Stephen Zunes Podcast

On Iran, Trump Has Backed Himself — and Much of the World — Into a Corner

First published in Truthout, May 5, 2026 U.S. efforts to force an end to the stalemate in the Strait of Hormuz by attempting to escort a few U.S.-flagged ships through the Iranian closure will not only fail to relieve the worsening global fuel crisis and disruption of supply chains, it risks a resumption of full-scale war. The Trump administration has rejected Iran’s suggestion for negotiating an end to the blockade followed by a resumption of talks on other outstanding issues, insisting that Iran first agree to eliminate its nuclear program. In February 2019, I sat in the Iranian Foreign Ministry, along with a small delegation of American peace activists, with Javad Zarif [https://progressive.org/latest/trumps-threats-towards-iran-arent-working-zunes-benjamin-190717/], the U.S.-educated foreign minister. He described how the 2015 Iran nuclear deal was a result of many months of intense direct negotiations, during which he met with then-Secretary of State John Kerry no less than 50 times, going over the agreement line by line. Indeed, the talks took nearly two years, and involved five other nations (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China) as well as the support of the European Union and the United Nations, before finally reaching the agreement formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) [https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/]. Those negotiations took the best efforts of scores of veteran diplomats, skilled mediators, and technical experts. The result was a deal which, in return for the lifting of sanctions, made it physically impossible for Iran to build even a single nuclear weapon and included a rigorous inspections regime to ensure Iran’s compliance. During his first administration, Donald Trump famously tossed that deal, insisting he could negotiate a better one. And now, instead of mobilizing the human and material resources to negotiate a political agreement with staying power to end the war, Trump is insisting that his son-in-law Jared Kushner, his real estate buddy Steve Witkoff, and his novice vice president JD Vance — none of whom have significant diplomatic experience or technical expertise regarding nuclear issues — could simply fly into Pakistan and, after no more than a few days, force Iran to capitulate. Indeed, it was Kushner and Witkoff’s lack of understanding [https://diplomatic.substack.com/p/no-imminent-threat-experts-dispute] of how nuclear enrichment and related issues work that prevented them from appreciating Iran’s major concessions in talks early this year. Such ignorance likely contributed to Witkoff’s misleading assessments [https://responsiblestatecraft.org/witkoff-iran-war/] regarding the progress in negotiations which may have prompted Trump’s decision to go to war. Trump has continued claiming the JCPOA was a one-sided deal favoring Iran, when in fact it was just the opposite. Iran had agreed to strictly limit its nuclear program without any reciprocity from nuclear-armed states nearby — Israel, Pakistan, and India — even though all three have also been in violation of UN Security Council resolutions regarding their nuclear programs which, unlike Iran, have actually produced nuclear weapons. And none of the other nuclear powers, including the United States, were required to reduce their arsenals, either. Despite this, Trump abrogated the agreement [https://progressive.org/latest/trumps-dangerous-abrogation-of-the-iran-deal-180509/], stating it did not go far enough to force Iran to stop supporting its regional allies, eliminate its missiles, and make internal political reforms. This has always been a pipe dream, however. It is hard to imagine any country not defeated in war making such concessions unilaterally. Indeed, Witkoff made a whole series of absurd demands, including that Iran unilaterally give up its navy [https://truthout.org/articles/witkoff-says-one-of-uss-demands-was-for-iran-to-give-up-its-navy/]. During the Cold War, in nuclear arms talks with the Soviet Union, despite the plethora of geopolitical issues dividing Washington and Moscow, even the extreme anti-communist Nixon and Reagan administrations recognized that nuclear arms needed to be addressed separately, both as a result of their singular importance and the fact that bringing up other issues would needlessly prolong the talks and likely make any agreement impossible. In my 2019 meeting with Zarif in Tehran, he noted how he had to fight elements within the Iranian government who opposed the treaty. The JCPOA required Iran to destroy billions of dollars’ worth of nuclear facilities and material in return for the lifting of debilitating sanctions. These political factions argued that the United States could renege on the agreement and reimpose sanctions at any time. Zarif and other political reformists expended enormous political capital by insisting that Washington could be trusted. Trump proved Zarif and his fellow reformers wrong. The reimposition of sanctions was not just in regard to Iran’s own direct trade with the United States. The Trump administration insisted on imposing secondary sanctions on companies in any country that continued economic relations with Iran, forcing many to comply against their wishes. For example, the French conglomerate TotalEnergies [https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/8/20/french-energy-giant-total-quits-lucrative-iran-gas-project] decided to pull out of a major project in Iran rather than lose its larger investments in the United States. In part as a reaction to the reimposition of sanctions and the seeming vindication of hardliners, Iranians elected conservative Ebrahim Raisi president in the lowest turnout [https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/19/raisi-wins-irans-presidential-election-amid-low-turnout] since 1979, and the clerical military leadership hardened their own political positions against further diplomacy with the U.S. Up until that point, Iran had been strictly following the JCPOA limits on its nuclear program, despite the U.S. abrogation and the imposition of new sanctions. But with the international community no longer willing to honor its end of the deal with sanctions relief, Iran determined that it was no longer bound by restrictions to its nuclear program and began enriching uranium well beyond the 3.67 percent allowed by the agreement. It is believed that Iran is now up to 60 percent enrichment capability, far closer to the 90 percent necessary to build a nuclear weapon. This further enrichment then led, with the support of European nations, to a resumption last year of the more comprehensive UN sanctions that had been lifted in 2015, worsening the economic situation still further. Those sanctions exacerbated the problems inherent in the Iranian state’s crony capitalism, corruption, and economic mismanagement to further strangle the Iranian economy. While Trump certainly deserves most of the blame, the failure of European countries to more forcefully challenge U.S. duplicity or even ensure desperately needed humanitarian aid [https://www.thedailybeast.com/iran-has-gotten-nothing-from-us-humanitarian-channel/] makes it into Iran has further weakened Iranian officials seeking greater openness to the West and increased the power of political factions that insist on turning inward and imposing their will on a restless population. In periods when the West appeared more willing to engage in serious diplomacy and economic relations, more political space has opened within Iran for both reformers within the system and pro-democracy activists seeking to change the system. By contrast, punitive sanctions, war, and the threat of war have helped elevate more reactionary clerical leadership as well as enrich [https://truthout.org/articles/sanctions-dont-weaken-us-adversaries-but-they-do-enrich-oligarchs/] elites and bolster the control of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which has in many respects already turned Iran from simply a conservative theocracy into a brutal military dictatorship. Trump does not appreciate the importance of real diplomacy, however. He is used to getting his way by making demands, issuing threats, and using whatever means of force are at his disposal, whether it be with business associates, regulators, women, or nations. He is under the false impression that Iran will blink first — that by denying Iran critically important revenue from its oil exports, it would effectively surrender. More likely, the Islamic Republic, which has dealt with major economic sanctions for much of its existence, is quite willing to let its economy suffer rather than submit in a war over its own existence. And the Iranian people are less likely to push for more democratic space in the domestic political sphere while they are struggling to survive day to day, and their nation is under constant threat of war. While negotiating an interim agreement which would allow for at least a partial reopening the Strait of Hormuz and postponing nuclear talks until later seems like the logical course of action, Trump may see such a compromise as making him appear to be a loser since, despite all the human and financial costs of his war on Iran, it would at best be a return to the status quo ante. His dramatic reaction [https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/02/world/europe/germany-trump-merz-troops-withdrawal.html] to comments by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz — traditionally one of the more hawkish European leaders in regard to Iran, publicly recognizing Washington’s lack of an exit strategy [https://www.dw.com/en/merz-says-us-humiliated-lacks-strategy-in-iran-conflict/a-76952959] — illustrates how he has backed himself into a corner, and much of the world with him. If the domestic and international pressure for a reopening of the strait gets to be too much, Trump might borrow from Henry Kissinger’s response to another negotiation impasse in December 1972: Despite progress in peace talks between the United States and North Vietnam, the U.S. launched a devastating 11-day bombing campaign over Christmas, dropping 20,000 tons of ordnance on North Vietnamese cities and killing more than 1,600 civilians. Four weeks later, a peace agreement was signed on essentially the same terms North Vietnam had offered before. The Nixon administration, however, contended that it was the bombing that led the North Vietnamese to agree to U.S. terms. The Trump administration may use the escalating conflict over the strait as an excuse to launch a similar short-term intensive bombing campaign on Iran and, regardless of whether it leads to further Iranian concessions, essentially declare victory if the Strait of Hormuz reopens, even with tolls. Whatever the outcome, the same kind of hubris out of Washington that led to the tragic wars in Vietnam and Iraq is manifesting itself with Iran today. This time, however, it is impacting the entire world. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit stephenzunes962006.substack.com/subscribe [https://stephenzunes962006.substack.com/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_2]

This Isn’t Just Trump’s War on Iran. Both Parties Paved the Way for Disaster.

First published in Truthout [https://truthout.org/articles/this-isnt-just-trumps-war-on-iran-both-parties-paved-the-way-for-disaster/], April 17, 2026. Read by Greg Bates Unlike the invasion of Iraq, which received the support of a sizable minority of congressional Democrats, Donald Trump’s war on Iran has received near-universal criticism. Still, the party has focused primarily on process-style critiques — such as the legality of declaring the war under the Constitution and the war’s economic impact — rather than the humanitarian consequences and flagrant violations of international law. That should not come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the U.S. bipartisan consensus on Iran: For over 20 years, a number of prominent Democratic leaders — and in some cases, large majorities of congressional Democrats overall — have helped paved the groundwork for Trump’s war by issuing exaggerated and alarmist statements about Iran’s supposed danger to the region, threatening the use of military force, and undermining diplomatic initiatives, sometimes even criticizing Republicans from the right. In 2024, the Democratic Party platform [https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/FINAL-MASTER-PLATFORM.pdf] criticized “Trump’s fecklessness and weakness in the face of Iranian aggression during his presidency” by not responding militarily to attacks by Iran and groups in Iraq and elsewhere that share Iran’s strategic objectives. The platform cited four separate incidents that took place under his first administration, failing to acknowledge that each was a direct result of Trump’s aggressive policies [https://truthout.org/articles/democratic-platform-defies-international-law-on-palestine-and-israel/] against Iran, including the assassination of Qassim Suleimani, a top Iranian general. By contrast, the party’s platform praised President Joe Biden for having “authorized precision airstrikes on key Iranian-linked targets,” which it claimed would “deter further aggression by Iran.” It praised “America’s ironclad commitment to the security of Israel and our unrivaled ability to leverage growing regional integration among U.S. partners to counter Iranian aggression.” Though eager to stress military means to counter Iran, the platform failed to directly call for a return to the Iran nuclear deal under the Obama administration, which considerably reduced regional tensions — a deal that Biden campaigned on reinstating but failed to do. The month after the release of the party platform, Democratic nominee Kamala Harris attacked Trump in a presidential debate [https://abcnews.com/Politics/harris-trump-presidential-debate-transcript/story?id=113560542], declaring that her administration “will always give Israel the ability to defend itself, in particular as it relates to Iran and any threat that Iran and its proxies pose to Israel.” In an interview with CBS, when she was asked who she considered to be the greatest enemy of the United States, Harris said [https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/8/kamala-harris-says-iran-is-greatest-adversary-of-us] it was “obvious” that Iran — not nuclear-armed states such as Russia, China, or North Korea — was the “greatest adversary.” She explicitly said that she would not rule out going to war against that country. This framing from the right continued into Trump’s presidency, even as the president began pushing more toward sustained military conflict. During Israel’s unprovoked bombing of Iran in June 2025, Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer insisted [https://www.democrats.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/leader-schumer-statement-on-israels-strikes-on-iran] that “Israel has a right to defend itself,” despite the fact that Israel had started the war. Just over a week before, he criticized Trump [https://reason.com/2025/06/04/schumer-attacks-trump-for-repeating-obamas-iran-diplomacy/] for even engaging in negotiations with Iran — negotiations that provided cover for the U.S.’s own bombing of multiple Iranian nuclear sites. Just prior to the U.S. bombing of Iranian nuclear sites during Israel’s war, Schumer posted a video [https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-nuclear-2672345081/] to social media accusing Trump of “folding on Iran” by attempting to negotiate a deal, bemoaning about how “Trump always chickens out” regarding the use of military force. Similarly, House Democratic leader Hakeem Jeffries refused to criticize the Israeli attack or call for a return to the Iran nuclear deal. Although Iran has no capability of striking anywhere outside of the Middle East, Jeffries claimed [https://democraticleader.house.gov/media/press-releases/leader-jeffries-statement-situation-middle-east] “the Iranian regime poses a grave threat to the entire free world.” Such hyperbole is not new. As far back as 20 years ago, Democratic leaders like then-Sen. Evan Bayh [https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna11133256] were claiming that Iran “may be only months away from having the capacity to build a nuclear bomb” and insisting military options should be considered. Similarly, then-Sen. Hillary Clinton [https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/19/international/middleeast/hillary-clinton-says-white-house-has-mishandled.html] argued during the Bush years that his administration was not taking the threat of a nuclear Iran seriously enough, criticizing it for allowing European nations to take the lead in pursuing a diplomatic solution, and insisting that the administration should make it clear that military options were being actively considered. These proclamations came even as the U.S. was struggling to maintain control of Iraq at the height of its occupation. During the 2008 Democratic primaries, Clinton [https://www.cbsnews.com/news/clinton-obama-irresponsible-and-naive/] accused Barack Obama of being “naive” and “irresponsible” for wanting to diplomatically engage with Iran and other nations that U.S. policy has often antagonized. Despite these accusations, Obama selected her as his secretary of state, through which, according to a story in Time [https://swampland.time.com/2014/01/14/hillary-clintons-unapologetically-hawkish-record-faces-2016-test/] magazine [https://swampland.time.com/2014/01/14/hillary-clintons-unapologetically-hawkish-record-faces-2016-test/], Obama administration officials noted she was “skeptical of diplomacy with Iran, and firmly opposed to talk of a ‘containment’ policy that would be an alternative to military action should negotiations with Tehran fail.” Clinton was far from the only Democrat pushing back against the Obama administration’s diplomatic efforts. In 2011, in an effort to sabotage [https://fpif.org/iran_threat_reduction_act_actually_increases_threat_of_war/] any potential diplomatic contact with Iran, an overwhelming majority of House Democrats voted for a Republican bill [https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/1905/text] declaring “No person employed with the United States Government may contact in an official or unofficial capacity any person that … is an agent, instrumentality, or official of, is affiliated with, or is serving as a representative of the Government of Iran.” Administration pressure and constitutional questions prevented the bill from passing the Senate, but it underscored that over 90 percent of House Democrats [https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2011927] were intent on undermining Obama’s efforts for a non-military resolution to the conflict with Iran.The following year, a similarly large majority [https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2012261] of House Democrats voted for a resolution [https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-resolution/568/text] urging the president to oppose any policy toward Iran “that would rely on containment as an option in response to the Iranian nuclear threat.” While Obama had already stated a willingness to consider taking military action against Iran if the regime procured nuclear weapons, this resolution significantly lowered the bar for war by declaring it unacceptable for Iran simply to have “nuclear weapons capability” — not necessarily any actual weapons or an active nuclear weapons program. In 2013, after Clinton was replaced by the more liberal John Kerry as secretary of state and Iranians elected the reformist President Hassan Rouhani, yet another overwhelming majority of House Democrats joined Republicans in voting, over the objections of the White House, to impose punitive new sanctions [https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/01/us/politics/sending-message-to-iran-house-approves-tougher-sanctions.html] on Iran. It was widely interpreted as a bipartisan rejection of the new Iranian president’s offer [https://www.scribd.com/document/170708709/Iran-Speech-to-UN-General-Assembly-Sept-24-2013-prepared-English-translation] to enhance nuclear transparency and pursue “peace and reconciliation” with the West. Additionally, in an apparent effort to poison the atmosphere on the eve of Rouhani’s inauguration, over two dozen Democratic senators signed a letter [https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/rep/release/seventy-six-senators-urge-obama-to-renew-urgency-on-iranian-nuclear-program]to President Obama demanding a “toughening of sanctions” and “a convincing threat of the use of force.” In May of that year, every Democratic senator joined their Republican colleagues in supporting a resolution [https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-resolution/65/text] which “urges that, if the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in self-defense, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel.” The wording is significant in that it put Senate Democrats on record that the United States should support an Israeli war on Iran not only if Israel was attacked, but even if Israel attacked first. By giving Benjamin Netanyahu the authority to determine what might “compel” Israel to act in “self-defense,” this near-unanimous decision helped pave the way for Israel to make such claims in its U.S.-backed war in June 2025 and the joint U.S.-Israeli war this year. Fortunately, by 2015, the Obama administration — along with Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China, and with the backing of the European Union and the United Nations — was able to negotiate an agreement whereby, in return for sanctions relief, Iran drastically curtailed its nuclear program to the degree that it was physically impossible to build a nuclear weapon, while also agreeing to strict monitoring to ensure compliance. It took perhaps the most intense [https://www.cnn.com/2015/09/11/politics/obama-congress-democrats-iran-nuclear-deal/] lobbying efforts of the Obama presidency to get congressional Democrats on board. In the end, only two Democratic senators, Robert Menendez and Chuck Schumer, opposed [https://www.cnn.com/2015/09/11/politics/obama-congress-democrats-iran-nuclear-deal/] the agreement, but their colleagues nevertheless elected them to senior positions — Menendez as chair of the Foreign Relations Committee and Schumer as their Senate leader. The 2016 Democratic platform [https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/2016-democratic-party-platform] endorsed the nuclear deal — but declared that, if Iran violated the agreement, rather than allow for the automatic reimposition of strict international sanctions to pressure Iran to come back into compliance as the deal outlined, a Democratic president “will not hesitate to take military action.” Since it would take Iranians at least a few years to rebuild their dramatically circumscribed nuclear program to the point where they could develop even a single nuclear weapon, there would be plenty of time, as well as serious punitive economic mechanisms, to push Iran to resume its compliance. Immediately launching a war, as the platform called for, would therefore not only be a direct violation of the United Nations Charter, it would be completely unnecessary. This is only a partial list of ways in which Democrats have pushed for a military confrontation with Iran over the past couple of decades. Even today, the fact that Democratic leaders [https://progressive.org/latest/trumps-disastrous-war-of-choice-in-iran-zunes-20260410/] still support [https://truthout.org/articles/democrats-reject-resolution-condemning-aipac-money-in-primaries/] unconditional military aid to Israel and Netanyahu, Trump’s partner in the illegal attacks on Iran, raises questions about their sincerity in opposing the war. It is highly unlikely the United States would have launched a full-scale war under a Democratic administration as it has under Trump. However hawkish many in the Democratic leadership have proven to be, they would have been far more likely to listen to allied governments, as well as the broad consensus of strategic analysts, intelligence officials, and military leaders that make up the foreign policy elite, many of whom have long warned of the serious consequences of going to war. At the same time, it is important to recognize how Democrats share responsibility with Republicans for creating the climate that made such a war possible. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit stephenzunes962006.substack.com/subscribe [https://stephenzunes962006.substack.com/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_2]

Trump’s Disastrous War of Choice in Iran

First published in The Progressive [https://progressive.org/latest/trumps-disastrous-war-of-choice-in-iran-zunes-20260410/], April 10, 2026. Read by Greg Bates. t is difficult, as of this writing, to speculate as to whether a genuine ceasefire in the war with Iran will take hold, even temporarily. Under previous U.S. presidential administrations, it was easier to make predictions, even when foreign policy decisions were based on faulty assumptions, since there was at least some sense that decision making would be based on strategic thinking. Not so under President Donald Trump, who has consistently sidelined [https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cg4g66r3z40o] or overruled [https://www.axios.com/2026/04/03/hegseth-george-hodne-army-fired-iran] knowledgeable advisors, including those in top military and intelligence positions, in order to pursue policies that appear to be motivated more by emotion than rational thinking. Indeed, even if the two-week ceasefire holds, the United States may simply use it to rearm and resupply its depleted stocks [https://americanmind.org/salvo/how-the-u-s-depleted-its-arsenal/] in order to resume its war on Iran. If the ceasefire does mean the end of hostilities for the foreseeable future, it will be hard for the Trump Administration to portray it as any sort of victory. Despite killing [https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/06/world/middleeast/killings-iran-leadership.html] prominent Iranian leaders and inflicting [https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2w0v19gw8o] enormous damage on Iran’s military and civilian infrastructure, the U.S. and Israeli bombardment of Iran appears to have left the critical components of its nuclear facilities and its supply of partially [https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/07/middleeast/us-israel-iran-nuclear-expertise-intl#:~:text=%E2%80%9CIran%20is%20the%20only%20country,enriched%20uranium%20became%20increasingly%20unclear.] enriched uranium intact. Iran is still able to launch drones and missiles, and the regime’s grip on power is as strong as ever, and all of Trump’s stated goals [https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/04/10/trump-goals-iran-achieved/] for the war remain unfulfilled. Indeed, with the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and ascension of his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, as Iran’s new Supreme Leader, the Iranian people and the entire region are now dealing with a regime which Ravi Agrawal, editor of Foreign Policy, correctly observes [https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/08/iran-war-ceasefire-trump-united-states-israel/] is “emboldened, vengeful, more militaristic, and more hardline.” And, if Iran allows ships to resume transiting the Strait of Hormuz, it will have unprecedented control over shipping, including the ability to charge fees [https://apnews.com/article/strait-of-hormuz-iran-tolls-oil-3ef5dcd907122922db714d318c35317e] to help rebuild the country’s damaged infrastructure. With the Strait acting as a chokehold for the transit of 20 percent of the world’s oil supply—as well as a great deal [https://www.politico.com/news/2026/03/14/hormuz-inflation-helium-fertilizer-00828680] of the world’s fertilizer, liquid helium, and other important commodities—this control is a valuable asset for Iran, and one they did not possess before the current war began. More critically, as Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft notes [https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ceasefire-iran-us-israel/], “The United States is no longer in a position to dictate terms; any agreement will have to rest on genuine compromise. That, in turn, demands real diplomacy—patience, discipline, and a tolerance for ambiguity—qualities not typically associated with Trump.” At the same time, the United States may not have much of a choice. Trump’s genocidal threats [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=03lvxq7kzdc] about destroying Iranian civilization on April 7—an act that in itself can be considered a war crime [https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-iran-war-crime-international-law/]—may have come from the knowledge that a ceasefire was imminent so he could pretend that it was he that forced the Iranians to give in, not the other way around. In spite of the apparent willingness of the Trump Administration to accept the enormous financial costs of the war, the physical damage inflicted on U.S. assets in the region and allied Middle Eastern states, the harm done to America’s international standing, and the impact on the global economy, it became apparent that the war had simply become unwinnable. Trump has found himself under enormous pressure, not just from the American public [https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/5821063-iran-war-trump-approval/] and U.S. allies [https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/8/trump-administration-says-it-is-mulling-nato-withdrawal-after-iran-war] (which he appears quite willing to ignore), but international business and finance, which are reeling [https://fortune.com/2026/03/29/global-economy-impact-iran-war-gas-price/] from the economic consequences of the war and fearful of far greater damage to come if the war resumes. As a result, Trump’s new priority became to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, which had been operating normally until the United States and Israel launched their war on February 28. However, as long as the Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed, the war could resume at any moment. And it is unlikely to re-open as long as Israel continues its horrific assault [https://www.democracynow.org/2026/4/9/israeli_escalation_in_lebanon?utm_source=Democracy+Now%21&utm_campaign=82527a6f16-Daily_Digest_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_fa2346a853-82527a6f16-1344041930] on Lebanon. Despite U.S. and Israeli claims to the contrary, Pakistani mediators and others have confirmed [https://www.commondreams.org/news/pakistan-lebanon-ceasefire] that the agreement for a two-week halt to the fighting and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz was contingent on a ceasefire in Lebanon. European leaders [https://apnews.com/article/iran-europe-eu-hormuz-lebanon-macron-meloni-merz-5c49b81c89bc694207db8e07ceba70ea] and other U.S. allies [https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2026/apr/09/penny-wong-joint-statement-aid-workers-lebanon-ceasefire] have underscored the importance of the ceasefire applying to Lebanon as well. In actuality, Israel’s U.S.-backed air strikes in Lebanon have gone well beyond Hezbollah military targets to include the heavy bombing [https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/04/lebanon-urgent-call-to-protect-civilians-as-death-toll-mounts-following-brutal-escalation-in-israeli-attacks/] of crowded urban neighborhoods. Israeli bombing on April 9, the day following the cessation of hostilities in the Gulf, killed [https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/israeli-strikes-kill-more-than-180-in-central-beirut-saying-iran-truce-doesnt-apply] more than 300 people, the vast majority of them civilians. This comes on top of Israel’s occupation and ethnic cleansing of a large swath of southern Lebanon and the systematic destruction [https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-destroy-all-houses-near-lebanon-border-defence-minister-says-2026-03-31/] of entire villages. The United States is therefore faced with a decision to either force Israel to cease its attacks on Lebanon or to accept the continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the likelihood of the resumption of the war. Meanwhile, Democratic leaders in Congress are being forced to explain [https://theintercept.com/2026/04/09/democrats-dnc-israel-aipac-resolution/] how they can both oppose a resumption of the Iran war while refusing to call for an end to offensive U.S. military aid to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as Israeli leaders continue to sabotage the prospects of maintaining a ceasefire. At the Democratic National Committee’s annual meeting this past week, party leadership blocked a resolution [https://theintercept.com/2026/04/09/democrats-dnc-israel-aipac-resolution/] calling for conditioning future military aid to Israel on that government’s compliance with international law in relation to the U.S.-Israel war on Iran. Even in a best-case scenario in which the worst of the killing and destruction is over, some semblance of normal commerce can resume, and the reconstruction of war-damaged homes and infrastructure can begin, the main challenge for those of us in the United States is to create measures to ensure that never again can a single man unleash such chaos and destruction. To do so will require a long-overdue assertion of Congressional authority, including a willingness by Congressional Democrats to block funding for Netanyahu’s war machine and Trump’s Pentagon until they come into compliance with international law and categorically renounce wars of aggression. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit stephenzunes962006.substack.com/subscribe [https://stephenzunes962006.substack.com/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_2]

The United States Cannot ‘Win’ a War on Iran

First published in The Progressive Magazine, April 3, 2026. Written by Stephen Zunes, Read by Greg Bates. Iran certainly cannot win a war in the face of the massive U.S. and Israeli onslaught. As recent weeks have shown, however, it can still prevent the United States from winning. In a new form of asymmetrical warfare, Iran has proven itself capable of wreaking havoc on the global economy to punish the United States and Israel for its aggression. President Donald Trump is a bully. Whether with women or with nations, he is willing to cross any moral or legal boundaries in order to dominate and control. He thinks he has the right to impose his will, whatever the consequences and however unpopular it may be with the international community and the American public. His insistence that he should have had a say [https://www.politico.com/news/2026/03/05/trump-unleashed-president-bullish-on-iran-eyeing-regime-change-in-cuba-and-impatient-with-ukraine-00814292] in picking Iran’s leadership underscores that this war is ultimately about control. This is not something the Iranian regime will accept, however much destruction will be rained down upon the country. The Tehran regime appears [https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260306-iran-says-it-is-ready-for-ground-invasion-and-rejects-ceasefire-with-us/] uninterested in a ceasefire. According to [https://tritaparsi.substack.com/p/some-observations-and-comments-on] Trita Parsi of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft [https://quincyinst.org/author/trita-parsi/], there is a sense that the decision to accept a ceasefire in the twelve-day war last June “only enabled the United States and Israel to restock and remobilize to launch war again. If they agree to a ceasefire now, they will only be attacked again in a few months.” There appears to have been [https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/khamenei-death-regime-change-iran-9.7110285] a mistaken belief in Washington, D.C., that the regime would implode upon the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other leaders, failing to recognize that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a complex network of overlapping interests with a stake in the status quo, not a regime that can be toppled by killing a few leaders. That failure has resulted in increasingly heavy bombardment of an ever-widening range of targets, along with the possibility of arming [https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/03/politics/cia-arming-kurds-iran] Kurdish rebels and other restive minorities and introducing U.S. ground troops. The Trump Administration has been unwilling to recognize that the Iranian regime could endure a long, incredibly one-sided, and utterly devastating war in the face of massive casualties. However, with Trump calling for [https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/03/06/iran-war-us-israel-strikes/] Iran’s “unconditional surrender,” it has become an existential war for the Iranian regime. Given how the Islamic Republic was willing to slaughter [https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/more-than-7000-dead-in-irans-crackdown-on-protests-activists-say] thousands of Iranians during the pro-democracy protests before the war, it is not likely to have much compunction about many thousands more being killed at the hands of foreign powers, particularly since many in leadership see their mandate as coming from God. Few authoritarian regimes in the post-World War II era have been toppled through foreign military intervention, and none through bombing alone. Hardly any have turned into stable democracies as a result. Indeed, Trump has said [https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/06/politics/trump-interview-iran-cuba-dana-bash] he does not care if Iran does not become a democracy as long as it is compliant with American interests. In the face of the horrific massacres of demonstrators earlier this year, there was some hope that the regular Iranian army [https://seymourhersh.substack.com/p/is-trump-a-liability-in-his-own-war] might move in to depose the clerics and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the two foundations [https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/irans-revolutionary-guards] of the regime’s power. While less politically and economically influential than the IRGC, the regular army is much larger and is composed largely of conscripts not necessarily allied with the regime. With them now under constant barrage and fighting to defend themselves from foreign attackers, however, this scenario seems far less likely. The most common and successful method of toppling autocrats has been through unarmed civil resistance [https://brill.com/view/journals/jpn/1/1/article-p130_010.xml], of which Iran has a rich history [https://www.huffpost.com/entry/irans-history-of-civil-in_b_217998]. Despite Trump’s call [https://youtu.be/o-E7DIctrzo?si=iGG6SDaxxjBvvKlG&t=411] on the Iranian people to rise up, most Iranians at this point are just desperately trying to survive. It was not surprising, then, that the initial celebrations [https://www.youtube.com/shorts/RjgpG-jtIak] over the killing of the hated “Supreme Leader,” and others in his circle, failed to turn into a movement. And no popular struggle is helped by vocal support from a nation’s sworn enemies, particularly if they are currently killing [https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/1/us-israel-attacks-on-iran-death-toll-and-injuries-live-tracker] thousands of your people. People tend to rally around the flag if their country is being bombed, particularly as civilian casualties grow. During my time in [https://www.facebook.com/stephen.zunes/posts/pfbid02u3pZH2EtRhhG6vpmgfySdoBVst2BhUQcmhT5EJBv5J4aThYR2SEZBsFB5v31kc1Vl] Iran in 2019, while the popular anger and frustration at the regime was palpable, and there was a clear desire to bring it down, I found no one advocating for war. Comments by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth [https://www.military.com/feature/2026/03/05/hegseths-stupid-rules-of-engagement-line-and-what-roe-actually-do.html] and White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller [https://www.the-independent.com/news/world/americas/us-politics/stephen-miller-trump-iran-war-b2932483.html] that the United States is no longer bound by international humanitarian law and other rules of engagement have already led U.S. and Israeli forces to target schools, hospitals, city parks, and cultural sites along with military and governmental facilities. This will likely lead to only greater resistance. The big mistake the United States made in Vietnam was seeing the struggle as one of fighting communism which, as an expansionist totalitarian ideology, it felt, had to be confronted with massive military force as was done against the fascists in Germany, Italy, and Japan during World War II. It failed to recognize that the National Liberation Front (the NLF or “Viet Cong”), while communist-led, was first and foremost [https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/the-program-of-the-national-liberation-front-or-viet-cong-1962/] a nationalist movement. So policymakers didn’t understand why the more troops they sent and the more they bombed, the stronger the resistance became. Similarly, in Iran, the regime is seen in Washington, D.C., through its Islamist identity and its efforts to spread a reactionary version of Shia Islam in the region. What the U.S. government fails to understand is that the regime’s hold on power comes in large part from taking advantage of its people’s strong embrace of nationalism and anti-imperialism. (During my time in Iran, I noticed that nationalist symbols were far more common in government propaganda than Islamist ones.) As a result, the terror bombing and calls to surrender to U.S. and Israeli demands is breeding its own resistance. Iran is an industrialized nation of more than ninety million people that has been a major regional power for much of the past [https://www.iransafar.co/history-of-iran/] 2,500 years and will not easily yield to foreign aggression. So, if the regime cannot be replaced, the ultimate goal may become to subject the country to such massive destruction it can no longer serve as a deterrent [https://truthout.org/articles/what-are-the-trump-administrations-true-objectives-in-iran/] to U.S. hegemony in this important oil-rich region, and to send a message to any governments that dare to defy U.S. objectives that they either do what the U.S. President says or suffer utterly devastating consequences. Even some of the current Iranian government’s harshest opponents fear “regime collapse.” They have seen the aftermath of foreign intervention in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan. Despite promises of freedom, each of these countries descended into chaos and civil war and/or were forced to endure a foreign occupation. As British Pakistani journalist Saima Mohsin noted [https://x.com/SaimaMohsin/status/2028052101528449197], “We know how imperial powers treat ‘liberated’ nations in the Middle East.” With the unlikelihood of an effective Iranian surrender, the only realistic way to end the carnage is to get the United States to end the war. The war is already unpopular with the American public. Even controversial wars like the invasion of Iraq had majority popular support once they were underway due to initial successes and a perceived obligation to back the government in wartime and to “support our troops” who were in harm’s way. Though initial support [https://www.gelliottmorris.com/p/polls-us-iran-attack-2026-03-06] for the war with Iran nearly doubled from pre-war polls [https://criticalissues.umd.edu/feature/do-americans-favor-attacking-iran-under-current-circumstances-latest-critical-issues-poll-0], this is still the first American war to have only minority support [https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/06/us/politics/trump-iran-war-public-support.html] at its outset. There are growing concerns [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/07/iran-us-israel-war-regime-change] among American military and intelligence officials that they will not be able to bring down the regime through air power alone. There are also limits to U.S. weapons stockpiles, raising questions [https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-weapons-stockpiles-interceptors-patriots-thaad-006d6294441fb2338463f6260e1a9256] as to how long the war can be sustained. The best hope in ending the carnage may be some kind of hurting stalemate resulting in a ceasefire where both sides could claim victory—the U.S. government claiming it has sufficiently damaged Iran’s military capabilities and the Iranian government noting that it survived. This is not likely to happen, however, until the physical destruction in Iran and, to a much lesser but not insignificant extent, other countries mounts. And, as evidenced by the current so-called ceasefire in Gaza, a humanitarian crisis and intermittent bombing will likely continue amid the rubble and the conflict will remain unresolved. Editor’s note: This article was written for the magazine on the eighth day of an ongoing war on the nation of Iran. It has been updated slightly to reflect events as they continue to unfold. At least fourteen countries have so far been drawn into the conflict, and in early March, the estimated cost to the U.S. taxpayer was estimated to be about $1 billion per day. Since its founding in 1909, The Progressive has always opposed [https://progressive.org/magazine/further-comment-never-just-war/] the use of military force to resolve conflicts. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit stephenzunes962006.substack.com/subscribe [https://stephenzunes962006.substack.com/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_2]

What Are the Trump Administration’s True Objectives in Iran?

First published in Truthout [https://truthout.org/], March 4, 2026. The ramifications of the escalating U.S.-Israeli war on Iran remain to be seen, but they will not be good. Indeed, as with the U.S.-led war on Iraq, the war on Iran could prove disastrous. It is important to understand, therefore, what would motivate the United States to launch such a reckless, illegal, and destructive action. Not surprisingly, most of President Donald Trump’s justifications for the war are demonstrably false: First of all, there is no evidence [https://www.politico.com/news/2026/03/01/trump-iran-preparing-attack-no-evidence-00806447] that Iran was planning a pre-emptive attack or constituted an imminent threat, as Secretary of State Marco Rubio [https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5763685-rubio-defense-iran-threat/] and others have claimed. Secondly, given that Iran’s missiles have a maximum range of 1800 miles, and that Iran is estimated to be a decade away from developing intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching North America, Trump’s claim [https://www.cnn.com/2026/02/27/politics/iran-missiles-trump-intelligence-nuclear] that Iran was on the verge of being able to attack the United States is absurd. Trump also repeated the long-debunked claim [https://progressive.org/latest/-no-evidence-iran-is-responsible-for-the-deaths-of-hundreds-of-americans-zunes-200107/] that thousands of Americans and millions of others were killed and wounded by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) made by Iran. Not only are these numbers gross exaggerations, but the vast majority of IEDs targeting U.S. forces were manufactured by Iraqi guerrillas (most of whom were anti-Iranian Salafists, Baathists, and others), not by Iran. And the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen’s Aden Harbor, which Trump has also mentioned, was done by Al-Qaeda, a bitter rival of Iran, not by anyone from Iran. Iran’s brutal repression of its own people is well-documented [https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/01/iran-authorities-unleash-heavily-militarized-clampdown-to-hide-protest-massacres/], but U.S. support for regimes that have engaged in either severe repression against pro-democracy protesters or mass killings of civilians — including Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Turkey, Egypt, and others — belies any genuine concern about promoting human rights and democracy. In this moment, Trump has made calls for the Iranian people to again rise up, but that cannot realistically take place while the country in being bombed. Indeed, being attacked by a foreign power generally leads people to rally around the flag. For example, while eventually successful, the Serbian democratic movement against the Milosevic regime was set back [https://www.csmonitor.com/1999/0402/p11s2.html] by the 1999 NATO bombing of their country. Indeed, a truly democratic Iran would likely reflect the anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist sentiments of the majority of Iranians and have more credibility than the corrupt, reactionary government currently in power, something the United States would presumably want to avoid. Trump falsely stated [https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-transcript-state-of-union-2026-c13e2a07df999b464b733f4a6e84dbd4] that Iran had never pledged not to build a nuclear weapon, when its leaders have in fact pledged not to [https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/16/when-the-ayatollah-said-no-to-nukes/] repeatedly. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has also tried push the contradictory claim that the United States “obliterated” [https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/trump-said-obliterated-irans-nuclear-program-now-says-us-may-bomb-iran-rcna260383] Iran’s nuclear program during its strikes last June, while simultaneously insisting [https://www.politifact.com/article/2026/feb/26/Iran-nuclear-bomb-week-Witkoff-Trump/] Iran is “probably a week away from having industrial grade bomb making material.” Neither is true. Meanwhile, there is no credible means by which the Trump administration can use Iran’s nuclear program to justify the war. The talks to revive the nuclear agreement were ongoing. On February 27, the Omani mediator said there had been significant progress in U.S.-Iranian talks and a deal was “within reach [https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-iran-deal-within-our-reach-oman-mediator-says/].” Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear program would not have even been an issue had Trump not unilaterally pulled out [https://progressive.org/latest/missed-opportunity-on-iran-zunes-20250618/] of the 2015 nuclear deal, which would have put very strict limits on Iran’s nuclear capabilities which, combined with its rigorous enforcement mechanisms, would have made it physically impossible [https://armscontrolcenter.org/the-iran-deal-then-and-now/] for Iran to build a bomb. It was doubtful that Trump even wanted a nuclear agreement, however. Given the scale of the ongoing military operations, it’s clear that these attacks had been planned for some time. Indeed, Trump’s insistence that he would not lift sanctions even if Iran gave into his demands provided Iranian negotiators little incentive to compromise. Furthermore, the Trump administration’s insistence that any deal with Iran also include agreements on other issues — such as eliminating Iran’s missile program, its support for regional allies, and internal repression — likely would have doomed the negotiations to failure. Even Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, despite their extreme anti-Soviet views, recognized that their nuclear agreements with Moscow would not have been possible if they insisted on including other contentious issues between the two countries in those deals. It is striking, though — in contrast to every other modern president who has taken the United States to war — how little effort Trump put into convincing Congress or the U.S. public that it was necessary. In 2003, George W. Bush devoted much of his State of the Union address just prior to the invasion of Iraq to making his case — albeit inaccurate and misleading [https://stephenzunes.org/2003/annotated-overview-of-foreign-policy-segments-of-bushs-state-of-union.txt] — for why the U.S. should go to war. By contrast, Trump spoke about Iran for less than three minutes of his one hour-48-minute State of the Union address, underscoring how he really didn’t care that much about convincing Congress or the U.S. public of the necessity to launch a major war in the Middle East. So, why has the United States gone to war against Iran? Much of it has to do with what was perceived as an opportunity. The Iranian regime has never been more isolated, both internationally and domestically. Its violent repression of pro-democracy protesters in January and its status as a pariah state has resulted in a somewhat muted response in the international community to the U.S.-Israeli attacks, despite their clear illegality. Meanwhile, Syria’s Assad regime, the only state in the region that the Iranian government considered an ally, was toppled in late 2024 in a popular uprising, and its Houthi and Hezbollah allies have been dramatically weakened by devastating air strikes in recent years. Domestically, the anger at the regime has never been higher, particularly after its recent massacre of thousands of anti-government demonstrators. However, such setbacks do not mean the regime is on the verge of collapse, even with the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei. Iran’s supreme leader was 86 years old and in declining health. His death will not likely change much except that this widely reviled cleric has now been made a martyr. More salient is the fact that Iran was already as much a militarized authoritarian state as a theocracy, with the Revolutionary Guard exerting at least as much power as the clergy. Even killing a few of their commanders as well will not weaken their control over the country. The authoritarian regime in Iran is not a typical one-man dictatorship in which the government can be toppled by a single leader’s elimination. Rather, the Iranian regime comprises a complex system of powerful overlapping institutions that have a stake in maintaining the system. As a result, the killing of leaders, while a serious setback in some cases, will not likely constitute a fatal blow. Among those wishing to take advantage of Iran’s weakened state has been Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has been pushing for a major war against Iran for decades. However, while Israel has joined the United States in its war on Iran in pursuit of their common objectives, there is little indication that the Trump administration is doing this to protect Israel. Israel has more than adequate defenses from any possible Iranian aggression, including a nuclear deterrent. U.S. hostility toward an independent-minded Iran has been a major component of U.S. foreign policy for decades, regardless of Israel. The United States overthrew its democratically elected prime minister in 1953. The United States repeatedly attacked Iran’s navy, coastal installations, and even a civilian airliner in the so-called 1987-88 “tanker war” toward the end of the Iran-Iraq War. The United States armed Kurdish and Baluchi separatists in the 2000s. Over the decades, the United States has supported the Gulf Arab monarchies, Israel, and even Saddam’s Iraq in targeting Iran. I’ve never seen any evidence that Israel was behind any of those policies and, despite Netanyahu’s encouragement, there is little evidence that he or the pro-Israel lobby were a decisive factor in Trump’s decision to go to war. Trump is nobody’s puppet. Failing any direct evidence that this war would not have taken place were it not for the Israeli government and its backers, there should be caution about claiming that it was — both for the sake of accuracy as well as the importance of not reinforcing old antisemitic canards about Jews manipulating non-Jewish political leaders into pursuing destructive policies they would not have otherwise taken. Ultimately what this war is about is going after the one major power left in the region that has dared to challenge U.S. hegemony. It’s about the “full spectrum dominance” originally articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy [https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/] during the Bush administration. Since even weeks of heavy bombing are not likely to bring down the Iranian government, the goal may be to inflict as much damage as possible, making Iran an example to any other country that dares defy the United States. What the United States and Israel want, therefore, is a weakened Iran, one with a severely damaged infrastructure that is incapable of meeting the needs of its own people, much less serving as a counterweight to U.S. hegemony. The U.S. and Israel appear to be angling to create a situation where ethnic minorities (which constitute close to half the nation’s population), leftists, monarchists, religious factions, and others will struggle against each other amid the ruins, leaving the nation weak and divided. In effect, if the United States cannot impose a government of its choosing, it is seeking to turn Iran into a failed state. Indeed, it appears the United States and Israel are targeting not just regime leaders, but also dissident nationalists and moderate Islamists. Former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Moussavi, the central figure in the 2009 Green Movement [https://www.huffpost.com/entry/irans-stolen-election-has_b_215472] against the regime, narrowly escaped assassination [https://x.com/KZiabari/status/2027703332366586304] by an airstrike targeting his residential building, where he has been under house arrest. There have been a number of reports [https://www.thenation.com/article/world/iran-war-trump-netanyahu-failed-state/] of prominent Iranian leftists [https://x.com/TariqAli_News/status/2027717241454686454] being targeted as well. Perhaps the United States believes that, in targeting all of these different groups, it will make it easier, in the event of a regime collapse, to reinstate the monarchy as the United States did back in 1953. It is very unlikely, however, that this effort will succeed. From the outset, Trump has treated Iran as if it were one of the Central American governments that the U.S. treated like vassal states in the early to mid-twentieth century, essentially dictating policies under threat of overthrowing the government. But Iran, by contrast, is an industrialized nation of over 90 million people that has been a major regional power for much of the past 2,500 years. Washington’s big mistake in Vietnam was seeing the conflict as part of an advancing global totalitarian threat that needed to be met by massive military support. In reality, the National Liberation Front (a.k.a. the “Viet Cong”), while communist-led, was first and foremost a nationalist movement, which was why the more the U.S. bombed and the more combat troops were sent, the greater the resistance. Similarly, the United States, by focusing on the religious orientation of the Iranian regime, is grossly underestimating its staying power as a nationalist government. As a result, this overtly imperialist effort, like most attempts of hegemonic overreach by Western powers, is almost certain to yield unexpected and devastating consequences. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit stephenzunes962006.substack.com/subscribe [https://stephenzunes962006.substack.com/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_2]