meanings in the OED, in parallel columns, and that the dictionary itself admits the families do not go closely together. I want to take you to the older of the two streams that fed the word. On the literal-motion side, it is the stream that was already there when the Scandinavian folk creature walked down the hill and met the English verb at the bottom. It is the stream of fishing. I am going to spend a few minutes on the angler, because the angler is where the word was first weighted with moral content. The folklore stream will get its own episode. Consider what fishing is structurally. You stand at the edge of a moving body of water. You cannot see into it. You know there is life beneath the surface and you cannot address that life directly. You construct an elaborate indirection. You take a line. To the end of the line you attach a piece of bait. The bait is chosen because it resembles what the fish you want would eat if the fish were doing what the fish do when you are not there. Then you place the bait in the water and you cause the bait to move — by casting, by drawing, by rowing forward with the line trailing behind. The fish, not seeing you, sees the bait. It mistakes the bait for the real prey. It strikes. You have caught it. Fishing is a lesson in the manipulation of another mind across a medium that makes direct communication impossible. The fish lives in a world you cannot enter. You reach into its world with an object that is not what it seems. You shape the object’s motion. You make it more persuasive. You wait for the target to project onto the object the identity you have designed for it. When the projection is complete, you set the hook. This is not a small thing. This is a model of how one mind can move another mind by constructing a lure, placing it at the boundary of another’s world, and making the lure move in a way that mimics the real thing. Every advertising campaign from 1890 forward is an application of this model. Every disinformation operation is an application of this model. What Surkov calls non-linear politics is an application of this model. What Steven Cheung does at the White House, with the Grand Theft Auto cheat code layered over real Iranian strike footage, is an application of this model. The fisherman was there first. God Trolleth for Thee: 1606 When did the English language acquire a verb for the activity I just described? The OED’s earliest citation for the angling sense is 1606. The source is Samuel Gardiner’s Book of Angling. The line reads: “Consider how God, by his preachers, trolleth for thee.” I want you to sit with that sentence for a moment, because it is where the word carries its highest moral charge. We are in a week where Donald is trying to distract by trolling as the Antichrist, by trolling the Pope, and modelling as the Antichrist, then trolling the Prime Minister of Italy when she defends the American Pope. Consider how God, by his preachers, trolleth for thee. I want you to sit with that sentence because it is where the word carries its highest moral charge in the entire history of the English language. Gardiner is not writing a manual of rod and line. He is writing a devotional treatise that uses fishing as an extended allegory for the work of salvation. The preacher in this image is the angler. The sinner is the fish. The gospel is the bait. The church is the bank of the river. God — note the grammatical position — is the one who trolls. God trolls through the preacher. The preacher is the instrument. God is the verb’s subject. What God does to you through the voice of the man in the pulpit in 1606 is troll. God trolls for your soul. Today, Donald says he is enacting God’s will — and he says that while trolling. You cannot read that sentence without seeing the kind of moral work the verb could once do. This is the verb at its most positively charged. It describes the activity by which divine love approaches a human being who cannot, in its unregenerate state, see the divinity directly. The lure is the gospel. The motion is the preaching — not Grand Theft Auto. It is the gospel. The strike is the sinner’s acknowledgement of grace. The word troll here means to save. From Gardner to the Present: How the Moral Charge Drifted How did we get from there to here? The short answer is that the verb was already older than Gardiner’s 1606 citation. What Gardiner did was apply an existing verb, used mostly for convivial motion — the passing of a bowl, the singing of a round, the trolling of bowls on a green — to a specific angling technique that involved a running line. The technique existed before the verb named it. There had been Tudor fishermen who trailed a baited line behind a rowboat or who spun a minnow on a winch for centuries. The word exists in American English in a way it does not exist in British English today — trolling, where you are hanging the line behind the boat, which works in America. Trawling is a different kettle of fish to trolling. In case English listeners think trawling and the use of trawls, where you put massive nets in the water — that is a different art to the art of trolling, which people who speak American English will understand but people who speak British English probably will not. What Gardiner does is take the verb that describes the bowls, the songs, the psalms, and lower it into the water. The fishing sense stuck. From 1606 onward, the OED citations proliferate in the angling register. By 1653, Thomas Barker in The Art of Angling writes: “The manner of his trolling with a hazel rod.” By 1682, Robert Nobbes publishes The Compleat Troller, an entire treatise devoted to the art. By 1720, John Gay writes, in Rural Sports: “Nor troll for pikes, despoilers of the lake.” By 1824, the British sporting press has refined the term: “Trolling or spinning a minnow is the other most general mode of trout fishing.” By 1891, Andrew Lang — the same Andrew Lang who edited the fairy books and who took an active interest in folklore — writes in Angling Sketches that “trolling a minnow from a boat in Loch Leven is probably the lowest possible form of angling.” Three centuries of angling use, stretching from a Jacobean devotional writer to a late Victorian folklore editor. Note what has not happened in those three centuries. The verb has not yet acquired the pejorative sense it will acquire in the 1990s and 2000s. The verb has not yet been used in any widespread way to describe the deliberate provocation of a human audience. The verb is still, for three centuries, doing what it did for Gardiner: describing the patient, motion-based, indirect approach of an angler to a quarry that cannot see the angler directly. All through those three centuries, the verb’s moral charge drifts. Gardiner’s “God trolleth for thee” is already slightly archaic by 1682, when Nobbes is writing a technical manual. By Gay’s 1720 Rural Sports, the verb is entirely secular. By Lang’s 1891 “lowest form of angling,” the verb has acquired a mild snobbery — trolling is what you do when you cannot fly-fish. The moral charge has left the word and gone into a different register. The word is now just a verb for a kind of fishing. Notice what remains: the structural meaning. One mind setting a lure at the boundary of another mind’s world and moving the lure through the water to make the other mind project onto it — that is constant across all three centuries. The angler in 1606 and the angler in 1891 are doing the same thing. What changes is what you are permitted to say about whether you are doing it virtuously. From Vietnam to Usenet to the Minab School The first modern migration of the fishing verb into the non-fishing context happens in the United States military in the 1960s. US Navy pilots in Vietnam used the phrase “trolling for MiGs” to describe an unauthorised but apparently widespread practice: flying in patterns that would lure Vietnamese aircraft into an engagement so the American pilots could evaluate their opponents’ capabilities. The practice was not sanctioned; the term was. The term moved from the river to the sky, and with it moved the structural meaning: laying a bait, making the bait move, waiting for the strike. This is an important moment. In the 1960s, in a cockpit over North Vietnam, the fishing verb acquires its first application to a human enemy. The fish and the MiG are both quarries. Both are lured by motion. Both strike when the lure moves in a pattern that mimics what they expected to hunt. With the MiG, the quarry is a person, and the person dies. From Vietnam, the term does not travel widely in the 1970s or 1980s. I told you before about the Factiva corpus. It runs from 1970 to 1991, and it shows the word trolling meaning principally the Norwegian gas field, with a secondary sense of fishing, with a vanishingly small residue of figurative uses. I found the first use of trolling in the context of Donald Trump: “Donald Trump trolling for a buyer for his yacht” — in 1990, in the Boston Globe, 31st of March 1990. Interestingly, in that article itself, it talks about how Donald Trump, having criticised the Japanese, is now trolling for a buyer for his yacht among the Japanese. For those who are old enough to remember 1990, the Japanese were very rich then, until their crash. He was trolling for a buyer. He was trolling for votes in 1992 political contexts. Trolling for customers in early 1990s tort reform rhetoric — tort, the law of wrong. In every one of these uses, the referent of troll is structurally identical to Gardiner’s 1606 angler. You are setting a lure and moving it to attract a quarry. There, Donald was using the Boston Globe to attract a quarry. Mitsubishi, I think, in the end bought his yacht. The virtue or vice of the activity depends on what you are hunting: a fish, a MiG, a yacht buyer, a vote, a customer, a soul. The next migration is the one that matters most for this series, and I will give it a whole episode on its own next time — on a Usenet newsgroup called alt.folklore.urban. In October 1992, a user writes: “Maybe after I post it, we could go trolling for some more and see what happens.” This is the OED’s earliest citation for the computing sense. The thing the computing sense borrows from the fishing sense is exactly, word for word, the structure I have described. A lure is placed in the water — the post. The lure is made to move — the provocation. The quarry, the newbie, strikes. The angler has caught something. Everything that happens after 1992 — all the way to the troll face image created on 4chan’s /b/ board on the 19th of September 2008, all the way to the Minab strike of the 28th of February 2026, all the way to the Slate headline “Iran Is Relentlessly Trolling Trump” — is the angling verb doing its structural work. Whatever the medium, whatever the quarry, whatever the moral register, trolling is still what the Book of Angling in 1606 said it was: the patient setting and motion of a lure, to attract, to elicit a projection, and to catch what strikes. From God Trolleth to the Minab School: A Moral Collapse I want to close by going back to Gardiner. The verb that in 1606 could describe God saving a sinner has by 2026 become the verb that describes a president killing 120 children because a cruise missile targeting system did not know the school had been fenced off from a naval base. This is not a change in the verb’s structure. The structure — set a lure, make it move, wait for the strike, catch what responds — is identical. What has changed is what the verb is permitted to describe, and what humans are willing to call their activity in those terms. The fisherman’s model of mind manipulation is morally neutral in the abstract — unless, like me, you are a vegetarian. It is good when God is the angler and the sinner’s soul is the fish. It is neutral when the angler is a man in a boat on Loch Leven and the fish is a trout — though I would slightly dispute that. It is bad when the angler is Steven Cheung and the fish is an audience of Gen Z TikTok users about to view Grand Theft Auto footage layered over real Iranian civilian deaths. The verb did not judge. The angler did, or did not. This is what my original definition — trolling as an emotion-moving activity of body, speech, and mind — was never arbitrary. It was the structural content of the fishing verb going back to 1606, translated out of angling into psychology. What I failed to see until recently was that the verb, while it kept its structure, had stopped carrying the 1606 moral charge. Gardiner’s “God trolleth for thee” is not available to us in English any longer. It is gone. The verb has moved, and when it moved, it took some of its positive resonance with it and left the rest behind. Arta — meaning the truth, the truth of the sovereign, as distinct from the usurper who practises druj, which also has a kind of T-R in it. Then into the Vedic, where the word is ṛta — right, truth. This will remind you of all the times I have spoken about the T-R sound. This is the journey I went on. I started by looking at Shakespeare and all these old English pamphlets. I was chasing this T-R sound backwards, just to see if I would get some insight into the present, because that is the point. The point is to understand what Donald Trump is doing when he is trolling. Of what does it consist? How is it moving people? How does it roil people? How does it affect eight billion minds in an hour? Going through the language, at each step of the way I found really interesting and insightful material. Here we are again, back in Iran, where you have Darius and the Behistun inscriptions, up there on the rocks, where he is talking about his different military victories. He characterises the reason he went to war as: so-and-so started practising druj, the lie. The lie — they are a usurper, like Donald. They engaged in an insurrection against the United States by lying. Darius cites his victories because he was practising arta, the truth. He is the truth, the truth of the sovereign. When the sovereign is truth and practises truth, he rules magnificently and there is no wasteland. That was the journey I went on. I will not spoil the rest of where we are going. It is just a coincidence we are in Iran. It all begins in Ukraine. This is the connection to Ukraine, because these languages began in Ukraine and they travelled to Trita. Trita — again, T-R — which is the most attested story in Indo-European culture, the Trita myth. The snake, the serpent, or the dragon, depending on the iteration, comes and steals the cattle. Trita is the third man, the third human after Manu and Yama. This is in the Iranian tradition, the Vedic, the Irish, Baltic, Slavic, the Albanian. It is in almost every Indo-European tradition. The serpent or the dragon steals Trita’s cattle — and then, in Ukraine’s case, sovereignty, security, prosperity — and then Trita, who could also be a troll on the bridge protecting his kingdom, gets his cattle back and makes the first sacrifice of the cattle. That establishes human culture. That is the foundation myth at the bottom of most Indo-European cultures. Again, the T-R sound. It is all in there. President Zelenskyy, the Positive Troll, and the War of Archetypes What you were searching for words to describe — what we have this sense of at the moment, what Firefella and Mockers are totally tuned into as we are, into the daily ebb and flow in a way that other people are not — it is not so much the signifier. We can call it anything we want. It is a sense of moving people’s emotions, moving Firefella’s and Mockers’ and my and your emotions so that we see President Zelenskyy in a certain way. We are also seeing it in his speech. We can call it trolling if we like. I note your apprehension about using the word trolling, because for most people it has a negative sense. This is the confession I began with, which is that I have been on a big journey with it. I thought I could retrieve this concept. I thought I could retrieve the idea, to use the word trolling as a signifier to describe positive manipulations of others. What I have come to realise, when I look at the data, when I look at what is going on currently, is that it is basically beyond redemption. It will always be a negative thing. Where I am talking about positive trolling — it is possible that what President Zelenskyy is doing, which I wrote about on the 30th of March 2022 on Twitter, where I called President Zelenskyy the positive troll extraordinaire, the 21st-century troll, as distinct from Putler being the 20th-century troll — I now include Druidy Don in Disinfolklore. Donald Trump is a 20th-century troll, because they can do the bait, the lure, the provocation perfectly, in a really clear formulaic way, in a small sentence. Because we do not really have words for it — it is such a complex move — trolling is a word we can use to describe it. Part of its power is that it is done in stealth and people do not really have a word for it. There is a utility to trolling. President Zelenskyy gives me hope. He certainly is a positive troll. By positive troll, I mean he is defending international law. He is defending his people. He is Trita. He is trying to get back sovereignty, security, and the prosperity of his people from the serpent, from the snake. We can see in how he is acting at the moment — for instance, those data points we have seen recently, the Belarus thing, he was outspoken, not against the United States, but he is basically saying: we do not need your s**t any more. In that attitude, we can see Ukraine’s archetypal identity transforming. He is an arch-communicator. As the art comedian, as I call him in my work, he is the perfect person to do this because he understands this stuff really intuitively, in a much more complicated way. I think even Donald Trump, or Putler, works on an animal sense and has loads of people around him who are composing these spectacles. Whereas President Zelenskyy, as the artist, as the cultural entrepreneur, as a scriptwriter, understands the arc of human emotion within individual speeches but also in terms of the war itself, which I suspect he has seen from the very moment of the beginning of the war as a war of archetypes — a war of these hidden ideas of right which work below the subconscious. To move those, you use the words and the trolling. I like Mockers’ characterisation: he is pretty spicy. I think that is a really good word for what he is doing. You can see what Mockers is doing when she uses that term to describe him — she is using it in an approving kind of way. We like to see it, because that is where the war will be fought and won: on the linguistic battlefield, on the mythological sphere, where David will defeat Goliath and then sing about it. I do have that sense that Ukraine is, of course, helped by this volcanic eruption, which is just so graphic, so dramatic. That is what we need. It is drama. That is one of my recent conclusions, which I have been writing about a lot recently: that basically, to disrupt archetypal identities — such as that Ukraine is weak, that President Zelenskyy has no cards — you need really dramatic actions. You needed President Zelenskyy to refuse to leave Kyiv on the first day of the war and the days after, to refuse to take that train. Then this term — I need ammunition, not a ride — came. The actual dramatic action was his not leaving. You need activities like that. You need the blowing up of Tuapse, and whatever else is to come, or Spiderweb, or invading Kursk. All of these really dramatic activities. On the other side, the Russians, with the Nova Kakhovka dam — the Russians hit my building in Dnipro last week and killed one of my neighbours. Those are very dramatic actions which have real, wild effects. This is the link between trolling through artillery and trolling on the internet: the same action can have the same kinds of impacts, can make people feel the same things. I think Ukraine, particularly President Zelenskyy, understands that that is how it works. It works on this kind of mythical story level. When he is being, as Mockers would say, spicy, by comparison to how we have seen him over the past year — going through various stages through our external perception when Donald Trump, before Donald lost most of his cards, was putting just enormous pressure, and you could see, physically present at his events, he seemed to be just so down and depressed — now he is on this emotional journey as well. It kind of feels authentic. That is the difference, because he is an actor. I think because we have seen him, like you would see a movie character or a book character — a brand called Shakespeare who has popped up every now and again as a Russian milblogger — the idea that this brand is now worried about insects just does not ring true, or any of the animals killed in the Nova Kakhovka dam. It is interesting that this artefact is being published and the dooming is on a scale we have not really seen before. To compare what is happening in Tuapse with what happened in Chernobyl, or what they are doing in Ukraine — that is what I mean by dramatic action. Ukraine understands, and President Zelenskyy has an understanding of the spectacle, the power of the spectacle of the reign of oil, which I guess was going to be burned anyway, sadly enough. Either it was going to coat and poison us in the air or poison them directly. It is not a choice between the oil staying in the ground and not covering this entire city. I do think it is interesting that these milbloggers are writing in this way. This is all part of this collapse of their confidence in any sense of victory. I am still waiting for the first sign when they suggest withdrawing from Crimea. That, for me, will be a very significant indicator. At the moment, I do not think we see much — Firefella would know more than me, looking at all of the data. I do not think we have seen much of anyone calling for a withdrawal from Ukraine. They are still at the position the wise people were at in mid-March 2022, which is: either we need to accelerate or try to freeze the lines. I do not think Ukraine will accept that. I do not think Donald has the leverage any more, which could partly be responsible for what Firefella mentions — that President Zelenskyy’s spiciness is a function of how his power has changed in relation to Donald. I still expect a ground invasion of American troops in Iran. I see very small space to avoid that, given the actual set-up in the Strait of Hormuz and Donald’s madness. I think President Zelenskyy can probably see all of this as well. Get full access to Disinfolklore at www.disinfolklore.net/subscribe [https://www.disinfolklore.net/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_4]

23 apr 2026 - 1 h 0 min
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