International report

Turkey courts Libya's rival factions in bid to further Mediterranean ambitions

In a bold move by Ankara, Turkey this week brought together Libya’s two rival militaries for international exercises. While firmly supporting the Tripoli-based regime, Turkey is now extending an olive branch to the Benghazi administration, aiming to steady Libya and broaden its sway across the region. For the first time, Libya’s two military forces participated internationally together under one flag. According to the Turkish defence ministry, 501 personnel from both Libyan armies joined Turkey’s Efes 2026 military exercises. “There needs to be one unified army in Libya [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/libya/], one unified military force,” said Libya expert Aya Burweila of the Athens-based Centre for Hellenic and Mediterranean Studies. “I think these joint exercises help with that. They help facilitate closer cooperation with both sides, and that can only be a good thing.” Libya has been split since 2014, with the Government of National Unity ruling the west from Tripoli [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/tripoli/] and the Government of National Stability holding the east in Benghazi [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/benghazi/]. While Ankara has long championed Tripoli, analyst Burweila suggests that May’s joint exercises signal a new Turkish push to engage with Benghazi. “This is a huge, practical pivot towards the east [by Turkey]. It has huge implications for Libya’s stability. Turkey’s position now is that it has good relations with both sides,” said Burweila. “It’s not just joint military exercises. There are business interests, there are sales of weapons and drones, and so forth.”  Turkey and Italy boost cooperation in bid to shape Libya’s political future [https://www.rfi.fr/en/podcasts/international-report/20250813-turkey-and-italy-boost-cooperation-in-bid-to-shape-libya-political-future] ENERGY RESERVES For Ankara, courting the Benghazi administration, led by military commander Khalifa Haftar [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/khalifa-haftar/], is all about expanding Turkey’s influence in the eastern Mediterranean, argues Jalel Harchaoui of the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based defence think tank.  Harchaoui said Ankara needs Haftar’s support to enforce a 2019 memorandum of understanding that Turkey signed with the Tripoli administration to create a joint exclusive economic zone in Libyan waters.  “Now, if Ankara wants to enforce it, which it does, it needs to have the Haftar family on board,” Harchaoui explained. “The Haftar family can deliver on two very necessary things: the parliamentary ratification, because the parliament happens to be controlled by the Haftar family, and also the part of the coast that is involved in this arrangement is eastern Libya, not western Libya.” However, the Turkey-Libya exclusive economic zone, believed to have large untapped energy reserves, is strongly opposed by Greece [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/greece/] and Cyprus [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/cyprus/], who claim it violates their territorial waters. Neighbouring Egypt [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/egypt/] and Israel [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/israel/] have also voiced concerns. Haftar’s eastern Libyan government shares their reluctance. “Eastern Libya has very good relations with Egypt and has cordial relations with Greece as well. And this memorandum, at least from their side, violates their rights,” explained Libya analyst Burweila.  She added: “I think what lots of Libyans feel is: 'this fight is not our fight. We don't want to be involved in this kind of dispute.' So while this is a big priority for Turkey, it is not a priority for Libyans, and I think everybody there would prefer to kick this can down the road.” Egypt and Turkey's closer ties spark hope for peace among Libya’s rival factions [https://www.rfi.fr/en/podcasts/international-report/20241027-egypt-and-turkey-s-closer-ties-spark-hope-for-peace-among-libya-s-rival-factions] CARROT AND STICK Throughout 2025, Ankara wooed Haftar and his son Saddam, chief of staff of the Libyan National Army [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/libyan-national-army/], but saw little progress. According to analyst Harchaoui, Turkey [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/turkey/] has since toughened its stance, zeroing in on Haftar’s late-year military backing of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Turkish-made combat drones have been pictured [https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypts-drone-deployment-border-raises-stakes-sudans-civil-war-2026-02-02/] on airbases in southern Egypt, which like Turkey backs the Sudanese army in its fight against the paramilitary RSF. According to a New York Times investigation [https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/01/world/africa/egypt-sudan-drones.html], they have been used for strikes in Sudan [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/sudan/]. “This was a new development,” said Harchaoui, “It was basically Turkey saying, 'I smiled for most of 2025, and you did nothing for me. And you will have seen two faces. You will have seen the carrot, obviously, but also the stick.'” In April, Turkey delivered a new batch of military drones to Haftar’s army, continuing this carrot-and-stick policy. The Turkish defence ministry says it aims to hold further joint military exercises with both Libyan armies. While Turkey is stepping up its efforts to stabilise Libya, its goal of securing joint control of a huge swathe of the eastern Mediterranean [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/mediterranean/] threatens to drag the country further into an increasingly bitter regional rivalry.

Turkey expands military footprint in Somalia as regional rivalries intensify

Turkey’s role in Somalia is under growing scrutiny, with the East African country embroiled in controversy over elections and Israel stepping up efforts to challenge Turkey in the region. Over the last two years Turkey has ramped up its economic and military presence in Somalia [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/somalia/], building on decades of development. The East African country is home to Turkey’s largest overseas military base and this year it bolstered its military presence, deploying F16 fighter jets and tanks. Turkey is also constructing a space port for its rapidly advancing missile programme, and the two countries have signed agreements to exploit potentially vast energy reserves. But the deepening partnership is proving increasingly controversial, says Omar Mahmood [https://www.crisisgroup.org/who-we-are/people/omar-mahmood]of the International Crisis Group. While five or 10 years ago there would have been "quite high praise" for Turkey's role, that's changed over the last two years. "Some of these [Turkish] contracts and projects have tipped into [a much] greater scale and that has raised questions" he noted. Turkey boosts Mali defence ties after separatist and jihadist attacks [https://www.rfi.fr/en/podcasts/international-report/20260502-turkey-boosts-mali-defence-ties-after-separatist-and-jihadist-attacks] ELECTION DISPUTE A looming constitutional crisis is adding to the scrutiny of Turkey’s role in Somalia. The Somali government is insisting it has one year left of its electoral mandate, while the opposition claims elections should be held in May. "The core issue is that the political elite are infighting about the system,” explains Mahmood. “So anytime that happens, those who are against the government wind up complaining and then also looking at who is supporting the Somali government." Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/recep-tayyip-erdogan/] authorisation of $30 million in cash aid to the Somali government, which coincided with an April visit to Istanbul by his Somali counterpart, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, drew criticism from both the Somali and Turkish opposition. Famine looms in Somalia amid drought, dwindling aid and Middle East war [https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20260515-famine-looms-in-somalia-amid-drought-dwindling-aid-and-middle-east-war] “Turkey providing cash aid to the Somali government sparked the debate,” said African studies professor Elem Eyrice Tepeciklioglu [https://bce.asbu.edu.tr/en/akademik-personel/elemeyricetepeciklioglu], of the Social Sciences University of Ankara. “It seems some people think Turkey supports the ruling government, and provides support to the ruling government because they benefit from the relationship.” Ankara has strongly refuted accusations of interference in Somali politics. However, it could be paying the price for being too focused on Mogadishu in the past, given the diverse nature of Somalia's regions. “Turkey has started to learn from its mistakes,” said Tepeciklioglu. “They have started to increase their involvement with different states, with different regions, and have started to increase their engagement with local people as well.” RIVALRY IN THE REGION Turkey is also facing a growing challenge in the region from Israel [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/israel/], which in April appointed an ambassador to Somaliland – becoming the first country to recognise the breakaway republic, which seceded from Somalia in 1991. “It’s been useful probably for [Israel] to assert themselves against Turkey in an area where Turkey has firmly planted its flag,” said Norman Ricklefs [https://mq.academia.edu/NormanRicklefs]of geopolitical consultancy, the NAMEA Group. Israeli-Turkish relations remain strained over Ankara’s support of Hamas and Israel’s war against Gaza and Lebanon. The Israeli government has indicated it is considering a military presence in Somaliland [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/somaliland/], to counter the threat posed by the Houthis in Yemen.  “I don't think we're at that stage yet,” said Ricklefs. "But any Israeli military presence in Somaliland is going to raise angst amongst the neighbours – Somalia, Egypt, Turkey and potentially Saudi Arabia. Obviously, it's going to be destabilising.” The risky calculations behind Israel's recognition of Somaliland [https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20260109-the-risky-calculations-behind-israel-s-recognition-of-somaliland] The Horn of Africa could be a potential new flashpoint if Israel deploys military assets in Somaliland, agrees international relations professor Serhat Guvenc [https://khas.academia.edu/SerhatGuvenc] of Istanbul’s Kadir Has University. "The potential for conflict between Israel and Turkey is really high, because they're pursuing diametrically opposed objectives. If relations further deteriorate, then we may see tensions running high between the two countries because they would be in almost physical contact. Their military assets may run the risk of having dangerous encounters with each other." Israeli-Turkish rivalry in the region threatens to exacerbate existing tensions in an already volatile area. For Turkey, which has invested more than €1 billion in development in Somalia over the past decade, and is also eyeing major financial returns from its energy exploration in Somalian waters, the stakes are high.

Turkey sounds alarm over planned French troop deployment to Cyprus

Ankara has voiced alarm at Cyprus’s announcement that France will deploy soldiers on the Mediterranean island. The move has fuelled Turkish fears of encirclement, as Cyprus and Greece continue to deepen defence ties with Turkey’s rival Israel. Turkish officials have strongly criticised France’s plan to send soldiers to Cyprus, warning it could escalate tensions. Cyprus [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/cyprus/] has remained divided since 1974, when Turkey invaded following a coup backed by Greece. The north is governed by a Turkish Cypriot administration recognised only by Turkey. Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides stated that the French deployment is part of a Status of Forces Agreement to be signed in June. France increased its military support, sending forces to the area after Iranian missiles targeted the island. But Ankara sees the move as part of a growing rivalry with Paris. “Turkey and France are geopolitical rivals. They have been competing with each other in Africa and the eastern Mediterranean,” explains international relations professor Serhat Guvenc of Istanbul’s Kadir Has University. “France is inclined to view Turkey as a potential revisionist power, pursuing hegemonic aspirations in the region,” he said, adding that Cyprus is a small island and a concentration of military power without unified command could lead to unwanted escalation. Cyprus’s EU presidency: seeking resilience in a new world order [https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20260102-cyprus-s-eu-presidency-seeking-resilience-in-a-new-world-order] Christodoulides downplayed Turkish concerns, stating that any French deployment would serve “humanitarian purposes". However, former Cypriot ambassador Euripides Evriviades argues that Turkey’s military presence is the primary security threat in Cyprus. “These things are happening because we feel very insecure – it is 40,000 Turkish troops on the island in an aggressive posture,” said Evriviades. “The insecurity on the island stems directly from the continued occupation and violations of human rights that come with any occupation." FRENCH BACKING Macron’s support for Cyprus echoes his strong backing of Greece. During a recent visit to Athens, he said there was “no room for doubt” [https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20260425-france-s-macron-tells-greek-pm-mitsotakis-we-will-be-by-your-side] about France’s military support for Greece against any threats, a statement widely interpreted as being aimed at Turkey. France’s increased support for Greece [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/greece/] and Cyprus coincides with Athens and Nicosia strengthening security ties with Israel. Cyprus urges EU to agree plan for defence of member states ahead of summit [https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20260422-cyprus-urges-eu-to-agree-plan-for-joint-defence-of-member-states-ahead-of-summit] “The Cyprus problem is no longer the Cyprus problem per se, but has become a part of the wider geopolitical rivalries in the region,” said Guvenc. Turkish-Israeli relations remain tense, with both sides viewing each other as a threat [https://www.rfi.fr/en/podcasts/international-report/20260418-turkey-warns-it-could-be-israel-s-next-enemy-as-tensions-escalate]. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan warned that the alignment of Cyprus, Israel and Greece is an attempt to “encircle Turkey". Ankara fears that such a military alliance could be used to advance Greek and Cypriot claims over the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas, where Turkey and Greece have multiple territorial disputes. “If they combine their military and naval capabilities, they may attempt to deny Turkey access to the Eastern Mediterranean. So this is a danger,” said Guvenc. CYCLE OF DISTRUST The upcoming Washington summit involving Greece, Cyprus and Israel [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/israel/] is likely to intensify Ankara’s concerns about isolation. Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, head of the German Marshall Fund office in Ankara, warns that the region is caught in a growing cycle of distrust, and any new military deployment to Cyprus is likely to prompt a reciprocal response. “Turkey could make new deployments, drones, even fighter jets,” he said. Turkey steps up as Europe's indispensable and uncomfortable defence partner [https://www.rfi.fr/en/podcasts/international-report/20260426-turkey-steps-up-as-europe-s-indispensable-and-uncomfortable-defence-partner] Unluhisarcikli also cautions that renewed tensions over Cyprus are a dangerous distraction from the ongoing Russian threat. “At a time when the transatlantic community at large is facing much larger external threats, NATO allies should not be posturing against each other, and that's what we are seeing. This is unacceptable." “The risk of a real confrontation is very limited, but it will lead both sides to double down on their current positions,” he added. Turkey [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/turkey/], which has the second-largest army in NATO, is viewed by some in the European Union as a potential answer to concerns about the United States’ commitment to Europe's defence amid the ongoing Russian threat. However, renewed tensions over Cyprus may undermine these expectations.

Turkey boosts Mali defence ties after separatist and jihadist attacks

Turkey’s efforts to expand its influence in West Africa could be threatened by attacks on Mali’s military regime, as Ankara pledges support while its growing security cooperation with Bamako faces new pressure. Ankara [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/ankara/] has strongly condemned attacks by Tuareg [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/tuareg/] separatists and Al Qaeda-linked jihadists on Mali’s military government. The attacks began last weekend, killed the defence minister and handed over control of key territory. Turkey [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/turkey/] has built ties with Mali [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/mali/] over the past two decades, but since Mali’s military rulers took power in 2021, that relationship has shifted sharply towards security. “Since 2010, that expansion has been much more rapid,” said Professor Sedat Aybar, director of the Asia Pacific Africa Studies Centre at Bahcesehir University [https://int.bau.edu.tr/] in Istanbul. “It starts on humanitarian grounds and then evolves toward economic cooperation, followed by security and military aid, and capacity building for the Malian military, particularly against terrorist activities in the north.” Russia vows to keep forces in Mali despite warning from separatists to withdraw [https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20260430-russia-vows-to-keep-forces-in-mali-despite-warning-from-separatists-to-withdraw] SECURITY EXPANSION Turkey has signed several security and defence agreements with Mali’s military rulers, mainly focused on training and logistics. Defence [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/defence/] sales have also increased, including advanced Turkish drones. Turkey’s role has grown as Mali sought new security partners after expelling French forces in 2022. Russia [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/russia/] remains Mali’s main security partner, but Turkey is becoming more important as Bamako [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/bamako/] seeks to reduce dependence on Moscow [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/moscow/]. “We did see the late defense minister [Sadio Camara] going to Ankara on several occasions to sign bilateral agreements, but also to acquire drones and other equipment that would support the Malian army,” said Beverly Ochieng, senior analyst at Control Risks, a global risk consultancy. Turkish firms have sold Mali advanced drones, including the Akinci, she said, adding that Russian paramilitary forces in Mali have also acquired equipment through Turkey, “It's also by proxy, because the Russian paramilitaries, they have been acquiring equipment on their own behalf, but also for the Malian army via Turkey,” Ochieng said. Malian official accuses Russian forces of 'betrayal' after Kidal falls to rebels [https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20260428-malian-official-accuses-russian-forces-of-betrayal-after-kidal-falls-to-rebels] REGIONAL AMBITIONS Turkey’s expanding security role in Mali is part of a broader Sahel strategy that also includes Burkina Faso [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/burkina-faso/] and Niger [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/niger/]. “Not just Mali, but the Sahel [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/sahel/] is very important. Cooperation with Burkina Faso and Niger is very important too,” said Melis Ozdemir, a PhD candidate at Galatasaray University [https://gsu.edu.tr/en] studying Turkish-Malian relations. The military governments in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, all of which cut defence ties with France, have opened new opportunities for Turkish diplomacy and defence exports. “It's given Turkey a chance to increase its footprint, not just politically or diplomatically, but also it can show its military power, its drones, and its new military vehicles and equipment,” said Ozdemir. “I think Turkey is also testing its own military equipment in these regions.” Direct Turkish military intervention in Mali appears unlikely, Aybar said, but Ankara could still send military advisers if requested. “Nigeria requested Turkish military advisors to enhance Nigeria [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/nigeria/]'s capacity to fight Boko Haram, the terrorist organization in Nigeria, so Turkey is engaged in doing this,” said Aybar. “If the Malian government invites Turkey to do a similar thing in Mali, then Turkey will consider sending in experts and advisers to the military in Mali.” Turkey is also offering diplomatic support. “There could be a route through negotiations,” said Ochieng. “Turkey is one of the middle powers that is also trying to look for dynamic ways of resolving conflict. It’s not just within the Sahel, but you've seen them try to be involved in the DR Congo, calling for dialogue between the warring parties,” Ochieng said. “Ankara and Istanbul [https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/istanbul/] have also become a point where armed groups are able to hold talks and to find mediated ways out of political and security crises."

Chernobyl, 40 years on: the disaster that triggered the downfall of a superpower

As radiation spread across Europe in April 1986, so did the truth about a political system built on silence. Four decades on, RFI spoke to history and politics professor Oleg Kobtzeff about how the Chernobyl nuclear disaster exposed the USSR's culture of secrecy, and was among the catalysts for its collapse. On 26 April, 1986, a reactor exploded at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in what was then the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, sending a radioactive cloud drifting across Europe. For days, the Soviet Union said nothing. But as radiation alarms sounded in Scandinavia and the truth seeped out, the disaster became something bigger than an industrial accident. It pulled back the curtain on a system built on secrecy – and, some argue, helped bring that system crashing down. Four decades on, the question still resonates: was Chernobyl the beginning of the end for the Soviet Union? Oleg Kobtzeff, associate professor of history and politics at the American University of Paris [https://www.aup.edu/profile/okobtzeff], says the scale of the disaster was understood almost immediately in Moscow. “You have a complete meltdown of the core of the nuclear plant. We quite often forget the incredibly heroic attempts of the local scientists and the firemen and other responders who managed to prevent the worst.” Those early interventions, he says, prevented an even greater catastrophe, one with potentially global consequences. “A lot of people sacrificed their lives [https://www.rfi.fr/en/europe/20160426-survivors-remember-chernobyl-nuclear-disaster] to contain the meltdown." Hiding the endless horror of Chernobyl [https://www.rfi.fr/en/20190717-chernobyl-12] CULTURE OF SECRECY But while the severity of the situation was clear to those in power, their response followed a different script – one shaped by decades of Soviet political conditioning [https://politicsgeo.com/ideological-subversion-and-the-strategic-logic-of-influence-2/]. “Secrecy was part of the political culture, and habits that had gone on for four generations,” said Kobtzeff. “It was unthinkable to be transparent.” From childhood, Soviet citizens were conditioned to see the outside world as hostile and to guard information accordingly. “You are taught that we are surrounded by enemies and spies and we must not disclose any vital information,” Kobtzeff explained. “So obviously there’s going to be about two, three weeks when the authorities keep it under the lid.” But when fallout was detected abroad – in Sweden, Norway and Finland, even parts of France [https://www.rfi.fr/en/asia-pacific/20110907-french-court-dismisses-chernobyl-nuclear-fallout-case-after-10-years] – silence became impossible, particularly at a time when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was seeking to ease Cold War tensions. According to Kobtzeff, Chernobyl was an opportunity. “It became a pretext for Gorbachev and the liberals in the Kremlin to begin the reforms that they had already been thinking about for years." A NEW TRANSPARENCY What followed marked a sharp break with the past, as Gorbachev faced journalists and answered unscripted questions about the disaster. “He dares to respond candidly,” said Kobtzeff. “Conferences of this sort had never happened since the Bolshevik Revolution.” This shift was immediate and widely understood. “It was seen as an absolute revolution. People understood what was happening even before the word 'perestroika [https://www.britannica.com/topic/perestroika-Soviet-government-policy]' was pronounced.” But this greater openness came at a cost. By exposing industrial mismanagement, environmental damage and decades of secrecy, the reforms also undermined the legitimacy of the Soviet system. “The tragedy of Gorbachev… is that instead of being seen as a reformer, he’s seen as the last man standing of a completely flawed system,” said Kobtzeff. West pays tribute to Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader who ended Cold War [https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20220831-west-pays-tribute-to-gorbachev-the-last-soviet-leader-who-ended-cold-war] The debate over Chernobyl’s role in the Soviet collapse continues. Some argue the system was already in decline, weakened by economic stagnation and political rigidity. Kobtzeff acknowledges that view, describing the disaster as part of an existing broader malaise. But he is clear on one point – Chernobyl acted as a catalyst. “Whether it’s a symptom or whether it’s completely part of the mechanisms… I don't think it really matters,” he argued. “The important thing to understand is that everything is related.” A GRIM LEGACY That interpretation, Kobtzeff said, was shared at the highest levels of Soviet power. “They realised that Chernobyl was becoming a catalyst for everything that was wrong with the system,” he said, citing personal accounts from former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze. “They discussed this in government meetings – that it revealed what needed to be reformed if you wanted to save the system.” Forty years on, the physical legacy [https://www.rfi.fr/en/video/20260423-studying-nuclear-fallout-in-chernobyl] of the disaster remains grim. In parts of Belarus and northern Ukraine, communities still live with elevated rates of cancer, thyroid disease and birth defects. A vast exclusion zone surrounds the reactor, a place that is strangely both abandoned and revived, with wild animals thriving there, undisturbed by humans. “You have an entire zone near Chernobyl which is completely cordoned off,” Kobtzeff said. “It’s like another planet.” He added that the site remains a long-term challenge: “We’ve got thousands of years of work to continue containing this.” In 1986, the Soviet Union too tried to contain the fallout – but the truth was harder to hide.