#70 Australian Food Is 13% of GDP. The Capital Found Other Hobbies. | Part 1

#70 Australian Food Is 13% of GDP. The Capital Found Other Hobbies. | Part 1

Australian food is 13 per cent of GDP. It gets less than 2 per cent of venture capital. That gap is not an accident. It is where the entire conversation starts. Todd Crowley sits down with Mark Gustowski and Tim Hui of Mandalay Venture Partners to work through why institutional money has stayed out of Australian agrifood for so long, and what the cautious capital is missing. Part 1 covers: The petroleum-derived blue colour sitting in your kids' confectionery and sports drinks. The US is moving to ban it. It is still on shelves here. FUL Foods, the spirulina-derived natural blue already replacing it, and why a fix this obvious took this long to fund. The 2 per cent of capital / 13 per cent of GDP problem, and why allocators trained on tech keep misreading food. Why Beyond Meat made every investor in this category wrong about the lesson. This is the structural read on why Australian agrifood has the demand, the science base and the runway, and still cannot get the cheque. Part 2 covers the bets that prove the thesis. Watch it next.

#69 ADF trained her to run a field hospital. She built the second one herself| Wing Commander Dr. Ajitha

What happens when the officer commanding Australia's forward-deployed surgical unit runs the same mission on her own time - faster, leaner, and without a joint logistics unit behind her? Wing Commander Dr Ajitha Sugnanam commands 1 Expeditionary Health Squadron, the RAAF unit responsible for delivering surgical capability in austere operational environments. She also founded the Esesson Foundation, which has deployed clinical teams across 14 countries using a supply chain built from Toll freight partnerships, in-country pharmacies, government-coordinated visas, accommodation and flights, and volunteer clinicians giving up their weekends. The comparison is instructive and uncomfortable. The ADF model is self-contained by design - own aircraft, loadmasters, pharmaceutical pipelines, joint logistics support. Essosson achieves comparable clinical outcomes at a fraction of the cost by building trust-based collaborative supply chains and training local capacity rather than replacing it. This episode forces three questions every defence capability planner should sit with: - If your forward surgical capability depends on a self-contained logistics chain, what happens when that chain is contested or unavailable? - The same clinician shortage constraining civilian health in PNG will constrain your coalition surgical capacity. Are those risks being assessed together or in separate columns? - When a CO can do it lighter and faster outside the wire, what does that tell you about how defence capability is being designed, funded, and measured? Dr Sugnanam is direct about the gap between military mindset and civilian adaptability in field operations — and about what resource-constrained deployments teach practitioners that no garrison environment can. The operational lessons here apply directly to how Australia plans, equips, and sustains forward health capability across the Indo-Pacific. If your portfolio touches force health readiness, ADF expeditionary capability, or defence logistics, this conversation will sharpen how you read the next capability review. Find deeper analysis and briefs inside Vaxa Bureau.

#68 Australia Was Warned About Its Fertiliser Vulnerability. Nobody Acted. | John Cotter

Australia feeds the region, but the mineral that makes that possible is almost entirely imported, processed offshore, and held in supply chains that break on a predictable cycle. In this episode of Intelligence Optimised, Todd Crowley sits down with John Cotter, founder of Northwest Phosphate and the man sitting on the largest phosphate deposit in Australia, 130km northwest of Mount Isa. The conversation was recorded before the current global fertiliser crisis. Listen to how accurate the warning was. Then ask yourself why nobody moved on it. Phosphate is the kickoff nutrient for photosynthesis and root development. Without it, crop yields collapse quickly. Australia has no strategic fertiliser reserve - none. Phosphate Hill mine at Mount Isa has shut. The single super plant in Geelong is gone. Wesfarmers CSP in Perth is closed. We are down to one domestic phosphate rock miner. That miner is Northwest Phosphate. Their Paradise South deposit holds 201 million tonnes of measured reserve in Stage 1, with a total resource close to 800 million tonnes at 34.5–35% P2O5 - above the global benchmark. The path to market runs through repurposed Century Mine infrastructure: a $2 billion-plus flotation plant and a 304km slurry line to the Port of Karumba, keeping 400 jobs in one of Australia's most remote regions for another 50 to 100 years. The strategic picture goes further than food. Downstream processing of this phosphate rock produces high-grade phosphoric acid, a direct feedstock for lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries. The calcium gypsum by-product carries light and heavy rare earths used in military platform manufacturing. One resource. Four sovereign capability threads: food, fertiliser, batteries, defence materials. John also maps what happens in the first 24 hours of a supply chain cutoff, which plants get nationalised, which inputs disappear, and why Australia's position is structurally identical to its AdBlue exposure and its single remaining vaccine batch facility. This is the episode for food security planners, critical minerals program owners, and anyone whose portfolio depends on assumptions that have never been stress-tested. Find deeper briefs inside Vaxa Bureau.

#67 The 'Australian Made' Battery Illusion | Dominic Spooner - Part 2

Australia commissioned more grid-scale battery storage in 2025 than the previous eight years combined. Most of those systems have no cell-level visibility, no long-term support plan, and no answer to what happens when the supply chain that feeds them gets cut. In Part 2, Todd Crowley and Dominic Spooner move from diagnosis to decisions. What sovereign battery manufacturing actually requires. Why defence and infrastructure planners are still catching up while sodium-ion is already commercially available. Why batteries rarely fail because of chemistry — and what they actually fail because of. And the three questions every procurement officer should answer before the decision gets made for them. What is your actual exposure. Why it matters to your specific operation. What you do before the disruption forces the answer. Find deeper analysis inside Vaxa Bureau.

#66 The 'Australian Made' Battery Illusion | Dominic Spooner - Part 1

Australia commissioned more grid-scale battery storage in 2025 than in the previous eight years combined. Most of those systems provide two to three hours of support. In January this year, the worst heatwave in six years tested that limit. In October 2025, China expanded export controls on LFP cathode materials, anode precursors, and battery production equipment. Under diplomatic pressure, those controls were paused. That pause expires November 2026. Most organisations filed it as resolved. It was a reprieve. In Part 1 of this episode of Intelligence Optimised, Todd Crowley speaks with Dominic Spooner — founder and CEO of Volta, a battery energy storage company that builds systems in Brisbane rather than simply assembling imported cells. Together they work through what sovereign battery manufacturing actually means, why the Australian made label frequently masks deep foreign supply chain dependence, and what the China export control sequence tells us about where Australia genuinely sits on the energy security risk spectrum. Key questions the episode works through: * When "Australian made" on a battery means an ABN and an overseasproduct, what is the government actually procuring? * LFP cell chemistry is essentially exclusively sourced from China.What does that mean for any operations manager whose infrastructure depends on it? * What does battery resilience look like when it is tested not in a procurement document but in a cyclone — specifically, Cyclone Alfred on Moreton Island? * Why do most battery companies refuse to provide cell-level visibility to operators, and what does that cost when a system is deployed somewhere you cannot reach quickly? * Energy resilience is an engineering outcome, not a policy setting. But you need the right policies to get there. Australia does not currently have them. This conversation sits at the intersection of sovereign capability, critical infrastructure resilience, and Indo-Pacific supply chain risk. The dependency is not theoretical. The timeline is not distant. Find deeper analysis and capability briefs inside Vaxa Bureau.