The Great Re-Rating: Is the SaaSpocalypse Real?
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Last week, we recorded the very first episode of the Pirate Street Journal.
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Through the category lens.
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1. Why is Salesforce down? Why is Micron up?
The Mag 7 reported earnings, and they were great overall.
But hereâs some weird data.
Salesforce (one of the Category Kings of SaaS) lost about a third of its market capitalization in the last 12 months, despite strong revenue and operating income. Forward P/E down 28% in twelve months. Benioff just announced a $50 billion stock buyback, one of the largest in corporate history.
Micron (memory for AI) saw over a 6x increase in its stock price in the last 12 months, also with incredible revenue and operating income. Forward P/E sat at roughly 3x a year ago. Today it is over 7x. The stock more than tripled in that window, but earnings grew faster than the multiple did.
In the columns, we have the Mag 7, plus SpaceX, which is soon to go public, as well as Micron and Salesforce.
The rows are what matter.
* Top row, Potential investors. Forward P/E above roughly 27, which is about +5 above the S&P 500 average PE multiple.
* Middle row, market-average band. Forward P/E is roughly 17 to 27. The S&P 500 lives here at around 22.
* Bottom row, Performance investors. Forward P/E below roughly 17, which is about -5 below the S&P 500 average PE multiple.
The actual PEs are merely a placeholder, as thereâs nothing magic about plus or minus 5 from the S&P 500 average.
We want to discuss the fact that there are two types of investors.
Performance investors. They invest in companies because of their current and near-term performance. Their performance is predictable, reliable, and steady. Sometimes slow, but never surprising. These are usually Category Kings today.
These companies are valued at lower multiples, whether it is price to earnings, enterprise value to EBITDA, or price to sales.
And there are Potential investors.
They invest in companies regardless of their performance now or in the near term, but in their long-term future potential. Usually, these are companies that can become future Category Kings that no one else really sees.
These companies are valued at much higher multiples, usually because earnings or sales are emerging and expected to accelerate.
When Potential investors start buying a stock, they lift the forward PE multiple as they are willing to pay a premium for potential. They think the category size of prize [https://www.categorypirates.news/p/sizing-the-category-prize] is growing and has huge upside.
They think the category is on the good side of the S-curve. All boats rise with the tide.
When Potential investors sell a stock to Performance investors, it depresses the forward PE multiple because they arenât willing to pay a premium for potential. They think the category size of prize is static and has limited upside.
2. Are you on the good or bad side of the s-curve
Performance vs. Potential investors are fundamentally debating one fundamental question.
Is the category and company on the good or bad side of the S-curve?
You donât have to be right on the precise number and date. Itâs not like picking black 17 on the roulette table.
Itâs just picking black or white. Using data and Category Design. And thinking about thinking.
You donât have to predict timing. You donât have to predict a number. You should, but donât have to, do fancy analysis.
Left or right of the S-curve is the question.
If you are right, and everyone agrees with you, it can be a profitable bet.
If you are right, and everyone disagrees with you, you can create generational wealth.
But you have to be comfortable with the loneliness, name-calling and mockery that comes with rejecting the premise.
When Pirate Eddie wrote in HBR that Netflixâs 80% stock drop in 2011 was Wall Street being dumb [https://hbr.org/2011/08/why-im-happy-netflix-raised-it], Wall Street called him dumb. When Pirate Eddie shared on CNBC about Teslaâs superconsumer [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sAxXwCC6hrc] being a new superconsumer who valued both functional and fun cars, Wall Street called him dumb again.
When Pirate Eddie wrote in HBR that General Mills should sell its cereal business [https://hbr.org/2018/02/why-dominating-your-category-can-be-a-flawed-strategy], he made a lot of former clients/friends at General Mills angry. But the data at the time was undeniable. 12 years of category decline. And unless you believed carbs and sugar were ever coming back into vogue, General Millsâ cereal business would never be more valuable than it is today. And they should sell it.
General Millsâ stock is down 38%, while Kellanova (old Kelloggs with cereal spun out) is up +4% since being acquired by Mars. General Millsâ PE ratio is 8x, and Kellanovaâs PE is 23x.
Sometimes being right doesnât feel great at first.
But the cost of being legendary is the willingness to be different.
3. Re-rating is a result of Category Design
Re-rating is when Wall Street decides a companyâs multiple should be higher or lower.
Revenue, gross margins, and cash flow donât change. The value of those economics does.
Everything we value, weâve been taught to value.
Re-ratings are simply a redefinition of the Category.
Did you know Dominoâs Pizza was the 2nd best performing stock from 2010 through the end of 2019?
Why? It transformed from a pizza delivery company to a tech company that happens to deliver pizzas. They invested heavily in their âpizza trackerâ, apps, and frictionless mobile apps.
Itâs Category Design 101.
And if you invested $1,000 into Dominoâs at the beginning of 2010, youâd have $40,000 in 10 years.
The best part is that re-ratings can happen slowly. You could have jumped on the Dominoâs train any of the first 9 years of its run and done well.
Wall Street is often blind to Category Design.
Category Design is your unfair advantage.
4. The SaaSpocalypse is overstated
The financial press has decided this is the death of software. Salesforce down $135 billion. ServiceNow down $100 billion. Workday down $50 billion. Hundreds of billions of dollars in enterprise software market cap gone in a year.
It is the wrong frame. Software is not dying.
On May 15, Marc Benioff sat down with the All-In Podcast and said,
â⊠the software marketâs rerated. It happens every now and then. There are cycles. You know, Iâve been doing Salesforce for 27 years, enterprise software for 40. And the marketâs rerated.â
â Marc Benioff
The earnings are fine, but the multiples got cut.
Salesforce guided to do $46 billion in revenue and $16 billion in cash flow this year. Performance is not the problem.
Potential is.
The market used to price these companies as Potential plays. Software is eating the world, every business needs a CRM SaaS, the seat count never stops growing. That story matured. The category got knowable. The TAM became visible. So the market quietly moved these names down a row. From Potential. To Neutral. Some all the way to Performance.
Benioff is responding to this exactly the way a category designer should. He is doing three things in parallel. Buying back stock at compressed multiples because he believes the business is worth more than the market pays for it. Acquiring companies (Informatica), while, in his words, âeverythingâs a little cheaper.â And, most importantly, repositioning Salesforce out of the SaaS category entirely. AgentForce. Slack as the context engine. Humans, agents, and headless platforms interoperating.
If that repositioning works, Salesforce gets re-rated up again under a new category label. Same business. Different multiple. Different shareholders. That is the move.
4. AI hardware is more valuable than AI software
The content in this section is 100% created by AJ on X @alojoh [https://x.com/alojoh].
Heâs a former Goldman Sachs investment banker, who built his own pirate ship that is a combination of investment research and trading advice with a rare alignment of incentives with his subscribers.
The goal of equity research is to drive trading revenue for investment banking, not necessarily at the benefit of the reader of the research. There is a strong motivation to put out positive news and analysis for investment banking clients and even stronger reluctance to say anything negative about those same clients. It is not 100% trustworthy.
The incentives for most traders/investors is to grow their own returns, even at the expense of subscribers/readers. They may tell you to buy a stock, but only after they bought it, and at times, they sell as they tell you to buy. Or their incentive is to grow their assets under management and charge you 2% of assets and 20% of carry for as long as possible.
AJ is the odd combination of a top-tier investment researcher who uses it to trade for his own account. His basic subscription on X is only $7/month, but his hardcore channel is $500/month, which Pirate Eddie subscribes to and has already generated more than a 20x ROI on the cost of the annual hardcore subscription. Sign up if you like buried treasure.
AJ is a pirate who routinely rejects the premise. This section is a synthesis of his insights and work and is shared with his permission.
One of the most provocative quotes from AJ is, âHardware is the endgameâ for AI.
For decades, software economics have always trumped hardware economics.
In the age of AI, itâs no longer always true.
Eighteen months ago, the DRAM memory industry was effectively left for dead. Post-COVID demand had snapped back. Customers had massively over-ordered during the shortages. The industry was working through an enormous inventory overhang. Prices collapsed. The major players took huge losses. Standard semiconductor cycle. Standard low-multiple memory business.
Then the AI buildout happened underneath them. In two or three months, the entire setup will be inverted. Utilization went from roughly 20% to over 100%. Hyperscalers moved into âwhatever it takesâ pricing mode on memory. Long-term supply agreements got locked in across the three major players (Micron, Samsung, SK Hynix) who together produce roughly 95% of global DRAM.
Memory used to be a commodity. Now it is AI infrastructure.
The cleanest way to show you why is to put Micron next to the most darling AI software stock on the public markets right now. Palantir.
* Revenue growth (year over year). Micron +196%. Palantir +85%.
* Operating margin. Micron 67.6% (GAAP). Palantir 60% adjusted, 46% GAAP. Yes, you read that right. The memory chip company has a higher operating margin than the AI software company.
* Rule of 40 (revenue growth percent plus operating margin percent). This is an awesome rule of thumb. If you want to know if a business is healthy or not, just take their revenue growth percent and add it up with their operating margin percent. If both are greater than 40%, you have a great business. Per Palantirâs own Q1 2026 investor deck, Micron sits at 265%. Palantir sits at 145%. Palantir is literally publishing slides that show Micron crushing them on the metric they brag about.
* Forward P/E. Micron roughly 7x. Palantir roughly 95x. Palantir trades at a multiple thirteen times higher than Micron, while growing slower, earning lower margins, and scoring lower on its own framework of choice.
This AI hardware company has the better business by every operating measure. The software company has the better multiple by every valuation measure. That is what a re-rating up looks like when it is not yet complete on one side and what a Potential premium looks like when it might be ahead of itself on the other.
This does not mean Palantir is doomed. It means the gap between the two multiples is going to close.
5. The Mag-7 will be the Mag-10. Abundance will follow
We are not telling you software is over.
Anthropic and OpenAI will do extraordinarily well. Pirate Christopher made the call on the pod. These are the largest, fastest-growing companies ever created, sitting in private markets at scale that exceeds most of the Mag-7. They are the leadership of the next decade of AI software. When they go public, the math changes for everyone.
But the SaaSpocalypse is more about the rise of AI hardware and hardware in general. This is why Micron is exploding. And why SpaceX is about to launch the largest IPO in history.
The Mag-7 framing is already obsolete. Three names belong in the group that are not in it yet, and the math suggests all three of them get added inside the next twelve months.
* OpenAI. Created the fastest-growing category in startup history. Reported to be exploring an IPO window.
* Anthropic. Became the fastest-growing company in history. Already operating at a scale that exceeds most public Mag-7 members on the metric that matters most, category formation speed.
* SpaceX. IPOing in June. Already cash-flow positive thanks to the Colossus lease deal with Anthropic, and reportedly being talked about at $1.75 to $2 trillion.
And it does not stop at ten.
Stripe could be next. The private IPOs of the last decade are starting to unwind. Every name that has been trapped in private markets at Potential multiples is about to become available to public investors who have been starved for Potential exposure.
One more thing the matrix hints at.
There is still no energy company in the Mag-anything bucket. Tesla is sometimes pitched as the answer because of its solar and battery business. The actual AI energy story is coming.
There is a real chance we are entering one of the largest equity bull markets in modern history, and most professionals are still positioned for a recession that did not happen.
Global GDP in 1926 was about $3 trillion. Today it is roughly $126 trillion. That is a ~50x expansion of human-created value in 100 years.
The mechanism was not âstocks went up.â The mechanism was that humans kept designing new categories that created value from nothing. Refrigeration. Electrification. The semiconductor. The internet. Each of those was, in its moment, an abundance boom. Each one looked like a bubble in the middle innings. Each one was actually a re-rating of the entire economy onto a new S-curve.
If AI is the next one, the abundance argument runs like this:
* The S&P 500 goes up because the Mag-10 carries it. The top names are already a huge share of index weight. When they re-rate up, the index does too, almost mechanically. This is already happening.
* The Nasdaq goes up more, because both the AI hardware layer and the AI software layer live inside it. Hardware re-rates up. Software re-sorts. The up names are bigger than the down names. Net positive.
* Productivity finally shows up in the data. If even 30% of the AI productivity case is real, US GDP growth surprises to the upside for years. That is the macro backdrop bulls have been waiting for since the 1990s.
* The Potential investor pool expands as more capital chases the abundance narrative. More Potential capital, chasing the same names, pushes multiples higher. The re-rating accelerates.
If we are right about the abundance boom, the index investor does well. The Performance investor does fine. The Potential investor does great.
But the category designer wins differently. The category designer wins by spotting re-ratings, in both directions, before the analyst class can model them.
All of this boils down to two questions.
* Is the category on the good or bad side of the s-curve?
* Is the risk of staying the same greater than the risk of changing?
If you can answer those questions honestly about your business, your career, your portfolio, your category, you could create a massive outcome and avoid sailing into rocky waters.
Arrrrrrr,
Category Pirates
Eddie Yoon [https://eddiewouldgrow.com/]
Christopher Lochhead [https://lochhead.com/]