CogWar

The Political Economy of Influence & Counter FIMI Institutions - part 2

In this episode of COGWAR, hosts Raymond and James explore the political economy of influence and counter-FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) institutions. Continuing from Part 1, they dissect a Swedish report on Russia's Operation Double Ganger, a leaked influence campaign by the Social Design Agency. Critiquing it as a "Western liberal document" with inherent biases and blind spots, they discuss how Russia fuses military doctrine, intelligence, and ad tech to sow discord, often prioritizing notoriety over efficacy. The conversation critiques proposals for a European network of counter-FIMI institutions, highlighting issues like free speech implications, lack of strategic goals, platform dependencies on US tech giants, and domestic tensions exploited by adversaries. Drawing on examples from Norway, the UK, and US politics, they question the feasibility of responses, emphasizing the need for evidence-based analysis, trust-building, and sociological awareness in cognitive warfare. ---------------------------------------- Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy [https://acast.com/privacy] for more information.

The Political Economy of Influence & Counter FIMI Institutions

In this thought-provoking first installment of a two-part series, hosts dive deep into the myths and realities of free speech, influence systems, and the digital battlegrounds shaping our world. Kicking off with a poignant quote from philosopher Ivan Illich on how technology disrupts the "commons" of silence, the episode challenges simplistic notions of democracy and unrestricted expression. ---------------------------------------- Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy [https://acast.com/privacy] for more information.

Eating the elephant

In this episode of Cog War, titled "Eating the Elephant: Conceptualising Disorder," hosts James and Raymond reflect on a recent workshop at Lancaster University exploring the new world order, or disorder. Drawing from military theories like cognitive warfare, reflective control, and unrestricted warfare, they critique gaps in the field: the lack of institutional coordination against cross-domain attacks, the West's defensive stance without offensive strategies, and hypocrisy in blaming foreign tech while ignoring domestic AI and social media's cognitive impacts. They challenge technological determinism, arguing that platforms amplify pre-existing social fractures, from mental health declines to eroded institutional trust. With examples from revolutions, genocides, and elections, they call for a holistic, self-reflective approach to this fuzzy domain. Join the conversation on navigating cognitive threats in a multipolar world. ---------------------------------------- Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy [https://acast.com/privacy] for more information.

Client-Side Scanning, the Moral Character of Cryptographic Work – Part 2

In this episode, hosts Raymond and James continue their deep dive from Part 1, exploring the nuanced political and economic implications of cryptography, client-side scanning (CSS), and its broader societal impacts. They emphasize that the technical arguments from Part 1 (regarding challenges and the tension between privacy and government access) still stand, but warn against a simplistic black-and-white view that could lead to alternative dystopias. Key Points: Reference to Philip Rogaway's Paper (2015): The discussion draws on Rogaway's "The Moral Character of Cryptographic Work," where he reflects on how cryptography, intended to prevent totalitarianism (inspired by cypherpunk ideals), has instead entrenched surveillance post-Snowden leaks. Cryptographers excel in technical analysis but fall short in political scrutiny. Limitations of Cryptography: Cryptography prevents unauthorized centralization of communications (e.g., governments reading messages) but ignores authorized centralization. Tech giants like Facebook collect metadata (who you communicate with, not the content), enabling pattern detection and power through inferences. This creates an imbalance where cryptography bolsters big tech's dominance over states. Crypto Wars as a Power Struggle: The conflict isn't just activists versus governments but a battle between states and tech corporations over evidence standards. Metadata alone makes it harder for states to prove intent (mens rea), while companies use it for predictions. End-to-end encryption weakens state power but strengthens corporate influence. Atomizing Effect and Libertarian Dystopias: Cryptography individualizes communication, making collective action harder and favoring those with the most resources (compute, energy, bandwidth). They reference historian Quinn Slobodian and critique visions from libertarians like Peter Thiel or Murray Rothbard, where decentralization could lead to "might makes right" societies. Examples include Bitcoin, where those with the most power win (51% attacks), and DAOs (Decentralized Autonomous Organizations) that render systems fragile in crises (e.g., the 2008 financial crash). Code as Law and Financialization: Cryptocurrencies emerged as a response to 2008, aiming to replace law with immutable code. However, legal analyses reveal they lack underlying value (no "potato in the field"), relying on the "greater fool" theory, new investors must inject money for old ones to profit. This makes systems unstable, and cryptography hinders rapid changes during crises. Comparison to Firearms (Second Amendment): Arguments for cryptography mirror those for gun rights,it protects freedom against tyrannical states. But this invites regulations, like the Danish justice minister's proposal to limit access. Cryptography can cause harm (e.g., cybercrime, terrorism, CSAM), but cryptographers distrust unverifiable government data on these issues. They also discuss biopolitics: Cryptography may invite suspicion toward marginalized groups (e.g., queer or people of color). Conclusion: Cryptography resists authoritarian dystopias but may enable fragmented, libertarian ones (e.g., "The Network State"). It's a balancing act; the technology doesn't solve everything and requires interdisciplinary analysis (math + social sciences). The episode stresses that issues like CSAM are real, not just rhetorical, and calls for nuanced debate. ---------------------------------------- Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy [https://acast.com/privacy] for more information.

Crypto Wars, Client-Side Scanning, and the Moral Character of Cryptographic Work: part 1

In this episode of Cog War, hosts Raymond and James dive into the complex and contentious topic of the "Crypto Wars," focusing on the EU's proposed Regulation to Prevent and Combat Child Sex Abuse, often referred to as "chat control" or client-side scanning. This regulation, driven by the Danish presidency of the European Parliament, aims to address serious issues like Child Sexual Abuse Materials (CSAM), terrorism, grooming, and other online crimes but raises significant concerns about privacy, trust, and the integrity of cryptographic systems. The episode explores the historical context of the Crypto Wars, starting from the 1990s when cryptography was treated as a military asset in the US, leading to legal battles over tools like PGP (Pretty Good Privacy). The hosts discuss how the current debate centers on client-side scanning, a technology proposed by Apple in 2021 to detect CSAM in encrypted communications without directly breaking encryption. This involves inserting an intermediary system between user input and encryption, which scans for specific content signatures. However, this approach has sparked fierce opposition from cryptographers, who argue it undermines the trust and security built into end-to-end encryption. Key points include: * Technical and Philosophical Concerns: Client-side scanning moves trust outside the cryptographic system, relying on external databases of hashed signatures that cannot be mathematically verified. This creates risks of misuse, such as governments or corporations adding non-CSAM content (e.g., specific words or political phrases) to these databases, potentially leading to surveillance overreach. * Political Implications: The hosts frame the debate through three lenses: 1. Affective Arguments: The visceral reaction to privacy violations, akin to someone reading your diary, though this argument has evolved with changing internet norms and younger generations' familiarity with surveillance. 2. Turnkey Tyranny: Drawing on Edward Snowden’s warnings, the episode highlights fears that weakened cryptography could enable future authoritarian abuses, citing examples like period-tracking apps being subpoenaed post-Dobbs decision. 3. Rights-Based Perspective: Cryptography is seen as a negative right, protecting individuals from unauthorized state intrusion, akin to the US Second Amendment’s role in resisting centralized power. * The "Four Horsemen" of the Info-Apocalypse: The episode addresses the main arguments for weakening cryptography, intellectual property violations, terrorism, CSAM, and crime. While acknowledging the severity of issues like CSAM, the hosts stress the need for human accountability and context in investigations, as algorithms lack the nuance to avoid misinterpretations or false positives. * Global and Geopolitical Risks: The EU’s proposal could set a precedent for authoritarian regimes to demand similar access to encrypted communications, expanding surveillance beyond its intended scope. The hosts also warn of the technical challenges, such as the need for mass packet scanning akin to China’s Great Firewall. Content Warning: This episode includes discussions of sensitive topics like CSAM, terrorism, grooming, and Hurt Core, with a clap to signal sections listeners may wish to skip. ---------------------------------------- Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy [https://acast.com/privacy] for more information.